VOLUME 20
NUMBER 4
WINTER 1977

ORBIS

A Journal of World Affairs

EAST-WEST DISPUTE AND NORTH-SOUTH GAP: THE EMERGING RELATIONSHIP

RECEIVED UW-EC
1977
D. McIntyre Library

FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
IN ASSOCIATION WITH THE FLETCHER SCHOOL OF LAW AND DIPLOMACY
TUFTS UNIVERSITY

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ORBIS, A Journal of World Affairs

Published by the
Foreign Policy Research Institute
in association with
The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy
Tufts University

Editor:	William R. Kintner
Managing Editors:	Richard E. Bissell, Nils H. Wessell (on leave)
Assistant Managing Editor:	Charles B. Purrenhage
Assistant Editor:	Margaret M. Capotrio
Circulation Manager:	Alan H. Luxenberg
Advertising Manager:	Charles B. Purrenhage
Editor Emeritus:	Robert Strausz-Hupé
EDITORIAL BOARD:	Inis L. Claude, Jr., Alvin J. Cottrell, James E. Dornan, Jr., William E. Griffith, Don D. Humphrey, J. C. Hurewitz, David C. Jordan, Morton A. Kaplan, Norman D. Palmer, Stefan T. Possony, William B. Quandt, Uri Ra'anan, Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Robert A. Scalapino, Paul Seabury, W. Scott Thompson, Frank N. Trager, William R. Van Cleave, Richard L. Walker, Arthur P. Whitaker.
EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD:	Loren C. Eiseley, Lawrence B. Krause, Covey T. Oliver, Sidney I. Ploss, Froelich G. Rainey, J. K. Zawodny.
EDITORIAL RESEARCH STAFF:	Karen Bosniak, Adam M. Garfinkle, Aram Nigogosian, William Perry, Robert F. Rogers, Harvey Sicherman

The opinions expressed in articles and reviews in this journal are those of the contributors and should not be construed as representing those of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, or the Editors of ORBIS.

Copyright © 1977 by the Foreign Policy Research Institute, a Delaware nonprofit corporation.

ORBIS is published four times a year by the Foreign Policy Research Institute. **Editorial and business offices:** 3508 Market St., Suite 350, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104. The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, is located in Medford, Massachusetts 02155. **Subscription rates,** per year: $12.00 for individuals, $16.00 for institutions. (Plus $2.00 per year, overseas.) Single copy, $4.00. Second-class postage paid at Philadelphia, Pa., and at additional mailing offices.

Books, monographs and pamphlets for review or listing should be sent to the Managing Editors. Address correspondence relating to subscriptions and bulk orders to the Circulation Manager (please include ZIP).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ORBIS
A Journal of World Affairs

VOLUME 20
NUMBER 4
WINTER 1977

Reflections on the Quarter		839
Toward a Communist International System	W. Scott Thompson	841
The "March" Through the World's Mass Media	Leonard R. Sussman	857
The Legislative-Executive Relationship in Foreign Policy: New Partnership or New Competition?	Frans R. Bax	881
The Use and Control of Executive Agreements: Recent Congressional Initiatives	Charles J. Stevens	905
The Rise of Military Sales as a U.S. Foreign Assistance Instrument	David J. Louscher	933
Weapons Procurement Collaboration: A New Era for NATO?	Frederic M. Anderson	965
United States Policy Toward Latin America: An Immoderate Proposal	Michael J. Francis	991
The Panama Canal: A Fresh Start	Charles Maechling, Jr.	1007
Pacific Basin Energy Development and U.S. Foreign Policy	Robert F. Ichord, Jr.	1025
"Equivalence" and SALT II	Christopher M. Lehman and Peter C. Hughes	1045
Poland Between the Superpowers: Three Decades of Foreign Policy	Arthur R. Rachwald	1055
The Efficacy of Technique: "Protracted Conflict" Revisited	Harvey Sicherman and Alan Ned Sabrosky	1085
Publications Received		1103
Index to Volume 20		1119

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

INFORMATION FOR AUTHORS

ORBIS welcomes articles that examine problems in international relations. All correspondence should be addressed to the Managing Editors, ORBIS, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 3508 Market St., Suite 350, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104.

Manuscripts

- ☐ Authors should submit an original and two clear copies, accompanied by a self-addressed, stamped envelope if return of the manuscript is desired.
- ☐ The entire manuscript (*including footnotes and tables*) should be typed double-spaced. Footnotes should be placed at the end of the manuscript, not at the bottom of the page. Tables should be typed on separate sheets, and all internal rules should be omitted. Articles that do not follow this format will be returned for retyping.
- ☐ Care should be taken that footnotes contain complete bibliographic information. For the proper footnote form — and all matters of style — please consult the latest edition of *A Manual of Style* (University of Chicago Press).
- ☐ The title page should include only the article title, author's name, and a fifty-word biographical statement (positions held, area of specialization, publications, and research-in-progress).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

reflections
ON THE QUARTER

As the United States enters 1977, it remains the strongest nation in the world, and by any measure it is the most dynamic. Yet the new administration is faced with numerous problems that defy virtually all efforts to establish a set of long-range priorities. One of the principal reasons for this situation was noted by the recently retired secretary of state: "The qualities of our high officials are becoming more and more those of an athlete responding rapidly to stimuli with no opportunity to reflect about the long-term trends. The problems that present themselves, however, are not always those that are frequently the most significant. And in any event, they are those that are frequently the most unmanageable." One of the major purposes of ORBIS is to publish analyses of the implications of these long-term trends for the stability of the international system.

A major conceptual problem for U.S. foreign policy in our time is the relationship between the North-South and East-West disputes. For America, is one dispute more important than the other? What is the impact of one upon the other? How does this relationship affect such concrete problems as energy supplies and the world monetary system? Part of the confused legacy of the "detente" of recent years has been a failure to establish linkages between the two disputes. If these two broad problem areas can be treated separately, then let it be frankly stated, and let American foreign policy be formed accordingly. In order to create more stable expectations on all sides, consistency is needed on this issue as on few others, and it will not do to confuse what is desirable with what exists.

In the current issue, ORBIS presents several viewpoints on this key challenge to long-term planning. We offer a number of perspectives: the changing implications of the Soviet presence in the Third World, the condition of the "protracted conflict" between East and West, and the East-West dispute as projected into the mass media of the Third World. It is our hope that these and other points of view will help the American foreign policy community to achieve a necessary consensus — how to resolve the questions raised by the two fundamental areas of confrontation in the world community.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

New from The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

War Clouds on the Horn of Africa

by Tom J. Farer

Farer warns that the Horn of Africa could become another Angola given current policy: the perception of an escalating naval competition, the struggle for influence in Africa and the Middle East, and the great concern with American credibility. Without some accommodation between the local belligerents—Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia—the US and the USSR could be dragged into a proxy confrontation through attachments to their clients.

"Superbly researched and written with verve and political skill, Tom Farer's controversially challenging conclusions should help to provide a new focus for the present largely ill-formed debate over the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea."
—Colin Legum

". . . of great value to American readers and for policymakers who want a ticket of understanding to the unfolding international and national drama in the Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea, and Ethiopia."
—Marcus G. Raskin

$3.75

For copies write: **Carnegie Endowment for International Peace**
11 Dupont Circle Washington, D.C. 20036

The World Today

The monthly journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs provides the general reader with up-to-date and authoritative information on current world problems

Recent issues include:

Andrew Shonfield	Can the Western economic system stand the strain?
Jeremy Russell	Energy considerations in Comecon policies
William Wallace	Wider but weaker: the continued enlargement of the EEC
Laurence Whitehead	The Chilean dictatorship
Sam Younger	The Syrian stake in Lebanon
Annual Subscription:	£4.75 post free (USA $15 by accelerated surface post) 40p per copy (plus postage)

Orders may be sent to booksellers and newsagents, or to the
Oxford University Press, Press Road, Neasden, London NW100DD
(Tel: 01-450 8080)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TOWARD A COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM*

by W. Scott Thompson

After thirty years of religious wars and the de facto breakup of the Holy Roman Empire, the Western powers concluded in 1648 the Peace of Westphalia, which recognized the small European state, whatever its religion or government, as sovereign and legitimate: whence the birth of the Western international system. Through the age of revolution and two world wars the system progressed to a high point in the late 1940s, when new institutions emerged to help govern the system beyond the norms and customs that had characterized its existence theretofore. These included a universal United Nations, codifying Western assumptions of acceptable behavior; an International Monetary Fund, to enshrine proper and — in effect — capitalistic assumptions about the world monetary system; and hosts of ancillary but important institutions.

In this system was a Russian communist enclave, which was soon to mark its first major expansion into eastern and central Europe and was soon to be joined by a separate Chinese system, which in time became hostile both to Moscow and to the goals of the Western system.[1] Of these two enclaves our focus is on the Soviet one and on its projection of power into the Third World in the 1970s.

The Projection of Soviet Power

America's bicentennial year, 1976, is perhaps more significant as a way station to a position the reverse of that in 1945

* This essay appears in slightly different form, as "The Projection of Soviet Power," in *Defending America* (Basic Books, forthcoming 1977).

[1] It is interesting to note that communist states have tended not to join the Western international organizations (though there is some correlation between their degree of radicalism and their willingness to join such), and where they have, as at the UN, they have used their veto power, or more generally their power to obstruct, quite liberally. This is comprehensible in terms of the inherent conflict between communist interests and those of the new institutions as then constituted. By the same token, American vetoes did not become a feature of its UN diplomacy until the conflict between its interests and those of the majority of UN members had become irreconcilable on many issues.

W. Scott Thompson, a member of the ORBIS Editorial Board, is Associate Professor of International Politics, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. Author of many articles and books on Third World foreign policies, his most recent book is *The Lessons of Vietnam* (Crane, Russak, 1976).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

than as an American anniversary. For, by 1975, the international organizations had already become forums for anti-Western and anti-American biases, for opposition to democratic political principles and free-market economics — forums where Third World and communist purposes, usually different in origin, shared a common objective of creating a new international order. Each of these blocs had a different new order in mind, but their intermediate purpose, their common interest in destroying the old, caused enough problems and raised enough questions to require Western statesmen to take the challenge seriously.

Even more importantly, by 1975 the Soviet Union had developed an interconnecting and mutually supportive alliance system to a new stage, cementing its own relations, and the relations of its East European satellites, with Middle Eastern, Asian and (most recently) African clients. Thus, for example, on July 4, 1975, Poland and Mongolia signed a significant treaty of friendship guaranteeing their mutual support in time of need[2] — but the presence of North Korean fighter pilots in Iraq, Cuban soldiers throughout Africa, or Vietnamese guerrilla-warfare experts in Algeria was more significant operationally.

From a system with only a communist enclave, and with a vast hinterland of Western colonies that functioned both as an economic and military strategic reserve, the Western system had become a beleaguered group of democratic states with only a dwindling handful of Third World allies willing to stand up on important issues of principle. True, changes of fortune in some regions, particularly in the Middle East, where Egyptian-American relations had warmed up and Syrian-Soviet ties had weakened, buoyed up hope that all was well. It also underlined more than anything else how much the Western system had deteriorated, given the base against which our ties in the Middle East were now being measured. Access to vital raw materials was after all threatened there, as elsewhere, by the same alliance of Soviet and Third World states coming together for their separate reasons toward a common intermediate goal. The world, in short, was becoming one where the West's interconnections were disappearing as rapidly as new communist ones were being put into place. The mutually reinforcing security systems that the Soviets have created throughout the Third World have brought flexibility and multiple options to Soviet military planning;

[2] A point made by Avigdor Haselkorn. See his "The Soviet Collective Security System," ORBIS, Spring 1975. I am grateful to Mr. Haselkorn for his helpful comments on a draft of this article.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

no longer is Moscow dependent on a single friend in a given region, for it can now shift its assets with changes in political winds while consolidating its hold in friendly ports.

In such circumstances, momentum accrues to the gainer and accelerates his movement. The appearance of irreversibility in his gains enfeebles one side and stimulates the other all the more. The bandwagon collects those on the sidelines. As happened in the collapse of Vietnam in the spring of 1975, once the appearance of irreversibility sticks, it becomes hard for the incipient loser to regain momentum. The gains of the winning side seem to increase exponentially.[3]

Ideology as Strategic Weapon

All states, with varying degrees of intensity, seek to have their own behavior generalized: it is in their nature and interest. The American desire to make the world "safe for diversity" thus attempts to sustain the pluralism essential to internal American politics. Likewise, sixty years ago the Russian Marxists believed that their revolution would have to be exported to survive at home. The Soviet belief was strengthened by an understanding that the ideology of world revolution — which seeks intrinsically to generalize the Soviet system — therefore necessarily conflicts with existing systems.

Viewed in this light, the answer to the old question, whether it is ideology or Russian national interests that drives Soviet foreign policy, does not come easily, because it is difficult to separate the two (though one need hardly doubt that where the two could be isolated, interests of state would win). Moscow, for example, has never hesitated to scrap communist parties with which it has fraternal ties if the greater good of Russian interests is served thereby. A good recent example occurred in 1974, in France, whose communist party was enraged by Moscow's ill-concealed, and plainly expediential, preference for Giscard d'Estaing's ticket over Mitterrand's popular front with the communists.[4] The Kurds, too, have been both beneficiaries and victims of Moscow, depending on the larger needs of Soviet Middle Eastern policy. The same has been true of communist parties in Iraq and Egypt.

[3] Whether such could happen in the other two pertinent theaters, Korea and Western Europe, is a matter of conjecture, since little serious study has been done. One person who was concerned about precisely such replication was Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, who was fired before the appropriate studies could be undertaken. See also W. Scott Thompson, "The Indochinese Debacle and the United States," ORBIS, Fall 1975.

[4] Because of the Guillaume spy affair, still fresh in memory, prudence was particularly appropriate for the Soviets, a point I owe to Professor Robert Legvold.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

But ideology is also important, whether intrinsically or as an instrument of national interests. Thus, the Soviet Union in recent years has underlined the significance of ideology and made clear in both word and deed that neither detente nor any principle of diplomacy practiced toward other superpowers conflicts with the demands of Soviet doctrine, particularly where this applies to the Third World and its "national liberation" struggles.

Throughout the Third World, the Soviets have encouraged the diverse and decentralized ideological centers of radicalism — from Havana to Algiers, from Hanoi to Conakry — in order to recruit allies and reinforce the nascent radicalism of other states. Ironically, they have not bothered much about the masses, concentrating instead on the leaders. They have captured the semantic symbols of competition: the "progressive" states, all totalitarian and usually retrograde economically, are those states joined in their cause who call for the "liberation" of Puerto Rico but not the liberation of the Tsarist-Soviet colonies in Asia or Europe. Their most potent weapon in the Third World has been the Leninist prescription to leaders to maximize power, which became a vastly convenient label for doing what had become quite natural — doing away with opponents, capturing the "commanding heights" of the economy (to further either party or personal interests),[5] and ensconcing themselves permanently in power until the next "radical" leader might muster a bigger part of the army.

Ideology, used skillfully, economizes on the use of force and can make the use of tanks, for example, almost unnecessary — though, as seen in the case of Angola, tanks can be quite useful both as a way of increasing the price of a Western response and as real instruments of war.

Meanwhile, American intellectuals have declared an "end of ideology," and fashionable journalists — as if it followed logically — have unilaterally proclaimed the end of the Cold War. Detente was always a popular notion in America, since it was supposed to finish the very notion of ideology, something that has always been anathema to pragmatic Americans. The problem is that American interests are diverse throughout the world; few of them are *intrinsically* worth risking a war, let alone waging war. To take even a fairly substantial example, the notion that American marines should fight over Middle Eastern oil can well be considered crass. Yet it is diffi-

[5] Thus Conor Cruise O'Brien has written, in the *New Statesman,* of "party demagogues" in Ghana "often with socialist slogans in their mouths and contractors' money in their pockets."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cult to see how the issue of oil can be separated from the greater issue of European and Japanese economic prosperity and ultimately — if one considers that the health of American institutions depends at least in part on Europe and Japan — from the issue of survival for Western institutions. The abandonment of what little doctrinal coherence exists in American foreign policy becomes a signal for piecemeal surrender throughout the globe — because then the parts are not seen to be an intrinsic part of a greater whole. It is in such doctrine that the interdependence of Western interests and Western institutions is demonstrated.

The West, in effect, conceded the real competition in the Third World before the engagement: thanks to the shrewd Soviet manipulation of slogans and timely association with Third World goals, an asymmetrical set of assumptions was accepted about the rules of the game. The Soviets could champion the cause of independence for French, British and Portuguese colonies and then work to bring the newly independent and weak states into their orbit, or at least out of the Western orbit and into the so-called nonaligned world. They could then work to affect the definition of nonalignment until such came to mean, as it does, "nonaligned against the West."[6]

The West, however, was not allowed, and did not ask, to work openly and outrightly for the independence of the peoples in the Soviet empire, the satellites of Eastern Europe, or the once fully independent prizes along the Baltic captured in 1940 — much less for the Tsarist colonies of central Asia acquired at around the same time as the French and British African empires were built. The only differences between these colonies and those of the West hardly reflect well on the Russians: whereas the British and French had, to a great extent, acquired theirs peaceably, the Tsars acquired — and the Soviets have maintained — theirs forcibly; and whereas the West Europeans engaged in a not always successful attempt to fashion nation-states out of their colonies, the Soviets have attempted to Russify theirs and thus obliterate the path to nation-formation.

Only in late 1975 was it finally said in the West that the Soviet Union should not be allowed to have it both ways — that it could not have "detente" with the United States while mounting such interventions as that in Angola. This became a marginally im-

[6] It is instructive to note that Vietnam, North Korea and Cuba were all invited to the nonaligned conference at Colombo, Sri Lanka, in August 1976. Consider also the headline of an advertisement in the *New York Times* for February 1, 1976: "The Non-Alignment Movement is a Mighty Anti-Imperialist Revolutionary Force of Our Times," by Kim Il Sung.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

portant slogan in American politics in 1976; but it was a little late, coming as it did at the end of a twelve-month period during which the Indochinese wars were lost to communist (Moscow-supplied) forces, during which Angola was won by Soviet-financed forces, and during which a core Soviet ally, the Portuguese Communist Party, nearly captured power in the capital of a NATO member.[7] The concept of detente in effect had simply picked up where a one-sided anticolonialism had left off.

Learning from Past Mistakes

However much ideology has been a general guide, Soviet tactics in the projection of its power have been flexible. The Soviets have been able to learn from their failures, and like serious people and states everywhere, they have been patient and content to accumulate small gains.

Many Western observers of recent Soviet moves have taken comfort from the evident problems the Soviets have faced — some caused by the inherent obstacles in the areas involved, some by the very method and style of the Soviet involvement. These optimistic students see in Soviet problems a possibility that the Soviets will fare no better than the United States in imposing their own image of the world in these warm climes. That misses the point. The Soviets have had and will continue to have difficulties, but the United States has retreated from failure, pretending that the game which it had entered and taken so seriously — in Southeast Asia — really was never very important; then it proceeded to suppress the memory and every attempt to learn from the mistakes. The Soviet Union, in contrast, seems willing and able not only to learn from its own mistakes but to profit from America's thirty years of successes and failures in constructing and sustaining an international system. Some examples from Africa — the most current arena of Soviet expansion — are apropos, even if they are still not equal to the Middle East and South Asia in long-term importance to Moscow.

Take Guinea. In the aftermath of the punitive French withdrawal from Conakry after the colony's rejection of the Communauté in 1958, the Soviets moved swiftly to establish relations with the strident regime of West Africa's enfant terrible, Ahmed Sékou Touré. In little more than two years, however, the Soviets were in trouble. Their senior ambassador, Solod, who had moved to

[7] It is worth recalling how fervently it was argued in many Western circles that the Portuguese communists would not attempt to seize power. For a retrospective view see David Binder, "Lisbon Aide Tells of Communist Bid," *New York Times*, June 6, 1976.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Conakry from Cairo as a signal of Moscow's growing interest in the radical West African state, was invited to leave at the end of 1961, owing to his purported involvement in a plot against the regime. The payoff for the West came a year later, when Guinea turned down the Soviet request for staging-privileges for their (missile-laden) planes en route to Cuba. This strategic loss for Moscow stemmed from its own mistakes, compounded by further errors of tactics in the mid-sixties.

But the "revolutionary" movement of the Third World did not die, and radicalism was sustained in Guinea by Cuba, North Vietnam and other radical states. When a Portuguese attack on Conakry in 1970 showed the utterly vulnerable (and pitiful) state of the regime, Sékou Touré had nowhere to turn for help, whereupon the Soviets established a naval cordon for him in return for access and privileges greater than those requested eight years earlier. By 1975, Conakry had become an ideal staging post for the intervention in Angola: cruisers, oilers, destroyers, landing ships and intelligence-collection ships were stationed there and deployed as needed to the coast of Angola. Guinea's leaders, the same group as at independence (minus those hanged along the way), played an important role in pressing other African leaders to jump on the bandwagon of their Angolan ally, the MPLA, in the name of antiracism. They had found the Soviets to be indispensable: ultimately a state as radical and threatening to its regional system as was Guinea needed the protection of a great power. The Soviets thus confirmed that they could trade off strategic privileges against the protection they supplied to a "nonaligned" regime and against the flattery to its sensibilities.

In Ghana, the Soviets learned another sort of lesson. There, the cost of establishing an intimate relationship with Nkrumah — but a superficial one with the government and a counterproductive one with the populace — was greater than in Guinea: after Kwame Nkrumah's overthrow in 1966, more than a thousand Soviet technicians, teachers and spies were expelled. They have not been invited back en masse, though technical teams have recently returned to check on the possibility of completing projects abandoned earlier; at the same time, the regime in Accra rehabilitates Nkrumah's memory.

In fact, the Soviets had anticipated their own problem, showing how steep their learning curve was in this period of rapid expansion. In 1965 the Soviets had attempted to change precisely those features of Nkrumah's regime that led to his overthrow a year later — the cult of the personality, the economic mess and so forth.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

They were in too deep to get out in time, and they paid a heavy price for their ephemeral accomplishments.

Again, the Soviets learned quickly. At a conference of African communists in Cairo, their spokesmen articulated the problem well — namely, trying to get a "quick fix," a profitable relationship without the homework, without the underlying base, without the structures for making relations between a communist and a tropical dual economy feasible. Thereafter the Soviets eschewed opportunities for fashionable relationships — except where specific short-term goals were sought — and concentrated on those of potentially enduring significance. They sustained regimes dedicated to Marxism-Leninism, of which there were a growing number in Asia and Africa, and they conducted the normal kinds of opportunistic diplomacy used by all powers, with whatever regime had large weight to bear on regional affairs: hence their cultivation and support of Nigeria during that state's civil war. The payoff here came in 1975, when Nigeria played a leading role in obtaining recognition for the Angolan MPLA regime and in "legitimizing" not only Cuban intervention but the notion of a long-term Cuban occupation.

The Soviet regime has always had greater flexibility in dealing with a broad spectrum of groups — whether liberation movements, political parties or established governments — than has the United States; now, it has learned how to shift support swiftly from groups on one part of the spectrum to those on another, in accordance with the Soviet estimate of the group's ability to further Moscow's interests. Thus, for example, after a steadily increasing warmth in relations with Ghana, Moscow established in 1961 a secret camp for the training of radical insurgents — freedom fighters or assassins, depending on one's vantage point. Yet within several months the camp was closed, and the Ghanaians received no more help of this sort until the next year, when the Chinese, with fewer "established" friends to offend in the region, picked up where the Russians had left off.[8]

What happened? The Soviets had sized up the potential of the human material with which they were working and found it wanting. "Treason doth never prosper: what's the reason? For if it prosper, none dare call it treason": support some clever insurgents who succeed, and Soviet interests are advanced. When treason fails, not only do the commandos lose their heads, but Soviet interests are damaged at a time when Moscow seeks respectability in Africa. At

[8] See W. Scott Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy, 1957-66* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1969).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the time, the mid-sixties, Moscow was trying to broaden its formal state-to-state relations in the Third World to such symbolic capitals of the political status quo — and, ironically, of dynamic economic growth — as the Ivory Coast and Nigeria.

Given the depth and background of Soviet ties that had accumulated in Africa, it is a wonder that so many Americans were shocked when a division of Cuban troops — dispatched in September 1975 before the withdrawal of the Portuguese army and encouraged, financed and advised by their Russian allies — was able to defeat its more numerous and more broadly based Angolan adversaries in two militarily breathtaking months. However tenuous the Soviet and Cuban hold may be in the long run — and it is by no means clear that the UNITA forces in southern Angola cannot make a comeback — the communist forces have established a vastly important beachhead for the short- and medium-term future.

Angola represents a new high-water mark of Soviet influence in the Third World. In that conflict the Soviets built on and used all the accumulated advantage they had in Africa — and they added a new one, the escalation of weaponry, which was to prove decisive in the conflict. There was also the background of relations with a local Marxist party through which to establish ideological legitimacy; there was the issue of racism on which they could fasten their crusade; and there was the presence, both in Angola and in the two neighboring states of Zaire and Zambia, of great reserves of natural resources vastly important to the Western alliance. Though a modest task force from the U.S. Sixth Fleet could have sent it scurrying, the Soviet naval group that operated between Conakry and Luanda became a symbol of Soviet aid to potential allies. None of this even constituted a risk on Moscow's part, given the state of public opinion in the United States and the furtiveness of the policy fashioned in the State Department to counter the Soviets. Short-term benefits were immediately apparent to Moscow: there was the embarrassing deference paid to Fidel Castro by the Canadian prime minister on an official visit to Cuba; more significantly, despite his great admiration of China and its brand of communism, Mozambique's President Samora Machel in effect voted for Moscow rather than Peking in their contest for premier communist position in southern Africa.[9]

[9] Colin Legum, the distinguished student of African affairs, argues that most analyses of conflict in southern Africa underestimate the import of Soviet-PRC competition as a motive for Soviet involvement. It is hard to see what comfort such an argument offers. See "The Soviet Union, China and the West in Southern Africa," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1976.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The African pattern is not exclusive to that continent. Beyond the borders of Europe, there is the action of the Soviets and their surrogates (whether Cuban, North Korean or East German) in South Yemen as in Laos, in Guyana as in Equatorial Guinea, and in Somalia as in Angola. All the familiar tactics of an imperial power are now present, even to the gunboats that have appeared in the harbors of Ghana and Libya to intimidate the regimes there, or in the Guinean and Somalian harbors to intimidate those regimes' opponents.

Projection at the Margins

So the projection of Soviet power and the expansion of the Soviet alliance system have proceeded step by step. The Soviets have retreated where necessary, always learning and always persisting, building exponentially on consolidated gains of the past. The linkage and parallel with the central strategic level can also be seen. "What in the name of God can you do with strategic superiority," a man no less than the U.S. secretary of state laments. The response is easy, and it is the lesson of this essay: you project it at the margins. The strategically superior state has enough power left over at the center to provide for the protection (or intimidation) of states at the margin of its previous realm of influence. The same is true at the conventional level. Power is projected geographically at the intersection of previously established spheres of influence, and the local power, sensing the change in the balance, alters his behavior accordingly.

There are two extremes on the spectrum of accommodation. At one end, a rare, overt (but superficial) change can occur overnight. In Zambia, the government-directed press, once the defeat of its allies in the Angolan civil war was seen to be irreversible, simply switched the target of its hyperbolic attacks from one side to the other. Having berated the Cubans, the Soviets, and everyone else supporting the MPLA on a daily basis, the *Times of Zambia* one day suddenly praised the Cubans and urged them to continue their war of liberation southward. Less dramatic accommodations, taking place after important events, are more familiar; an example is the behavior of the noncommunist Southeast Asian states after the dominoes of Indochina fell in 1975. As insurgencies heat up in Malaysia, one can presumably expect the struggle for power in the capital, between factions of the Left and Right, to intensify and further destabilize the state as has already happened in Bangkok. Unless Malaysia and Thailand can elicit great-power support of a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

firmer sort than they have enjoyed in the past, or achieve a firmer resolve within themselves than they have been capable of summoning in the past, they must accommodate to communist power in the region.

More interesting in many ways — and in the long run most important — is the subtle change occurring almost imperceptibly as a result of the shift, both strategic and conventional, in the global balance. Take Turkey, a member of the Atlantic Alliance, whose superior power compensated in Ankara's defense calculus for the proximity of the Soviet Union and which was its preferred association for reasons of history and political aspirations. Turkey was beyond the margins of projected Soviet power; but Moscow cultivated good relations to ensure innocent passage through The Straits and in hopes of a new strategic balance. As late as 1967 the Turks relented to strong American pressure and did not invade Cyprus to protect the harassed Turkish community there. But as Western capabilities declined in the 1970s, the Turks were not only unsusceptible to American pressure in a similar crisis, they were willing to jeopardize the entire U.S. strategic posture toward the USSR by closing the American bases in Turkey and demanding a high price for their reopening.

Few have understood the magnitude of the stakes: no bases have greater importance to us than those in Turkey. The incident occurred because of a change in the balance of power. At best, the Turkish-American relationship will never again be the same; more realistically, Soviet-Turkish relations will improve while the ability of the West to use Turkish facilities or airspace will decline. Such signs as the recent visit to the Soviet Union by the Turkish vice chief of staff on the armed forces, or the incredible fact that Turkey was recipient last year of the largest single grant of Soviet economic aid for the year, are hardly encouraging. Not to put too fine a point on this argument, the Soviets are out to detach Turkey from NATO. Their first sign of success came in mid-1976 with the illegal passage through The Straits of the new Soviet carrier, the *Kiev*, an act forbidden by the Montreux Convention yet unprotested by Ankara.

The Logic of Withdrawal

A comparison of Soviet and American capabilities to project power beyond their borders and to sustain a worldwide system of alliances ends with the United States substantially ahead. From most vantage points, American preeminence is of an order of mag-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nitude. If the Soviets have launched their first carrier, it is less than half the tonnage of the Nimitz-class carriers, of which our navy has thirteen. If the Soviets have established impressive facilities in Somalia and Cuba, these are only a fraction of the size of the American facilities in the Philippines and Japan.

But is this relevant? One must consider the question in the light of contrasting strategic objectives. America must control the seas in order to protect its far-flung allies and reach its markets. The Soviet Union, however, is a great continental land mass and need only disrupt our lines of communication in order to disrupt our system. We are dependent on other countries for a dozen critical minerals; the Soviets depend on none. They are more or less self-sufficient in oil and, with a command economy, can adjust their consumption almost at will.

Two other factors vitiate the apparent American advantage: theater capabilities and momentum. We in the West have been the possessors; we have the goods that the have-nots want. To disrupt our network, the Soviets have only to build up their forces near the Soviet homeland, in the Persian Gulf and Europe, the two areas vital to the American-led community. And there are significant differences in our capabilities to project force in these areas.

In Europe, the simple asymmetry of forces is too widely known to need repetition here. General Johannes Steinhoff, former chairman of the NATO Military Committee, is only one of many to issue dire warnings of NATO's fate in the event of Soviet attack; in his words, the fighting would last "at most for a few days." Other equally eminent authorities have predicted that the USSR would need only ten days to reach the English Channel. Less known is that the Soviet ability to project power anywhere has been well exercised in Europe. The Warsaw Pact has no problem of weapons standardization, whereas NATO commanders cannot even talk to each other over secure phones because of the dozens of different communications systems used. Warsaw Pact transport, communications and logistical systems are all geared for Soviet intervention, as was shown so clearly in Prague during 1968.[10] Add the growing Soviet capability in chemical and biological warfare, and Moscow poses a formidable threat indeed to Western Europe.

The growth of communist parties in Italy, France and Spain compounds the problem. Even assuming that the Italian Com-

[10] See William Schneider, Jr., "General Purpose Forces: Army and Air Force," in William Schneider, Jr., and Francis P. Hoeber, eds., *Arms, Men, and Military Budgets: Issues for Fiscal Year 1977* (New York: Crane, Russak, 1976).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

munist Party's belief in democracy is genuine — which is substantially justified by its history and present practice — the problem is that NATO must alter its strategy in order to satisfy that party (not to mention the need to ensure its own security) if a *compromesso storico* occurs in Rome. In the meantime the rest of Europe would be demoralized by such communist gains, and communist parties in France and Spain, where unreconstructed hard-line Moscow loyalists lurk just below the fashionably flexible top line of the leadership, would be the immediate beneficiaries.

With regard to the Persian Gulf, the dependence, direct or indirect, of Europe, Japan and, increasingly, the United States on oil from this critical region is virtually absolute. This, too, is well described elsewhere. Less well known is the extent to which the Soviets have ensconced themselves so that in a crisis they might enlarge their control over the egress of gulf oil to Europe and the United States. Prior to the October 1973 Middle East war, Soviet willingness to play "oil politics" was doubted in almost all U.S. government circles, and the handful of senior officials who dissented were considered foolish. Almost no one bothered to ask what the Soviet motive was in establishing, at such enormous cost in money and time, new positions of influence at every critical geographic point of the region: substantial arms deals with Somalia starting in 1969, arming the Yemeni republicans in the mid-sixties, and the build-up of naval task force tours in the Indian Ocean in the same period.

Western analysts also seemed too impressed by the American airlift capability. If one calculated the net-tonnage capability possessed by both sides in the mid-seventies, the United States was clearly ahead, despite America's much greater distance from the theater. Our C5As made it *theoretically* possible for us to project more tangible power into the gulf than the Soviets could. Yet such calculations did not take into account Soviet violations of Iranian airspace or the possibility of transit across Turkey. They did not take into account the Soviet ability to pre-position materiel in the region; and they did not take into account the fact that, in a crisis, the Soviets would have a secure base in Somalia from which to operate, while American allies (as in 1973) would be too terrified to extend anything more than minimal facilities to Washington. The Persian Gulf, moreover, is little more than 400 miles across from the Caspian Sea, where in a crisis the Soviets could build up the visible signs of power for psychological effect. Whatever these imponderables add up to, no calculation could give the United States a net lift advantage

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in 1980, by which time a much enlarged fleet of Soviet Antonov Cock-22s would be in operation.[11]

Momentum has a small and a large dimension. The small dimension is illustrated by what has happened to American projection capabilities abroad. In the past decade, from Wheelus Field in Libya to Camrahn Bay in South Vietnam, literally hundreds of American bases have been closed or surrendered, for reasons ranging from "managerial efficiency" — because facilities could be duplicated and consolidated elsewhere — to ignominious military defeat. It is not that the loss of any single base has been crucial, but that the closure of each has removed an interconnecting link from a system, and the function of interconnection is often more important than the ostensible primary function of the base itself. Once the process of closure and decline begins, once each individual base's function comes under scrutiny, it is easy to demonstrate the dispensability of any one base. If a great power has a declining purpose, declining function and a perceived declining need, then it is possible to justify the closure of any facility.

The case of Thailand is interesting in this regard. Few things seemed so crucial to American policymakers in the 1960s as access to the great Thai bases constructed at the height of Thai-American cooperation in the Vietnamese war. Expansion was its own justification. As the war wound down, retention of these bases, as a trump card against Hanoi, became even more important. By the autumn of 1974 policymakers were looking to the long-term relevance of the bases, whether or not noncommunist Vietnam survived: the October 1973 war had made America's international vulnerabilities clear. Access to the Persian Gulf, it came to be seen, might be available only through the back door (i.e., by way of the Pacific), and the Thai bases were a necessary steppingstone between Subic Bay and Diego Garcia. But once Vietnam was lost, the desire to hold onto the Thai bases declined even faster than our troops withdrew.

Now, withdrawal became its own justification. In the absence of any real pressure within the bureaucracy to retain the bases, the typical idiosyncratic factors that drive decision-making — ambition, preoccupation with other matters, lame-duck status, or whatever — can win out, as they did in this case. With no will behind the negotiators, the lawyers could of course do their work. The final position was ironic. Just before the negotiations collapsed, the official wisdom was that the bases were indispensable and that virtually all the 4,000 troops there were useful. Once the negotia-

[11] For a description of the AN-22, see *Air Force Magazine*, March 1976.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tions collapsed, however, that position became untenable, and it could be argued that there was no special reason why so many troops were needed and that, no matter what, we would not go back to the status quo ante. The logic of withdrawal had created a new legitimacy. On July 14, 1976, the last American soldiers departed from Bangkok.

Momentum is also critical on the larger level. In either direction, up or down, momentum creates a justification for the expanding or contracting party. For the Soviet Union, with its new military muscle, there is a strong tendency to see new facilities and alliances as natural; strategic need is the rationale of every expansion. Why shouldn't they have bases in the Middle East or in Africa, now that they have a blue-water navy? it is asked. (Why not, indeed, unless because of something so mundane and self-serving as the American interest.) By the same token, as one hears so often these days, Why should America have these cumbersome, entangling bases abroad, when it has so much overkill capability and so many unpleasant memories of trying to defend ungrateful and uncooperative allies? The reason of course is simple: because our interests cannot be separated from those of the rest of the noncommunist world. Already the logic of withdrawal has begun generating pessimism, even morbidity in some (particularly European) quarters, with regard to our fate, which ultimately is as closely related to the closing of an American intelligence-collection base in Thailand as is the addition to the Soviet system of a new tender in Conakry Harbor.

The creation of a Soviet international system has proceeded much further than is generally realized. The shift in the strategic balance, the conventional build-up at the margins, the adventitious and often fortuitous overlap of Soviet and Third World interests on the issues of "Zionism" and racism, not to mention the accumulation of personal power in these fragile states — all have played their part. No factor, however, has been so important as the collapse of Western will.

A fragile consensus appears to have been rebuilt in the American Congress for maintaining military inventories, which hitherto had been allowed to fall below levels of prudence as never before in the nation's history. World order, however, is not sustained merely by inventories. It is sustained by a willingness to use them — on which there is no consensus. This collapse of will has resulted from the critical failure of Western elites even to recognize the problem and the imminent consequences. Knowledge is a vital first step, lest the owl of Minerva once again come at dusk.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE "MARCH" THROUGH THE WORLD'S MASS MEDIA

by Leonard R. Sussman

American, British, French and Japanese journalists outside their homelands report the news for the hundreds of millions who read newspapers and listen to broadcasts in the developed and Third worlds. In the past thirty years the major international news agencies have sold their services to the mass media in many new countries. Two American news agencies, around the clock, transmit news by high-speed technology to and from all parts of the world. Whether reporting from Afghanistan or Washington, the wire-service correspondent is charged with fulfilling certain standards of journalistic practice. This calls for balance, integrity and the skills associated with his craft. Thus, the American journalist in this country (if not elsewhere) is guaranteed considerable freedom by the First Amendment, and he is enjoined by his ethical code to exert a high degree of professional responsibility.

The expansion of the number of wire-service customers outside America has only marginally diversified the subjects and treatment of the news transmitted to and from the Third World, for modern news agencies tend to operate within psychological patterns similar to those of the ancient Hebrews and Greeks. Now, as then, news messengers generally report on the events, personalities and developments that are expected to have greatest interest and meaning for the folks at home. Yet American and other news agencies are in unrelenting competition to secure and retain foreign press and radio customers. The Associated Press is actively pursued by United Press International. Several major newspapers syndicate their own correspondents' reports. Each service competes in most of the world with Reuters and Agence France-Presse, and in some places with several Japanese agencies as well. Thus, there is no monolithic Western press service.

To stay alive in this increasingly expensive competition, each agency must endeavor to meet some particular need of the

Leonard R. Sussman has been Executive Director of Freedom House for ten years and is Editor of its bimonthly magazine, *Freedom at Issue*. While at Freedom House, he has organized a conference on the relationships between news media and government and directed a five-year study of the U.S. press and television networks. Earlier, he served as press secretary to the governor of Puerto Rico.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

customer, whether it be a newspaper in Caracas, a radio station in Lagos or a magazine in Kuala Lumpur. Until recently it was relatively easy and inexpensive to satisfy local newspapers and broadcasters. Sometimes they wanted special coverage of a local personality traveling abroad, but foreign customers traditionally had accepted a news diet that featured coverage from the major power centers—New York, London, Paris, Washington, Moscow — unless, of course, wars or earthquakes erupted in out-of-the-way places. News from Caracas was seldom passed to Lagos, and Kuala Lumpur was likely to be mentioned in Venezuela or Nigeria only if some great disaster fell on Malaysia. Until 1975, a Nigerian wishing to communicate with someone in Benin (Dahomey), only a few miles across the border, had to call London, get a relay through Paris, and then a connection to Porto-Novo.

Inevitably there is clamor for change. Increasing participation of Third World countries in the United Nations and its specialized agencies provided the procedural opportunities for information-poor nations to call for assistance. The nature of both their complaints and their demands generally varied in accordance with the social or political structure of the country speaking out. Authoritarian Latin American states want to establish government-run news agencies and form a regionwide news service firmly controlled by the respective governments. Democratic Costa Rica, however, favors private ownership of the press, while supporting a cooperative regional news agency. The so-called socialist states in the Third World and Eastern Europe regard the burgeoning clamor for new mass media arrangements as an opportune movement for bringing national and international media under governmental control along Marxist-Leninist lines. Third World opposition to Western news media is, at present, diversified. But it will become more homogeneous, and it could come fully under the sway of the Marxist-Leninists if present trends continue and if correctives for legitimate grievances are not taken by the major international news media.

The struggle for socialist control of the world's information channels has been under way since Lenin, seventy-five years ago, characterized liberty as "bourgeois tyranny." In his handbook for the communist revolution, Lenin assigned to the intellectual elite the role of "special assistants" in the established institutions, where they would be "of much greater use to the party" than as "part-time revolutionaries."[1] A half-century later Joseph Schumpeter, in an

[1] See V. I. Lenin, *What Is to Be Done?*, rev. ed. (New York: International Publishers, Little Lenin Library, ca. 1943), pp. 120-121 (esp. fn., p. 121).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

address before the American Economic Association, described this as the socialist "march" through the world's intellectual institutions.[2] Today, the socialists are engaged in a march through the mass news media — a campaign to control or influence international and national news media through (1) the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), (2) the Ministerial Conference of Nonaligned Countries on the News Agency Pool, and (3) the International Organization of Journalists (IOJ), headquartered in Prague.

Not every person or every nation participating in the first two arenas seeks "socialization," governmental control or regulation of the news media, though, in some form, most do. Many believe the histories of their own countries demonstrate that only governmental agencies will convey information acceptable to the regime in power. But participants in the third arena are characteristically doctrinaire Marxist-Leninists, thoroughly committed to employing UNESCO and the "nonaligned" press pool as "special assistants" in the revolutionizing of national and international communications.

The first two of the three arenas have only recently become visible to the Western press and, to a far lesser degree, their publics. UNESCO began analyzing the "communication policies" of different nations about six years ago, but only in the past four years has the organization adopted a specific political and economic rationale to guide its extensive programs in the news-media field. And only since early 1976 has UNESCO faced a forceful challenge from voluntary organizations and news agencies in the United States and Latin America, and from some editorial writers in England, France, Canada and Australia.

The second rank of the "socialist march" is represented by the nonaligned conference that met in New Delhi, during July 1976, to write the operational rules of a Third World news-agency pool. That program had been three years in the planning, but not until fall 1976 — when operational arrangements were approved at Colombo, Sri Lanka, by the eighty-five nonaligned nations — did Western journalists examine in earnest the governmental-control aspect of this nascent, multinational news-media system.

The third prong of the march through the news media is now thirty years old. The International Organization of Journalists,

[2] Schumpeter's theme of a "march into socialism" is fully developed in his *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947). The role of the intellectual in the spread of political ideas (here with particular reference to criticisms of capitalism and the spread of socialist ideas) is contained in chapter 13, "Growing Hostility."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the socialist ideologue and major coordinator of news-media practices for the Soviet bloc, is virtually unknown in the United States, has somewhat higher visibility in Western Europe, and is expanding its efforts (with UNESCO's help) throughout the Third World. The IOJ holds that "mass media cannot be divorced from the overall socio-political structure of a country" — a basically sound axiom, over the long term, for the press in any political system — and is led to conclude that "mass communication media must not be in private hands."[3] The rapidly increasing programs, conferences and publications of the IOJ are aimed at influencing the communications policies and structures of the Third World. Together with the programs and new ideology of UNESCO, and the pragmatic arrangements of the nonaligned press pool, the IOJ seems likely to serve more and more as the Marxist-Leninist ideologue of the mounting Third World challenge to the free — mainly Western — press.

Let us examine in detail each of the three aspects of the impending march through the news media, and mark out the points at which they intersect and become mutually supportive. Finally, we should ask, as did Lenin, What is to be done?

II

UNESCO was created in 1945 to advance the "unrestricted pursuit of objective truth" and the free exchange of ideas and knowledge. The founders acknowledged early in their new constitution that political and economic arrangements among governments, even if successful in achieving peace, could not secure "the unanimous, lasting and sincere support of the peoples of the world." It would also be necessary "to promote the free flow of ideas by word and image."

Particularly during the past five years, the commitment of the United Nations and UNESCO to the economic development of poor nations has led to the evangelizing of preordained truths — not solely the pursuit of truth — as a dominant aspect of UNESCO's news-media programs. The principal text "governing the use of the mass media," placed before the organization's biennial conference at Nairobi in November 1976, linked "use" of the news media to the earlier UN General Assembly declaration calling for a "new international economic order." The draft thereby tied projected revolutionary changes in the field of journalism directly to revolutionary changes in economics, international trade and national develop-

[3] *The Democratic Journalist* (Prague), 1'76, p. 2.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ment. In effect, as the nationalization of natural resources has been regarded as the sovereign right of decolonialized nations, so might the economic development of these countries require the nationalization of domestic news media, or at least the creation of strong competition, in order to break the domination of the (largely Western) international news agencies. A Soviet proposal before UNESCO's general conference (November 1976) would have made governments responsible for regulating news agencies within their countries of origin and wherever their correspondents roam. The draft was referred to a negotiating commitee for further study.

Spokesmen for UNESCO maintain that UNESCO has no policy of its own regarding these matters — that it merely sponsors or conducts research that presents alternative policies to constituent governments. Yet, while acknowledging that UNESCO's news-media programs are formally committed to advancing economic development and "national sovereignty," UNESCO spokesmen deny that commitment to a governmental goal (linked to a governmental system) implies control or regulation of the news media in order to assure progress toward that goal. It is essential, therefore, to examine the philosophical and operational objectives of UNESCO programs and — even if the worst potentialities have not yet materialized from the governmental controls considered at UNESCO conferences — to look at the steps taken toward implementing these programs.

For many years the news media have been regarded by UNESCO as a major channel of information and education. At UNESCO's Seventeenth General Conference (1972), however, the Soviet Union and Byelorussia raised the question of national journalism to the level of international controversy. The Soviet resolution requested the director-general of UNESCO to submit to the next biennial conference a draft declaration concerning "the fundamental principles governing the use of the mass media with a view to strengthening peace and international understanding and combating war propaganda, racialism and apartheid." A draft text was prepared by Hilding Eek, retired professor of international law at the University of Stockholm and the man responsible for freedom-of-information questions in the UN Secretariat. Dr. Eek, at the 1965 UNESCO Conference on Communication in the Space Age, had advised, "It would perhaps be wise to set aside, with respect to outer space, the old terrestrial principles of unlimited freedom of information and opinion, at least during the period in history when space communications on a global scale is brought into being, and to adopt instead a careful, pragmatic approach to the question of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the rules designed for using it." He added that "this approach should not interfere with different national policies towards mass media in general and the right to freedom of opinion and of information."[4] Yet he did not explain how the rules of freedom could be suspended without hampering freedom itself.

Nine years later, the draft that Dr. Eek initiated under the 1972 resolution contained even more restrictive language and implications. After revisions by experts from twelve countries, it was deemed "not acceptable" by the American expert. The draft was further argued at Paris in December 1975 at an intergovernmental meeting of experts that had been convened to approve the declaration for submission to UNESCO's November 1976 conference in Nairobi. By then, it included a preambulary reference to General Assembly Resolution 3379, which equated Zionism with racism. The American delegation, joined by twelve West European delegations and the Canadian and Australian representatives, walked out of the meeting, whereupon the remaining conferees approved a still more restrictive draft. Both the debate and the final draft, in the view of the U.S. delegate, "clearly revealed the Soviet intention to attempt to draw back from both the original UNESCO mandate and the Helsinki accords in the area of open exchange of ideas and information. For example, the first preambular paragraph purports to recall the UNESCO Constitution, but then goes on to use new formulas significantly more restrictive than those found in that Constitution and even more restrictive than that agreed in the CSCE Final Act signed [just five months before the Paris meeting!] in 1975."[5]

The final draft, reflecting its Soviet origins, repeatedly mixes universal, high-value themes (attacks on war, racism, discrimination; support of the preservation of cultures and economic development) with talk of governmental responsibility for the news media and proposals to assure that governments have access to the "use" of the media, particularly so that they can "rectify" the "circulation of erroneous news reports." State control of the behavior of the news media and of the content of their reports is advocated throughout the text. The title, now a part of the international organizational jargon, refers to the "use" of the news media — by governments, individuals or a consortium.

---

[4] In *Communication in the Space Age* (Paris: UNESCO, 1968), p. 166.

[5] Ronald F. Stowe, *Report of the U.S. Delegate to the Intergovernmental Meeting of Experts to Prepare a Draft Declaration of Fundamental Principles Governing the Use of the Mass Media in Strengthening Peace and International Understanding and in Combating War Propaganda, Racism and Apartheid,* Department of State, February 2, 1976, p. 5.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The draft also calls upon the media to include specific content in their news reports and commentaries, referring to a "responsibility for creating an atmosphere of international confidence and mutual respect." Even if some of these "responsibilities" were not ambiguous and were entirely laudable, acceptance of the governmental role in policing the affirmative as well as negative content of the news introduces a principle that would starkly violate freedom of the press as understood in most Western countries.

Perhaps the most pervasive threat to the free press is stated in the single-sentence wording of article 12: "States are responsible for the activities in the international sphere of all mass media under their jurisdiction." Whether or not this sweeping dictum ever gains majority support in UNESCO, the fact that it has been seriously debated for several years within an organization created "to promote the free flow of ideas" indicates the significant turn UNESCO has taken. As we have noted elsewhere,[6] article 12 clearly invites governments to demonstrate that they are "responsible" for the "mass media under their jurisdiction." The article provides fresh international moral authority for prevailing restrictions on domestic news media, and for future regulation of local reporters and editors. The article also provides a mechanism for controlling the local correspondent of an international news agency (e.g., the Associated Press, Reuters, Agence France-Presse) or the local reporter of a foreign newspaper or magazine (e.g., the *Washington Post, Le Monde, Time*). The repressing government may cite article 12 to belabor the government of the free-press correspondent as not being "responsible" under the terms of the UNESCO declaration. Such "uses" of the declaration could multiply as regimes exploit the declaration for their own repressive purposes. Indeed, article 12 can only stifle the free flow of information.

The principle of the free flow of ideas has already undergone drastic revision at the hands of UNESCO's Secretariat, nongovernmental experts and governmental conferees. UNESCO's Intergovernmental Conference on Communication Policies in Latin America and the Caribbean, held in July 1976 at San José, Costa Rica, was the first regional test of its new mass-media programs. The conference — called to consider policies that countries might adopt — was delayed one month and its site changed when a group of Latin American journalists protested several proposals set forth in the background papers that had been prepared as guides to developing

[6] Leonard R. Sussman, "Developmental Journalism: A Backward Idea Whose Time Has Come," *The New Lugano Review*, Winter 1977.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Latin American news-media programs. One of these background documents, later withdrawn, anticipated "strong resistance on the part of the owners of 'private enterprises' in the communication field." The paper maintained, however, that "government should assert a policy of national interest for the benefit of the entire population."[7]

The majority of the delegates agreed on "the need for specific legislation to define communication policies and for the establishment of national mass communication systems designed to contribute to the overall development of society."[8] The delegates approved the creation of National Communication Councils to oversee the mass media in accordance with national policies; they also agreed to create national and regional news agencies in Latin America and link those to others in the Third World. All these steps approved at San José require government initiation as well as continuing regulation or control. Yet, according to the UNESCO final report, "The majority of the delegates stated that journalists and communicators in general enjoyed freedom of expression and guarantees in their respective countries."[9] It is illuminating, therefore, to examine this claim against the prevailing level of press freedom in the respective countries.

Table I lists the countries participating in the San José conference and shows the levels of freedom for each, as ascertained in November 1976 by the "Comparative Survey of Freedom" (conducted by Freedom House, New York). The survey employed data from many sources, including official statements by the respective governments, accounts published in the general press, and regular reports of the Inter-American Press Association. In Table 1, five (23.8%) of the countries may be regarded as "free," ten (47.6%) as "partly free," and six (28.5%) as "not free." Some of the most authoritarian regimes in the Third World (e.g., Haiti and Panama) and several of the most democratic (e.g., Costa Rica and Venezuela) joined at San José in approving communications policies that invite governmental controls over newspapers, magazines and broadcasters. How can this be explained?

UNESCO's director-general, Amadou-Matar M'Bow, in opening the San José conference, declared that the organization is "resolutely in favor of freedom of information." He added, "However, a word of warning is necessary. For when the mass communi-

[7] UNESCO, Comm 74/Conf 617/4, October 4, 1974, p. 7.
[8] *Draft Final Report: Intergovernmental Conference on Communication Policies in Latin America and the Caribbean* (Paris: UNESCO, n.d.) pt. 1, p. 5.
[9] *Ibid.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE I

LEVELS OF FREEDOM IN COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING IN THE JULY 1976 SAN JOSE CONFERENCE*

Country	*Freedom to Communicate†*	*General Level of Political & Civil Liberty*
Argentina	5	Not free
Bolivia	4	Partly free
Brazil	5	Partly free
Chile	5	Not free
Colombia	3	Free
Costa Rica	1	Free
Cuba	6	Not free
Dominican Republic	3	Partly free
Ecuador	4	Partly free
El Salvador	3	Free
Guatemala	3	Partly free
Guyana	3	Partly free
Haiti	6	Not free
Honduras	3	Partly free
Mexico	4	Partly free
Nicaragua	5	Partly free
Panama	6	Not free
Peru	4	Partly free
Surinam	2	Free
Uruguay	6	Not free
Venezuela	2	Free

* Based on a survey conducted by Freedom House, New York, in November 1976.

† Ranked on a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 and 2 = free; 3, 4 and 5 = partly free; and 6 and 7 = not free.

cation media persistently purvey systems of values foreign to the countries of a given region, there is a danger that in the long run they will efface or obliterate the region's own values, thus making it difficult for many countries to assert their own cultural identity." He reiterated that UNESCO "has no communication policy," yet he called for "a concertation of all sectors of national life to enable their contribution to development to be properly coordinated and thereby enhanced" — through the "role of communication" and "decisions in the communication field." Each state, he added, needs to "rationalize existing situations" through governmental actions. He acknowledged that this "rationalization in the field of communication carries with it a danger to freedom of expression." Yet, he said, "development of modern societies requires the rectification of certain ill-defined or irrational situations." He cited "groups of families which control information media in some countries" and asked

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"whether we can actually speak of freedom of information when the real owners of the [international] information media are concentrated at a few limited points on the globe." The director-general attacked the stress on "the phenomenon of tension or violence in the countries of the Third World" and the silence on "events of a positive nature." He further charged that the international agencies convey little news from one Latin American country to another, and then only after processing at distant home offices.[10]

The chairman of the San José conference, Gonzalo J. Facio, then foreign minister of Costa Rica, stated the issues in terms of power: "The imbalance of the flow of information which is at the origin of [the] technological advances with the obvious concentration of information centers in areas of worldwide political and economic power, is something to which users, communicators, governments and mankind at large cannot be indifferent."[11] "Communication," he said, "is development. It is also power." Mr. Facio was asked at a UN press conference in September 1976 how the San José decisions could be implemented without undermining freedom of the news media. He replied that the conference did not adopt the most extreme proposals that had been discussed (mainly, he said, because the meeting had taken place in his democratic country). He then expressed support for two principles and acknowledged a reality that may be considered irreconcilable with these principles: Principle 1 — newspapers *should not be* government-controlled; Principle 2 — there *should be* a cooperative regional news agency comprising national news agencies; Reality — most of the cooperating governments in the region are dictatorships. When asked how a free press could survive such an arrangement the minister replied, "We are optimistic."[12]

The San José decisions were formally reported before UNESCO's general conference of November 1976. UNESCO was asked to (1) assist in the creation of national news agencies and a Latin American wire service, (2) study the mandatory international right of reply, (3) help national press councils supervise mass communication media, (4) conduct legal studies on the "right to communication," (5) prepare a code of ethics for journalists, and (6) examine regulatory law regarding communications media.

Clearly, a broad spectrum of domestic and international governmental controls of news media now formally occupies

[10] *Ibid.*, annex 2, pp. 4-6.
[11] *Ibid.*, annex 2, p. 16.
[12] Press conference at UN Headquarters, New York, September 28, 1976, the day before Minister Facio resigned to run for the presidency of Costa Rica.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

UNESCO. It cannot rationally continue to insist that it has no policy on these issues. UNESCO is committed to advancing systems of communication that facilitate the controlled flow of news. If this "balancing," as UNESCO calls it, is to be achieved by a government-run press or a censor regulating a purportedly independent news agency or foreign correspondent, then "balancing" will be as far removed from the "free flow of ideas" as secret voting in a democracy is from a totalitarian plebiscite.

UNESCO may well regard its commitment to economic development as a high value. The richer nations must indeed share more equitably with poorer countries the fruits of technology, trade and monetary arrangements. Nevertheless, UNESCO moves toward governmental control when it regards information as a resource no different from any other. Governmental control of the mass media, even for a high-value purpose, devalues the news media. Once that happens, media reports by definition become propaganda, not news. UNESCO summarized this 180-degree turn in commitment in a statement immediately after the July 1976 meeting at San José:

> Most of the recommendations had roots in the unanimous acceptance of the following principle: there should be a juster criterion for exchanges between nations in order to hasten the new international order. There is a need for new national policies for the sovereign determination of needs and priorities regarding the international flow of messages. The free flow of information will really exist only when all countries have equal access to all the sources of information and take part on an equal footing in the control over and use of international channels of dissemination.[13]

III

To secure rapidly such "equal . . . control over and use of" international news media, fifty-eight Third World countries calling themselves nonaligned met at New Delhi in July 1976 to create a pool of press agenices.[14] The nonaligned nations were told at the outset by their host, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, that "the media of the powerful countries want to depict the governments of their erstwhile colonies as inept and corrupt and their people as yearning for the good old days." Press reports the previous year had incor-

[13] "Conference on Communication Policies in Latin America and Caribbean Concludes in Costa Rica: UNESCO Sponsored Meeting Adopts Recommendations Stressing 'Balanced' Flow of News," UNESCO press release (New York: July 22, 1976), p. 2.

[14] The notion originated at the Fourth Nonaligned Summit Conference in Algiers, September 1973, as an extension of agreements to end the "legacy of the colonial past," which was said to hamper direct communication among Third World states. The plan sought to reduce cable rates for the press, develop rules for collective ownership and use of the communications satellites, and increase exchanges among the mass media and other informational agencies in the Third World.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rectly interpreted her taking of emergency powers in India as "an onslaught on democracy or an abrogation of our constitution," she said, and "many were misled into believing the Western version to be objective reporting." Hence, the necessity for a Third World news pool: "We want to hear Africans on events in Africa. We should similarly be able to get an Indian explanation of events in India." A Third World press pool, Mrs. Gandhi concluded, would "rectify another lingering consequence of colonialism."[15]

The Indian president of the conference, Vidya Charan Shukla, elaborated on the prime minister's remarks:

> The theme of "free" flow of information, which was chanted in a chorus, was aimed to enable all countries in name but only the powerful countries in reality, to pump their information into all regions of the world without let or hindrance. Non-aligned countries till today have been able to do almost nothing to protect their national interests against such onslaughts, since no safeguards are possible without (a) some degree of development of their own national media and (b) a state of cooperation amongst themselves. In fact, the idea of a "free" flow of information fits insidiously into the package of other kinds of "freedom" still championed by the adherents of 19th century liberalism. . . .
>
> It is painful to recall that many of us have to reckon with such an elitist neocolonialism within our own countries. Such a link-up is typical of the ways through which former colonial powers still wish to maintain their material and intellectual hold, and is parallel to a similar link-up witnessed in the economic field where internal elements of vested interests make common cause with external elements in the name of freedom of trade and business.[16]

Thus the fundamental economic, political and communications issues are set down in a single package. The conference called itself nonaligned vis-a-vis the Eastern and Western superpowers, yet it included twenty-two communist or socialist states. Only four of the fifty-eight participants (Gambia, Jamaica, Sri Lanka, Trinidad and Tobago) may be considered free and protectors of press freedom.[17]

On July 12, 1976, the conference issued a declaration noting that "the present global information flows are marked by a serious inadequacy and imbalance." It stated that "the decolonialization of information is essential and . . . the establishment of a New

---

[15] Text of Mrs. Gandhi's address published as a separate document by the Ministerial Conference of Nonaligned Countries on the Press Agencies Pool (New Delhi: 1976).

[16] Text of Mr. Shukla's address published as a separate document by the Ministerial Conference of Nonaligned Countries on the Press Agencies Pool (New Delhi: 1976).

[17] Raymond D. Gastil, "The Comparative Survey of Freedom," *Freedom at Issue*, January-February 1976, pp. 11-20.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

International Order for Information is as necessary as the New International Economic Order."[18] Thereupon it was decided to endorse the proposed constitution for the nonaligned press pool, and a coordination committee immediately went to work. It was also agreed to consider further pooling arrangements in the fields of television, films, radio programming, books, photos and other services. Coordinators were assigned to establish "linkage" among the research and information training centers of nonaligned countries, with a view toward promoting shared expertise and facilities. Such linkage could readily result in direct collaboration with the International Organization of Journalists, the communist-bloc directorate in Prague.

The constitution of the Third World press pool includes the following operational provisions:

The pool is intended to achieve the broad and free circulation among themselves of news, informative reports, features and photographs about each other, and also provide objective and authentic information relating to non-aligned countries to the rest of the world.

[The pool] is not a supranational news agency. All pool-participating news agencies have the same rights in terms of the circulation of the material each makes available to the pool.

None of the pool-participating agencies has a dominant role.

If a national news agency does not exist in a participating country, the pool is open to participation by a comparable body in the field of news service in that country.

Objective information is the basic premise of the pool, with emphasis on progressive, economic, socio-political and cultural development. . . .

The pool is intended to facilitate dissemination of correct and factual information about non-aligned countries, their mutual cooperation, and other subjects of common interest. . . .

News items included in the pool could also be made available to other news agencies. . . .

Each news agency will endeavor, to the full extent of its possibilities, to promote utilization of the news and information carried by the pool. . . .

Countries participating in the pool should meet at the level of governments and national news agencies at the beginning of each year in which a Conference of the Heads of States or Governments of Non-Aligned Countries is to be held. . . .

The pool is founded on the principle of being a self-financing activity and each participating agency would bear the cost of its own participation.

[18] "Declaration of the New Delhi Conference of the Ministers of Information of the Nonaligned Countries," Ministerial Conference of Nonaligned Countries on the Press Agencies Pool press release A/7, pp. 2, 4.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

. . . News agencies receiving pool newscasts from collecting/redistributing news agencies, will then distribute to their subscribers at their own cost.

The basic declaration and the pool constitution were formally approved by the Conference of Heads of State or Government of Nonaligned Countries, which met in August 1976 at Colombo. Three months afterward the UNESCO biennial conference voted close collaboration with the nonaligned press pool. UNESCO was asked[19] to provide substantial research and programmatic support for the pool, including exchanges of information among journalists' associations (including, presumably, the IOJ).

Although the formal establishment of the pool dates from July 12, 1976, the concept has been developing for at least as long as the nonaligned summits themselves, starting with the 1955 Bandung conference. And just as Marshal Tito was a primary organizer of that meeting, so have the Yugoslavs become the prime movers in the Third World press agency. The Yugoslav delegate to the Fourth Nonaligned Conference, held at Algiers in 1973, pressed for the regularization of information exchange among the print and broadcast media. Sixteen months later, Tanjug, the government-owned Yugoslav news agency, announced it had arranged a pool of twelve cooperating agencies. Tanjug now claims that sixty-two nonaligned countries participate in its pool. Yugoslavia has said that it is spending $13 million to improve Tanjug's capabilities and is constructing four 38,000-watt transmitters near Belgrade. These are intended to deliver news by radioteletype, six days a week, in French, Spanish and English. In addition to Tanjug's stories, there are to be those of the participating nonaligned agencies, unedited by Tanjug.

By the time the nonaligned conference opened, Tanjug's sizable staff at Colombo not only serviced its own subscribers but also relayed stories filed by other agencies in the pool. Yugoslavia has also organized courses and seminars designed to indoctrinate Third World journalists. It's use of political scientists and journalists to impress Yugoslav views on the newsmen and newswomen of other countries is similar to the extensive Soviet-bloc journalists' program headquartered in Prague and described below. The Yugoslavs advance similar themes: the "uses" of journalism in completing decolonialization along socialist lines, in speeding economic development, and in promoting cultural and ideological interaction within the Third World.

[19] Draft resolution submitted by Tunisia, 19C/DR. 19, September 7, 1976.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Tanjug, however, does not have the Third World pool to itself. Prime Minister Gandhi, in a series of steps to control India's press and wire services, forced the merger of all Indian agencies into a single channel, Samachar. Samachar, too, fielded a large staff at Colombo to report the conference for Indians and for nonaligned countries that did not have reportorial or communications facilities in Sri Lanka. Samachar is stationing correspondents in Europe and the United States as well as in Asia. The Mexican government, in September 1976, opened in Mexico City the Center for Economic and Social Studies of the Third World, intended to generate ideological and developmental support for a Third World communications system.

IV

All such efforts are somewhat competitive, and there may well develop a lively race for control of a network of Third World press agencies. The national agency that dominates a pool may exert power and influence rivaling that of the large Western agencies in the Third World, for the press pool rests on the ideological premise that a Third World press agency is one of "ours" while a Western agency is one of "theirs" and therefore suspect. Third World agencies may compete for control of existing channels and try to expand into new areas, but they are likely to continue to suspect the Western agencies and to accept readily technical and ideological assistance from Eastern Europe. Some noncommunist journals in the Third World charge the Soviet government's news agency, Tass, with actions no less domineering than those of Western agencies. Yet there is broad acceptance for the Soviet-supported International Organization of Journalists. The IOJ celebrated its thirtieth anniversary in 1976 with telegram greetings from journalists' "unions" in the USSR and other East European countries, North Korea, Mexico and Finland, and from the Union of African Journalists.

The IOJ serves as a sophisticated mobilizer of opinion and a supporter of major Soviet policies and Marxist-Leninist ideology. It describes itself as a "nongovernmental organization" and thus holds "NGO consultative B" status in UNESCO and the United Nations Social and Economic Commission; indeed, UNESCO has cosponsored conferences and other activities organized by the IOJ. With information centers in Cairo and Paris (another is being organized in Lima), the IOJ teletypes journalistic advisories to affiliates far beyond Eastern Europe.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Its ideological premises are stated clearly: "mass communication media must not be in private hands and, of course, not in the hands of multinational monopolies. . . . mass media cannot be divided from the overall socio-political structure of a country. . . . as a social instrument they belong in the hands of society as a whole and its organizations."[20] The IOJ regards itself as the "competent forum" to analyze and develop a "world journalism and to find the method and means of assisting the further victorious development of democratic and progressive journalism."[21] The organization records its worldwide activities and observes, "Not by chance was an official IOJ delegation invited to Hanoi and Saigon immediately after victory in appreciation of its efforts [i.e., arousing world opinion against American aggression in Vietnam]."[22]

The IOJ sees its principal task as the education and training of journalists. It organizes seminars and colloquiums and assists schools of journalism in many nations: East Germany, Bulgaria, Cuba and several African states. The organization produces textbooks on journalism and guides to specialized areas such as photojournalism, news-agency journalism, and the development of the mass media. In 1976 the IOJ published a 133-page hardcover book that strings together a variety of attacks, mainly from American sources, on the American news media. The volume generally follows the theme that U.S. news media are "the finest brainwashing system" in the world. Says its Soviet author:

> American politicians had, so to say, to design the kind of relations between the administration and the "free press" which look like a "democratic" and "independent" system to the outsider but in effect involve the news and propaganda outlets in the business of government, and as an integral part of it; moreover, less and less efforts are made to camouflage such integration of the government and the media. . . .
>
> American monopoly capitalists have always sought to influence intellectual life, and not only at home but in other countries as well. With all the major newspaper, magazine, book-publishing houses and motion-picture studios churning out billions of words, thousands of books, and thousands of radio and hundreds of television stations broadcasting virtually around the clock, one can easily picture the opportunities the financial and industrial oligarchies have for keeping various sections of the public under their ideological guidance and influence.[23]

This Marxist-Leninist interpretation of both America and its mass media runs through IOJ publications from the most ele-

[20] *The Democratic Journalist*, 1'76, p. 2.
[21] *Ibid.*, p. 4.
[23] *Ibid.*, p. 3.
[23] Vitaly Petrusenko, *The Monopoly Press — or How American Journalism Found Itself in the Vicious Circle of the "Crisis of Credibility"* (Prague: IOJ, 1976), pp. 41-42.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mentary guides to papers intended for education at the graduate-school level. While denigrating what it regards as the oligarchical control of an American press linked to government policy, the IOJ explains that it is "imperative to apply correspondingly different criteria to the social role and quality of the operation of the mass media under socialism and capitalism respectively."[24]

Obviously "different criteria" are necessary because governmental control of all mass media in the socialist countries must be rationalized, as indeed it is:

> Under socialism mass communication media proceed from the principle of a Marxist-Leninist world outlook specifically geared toward bringing topical events and phenomena within the reach of human understanding and the current grasp of the social significance of the facts and realities seen through the prism of socialist society and the ensuing stand of its members.[25]

The press, therefore, becomes a cog in the governmental process of organizing and controlling all aspects of the society and the nation. Journalism thus plays a "specific role" in "shaping and promoting socialist social awareness [as] defined by the following factors: a) public activity, b) topical subjects (events, problems), d) current policies, e) continuity (uninterruptedness), f) universal continuity of themes."[26]

The journalist is expected to fulfill "increased demands on goal formulation and the definition of objectives" within the socialist state. The field is not uncontested, however, warns an IOJ writer:

> Steering a course of ideological subversion, the reactionary forces of imperialism are intent on extending their range of operation into the sphere of influence exerted by the socialist and developing countries. International communication offers a particularly suitable mode of ideological penetration. This makes it necessary for socialist journalism to equip the people with convincing arguments for the ideological class dialogue going on in the international sphere.
>
> Socialist journalism thus follows a line advocating the political activity of committed socialist internationalists as one of the tasks of progressive supranational socialization.[27]

These theoretical-ideological arguments are bolstered in a great variety of publications, printed in several languages. *The Democratic Journalist,* a monthly technical magazine, appears in

[24] *The Democratic Journalist,* 1'76, p. 5.
[25] *Ibid.,* p. 6.
[26] *Ibid.*
[27] *Ibid.,* p. 7.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Russian, English, French and Spanish. It is professionally of high quality and includes political, theoretical and reportorial pieces from journalism professors, deans, practicing journalists and others from all parts of the Soviet bloc and occasionally from Finland, Denmark, Venezuela and elsewhere. Soviet contributions predominate.

The IOJ examines the latest technological developments in the mass media. It acknowledges the great technical strides made in Western journalism; these advances, according to classic Marxist analysis, enable the ruling class to dominate the masses more effectively. "Capitalist theoreticians," the IOJ maintains, "mostly deal with the technical aspect of mass communication media and try as much as possible to avoid the latter's ideological impact." Clearly, however, the IOJ is quite interested in the possible uses of advanced technology for the furtherance of Marxist-Leninist objectives. These new systems, the IOJ holds, "are destined for further development in a new advancing social system." In the offing, it is noted, is a "control computer" linked to subscribers in all parts of the world and "able to feed directly into the rotary presses . . . a text that can be processed by offset printing." The editorial office, it is added, cannot change anything in the text. The IOJ adds, "The point is, not this wonderful invention but its misuse in favor of the capitalist social system."[28]

V

We may regard the IOJ as the ideological powerhouse of a three-pronged movement toward the "socializing" of mass media in the Third World. Collaboration between UNESCO and the IOJ started in 1969 when the Prague group was given consultative status. Since then, the two organizations have conducted many joint activities, particularly in the training of journalists. Three years ago the IOJ, with UNESCO collaboration and support, conducted a colloquium on "The Development of the Communications Media and New Tendencies in the Training of Journalists." In December 1975, also in association with UNESCO, the IOJ presented in Budapest another colloquium, this one on "The Training of Journalists in Developing Countries."[29]

---

[28] *Ibid.*, pp. 14-15.

[29] Participating in the last mentioned, besides UNESCO and IOJ representatives, were specialists from faculties of journalism in Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Romania, Poland and the USSR, as well as from the IOJ's International Centre for the Training of Journalists (Budapest), the Solidarity School (Berlin), the University of Strasbourg, the Higher School of Journalism (Lille, France), the Centre for the Training of Journalists (Paris), the Thomson Foundation of Great Britain, the Belgian

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The IOJ and its affiliates have also participated in UNESCO's researching of "communication policies," the core of UNESCO's Latin American conference at San José in July 1976. A spokesman for UNESCO, Hifze Topuz, writing in the IOJ monthly magazine, outlines the history of IOJ-UNESCO collaboration and urges the IOJ to devote its resources to studying UNESCO's current-favorite theme — the "balancing" of the flow of information between developing and developed nations. Dr. Topuz notes that the IOJ is "inclining more and more toward the problems of the Third World," and he concludes with a plea to the IOJ to expand its "collaboration with the journalists of the developing countries." The objective given is the same as the UNESCO refrain — "the free and equilibriated flow of information in that great part of the world."[30]

Whichever word is used — "balanced" or "equilibriated" — the intention is the same: to assure governmental control of the flow of news and its analysis. The meaning of "free" withers in importance, reflecting merely the movement of press copy across wires or sound waves. The *content* of transmissions would inevitably be as synchronized and tamper-proof as the "control-computer" the IOJ predicts may one day revolutionize mass media around the world. The preparatory education for that time is already under way through such activities as the colloquiums jointly produced by UNESCO and the IOJ.

The 1975 Budapest colloquium was divided into three meetings, the third devoted to "the press — an instrument for the cultural renaissance of young states. [A discussion of] the *task* of the mass communication media in economic, technical, scientific development and especially in the development of agriculture in the developing countries."[31] One journalist from a Third World country who attended these sessions reported later that, with the exception of a period devoted to photography, every aspect was permeated with Marxist-Leninist indoctrination.

V. Smirnov of the USSR, writing on "The Humanism of the Soviet Press," explains succinctly the father-protector role of the authoritarian press. "The Soviet press," he says, "regulates the be-

---

Institute for Information and Documentation, the International Higher School of Journalism (Yaoundé, Cameroun), the Arab Centre of Studies on Information concerning Population, Development and Construction (Cairo), and the International Centre of Higher Journalistic Studies for Latin America (Quito, Ecuador). There were also specialists in the training of journalists, delegated by the journalists' unions of Bulgaria, Cuba, Iraq, Mali, Tanzania, Nigeria, France and Finland, along with others involved in the teaching of journalism.

[30] *The Democratic Journalist*, 2'76, pp. 4-5.

[31] *Ibid.*, p. 2. (Emphasis added.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

havior of people by praising or condemning these or those acts and therefore acts as a wise and demanding educator."[32] By this means, the press becomes an instrument for governing the state, as the IOJ-UNESCO discussion theme above indicates. The Soviet Union's draft declaration for UNESCO's Nairobi meeting reiterated this point in similar terms. Whenever the "task" of the mass communication media is defined as applying an ideological, developmental or other criterion to the practice of journalism, the term "journalist" goes the way of such words as "democracy" and "freedom." Their meanings become distorted for all but the socialist true believers. For them, the "journalist," by Soviet ascription, is an agitator of the masses. It has taken the noncommunist world a long time to recognize that the Peoples' Democracies, with regard to the political freedoms granted their citizens, are at the other end of the spectrum from the democracies of the West. We must come to recognize that the "democratic journalist" of Prague is neither democratic nor journalist. He has the state-assigned role of "shaping and promoting socialist social awareness" — no mean task in a socialist society. But he is not a journalist. He is an "agitprop."[33]

VI

It remains to be seen whether assigning developmental and national tasks to news agencies will eventually deprive Third World citizens of effective journalism. The Third World's linkage of economic development with information development is appropriate in one sense: just as the less developed countries may be further deprived by suggested cutbacks in world industrial productivity (out of fear of using up limited natural resources), so would the developing nations be intellectually stunted by denying freedoms to domestic journalists and hampering the reception of Western reportage. Developing countries, especially, can profit from freer exchanges; they can only be hurt by more restricted information channels. Western news organizations and governments have the opportunity to assist the information development of the Third World. In doing so, they will want to distinguish those Third World countries that recognize the exploitative nature of Marxist-Leninist ideology masquerading as informational journalism. The pleas of these non-"socializing" developing nations, who clamor for informational assistance, should be earnestly examined.

[32] *Ibid.*, 5'76, p. 13.

[33] The "agitprop," conceived by Lenin and still employed in the USSR, combines the role of the Marxist-Leninist propagandist with the "agitator," who spurs citizens to act in accordance with their political education.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

For there are indeed critical issues on the agenda. The pervasiveness, speed and high cost of Western communications technology do overwhelm the poorer nations. Limited coverage of the Third World harms not only its citizens but those in the industrial nations who must share the same planet and who ultimately must face the problems generated in the depressed areas. Threats against the major international news media tend to harm both the threatener and the threatened. Further reduction of international reportage in the Third World will deprive less developed countries of the information they need in order to develop. Such reduction may also discourage Western investment in countries where accurate, impartial reporting of events and economic conditions is no longer available — because the news media have become the handmaidens of government. There can be no legitimate Western objection to the creation of any number of new communications media to provide more service for the peoples and nations of the Third World. Western agencies are now properly resisting those aspects of the "new information order" that would repress or harass the Western news media in their reportorial functions around the world.

In response, American news agencies may patiently profess that their tried-and-true standards of journalistically balanced reporting, despite some admitted failures and exaggerations, have produced the most open and varied communications system the world has ever seen. These agencies may also gain credibility for their professional standards by listening attentively to complaints that come from the nonsocialist states. The latter, in reply, may be told that while U.S. news media can largely demonstrate their independence from governmental controls, the socialist countries glory in their "use" of the mass media as an ideological and mobilization tool of the state. Further, the IOJ openly avows its objective of "socializing" the news content, procedures and staffs of its affiliates. If the Third World press is to accept such ideological domination, it will be far more shackled than it was by any errors of omission that Western news agencies may have committed.

Some indication of this argument's persuasiveness may be found in a recent report from Helsinki:

> The International Organization of Journalists (IOJ), representing mainly the socialist press, has adopted a wait-and-see attitude towards the Third World news agency which was recently brought up in Colombo, Sri Lanka, Victor Afanasov, editor-in-chief of the Soviet Party organ *Pravda,* said Thursday. Afanasov, also the chairman of the Soviet Union of Journalists, said the Third World press pool system was not officially taken up by the IOJ Congress "though the idea is intriguing."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"The matter is still very complicated and it is difficult to say what will come out of the plan. Our relations to the press pool will depend on their policy and on what they do," Afanasov said.[34]

Apparently, the Soviets, who control the IOJ, seek to dominate the eighty-five-nation pool but are troubled by its constitution, adopted at Colombo.

That constitution promises that "none of the pool-participating agencies has a dominant role." Practically, this can lead to serious dilemmas for the Soviet bloc, provided the present pool rules remain unchanged and are enforced. For the constitution further provides that "each news agency will endeavor, to the full extent of its possibilities, to promote utilization of the news and information carried by the pool, by publications and radio and television stations using its services." Under this clause, nonsocialist or even right-wing Third World countries (adhering fully to the governmental-control features promoted by the pool) may transmit strongly antisocialist information through pool facilities. Technically at least, if it adhered to the constitution, the Soviet bloc would be expected to "promote utilization" of such news to "the full extent of [Soviet-bloc] possibilities."

Once the Western news media successfully affirm their credibility as independent organs — i.e., when their reporting sometimes pleases, sometimes angers — they may then discover a sensible vein of understanding within the Third World. Ground for this optimism was suggested by Christian Grote at the April 1975 Regional Conference on Information Imbalance in Asia:

> I submit that Asia is merely a geographical term and nothing more. Indians, Pakistanis, Ceylonese, Burmese, Singaporeans feel themselves to be Asians only when they encounter a mutual enemy or danger, but otherwise they belong to just so many different nations, young and artificial nations, democratic nations, socialist nations, nations within nations etc. — many very sensitive, nationalistic nations.
>
> May I refer here to Asok Mitra's paper: "Information Imbalance in Asia," II: ". . . [I]n their opinion-forming, opinion-molding and reader-holding powers [the Western news magazines] are worse than drugs . . . Most of us know what interests [they] represent." Well, may I confess that I am sorry I do not belong to "most of us" because I do not know. . . . American journalism in these [news] magazines is of a very high standard, the writers criticize and analyze their own government freely and they take the same freedom and methods when dealing with other countries. Critical reports on Asian countries (even when written by Asians as in the *Far Eastern Economic Review)* often result in the banning of such magazines

[34] Associated Press, Helsinki, 1556 GMT, September 23, 1976.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in the countries criticized. This of course is another way of "balancing" information.

The mole hill in front of one's own door will always be of more interest than the mountain in another continent. How then will news items that are of global interest look? Sensational, beyond national relevance? It will be the moonlanding or the landing on Mars which you see on the screen, the same moment it takes place, but the news of the earthquake in North Pakistan will reach the public with a three-day delay. Let us assume that some time in the future every country will have access to all the news and that it will also feed news into the global conduit. Thus there will be Asian, African, South American, Pacific news agencies. If a person has access to all sources, then he surely will be able to exercise his "right to know." But will he be able to do so? For many years to come there will be governments, national broadcasting networks, regional and national agencies, local newspapers, etc. which will select the news for him and present it to him. News that is good for him? Healthy news? News that does not irritate the government? Any imbalance will be "in the national interest" and is not imposed by superpowers, former or new colonial powers. Moreover it will not be the result of any technological lag or lack of funds.[35]

Finally, Western news agencies should open a serious dialogue with appropriate Third World leaders. They should demonstrate that agencies like themselves — despite faults not always acknowledged readily — keep themselves free of the U.S. governmental system and also assiduously resist pressures from the corporate complex. Notwithstanding our willingness to listen to Third World complaints, we should make it clear that we do not acquiesce in any arrangement that would deprive our correspondents of free access to news sources or movement, and that we cannot agree to restrict any reportorial or interpretative coverage. We may discover that a Third World press pool can carry reports of interest to the industrial nations (when the pool source is properly credited), and that Western technical facilities may be used reciprocally to assist the Third World pool.

The current trend, leading toward a confrontation between two news-delivery systems, must be averted. And so should the parallel "socialist march" through the mass news media.

[35] "Information Imbalance in Asia — Some Critical Remarks," a paper delivered at, and enlarged after, the Regional Conference on Information Imbalance in Asia, April 21-26, 1975, Kandy, Sri Lanka, sponsored by the Asian Mass Communication Research and Information Center, Singapore.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE RELATIONSHIP IN FOREIGN POLICY: NEW PARTNERSHIP OR NEW COMPETITION?

by Frans R. Bax

Ten years ago this journal featured an essay by an eminent observer of the domestic setting of American foreign policy.[1] Published on the verge of the critical presidential decisions to directly involve American military forces in the Vietnam conflict, Westerfield's essay looked ahead with some foreboding to an era of "closed politics" in national security affairs. The dangers inherent in shutting out congressional participation in key policy decisions were pointed out. In retrospect, this warning takes on the stark features of prophecy. The dangers of closed politics have been realized completely, and the damage to American foreign policy has been immense. Today, with the advantage of ten years' greater perspective, I propose to analyze where we have been, in order to offer some new guidelines as to where we, as a nation, should go in the critical arena of legislative-executive relations. Should we seek a new interbranch partnership, or should a new form of competition between the branches be encouraged?

In these ten years, controversy has been building over the proper role of Congress in the making and conduct of our foreign policy. The beginning was inauspicious enough — polite questions concerning the president's authority to act in Vietnam, addressed to an elusive secretary of state by Senator J. William Fulbright. Until recently, most observers have argued that Congress has surrendered to the president its power and responsibility to participate in the making of foreign policy.[2]

In 1976, the comments of these observers are radically different. Congress has involved itself heavily in a variety of impor-

[1] H. Bradford Westerfield, "Congress and Closed Politics in National Security Affairs," ORBIS, Fall 1966, pp. 737-763.

[2] For example, see Merlo J. Pusey, *The Way We Go to War* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1971), or U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *National Commitments*, Senate report no. 129, 91st Congress, 1st Session, 1969.

Frans R. Bax is Assistant Professor in the Woodrow Wilson Department of Government and Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia. His current research is on U.S. conventional-arms sales policy and the impact of Congress upon it.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tant foreign policy matters — military aid to Turkey and the conditions of Soviet-American trade, to mention just two prominent examples. A major watershed was reached in April 1975, when American participation in the Vietnam war was terminated by congressional decisions. The president was denied authority to provide emergency military aid to beleaguered South Vietnam. He was also prevented — by the August 1973 congressional prohibition on the reintroduction of American combat forces into Indochina — from using American air power to stop the decisive North Vietnamese offensive.[3] These events prompted Secretary of State Kissinger to declare:

> The decade-long struggle in this country over executive dominance in foreign affairs is over. The recognition that Congress is a coequal branch of government is the dominant fact of national politics today. The executive accepts that the Congress must have both the sense and the reality of participation; foreign policy must be a shared enterprise.[4]

It appeared that Congress was no longer willing simply to watch the president and the executive branch make most of the important policy decisions.

Ironically, less than one month later the *Mayaguez* incident suggested that such conclusions may be as premature as the earlier one about the surrender of power by Congress. As the president sought to rescue American citizens and involved American forces in combat, the Congress sat on the sidelines, happy to act as presidential cheerleader. The lack of consultation, required by the 1973 War Powers Act, was protested only halfheartedly, and serious questions about the American reaction were raised only belatedly by Congress.[5] Finally, to further confuse any assessment of legislative-executive relations, the House voted, in February 1976, to prevent the Pike committee from officially releasing its controversial report

[3] In a news conference on April 3, 1975, President Ford condemned the flagrant violations of the Paris peace accords by the North Vietnamese and said: "I am frustrated by the limitations that were placed on the Chief Executive over the last two years." On April 21, as the situation rapidly deteriorated, he spoke of the commitments the United States had made to the Thieu government. Then he said this to the CBS correspondents interviewing him: "Now, unfortunately, the Congress in August of 1973 . . . took away from the President the power to move in a military way to enforce the agreements that were signed in Paris." It seems clear that the United States might be fighting in Vietnam today were it not for this congressional action.

[4] Address by Secretary Kissinger on April 17, 1975, to the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Washington, D.C.; reprinted in the *Department of State Bulletin*, May 5, 1975, p. 562.

[5] As Raoul Berger commented: "Once more Congress has abdicated its constitutional responsibility, carried away by a wave of 'rally round the flag' fever." (*New York Times*, May 23, 1975.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

on the CIA, in effect allowing the initiative on this question to pass into the hands of the president.

II

What can be said about this confusing state of legislative-executive relations? Can any prescription for a future legislative-executive relationship be offered? In approaching these questions, this essay will proceed in three stages. First, the historical pattern of legislative-executive relationships since World War II will be discussed. Then each of the alternative historical relationships discerned, including the contemporary situation, will be analyzed for its positive and negative features; the current situation can only be understood in the light of history. Finally, a desirable pattern of legislative-executive relations for the future will be outlined, and the possibilities of its realization in fact will be assessed. It is my underlying thesis that the institutional arrangements for making foreign policy have a critical influence on the quality of policy produced. Certain relationships between the legislative and executive branches are more conducive to wise policy than are others.

Before beginning this discourse, however, an important "methodological" caveat must be offered. A number of scholars have emphasized the fragmented nature of decision-making in the executive branch. Bureaucratic politics, a process of political struggle, negotiation and compromise, often produces key policy choices. Thus, some have claimed that there is no such thing as an American foreign policy imposed on the bureaucracy by the president, that there is no foreign policy actor identifiable as the "executive branch."[6] While important insights have emerged from this school of thought, its emphasis upon a fragmented executive is overstated. The president does retain a large measure of hierarchical control over the bureaucracy, and at the very least he makes the final choice among the positions advocated by his subordinates. Others contend that his influence goes far beyond this, arguing that his own values, policy preferences and intensely loyal subordinates and advisers impose real direction on the executive branch.[7] It is beyond our scope here to discuss this debate in greater detail, but whenever

[6] Prominent advocates of this approach are Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin. See their "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications," *World Politics*, vol. 24, 1972 (supp.), pp. 40-79.

[7] Persuasive articulators of these criticisms are Stephen D. Krasner, "Are Bureaucracies Important?," *Foreign Policy*, Summer 1972, pp. 159-179, and Robert J. Art, "Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique," *Policy Sciences*, December 1973, pp. 467-490.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

reference is made to the executive branch or to executive policy, it will mean the presidentially directed executive branch.

Like the executive, perhaps even more so, Congress is decentralized and fragmented in its actual operations. It comprises a variety of actors, both individuals and small groups. One might expect that the institutional provision for "collective action" through roll-call votes would allow one to refer to Congress as taking this action, but such is not the case. Votes are taken in the two houses of Congress separately, so it can only be said that the House and the Senate are collective actors, each having somewhat different motivations and objectives. But even this is simplistic: many studies of Congress have shown that the actions of the parent chamber usually constitute a ratification of decisions made at the committee (either standing or conference) level. At this level, action usually follows the lead of those one or two members who have taken a personal interest in a matter and who have developed enough understanding to offer an informed judgment.[8] To be sure, legislation is sometimes amended and written on the floor of the House or Senate, but this is the work of other individuals who are supported by a majority of the membership against the original committee sponsors.

In the context of Congress and foreign-policymaking, each issue has its own constellation of congressional "players," and it is not always obvious which members of Congress will "have the action" on any given issue. Congressmen have considerable latitude to select for themselves the issue areas in which they will play a part.[9]

Nevertheless, I believe it is possible to speak of a congressional role in foreign policy and to make certain generalizations about it. First, to the extent that the entire Congress supports or ratifies the desires of those members interested in an issue, it can be said that those members embody or act in the name of Congress. In this regard, it should also be remembered that legislators try to keep in touch with the prevailing sentiment or mood in Congress. The individual players are not entirely free of a collective, yet ambiguous, will. Second, while it is usually impossible to define this general congressional mood or will, it nonetheless has perceptible

[8] In this regard see Richard Fenno, "The Internal Distribution of Influence: The House," in David B. Truman, ed., *The Congress and America's Future*, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973), pp. 63-90; John W. Kingdon, *Congressmen's Voting Decisions* (New York: Harper & Row, 1973); and Randall B. Ripley, *Power in the Senate* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969).

[9] See, for example, Raymond Bauer, Ithiel De Sola Pool and Lewis Dexter, *American Business and Public Policy: The Politics of Foreign Trade* (Chicago: Atherton, 1963), pp. 401-458.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

effects. It changes over time, and it dictates the general pattern for specific legislative-executive interactions.[10] In Congress, then, unity is imposed by the willingness of individual members to follow other congressmen with recognized expertise on specific issues, and by the current mood of the membership as a whole. Thus, the term "Congress" can be used in reference to the actions of specific congressmen that are ratified by Congress and to the general pattern of congressional-executive interaction. Given these definitional caveats, we may now turn to the principal questions posed earlier.

III

How have legislative-executive relations in foreign policy reached their current state? Since World War II there have been five successive phases in legislative-executive relations. In chronological order, I have labeled these the phases or periods of accommodation, antagonism, acquiescence, ambiguity and acrimony.

The period of *accommodation* can be dated conveniently from the presentation of the UNRRA program to Congress in the summer of 1943 until 1950-1951. Prior to this program the president and his advisers had, by and large, run the war and conducted diplomacy independently. In Congress, Democrats cheered their president on while the isolationist core of the Republican Party watched his actions without comment: Pearl Harbor had chastened them into silence. The president planned to accept UNRRA by executive agreement, and he had not intended to submit this international agreement to Congress for approval. When word reached Congress that the first major postwar policy decision, one involving the commitment of American treasure to foreign lands, was to be made without congressional participation, trouble arose. The Democrats grumbled, but the Republicans, led by their foreign policy spokesman, Senator Arthur Vandenberg, threatened to make this a major political issue. The administration's original plan was scrapped, and the UNRRA program was submitted to Congress. In the process, a pattern of close consultation was initiated between high-level executive officials and the committee and party leaders of Congress — a pattern that kept foreign policy out of the 1944 and 1948 presidential elections, maintained a consistent foreign policy after the Republi-

[10] Gabriel Almond refers to the public mood in much the same way; however, the policy implications of this mood are much less clear or direct than are the implications of the congressional mood. One might speculate that the congressional mood is a representation of the public mood, but there are pitfalls in postulating such a connection. See Almond's *The American People and Foreign Policy* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1950).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cans gained control of Congress in 1946, and procured the complex legislation creating the Marshall Plan in record time. This period culminated in the Senate's approval of the NATO treaty, an unprecedented American commitment. Contemporary observers called this the era of "bipartisan foreign policy," during which politics stopped "at the water's edge."[11]

The indispensable Vandenberg, who brought together congressmen with widely divergent philosophies, left the Senate by 1950. Recriminations over who "lost" China began, and when the Korean War went badly and MacArthur was dismissed for insubordination, matters came to a head. The Korean War became "Truman's war," foreign aid became vulnerable to huge cuts, and Truman's commitment of troops to Europe became a major bone of contention. Foreign policy issues were heavily involved in the 1952 presidential campaign. This was the phase of *antagonism*.[12]

While these conflicts between the president and Congress had a strongly partisan undertone, there was also an important measure of institutional rivalry involved. This was illustrated early in 1953, after the election of President Eisenhower, when Republican Senator John W. Bricker introduced a proposal to amend the Constitution and was joined by sixty-three cosponsors, of whom forty-three were Republicans and nineteen were Democrats. The Bricker Amendment was designed to ensure that Congress would have the responsibility and authority to pass judgment on international agreements entered into by the president. After a year of intense senatorial debate in committee and on the floor, the Bricker Amendment failed to achieve the necessary two-thirds majority by a single vote (60-31). The amendment both symbolized and brought to an end this period of antagonism in legislative-executive relations.[13]

With the election of Eisenhower and a marginally Republican Congress, it was the Democrats' turn to remain silent and sus-

[11] For a detailed account of this era, see H. Bradford Westerfield, *Foreign Policy and Party Politics: Pearl Harbor to Korea* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1955). Also Dean Acheson, "Arthur Vandenberg and the Senate," in Nelson Polsby, ed., *Congressional Behavior* (New York: Random House, 1971), pp. 93-104. A recent look at this period is in Henry W. Berger, "Bipartisanship, Senator Taft and the Truman Administration," *Political Science Quarterly*, Summer, 1975.

[12] Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation* (New York: Norton, 1969), pp. 249-724, covers this period extensively. On the MacArthur episode, see John Spanier, *The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1959.)

[13] A good summary of the legal and political complexities that developed over the Bricker Amendment can be found in the *Congressional Quarterly Almanac* (Washington: Congressional Quarterly, 1954), pp. 254-262. A recent reevaluation of this episode can be found in Stephen Garret, "Foreign Policy and the American Constitution: The Bricker Amendment in Contemporary Perspective," *International Studies Quarterly*, June 1972, pp. 187-220.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

picious. Briefly it appeared that the era of accommodation would return. In 1954 Eisenhower sought the advice of congressional leaders about American military intervention in Indochina,[14] and later that year Democrats from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee were involved in the negotiation of the Manila Pact. But after the Democrats regained control of Congress in 1955, consultations declined in number and importance. Thus began the period of congressional *acquiescence,* mistakenly equated by some with the earlier period of accommodation. The major program innovations of the 1940s became annual events, Congress routinely slashing from 10 per cent to 20 per cent of each program's budget. These cuts and a variety of restrictive amendments to the foreign aid bill constituted Congress's main contribution to foreign policy.[15]

This pattern accelerated during the Kennedy presidency and reached its high-water mark under President Johnson.[16] No congressmen were consulted or even informed of the plans for escalation in Vietnam.[17] After the bombing began and ground troops were committed in early 1965, Congress appropriated funds for the war under pressure to "support the boys overseas." The symbol of congressional acquiescence was the "area resolution," which three successive presidents used to obtain rubber-stamp approval from Congress for proposed or accomplished presidential actions.[18]

The chief function of Congress became the legitimizing of presidential decisions. With the end of the Korean War, a national consensus had developed around the policy of containing communism to its extant borders. Nearly all members of Congress were partners to this consensus, and all three presidents of the era worked within its assumptions. Thus, Congress agreed with most specific presidential decisions and reassured the public that the president's

[14] Chalmers Roberts, "The Day We Didn't Go to War," *The Reporter,* September 14, 1954; reprinted in Marcus G. Raskin and Bernard B. Fall, eds., *The Viet Nam Reader* (New York: Vintage, 1965), pp. 57-65.

[15] Much of this period is covered by Holbert Carroll, *The House of Representatives and Foreign Affairs* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966). On restrictive amendments and their impact, see John D. Montgomery, *The Politics of Foreign Aid* (New York: Praeger, 1962), pp. 128-134, 197-242.

[16] For example, in spite of Kennedy's uneasiness with the Bay of Pigs operation, no effort was made to consult with knowledgeable leaders of Congress; it was only inadvertently that Senator Fulbright was able to get his views in at the last minute. For an account of this episode, see Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days* (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett, 1965), pp. 219-249.

[17] The Pentagon Papers reveal how much was done without consulting or informing Congress. On the Tonkin Gulf resolution and the subsequent escalations, see Hugh Gallagher, *Advise and Obstruct: The Role of the U.S. Senate in Foreign Policy Decisions* (New York: Delacorte, 1969), chap. 8.

[18] Area resolutions were obtained on Formosa and the Middle East by President Eisenhower, on Berlin and Cuba by President Kennedy, and on Vietnam and Latin America by President Johnson.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

actions were necessary and consistent with the consensus. On some occasions, the Congress did deliberate upon and then agree with presidential plans, but all too often the Congress simply swallowed its lingering doubts, preferring not to share the responsibility of decision with the president.

The executive branch, however, encouraged the Congress in its evasion of responsibility. The basic legislation required for the general policy of containment had been passed in the late 1940s; the executive was no longer totally dependent upon congressional assistance and quickly became less solicitous of congressional involvement. Contributing to this desire for independence was the growth in the size and confidence of the executive branch. The assistance of "mere congressmen" was no longer felt to be necessary. This sense of executive superiority increased year by year, making a quantum leap under Kennedy.[19] Most congressmen shared in this sense of their own inferiority, and no leaders or respected men of experience emerged to counter it after the passing of Vandenberg. No one in the executive branch did anything to encourage the development of new congressional foreign policy leaders who could join in the formulation of policy. Without individual leaders, "Congress" became an irrelevant abstraction, and for the most part, members of Congress preferred things this way. Responsibility was avoided for often risky foreign policy decisions, while credit for any resultant success could be shared. Policy problems could be criticized or investigated after the fact.

Throughout 1966 and 1967 a growing number of congressmen became uneasy about American policy in Vietnam.[20] A new era of legislative-executive relations began with the so-called Fulbright hearings on Vietnam, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Sensing a major policy failure, the only way for a Congress trained in acquiescence to react was through a series of investigative hearings. In some forums (the Fulbright hearings) many senators criticized the overemphasis on military force, while in others (the Senate Armed Services Preparedness Subcommittee

[19] For an undocumented but probably accurate characterization of the hubris that permeated the executive branch under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, see David Halberstam, *The Best and the Brightest* (New York: Fawcett/Crest, 1972).

[20] Two unpublished papers by Harvard undergraduates trace the rise of the anti-war movement in Congress: Ira H. Zalesnik, "Structure and Influence in the United States Congress: Voting Patterns on the Viet Nam Conflict" (senior honors thesis in government, Harvard College, 1974) and David H. Solomon, "To Be a Dove or Not to Be: New England Congressmen and the Viet Nam War" (junior honors tutorial paper in government, Harvard College, 1975).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

hearings) senators criticized what was seen as excessive restraint in the use of military force.[21]

In spite of these hearings, nearly all congressmen continued to support the president. With several hundred thousand American troops in the war zone, and with American casualties mounting daily, it was politically impossible for most congressmen to express their doubts or opposition in public. Thus, I have differentiated this era from the earlier period of antagonism, calling it a period of *ambiguity* in legislative-executive relations.

As tension gradually increased between the branches, a new issue involving procedural rather than substantive questions began to develop. A feeling grew that, regardless of the merits of the war, the Congress had not been and was not being consulted properly by the president on the major commitments, policies and strategies involved. Thus, in late 1967, a "National Commitments Resolution" was unanimously reported to the Senate by the Foreign Relations Committee. It was passed in June 1969 by a 76-to-19 vote. The resolution read:

> Whereas accurate definition of the term 'national commitment' in recent years has become obscured: Now, therefore, be it
>
> Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that a national commitment by the United States to a foreign power necessarily and exclusively results from affirmative action taken by the executive and legislative branches of the United States Government through means of a treaty convention, or other legislative instrumentality specifically intended to give effect to such a commitment.[22]

As the vote indicates, considerable agreement was possible on a matter involving the institutional prerogatives of Congress in relation to the executive branch.

The invasion of Cambodia in the spring of 1970, without any prior consultation of Congress, brought the ambiguity to a sharp end and initiated a period of *acrimony*. The Cambodian action fo-

[21] Among the main Fulbright hearings were the following: U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *FY 1966 Supplemental Foreign Economic Aid Authorization, Hearings,* January 28-February 18, 1966, 89th Congress, 2nd Session; U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *The Responsibilities of the United States as a Great Power, Hearings,* January 30-February 21, 1967, 90th Congress, 1st Session; and U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *National Commitments, Hearings,* August 1-23, 1967, 90th Congress, 1st Session. The Armed Services Committee hearings were U.S. Senate, Investigating Subcommittee on Preparedness of the Committee on Armed Services, *The Air and Sea War in Viet Nam, Hearings,* August 9-29, 1967, 90th Congress, 1st Session.

[22] Senate report no. 129 (see fn. 2, above). Senate Resolution 85, reported and passed in 1969, was identical to Senate Resolution 151, which was reported following the national commitments hearings in August 1967. The Tet offensive in February 1968, President Johnson's March 1968 decision not to run for reelection, the subsequent presidential campaign, and a brief honeymoon period for President Nixon all caused delay, and no action was taken on the earlier resolution.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cused interbranch controversy on the continuing involvement of American military forces in Vietnam, a substantive issue. For the next three years, numerous amendments — McGovern-Hatfield, Cooper-Church and Nedzi-Whalen, to name a few — were offered to various bills in order to limit the president's power to keep or use combat forces in Indochina. Many of these passed the Senate only to fail in the House, but the Special Foreign Assistance Act of 1971 stipulated that none of the funds authorized or appropriated pursuant to that act, or to any other, "may be used to finance the introduction of United States ground combat troops into Cambodia, or to provide United States advisors to or for Cambodian military forces in Cambodia."[23] Congress had begun to eliminate American participation in the Indochina war.

While Congress remained sharply divided on this substantive controversy, the information that came out of it increasingly united the Congress in opposition to the executive around what came to be seen as a crucial issue of institutional integrity — congressional access to information. Great concern was prompted when Senator Symington's Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad reported in 1970 that a number of important commitments or understandings with foreign nations had been reached without the knowledge or participation of Congress.[24] Concern heightened as it was discovered that extensive bombing operations had been conducted in Laos and Cambodia without formal notification of Congress or any of its members.[25] A majority that could not be formed around substantive issues was formed around this issue of institutional integrity. A bill requiring the prompt reporting of executive agreements to Congress was passed, and specific reporting requirements began to proliferate in regular legislation.[26] Action on a bill clarifying the war powers of the president and Congress began, and after two years of work a war powers resolution passed in November 1973, over the president's veto.[27] And in August 1973, the original substantive issue was addressed as the

[23] 84 Statutes 1943 (January 5, 1971).

[24] The Symington subcommittee conducted hearings in 1969 and 1970 and made a report to the Senate on December 21, 1970, entitled *Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad.*

[25] U.S. House, Committee on Armed Services, *Bombing in Cambodia, Hearings,* May 8, 1973, 93rd Congress, 1st Session.

[26] See U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Required Reports to Congress in the Foreign Affairs Field,* 93rd Congress, 1st Session, 1973.

[27] An "insider's account" of the passage of the war powers resolution can be found in Thomas F. Eagleton, *War and Presidential Power: A Chronicle of Congressional Surrender* (New York: Liveright, 1974).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

president was prohibited from using American military forces in Indochina in the future. By 1975, procedural and substantive disputes had arisen in virtually every area of foreign policy.

This crisis in legislative-executive relations, one potentially as serious for American foreign policy as any that might develop abroad, is the legacy of the earlier period of congressional acquiescence. Congressional noninvolvement is possible only when two conditions are fulfilled. There must be a high level of consensus in the nation over the general purposes of policy, and the specific means chosen by the president to pursue those purposes must be generally successful. Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s little thought was given to the likelihood that one or the other of these conditions would eventually fail. Thus, the close consultative relationship of the 1940s was allowed to lapse, and Congress acted only as the legitimizer of presidential policy. The president and Congress must share the blame for this, even though the dependence of the earlier relationship upon certain historical circumstances and personalities probably made its collapse inevitable.

Successive presidents and the national security bureaucracy, however, must be accorded particular blame for taking advantage of the situation. An increasingly closed political system was developed in the executive branch.[28] Key information and many intraexecutive policy disputes were kept out of the purview of Congress on the expectation that Congress would meekly accept whatever was decided. This did not hold true for all issue areas and at all times, but it was certainly the dominant trend from the late 1950s until the present day. No one considered what the consequences might be when either the national consensus collapsed or a major policy failure occurred.

Unfortunately, both of these transpired in the last ten years. Espoused in the beginning only by a small, loud minority, the view that America's Vietnam policy has been a disastrous failure is now the prevailing wisdom. In the short run, this is indisputable. During President Nixon's first term the consensus in favor of rigid anticommunism and of communism's forward containment fell apart. With much fanfare over the new "spirit of detente," presidential policy accelerated this trend as accommodations were sought with Peking and Moscow. Questions that were not considered legitimate before could now be asked: Are all the Cold War alliances still

[28] Westerfield gives a prophetic description of this system. ("Congress and Closed Politics . . .," pp. 737-753.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

necessary? Can't American military power be pulled back from many areas of the world, cutting the defense budget accordingly?

As in the Korean War, this confusion and failure in foreign policy was bound to increase tension between the legislative and executive branches. But because of the long period of deference to executive leadership, congressmen also felt a sense of betrayal, a breach of trust, and this legacy of acquiescence increased the tension even more. Tension quickly turned to acrimony as the brazen efforts of Presidents Johnson and Nixon to manipulate and deceive the Congress were uncovered. Congress had been treated as just another target for a public relations "hype"; information had been deliberately withheld, distorted and even falsified in order to maintain the appearance of a rational and successful presidential policy. The Watergate denouement brought about a *Götterdämmerung* of this philosophy, but the damage was done. In December 1974, the secretary of state was reduced to pleading that he and the president were not engaged in a confidence game with Congress and the American people.[29]

IV

In light of these historical developments, can a pattern of legislative-executive interaction be discerned that will be conducive to the formulation and conduct of wise foreign policy in the future? The pattern of acrimony has the least to recommend it. A high level of legislative-executive conflict leads either to policy stalemate or policy inconsistency, leaving foreign nations uncertain as to the credibility of the American position, if there is one. Some observers, desirous of a significant American withdrawal from overseas commitments, advocate a pattern of legislative-executive acrimony as furthering that end. To achieve this goal, some would have Congress institutionalize acrimony by insisting upon a strict, literal reading of the foreign policy powers granted under the Constitution.[30] This standard for legislative-executive interaction is laden with danger. Besides reading more clarity into the constitutional division of powers than is actually there, it imposes a dangerous inflexibility upon

[29] News conference by Secretary Kissinger in December 1974; excerpted on NBC evening news.

[30] Many lawyers have argued for a return to strict constructionism. Particularly adamant in this regard are Francis D. Wormuth, "The Viet Nam War: The President Versus the Constitution," in Richard A. Falk, ed., *The Vietnam War and International Law* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1969), vol. 2, pp. 711-807, and Raoul Berger, *Executive Privilege: A Constitutional Myth* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the conduct of policy.[31] Time and effort better spent on a discussion of policy is dissipated in contentious and frankly tedious and circular arguments over whose right it is to do what. Policy stalemate or no policy at all is the inevitable result. Even for those who desire some U.S. withdrawal from overseas commitments, this cannot be a satisfactory result. At some point a desirable policy or activity will be hampered by interbranch acrimony and the uncertainties it entails. Certainly legislative-executive conflict over military aid to Turkey, the Panama Canal treaty and, most recently, over the control and use of the CIA illustrate this danger. Acrimony should be rejected as a model for the future.

The pattern of antagonism, involving a lower level of conflict, differs from that of acrimony largely in degree. Discussion and good-faith bargaining can still go on between the president and Congress. It has the potential advantage of stimulating serious national debate on policy options, thereby clarifying them for policymakers, and it can help educate the public as well. Nevertheless, extended antagonism may have unpredictable results. Passions once aroused can lead to acrimony and policy stalemate. While it may be healthy for American foreign policy to undergo occasional periods of legislative-executive antagonism, this is not a good model for the long haul. A similar conclusion can be drawn from the period of ambiguity, which differs historically from the phase of antagonism chiefly in the weakness of the congressional challenge.

The pattern of congressional acquiescence was once highly touted in both political and academic circles.[32] In the post-World War II period, with its rapid communications, frequent crises and nuclear weapons, it became imperative that policy be conducted with purpose, efficiency, flexibility and dispatch. Only central presidential direction could ensure these qualities, so it was asserted. At the very least, it was argued, the president is the most likely to make the correct decisions; therefore, the Congress should provide him with a strong base of support. It is a truism that leadership by one man or by the few is more efficient than leadership by the many.

[31] One respected source on the constitutional division of power in foreign policy concludes that the constitution is at best ambiguous, constituting an "invitation to struggle" for the two branches; see Edward S. Corwin, *The President: Office and Powers* (New York: New York University Press, 1957), p. 171. Similar is Justice Jackson's notable "zone of twilight" argument in his majority opinion on *Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. et al.* v. *Sawyer*, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).

[32] For example, see Henry Steele Commager, "Presidential Power: The Issue Analyzed," *New York Times Magazine*, January 14, 1951, and J. William Fulbright, "American Foreign Policy in the 20th Century under an 18th Century Constitution," *Cornell Law Quarterly*, Fall 1961. Most of these observers have since recanted from their earlier stand as "highflying Presidential prerogative men," to borrow Corwin's phrase.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

But as already noted, presidential dominance in America has been heavily dependent upon the prior existence of a broad foreign policy consensus and upon the continued success of presidentially sponsored programs in achieving the goals of that consensus. The consequences when either condition fails have been severe. This in itself should encourage the avoidance of this pattern; in any event, no foreign policy consensus seems likely to emerge in the short- or middle-range future.

These problems alone are sufficient to make acquiescence undesirable, but there are other equally important reasons to reject it. Not to encourage Congress to continuously involve itself in foreign policy is to squander a valuable pool of experience, knowledge and leadership. Members of Congress have usually spent more time grappling with national policy issues than have the president and his appointed assistants. The expertise of some congressmen rivals that of career national security and foreign policy bureaucrats, and the political wisdom of the Congress with regard to the public mood is unmatched by the presidential advisers in the executive branch, none of whom undergoes the periodic test of election. Some have persuasively argued that the president himself, because of the nature of his office, is inferior to congressmen in this regard.[33] It is precisely this type of experienced political advice that recent presidents have not received. A pattern of congressional acquiescence can thus reduce the responsiveness of the nation's foreign policy to its people, and this principle is at least as important in a democracy as any question of efficiency. If this democratic requirement is ignored in a quest for secrecy, flexibility or simple efficiency, the consequence can be a sharp rift in policy when the public reacts to an eventual failure of leadership.[34] This was the damaging result of the unilateral and secretive presidential decision-making of Vietnam.

The accommodation model has also won high praise in the past. Usually this pattern has been referred to as "bipartisan foreign policy," which is an appropriate term to use whenever the Congress is controlled by one party and the presidency by the other.[35] Such a situation has existed for fifteen of the thirty years since 1945. To encompass both the latter situation and that in which the president and Congress are of the same party, however, it is

[33] George Reedy, *The Twilight of the Presidency* (Cleveland: World, 1970).

[34] Almond notes the dangerous volatility of the public mood when confronted with policy failure.

[35] Westerfield, in *Foreign Policy and Party Politics* . . ., suggested the phrase "extrapartisanship" as a more accurate term for general use.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

useful to speak of a general pattern of legislative-executive accommodation.

There is a serious lack of clarity in the terms "bipartisanship" or "accommodation." They can refer to an end being sought — national unity — or to certain procedures designed to attain that end. When either term is used in the first sense, it is usually held up by the president as a symbol in order to obtain congressional acquiescence. This is not the meaning attached to accommodation here. The accommodation model involves the use of certain procedures designed to produce agreement between the two branches. It does not necessarily require a broader consensus on the nation's larger foreign policy goals. The essence of these procedures is regular consultation between the president or other executive decision-makers and members of Congress designated by the Congress. Also, to the extent possible, consultation should occur before the policy decision is made. Finally, Congress or its designated representatives should receive all information pertinent to decisions under consideration and any other information it may request.[36]

Such a relationship can have a salutary impact upon foreign policy: it is more likely that the nation will present a united front in negotiations abroad; foreign policy is minimized as a domestic political issue; the legislative process is speeded up; and necessary secrecy is maintained more easily. These are major advantages, but there are disadvantages as well. The root of the problem is the unavoidable ambiguity involved. It is expected that unity between Congress and the president will result, not simply that certain procedures will be followed. Thus, when the president and leaders of Congress engage in these procedures, there is pressure upon everyone to agree in the end. This pressure is felt most intensely by the congressional participants, and subsequently by the Congress as a whole, since the president issues the final instructions to executive agencies and is empowered to speak to foreign governments for the United States.

Such pressure is harmful in two ways. First, those members of Congress who are consulted may be co-opted and lose their freedom of action — becoming, in effect, ambassadors to Congress. The rest of the membership, or at least the majority, will feel compelled to go along, thereby co-opting Congress as well. The political wisdom, foreign policy expertise and deliberative capabilities of

[36] A full discussion of all that is involved in the accommodation model is beyond the scope of this paper. For that, I refer the reader to the excellent and still definitive work by Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., *Bipartisan Foreign Policy: Myth or Reality* (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 1957).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Congress thus may not be used, increasing the danger that important policy factors will not be considered adequately. Second, no matter what the reservations of Congress and its leaders, they will feel constrained in their ability to continue any debate once a decision has been made. In crisis situations this problem will not be severe, since some course of action must be taken quickly, regardless of anyone's reservations. Congress has shown itself willing to defer to the president in the necessity of such situations. But in other decisions — and this means most decisions — Congress may be unable to develop the desired congressional and public debate on a given issue.

V

An essential difficulty with the accommodation model, we have seen, is the expectation of legislative-executive unity. Yet the procedures for consultation are valuable in their own right, since they promote mutual trust and understanding and enhance Congress's capacity for constructive participation. Thus, for the future I advocate a legislative-executive relationship based upon the procedures of the period of accommodation but without its concomitant insistence upon complete and public unity. This entails a realization by both the president and Congress that foreign policy decisions should be the outcome of a political process. Differences of opinion should be expected to arise from time to time and to persist, perhaps to the extent of causing periods of antagonism, but disagreement and periodic antagonism should be viewed as healthy tests of policy through earnest debate. At times like these both the president and Congress must continue to accept the legitimacy of the other's concerns and, more importantly, of the other's continued participation. I call this the model of *competitive acceptance* — competitive in that it allows for and encourages debate between the two branches over the ends or means of policy; acceptance in that both branches acknowledge the importance and legitimacy of the other's participation.

Because the president holds the position of strength on most foreign policy decisions, the major burden rests on him to develop this pattern of behavior. Most important is an acknowledgement of Congress's "right to know." The president, and with his encouragement the executive bureaucracy, must allow the committees or individuals designated by Congress timely and complete access to any information pertinent to current policy decisions and operations. Provision of such information on the initiative of the executive branch would be most desirable, but at the very least the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

executive must be responsive to congressional requests. To ensure that the president's interpretation of the situation is accurately understood, the president and his political subordinates should consult regularly with designated members of Congress. These should be legitimate consultations, not merely briefing sessions.

A variety of questions arise here: What about the security of sensitive information and decisions? Won't the inclusion of Congress increase the likelihood of potentially damaging leaks? The underlying assumption of the need-to-know principle is undoubtedly correct; that is, the greater the number of individuals informed, the greater the chance of leaks, either malicious or inadvertent. Nevertheless, the great desirability of stability and consistency in American foreign policy dictates that risks be taken in this regard. Congress does have procedures and facilities for safeguarding sensitive information, and I would argue additionally that Congress is no more likely to be a source of damaging leaks than is the executive bureaucracy, particularly if the Congress feels that information is genuinely being shared. Much of the congressional leaking in the recent past has occurred simply to illustrate to the public how much was being withheld and thus to gain public support for further disclosures.

The real problem is not security but the political connotations of access to information. Information is a critical resource, and leaks occur to promote and strengthen a particular viewpoint, not to damage national security. For the same reason, information is hoarded and kept from political opponents. Is it not naive, then, one might ask, to expect the president, and particularly the executive agencies, to give up one of their political advantages and freely provide congressmen with information, unless it suits their purposes? This point has considerable validity; indeed, it is this problem that guarantees the president a continuing place as initiator in any future era of "competitive acceptance." It is up to Congress to see that it is not overwhelmed by this disadvantage; it must take the initiative in seeking information, both from the executive branch and from sources of its own. In such an era, therefore, the many reporting requirements passed in the last few years will be highly useful.

Another problem is the possibility that the president, after consulting with Congress and failing to win their support might choose not to "waste his time" in this manner again, or he might decide to consult only with congressmen he knows will agree with him. There is nothing to prevent this from happening, and I would not like to see a statutory procedure for consultation established in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

an attempt to avoid it. A rigid schedule or format for consultation would routinize such meetings into briefing sessions and increase the danger of congressmen being co-opted. I would argue that it is in the president's own interest to consult regularly and before he makes important decisions. It is never the case that only one decision matters. Presidents must return continually to Congress for consideration and support of their policies, and it would be foolhardy to alienate Congress simply because of a failure to reach agreement in one situation.

The Congress, for its part, must do two things. First, it must make sure that it is organized and equipped to play a significant role in foreign policy. Recent developments suggest that it is doing so. The war powers resolution and other reporting requirements establish a certain minimum level of information that Congress must receive and, in some cases, force the Congress to act upon it within a set period of time. Some of the reforms undertaken by the Ninety-third Congress should increase congressional capabilities: e.g., the improved jurisdictional divisions among committees in the House, the new budget committees and Congressional Budget Office, and the general increase in authorized staff. The commitment of the House Foreign Affairs Committee — newly renamed the International Relations Committee — to involve itself in more than the foreign aid program through an invigorated subcommittee system augurs well for the future. (The name change may symbolize its commitment to an enlarged role.) Congressmen in general are paying more attention to foreign affairs; the interdependence of foreign and domestic policy has never been clearer.

One weakness is present in the current Congress, though. Both chambers, particularly the House of Representatives, are groping for new patterns of institutional leadership, and in the Ninety-fifth Congress both will select a new group of leaders. The current membership is highly individualistic, and the president faces a formidable problem in deciding how to deal with them. Congress must eventually select new leaders whom it will trust as its representatives in the vital consultations with the executive branch. Until this transitional period passes, congressional participation may be hampered. This fragmentation is not entirely a weakness, however. Congress's multiple points of leadership and influence are a source of great strength. No inflexible dogmas can be imposed upon the nation by a non-existent unitary congressional leadership; in this regard, there is more danger from the presidency. Multiple points of leadership in Congress are valuable, since new ideas and perspec-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tives should always be surfacing. Congress's new leadership should be careful not to damage this valuable asset.

Second, the Congress must accept and support the legitimacy of strong presidential leadership in three specific situations, so long as the president acts in good faith and informs the Congress of his activities in a timely fashion. (1) The president's role as the nation's chief negotiator must be respected. Considerable flexibility is needed and should be granted in ongoing negotiations. (2) In severe crisis situations the president should be permitted to make the critical final decisions, and if time does not allow this, consultations should be minimized with the consent of both branches. This does not mean that presidential decisions made in time of crisis must be supported indefinitely or that Congress should allow the president alone to decide what is or is not a crisis, thereby justifying reduced congressional participation. Congress's right to make an independent judgment will always remain. (3) The president's constitutional role as commander in chief should be respected; the president has the independent power to deploy the forces authorized by Congress as circumstances dictate. But this does not grant a presidential prerogative to engage the nation in new commitments simply through the deployment of forces. The reporting and consultation provisions of the War Powers Act must be observed scrupulously. Again, the Congress must be continuously watchful of its own responsibility to participate.

VI

Is an era of competitive acceptance likely in the future? Three points are relevant here. First, no matter what interbranch relationship is developed, it is clear that the congressional presence in foreign policy is here to stay. For a variety of reasons, Congress appears determined to assert itself and not to allow the pattern of acquiescence to reemerge. The failure of executive-determined foreign policy in the past has increased the confidence of our congressmen in the belief that they can do at least as well. No longer is there faith in executive infallibility. The perception of a compelling national security threat, once held throughout the nation but particularly in Congress, has largely disappeared, and today Congress is less likely to defer to the president simply because it is too risky to do otherwise. Second, the increasing linkage between domestic and foreign economic questions should give Congress a prominent role. Traditionally, the Congress, being responsive to domestic pressures

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and concerns, has paid considerable attention to America's foreign economic policy. Given these factors, Congress cannot be ignored or avoided by the executive branch. If such an approach is tried, the result can only be a continuation of acrimony.

What about the attitude of the president and the executive branch? Can we expect them to be amenable to a relationship of competitive acceptance? The Ford administration's attitude was ambiguous. In his State of the Union message, President Ford announced a policy of "communication, conciliation, compromise and cooperation" and pledged to act "in the closest consultation with Congress as we face delicate situations and troubled times throughout the globe." At the same time, however, he stressed heavily that the "execution of foreign policy is the responsibility of the President."[37] Secretary of State Kissinger in a speech on January 24, 1975, at first seemed to call for a return to the pattern of accommodation, which "insured the success of the historic post-war American initiatives and sustained our foreign policy for two decades thereafter." But he went on to say:

> On behalf of the President, I invite the Congress to a new national partnership in the conduct of our foreign policy. Together with new conceptions of foreign policy, we must define new principles of executive-legislative relations — principles which reconcile the unmistakable claims of congressional supervision and the urgent requirements of purposeful American world leadership. . . . Specifically, the Administration will strive to evoke the advice and consent of the Congress in its broadest sense.[38]

The rhetoric is ambiguous. Some of it suggests that President Ford and Secretary Kissinger would have liked most to return to the old pattern of accommodation; some of it implies acceptance of a relationship similar to the ideal model proposed here.

The actions of the Ford administration offered even less encouragement and indicated that old styles of presidential behavior die hard. Few operational changes occurred to back up administration rhetoric. The State Department was not encouraged to give up its old approach of looking upon congressional activity as unfortunate interference and wishing that it would go away.[39] As disaster in South Vietnam came closer, a number of congressmen complained that no consultations were held. Behavior characteristic of inter-

[37] Reported in *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, January 18, 1975, pp. 140-143.

[38] Kissinger's speech, "A New National Partnership," was presented before the Los Angeles World Affairs Council; the text may be found in the *Department of State Bulletin*, February 17, 1975, pp. 197-204.

[39] Robert A. Pastor, "Coping with Congress's Foreign Policy," *Foreign Service Journal*, December 1975, pp. 15-18.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

branch acrimony continued as bills were introduced in Congress to place statutory limits on the president's discretion. The *Mayaguez* incident, too, revealed that the president still had the propensity to treat consultation simply as a duty to inform. Admittedly, the president perceived his decision time to be short, but many members of Congress felt he could have consulted more than he did.[40]

These difficulties reflected a legacy that the Ford administration inherited. The suspicion and acrimony engendered by Vietnam afflicted the president and his secretary of state, and they made one last try to extend America's involvement there. But to my mind there was, and is, a more enduring problem, one that transcends personalities. For thirty years presidents have been used to getting their way with Congress on nearly all important matters. An expectation of congressional docility combined with a desire to continue the tradition of strong presidential foreign policy is hard to overcome. These attitudes will only dissipate with the passage of time, as the unwillingness of Congress to stop "meddling" in traditionally presidential concerns becomes apparent.

This leads to the third factor that will influence the future legislative-executive relationship — the outcome of the 1976 presidential election. The presidential campaign involved foreign policy issues only sporadically; the danger that previous interbranch acrimony would stimulate partisan bitterness in the campaign did not materialize. In spite of occasional lapses into irresponsibility by both candidates, sharp disagreements on the fundamentals of American policy did not occur. The campaign did not stoke the fires of interparty, and thus interbranch, acrimony. Indeed, with the election of a new president, Jimmy Carter, and a new post-Vietnam Congress, it is likely that many of the old suspicions will quickly fade away. It will be possible for new leaders in both branches to create a relationship that accepts the desirability of healthy competition between these branches. The common party affiliation of the president and the congressional majority will contribute to this end. This is one of the most positive aspects of the outcome of the 1976 election.

There is nothing automatic about the emergence of this new era, however. With the same party in control of both branches, it will be all too easy for the Congress to become a presidential cheerleader again — losing interest in asking independent questions, in offering policy alternatives or in sharing the responsibility for policy formulation. The new Democratic leadership in the House

[40] See the report on congressional reactions in the *New York Times*, May 15, 1975.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and Senate must resolve to hold a Democratic president to the same standards of consultation and accountability that were developed for Republican administrations. Otherwise, important foreign policy decisions will again be made in the confines of the Oval Office by a president and his personal, intensely loyal aides. Even worse, this time there would be no Congress controlled by the opposing party to insist that embarrassing questions be answered. Legislative-executive relations would be conducted along the lines of the congressional acquiescence model, with all its eventual consequences.

The reservoir of expertise and experience in the Congress, and its capacity for providing multiple perspectives different from the administration's, must not be lost. This is particularly true in light of the new president's inexperience in foreign affairs. The danger of unwise decisions early in the president's term, a problem that has plagued other presidents, could be minimized if the Congress insists on playing a major role. There is reason for optimism here. The new leaders in both houses of Congress will no doubt be anxious to establish their authority and influence. Thus, they should be sensitive to any signs of presidential arrogance or indifference. The new chairman of the House International Relations Committee, for example, should seek to establish important precedents for prior consultation and access to information in the executive branch.

While the Congress must insist upon its involvement, President Carter must recognize the desirability of congressional input. This means approaching the Congress not merely as the legitimizer of presidential initiatives but as a source of advice prior to presidential decision. President Carter should break the pattern set in the past and risk some increased political vulnerability by allowing the appropriate committees of Congress general access to executive information. The short-term risks of openness will be canceled out by the long-term benefits of informed congressional participation. Responsiveness to the desire of Congress for information and for an opportunity to participate could dispel years of suspicion and enhance the possibility for constructive competition and cooperation over policy.

Here also there are grounds for optimism. In August 1976 Jimmy Carter said:

> The President must also keep the American people informed, especially through the Congress, of all the United States' commitments. There can be no deleterious consequences to keeping the people and Congress informed. If national security is involved on some special issue and it is therefore inadvisable to publicize details, at least Congress must be kept informed.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

. . . If the Congress and the President consult continually and closely on our country's objective needs there will be less political influence exerted on Congress or applied by pressure politics. Congress has a tendency to inject itself into foreign policy when it is not first consulted by the President.[41]

While this statement implies a belief that the chief executive must make the final decisions, it does show a consciousness of the need for and desirability of congressional access to information and prior consultation with the president. Carter began his consultations during the campaign, meeting with a number of committee and party leaders of the Congress on several occasions.[42] All of this suggests a realization on the part of the new president that Congress will not simply acquiesce in a new era of presidential domination. President Carter should be encouraged to follow through on this general belief. Otherwise, the nation will witness the gradual build-up of interbranch suspicion and acrimony once again.

VII

Several concrete steps could be taken early in the Carter administration to indicate the priority given this issue. To ensure that important information is routinely transmitted to Congress at the initiative of the executive branch, and that congressional requests for information are promptly fulfilled, the assistant secretaries for congressional relations in the Departments of Defense and State should be chosen carefully. They should be individuals with a knowledge of and sympathy for the Congress, with experience in Washington politics, and with a belief in the value of congressional participation in policymaking. They should be charged with revitalizing their offices, especially in the State Department, and with working not simply as a constituency service bureau or a public relations-propaganda service directed at the Congress, but as a liaison between the policy views and information needs of the two branches.

To ensure that congressional and presidential perspectives interact at a higher level, one individual on the National Security Council staff or in the Executive Office of the president could be designated congressional liaison officer for international relations. He would see that the appropriate members of Congress are advised of developing policy problems or proposals at the presidential level, and he would seek to bring the ideas and perspectives of our con-

[41] Interview with Jimmy Carter by C. L. Sulzberger, *New York Times*, August 22, 1976.

[42] Richard O. Lyons, "Carter Seeks to Establish Close Ties with Congress," *New York Times*, August 22, 1976.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

gressmen into the president's view as policy options are developed. Such a system would allow direct presidential-congressional consultations to be reserved for important issues, while making certain that each party maintains an ongoing sense of the other's concerns. An excessive number of direct consultations would lead either to their devaluation into briefing sessions or to a reduction of independent judgment among the congressmen involved.

Reforms such as these will facilitate the development of a healthy relationship between the president and Congress, but in the final analysis the instinct of America's new leaders for politically responsible behavior is critical. Without this, no procedural reforms will be sufficient. In the last ten years we have witnessed numerous battles between the Congress and the executive in foreign policy. It is a truism to say that the Constitution is an invitation to this struggle, but nothing in that document requires the struggle to produce interbranch distrust and policy failure. If we have learned anything in these ten years, it is that neither branch of government is the fount of all, or even most, wisdom. A corollary to this is that neither branch should seek to dominate policymaking or deliberately attempt to minimize or exclude the other. The new era in legislative-executive relations in foreign policy must not be another form of closed politics, and it need not be a new partnership. It must mean a new style of legislative-executive competition, or American foreign policy may not exist at all.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE USE AND CONTROL OF EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS: RECENT CONGRESSIONAL INITIATIVES

by Charles J. Stevens

Since World War II, the use of the executive agreement as an instrument of United States foreign policy has greatly increased. According to State Department records, the United States concluded 25 treaties and 9 executive agreements during 1930. In 1968 it entered into 16 treaties and 206 executive agreements. By 1969 the total number of United States commitments stood at 4,882, of which 909 were treaties and 3,973 were executive agreements.[1] The growing number of such instruments in force for the United States and the ratio of executive agreements to treaties have become matters of congressional concern; moreover, executive agreements have become an object of legislative attempts to influence executive initiatives toward foreign governments. Because these agreements serve to define and implement foreign policy, they have become a focus of attention in the current debate over the role of Congress in American foreign relations. The experience of the Vietnam conflict has prompted Congress to become better informed and more influential with regard to international commitments undertaken by the executive branch. Congressional oversight of executive agreements is thus part of a pattern of action that includes passage of the War Powers Resolution, suspension of military aid to Turkey and Angola, and investigation of U.S. foreign intelligence operations. This study, concentrating on the use of executive agreements, examines one of the ways in which Congress has attempted to assert its responsibility for the conduct of foreign relations.

Executive Agreements: Use and Effect

The term "executive agreement" has come to be used in practice as a means of distinguishing treaties, that is, instruments

[1] Marjorie M. Whiteman, compiler, *Digest of International Law* (Washington: GPO, 1970), vol. 14, p. 210.

Charles J. Stevens is Associate Professor of Political Science at Western Carolina University. His area of specialization is international politics, law and organization, and he is currently conducting research on international regulation of weather-modification activities.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

subject to Senate advice and consent for ratification under the Constitution, from other international agreements not submitted to the Senate for that purpose. The distinction is largely one of domestic rather than international legal consequence, since international agreements, by whatever name, form or process of negotiation, may be used to create binding obligations upon the parties to them. It is ultimately the intentions of the states entering into an international agreement that determine the obligations to be created between them. Under international law the United States is bound by its executive agreements as well as its treaties. Furthermore, the duration of an executive agreement is not limited to the life of the administration under which it was concluded any more than a treaty would be.[2]

Executive agreements are not specifically mentioned in the Constitution, although they have been used since the time of Washington's presidency.[3] Their use is governed by international practice and by provisions of the Constitution relating to the conduct of foreign affairs; notably, those empowering the president, as chief executive, to conduct foreign relations, send and receive ambassadors and serve as commander in chief of the armed forces. More specifically, executive agreements can be divided into three categories depending upon the constitutional provisions that authorize and control their execution. First, executive agreements may be made to implement treaties or legislation previously adopted by Congress. Second, they may be concluded subject to subsequent congressional approval by resolution, by reference to the agreement in legislation, or by the appropriation of funds to carry out the terms of the agreement. Third, the president, under his exclusive powers granted by the Constitution, may enter into agreements with foreign executive officers.[4]

---

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 211-212; U.S. House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *International Executive Agreements, Hearings on S. 596, H.R. 14365, and H.R. 14647,* before the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments, 92nd Congress, 2nd Session, 1972, p. 19 (hereafter cited as House Hearings on Executive Agreements); U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Transmittal of Executive Agreements to Congress, Hearings on S. 596,* 92nd Congress, 1st Session, 1971, p. 14 (hereafter cited as Senate Hearings on Executive Agreements); House report no. 1301, 92nd Congress, 2nd Session, 1972, p. 4. See also Everett G. Hopson, "The Executive Agreement in United States Practice," *Air Force JAG Law Review,* Fall 1970.

[3] The Post Office Act of 1792, sec. 26 (1 Statutes 232-239) provided that "the Postmaster General may make arrangements with the postmasters in any foreign country for the reciprocal receipt and delivery of letters and packets, through the post-offices." For examples of early executive agreements, see Wallace McClure, *International Executive Agreements: Democratic Procedure Under the Constitution of the United States* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1941), pp. 25, 35-51.

[4] Department of State, *Foreign Affairs Manual,* October 25, 1974, vol. 11, sec. 721.2.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It has been argued that executive agreements properly so called should be limited to those falling into the third category. Agreements belonging to the first and second categories receive legislative approval at some point in their development and thus might be described more accurately as congressional-executive or legislative-executive agreements.[5] It has been estimated that 97 per cent, or more, of the international agreements other than treaties entered into by the United States in recent decades involve congressional action, and that they are therefore not within the exclusive purview of the executive branch.[6]

Among the more notable recent agreements that have not taken the form of a treaty and thus have not been submitted to the Senate for advice and consent are the following: the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam (1973),[7] the interim agreement with the USSR on the limitation of strategic offensive weapons (1972), and various agreements concerning American use of military bases in Spain, the Azores, Diego Garcia, Bahrain and Iceland. Earlier agreements include those made to implement the Lend-Lease Act of 1941, the Truman Plan of aid to Greece and Turkey, and the Fulbright educational exchange program. United States membership in bodies such as the International Labor Organization and the World Health Organization and the agreement between the United States and the United Nations on the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands have been made in the form of executive agreements submitted for subsequent congressional approval.[8] The Soviet Union and the United States concluded the Litvinov Agreement by an exchange of notes in conjunction with the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1933. This executive agreement was based upon the president's constitutional authority to send and receive ambassadors. In his capacity as commander in chief and principal officer for United States foreign relations, President Roosevelt concluded the destroyer-bases deal with the United Kingdom in 1940. That arrangement took the form of an executive agreement in order to avoid the possibility of rejection by Congress.[9]

Of the executive agreements now in force, numbering in the thousands, many are of considerably less significance than those

[5] Whiteman, vol. 14, pp. 210-211.

[6] Assistant Legal Adviser for Treaty Affairs Charles Bevans, *ibid.*, p. 210.

[7] See Arthur W. Rovine, compiler, *Digest of United States Practice in International Law: 1973* (Washington: GPO, 1974), pp. 188-189.

[8] See examples cited in Daniel P. O'Connell, *International Law* (London: Stevens & Sons, 1965), vol. 1, pp. 227-229.

[9] Whiteman, vol. 14, pp. 243-245; Amy M. Gilbert, *Executive Agreements and Treaties: 1946-1973* (Endicott, N.Y.: Thomas-Newell, 1973), p. 13.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

just enumerated. Routine foreign affairs transactions frequently take place under the provisions of such agreements. Executive agencies, for example, may deal with one another on a government-to-government basis by employing executive agreements.[10]

Statements of support for foreign governments made by officers of the executive branch, while not constituting executive agreements, may erroneously be regarded as such by those who seek to create the impression of an international obligation. In the absence of bilateral defense treaties, such statements have been made with regard to the United States' support of the state of Israel and of former governments in South Vietnam. Reiteration of such policy statements over time does not make them legal commitments binding upon the United States.[11] Some members of Congress believe, however, that President Nixon did make a commitment to President Thieu of South Vietnam in a letter written during the negotiations of the Vietnam peace agreement. In order to encourage South Vietnamese approval of the accords, the American president promised to "respond with full force should the settlement be violated by North Vietnam."[12] Even though such correspondence is not ordinarily construed as an executive agreement, Congress questioned the implications of such presidential assurances when it learned of the exchange of letters some two years later.

At this point the question might well arise as to how it is determined whether a treaty or an executive agreement should be used for a given purpose. McDougal and Lans express the view that, in practice, the two have come to be used interchangeably, and that there are no legal or policy reasons to limit the substitution of one for the other. In their now classic study of treaties and executive agreements, they assert that

> . . . our constitutional law today makes available two parallel and completely interchangeable procedures, wholly applicable to the same subject matters and of identical domestic and international legal consequences, for the consummation of intergovernmental agreements. In addition to the treaty-making procedure, which may — as the nation has found from bitter experience — be subjected to minority control, there is what may be called an "agreement-making procedure," which may operate either under the

[10] Senate Hearings on Executive Agreements, pp. 14, 16; Rovine, pp. 189-191.

[11] Senate report no. 129, 91st Congress, 1st Session, 1969, pp. 26-28.

[12] For material relating to the Nixon-Thieu correspondence, see U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, *Congressional Oversight of Executive Agreements—1975, Hearings on S. 632 and S. 1251,* before the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers, 94th Congress, 1st Session, 1975, pp. 315-326. (Hereafter cited as Senate Hearings on Congressional Oversight, 1975.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

combined powers of the Congress and the President or in some instances under the powers of the President alone.[13]

The executive branch is primarily responsible for determining the procedure and form to be used in concluding international agreements, subject to existing constitutional and statutory requirements. Chapter 700 of the *Foreign Affairs Manual*,[14] developed for the guidance of State Department personnel, incorporates the "Circular 175 Procedure," which covers the negotiation and signature of treaties and other international agreements. Section 721 of "Circular 175" enumerates considerations to be taken into account in determining the nature of an agreement. It does not specify, however, which choice is to be made — treaty or executive agreement — in a given set of circumstances. In any case, a request for authorization to negotiate an international agreement must include a justification for the type of agreement selected. Questions are to be resolved by the secretary of state in consultation with the department's legal adviser and with appropriate congressional leaders and committees. Within the Department of State it is maintained that a precise formula for distinguishing between treaties and other international agreements is impossible. Such a formula would involve defining the entire scope of presidential authority in foreign affairs and that of Congress under the "elastic clause."[15]

Political considerations are often relevant to the form of international agreements, although that fact is rarely acknowledged in official statements. An agreement submitted to the Senate as a treaty for its advice and consent can be blocked by as little as one-third of the members, who may oppose it for any reason. It is sometimes found prudent to avoid drawing attention to international commitments by dispensing with treaty nomenclature and formality; this may be to the advantage of the executive branch or to that of a foreign government with legislative opposition. Conversely, a certain significance not attached to other international agreements may be associated with the conclusion of a full-fledged treaty.

Because the president and Congress share constitutional

[13] Myres S. McDougal and Asher Lans, "Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy," in McDougal and associates, *Studies in World Public Order* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1960), pp. 411-412.

[14] See fn. 4, above.

[15] Whiteman, vol. 14, p. 209; see also the memorandum from George H. Aldrich, Office of the Legal Adviser to the Department of State, to all assistant legal advisers, "Memorandums of Law in Connection with Circular 175 requests," n.d. In Senate hearings on the Case Act, Senator Case suggested that the justification for an agreement prepared by the executive branch should become part of the record and be made available to Congress.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

powers in foreign affairs, there arises periodically a concern over the prerogatives of each and the balance between them. The initiative in such matters often appears to belong to the president, with Congress reacting after the fact. Consequently Congress might be regarded as a restraining device in the foreign policy process. The oversight function that Congress has attempted to apply to executive agreements during the past decade is reminiscent of previous attempts to limit presidential actions in foreign affairs. While the dictatorships of Europe extended their grasp in the late 1930s, for example, isolationist forces in Congress sought to establish a posture of neutrality and nonintervention for the United States. Only with the outbreak of war in 1939 did President Roosevelt succeed in winning a repeal of the arms embargo. By concluding the 1940 destroyer-bases agreement, the president abandoned any pretense of neutrality and avoided seeking congressional authorization for doing so. The neoisolationists of the post-World War II period questioned the commitment of U.S. forces to NATO as a potential infringement of the power of Congress to declare war. In the case of Korea, President Truman actually dispatched American troops without seeking authorization from Congress.[16]

The struggle between Congress and the president over their respective roles in foreign affairs culminated in the debate over the Bricker Amendment. During the period from 1952 to 1957 a series of proposals was put forth in Congress to assure legislative control over the effect of treaties and executive agreements negotiated under presidential auspices. These were embodied in what is commonly referred to as the Bricker Amendment, named after the principal sponsor, Senator John W. Bricker. Several versions and revisions of the proposed constitutional amendment were debated and voted upon by the Senate. The intent of the sponsors was to assure that no treaty or other international agreement contravened the provisions of the Constitution. Consequently these agreements would require implementing-legislation by Congress in order to have the effect of law in the United States.

Opponents argued that a treaty provision that violates the Constitution is *ipso facto* void, making the amendment unnecessary. Moreover, they suggested, the requirement of implementing-legislation to give domestic legal force to executive agreements might offer Congress an opportunity to interfere with presidential prerogatives in the conduct of foreign relations. Advocates of the amendment

[16] Sidney Warren, *The President as World Leader* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), pp. 189-212, 326-329, 337-338.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

were motivated by an opposition to the growing responsibilities that the United States had assumed in international affairs. Agreements concluded under presidential direction were the means by which many of these commitments had been undertaken. It was also argued that the powers of the states under the federal system were being eroded in the process. Membership obligations with regard to the United Nations and NATO, along with the earlier Litvinov and Yalta agreements, were presented as evidence of the undesirable consequences of a foreign policy dominated by the president.[17]

Defense Commitments

As a result of the United States' involvement in Southeast Asia, Congress has again had reason to examine the substance and processes of American foreign policy. One focus of its attention has been military commitments made in the form of executive agreements, some of which were discovered to have been made secretly. While the influence of the traditional isolationist has declined, congressional forces argue the need for constitutional restraints upon the president's foreign policy actions and for broader congressional involvement in the formulation of that policy.

At the beginning of the Ninety-first Congress, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee created an *ad hoc* Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad. Headed by Senator Stuart Symington, the subcommittee undertook a two-year study of "the international military commitments of the United States and their relationship to foreign policy." The subcommittee directed its inquiries toward United States commitments in the Philippines, Laos, Thailand, the Republic of China, Japan and Okinawa, the Republic of Korea, Ethiopia, Morocco and Libya, Europe, Spain and Portugal, Greece, and Turkey. In its final report, the Symington subcommittee recommended that Congress "take a realistic look at the authority of the President to station troops abroad and establish bases in foreign countries." Notwithstanding the general authority contained in treaties and in congressionally authorized programs, it maintained that the United States should neither station its forces nor establish bases abroad without specific, prior authorization from Congress.[18]

[17] See Stephen A. Garrett, "Foreign Policy and the American Constitution: The Bricker Amendment in Contemporary Perspective," *International Studies Quarterly*, June 1972, pp. 187-219. See also Gilbert, pp. 63-77, 193-197.

[18] *Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, by the Subcommittee on Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad*, 91st Congress, 2nd Session, 1970, p. 28.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In the course of its hearings on Ethiopia, the Symington subcommittee learned of an agreement made by the United States in 1953 to train and equip that country's military forces in exchange for the use of defense communication facilities at Kagnew Station near Asmara. By 1960, support was being provided for a 40,000-man Ethiopian force. The cost of that support through 1970 was estimated at $159 million.[19] Terms for supplying this aid to Ethiopia have been included in several executive agreements. While the substance of the agreements had been presented during the course of congressional budget authorization and appropriation proceedings, the documents — classified in some cases — had not been made available to Congress. During his testimony before the Symington subcommittee, David Newsom, assistant secretary of state for African affairs, justified the secrecy of the agreements on the basis that there is "a great sensitivity among heads of state about our releasing private communications we give to them or that they give to us."[20]

Included in 1960 agreement was a provision by which the U.S. government reaffirmed its continuing interest in the security of Ethiopia and its opposition to any activities threatening the territorial integrity of Ethiopia. Under questioning, Newsom asserted that the commitment was limited to a willingness by the United States to use its good offices in the United Nations in the event of an attack upon Ethiopia.[21] Subcommittee members received his explanation with some skepticism. The terms of other agreements made with the Ethiopian government by the Department of State and the Defense Department were made public for the first time at the behest of the subcommittee.

A central consideration in the subcommittee's investigation was the need for legislative control and information concerning commitments, especially those with military implications, made to foreign governments. The executive agreements that formed the basis of the American commitment to Ethiopia were not made in pursuance of treaty obligations and were not submitted for congressional approval except when appropriations were necessary.

Well before the subcommittee completed its investigation and submitted recommendations in a final report, the Senate went on record to define the meaning of "national commitments" and to

---

[19] U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, Hearings,* before the Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, 91st Congress, 2nd Session, 1970, pt. 8, pp. 1883-1886, 1889. (Hereafter cited as Senate Hearings on U.S. Security Agreements.)

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 1900.

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 1904.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

propose a limitation upon their undertaking.[22] Unable to bind the president by its resolution, the Senate nevertheless asserted that Congress must be associated with the executive branch in affirming any national commitment by the United States. A similar resolution had been introduced by Senator Fulbright in 1967, but it was not submitted to the full Senate after President Johnson's speech of March 31, 1968, in order to avoid any interference with the proposed Vietnam peace initiatives.[23] Reaction to the resolution by the Department of State represented a view that it has consistently held toward congressional attempts to oversee executive commitments to foreign states. In a statement submitted to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the State Department said, in part:

> In our view Senate Resolution 85 would tend to detract from efforts at cooperation between the two branches by focusing attention on a statement of policy that does not accurately reflect the constitutional balance between the executive and legislative branches. Furthermore, we think that the policy of Senate Resolution 85 — that the executive branch obtain formal legislative approval to enter into any commitment to a foreign power — would not be workable in practice. Its effect would be to flood the Congress with requests for consent in small as well as important matters and to disrupt seriously the conduct of foreign relations.[24]

During the time that the Symington subcommittee was making its detailed examination of United States security agreements and commitments, the U.S. government negotiated with Spanish authorities concerning American base rights and facilities in Spain. An initial arrangement had been made between the two governments by executive agreement in 1953.[25] The United States thereby acquired use of bases in Spain for the Strategic Air Command, its major deterrent force. In 1963 the agreement was extended for a period of five years; the joint declaration of renewal specified, in part, that

---

[22] Senate Resolution 85 (June 25, 1969) states: "Whereas accurate definition of the term 'national commitment' in recent years has become obscured: Now therefore, be it *Resolved,* That (1) a national commitment for the purpose of this resolution means the use of the armed forces of the United States on foreign territory, or a promise to assist a foreign country, government, or people by the use of the armed forces or financial resources of the United States, either immediately or upon the happening of certain events, and (2) it is the sense of the Senate that a national commitment by the United States results only from affirmative action taken by the executive and legislative branches of the United States Government by means of a treaty, statute, or concurrent resolution of both Houses of Congress specifically providing for such commitment." See Whiteman, vol. 14, pp. 198-200.

[23] Senate report no. 129, 91st Congress, 1st Session, 1969, pp. 1-6.

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 38.

[25] *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements* (Washington: GPO, 1955), vol. 4, p. 1895 (hereafter cited as UST); *Treaties and Other International Acts Series* (Washington: GPO, 1953), no. 2850 (hereafter cited as TIAS).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A threat to either country, and to the joint facilities that each provides for the common defense, would be a matter of common concern to both countries, and each country would take such action as it may consider appropriate within the framework of its constitutional processes.[26]

The State Department repeatedly denied that the declaration constituted a security commitment to Spain.[27] Its wording, however, paralleled that found in defense treaties between the United States and various other countries. In talks between military representatives of the Spanish and American governments late in 1968, General Earle G. Wheeler gave assurances that "by the presence of United States forces in Spain the United States gives Spain a far more visible and credible security guarantee than any written document."[28] While not constituting a legal opinion, the general's statement carried considerable political insight.

A second extension of the 1953 agreement was announced in June 1969,[29] covering the period from September 26, 1968, to September 26, 1970. Since the Spanish had been seeking a more broadly based agreement with the United States, the two-year extension was decided upon to permit the conclusion of a new agreement. Negotiations to that end took place in Washington between Undersecretary U. Alexis Johnson and Spanish Ambassador Jaime Arguelles. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee followed the proceedings by receiving two closed-door briefings from Johnson. The agreement of friendship and cooperation, signed by Secretary of State William Rogers and Spanish Foreign Minister Gregorio López Bravo, replaced the defense agreement of 1953 and its extensions.[30] Under the new agreement, the United States continued its joint-use rights in return for defense assistance to Spain; cooperation was also extended in such fields as education, economics and space exploration.

The announcement of the agreement of friendship and cooperation on August 6, 1970, raised anew the issue of using an executive agreement in place of a treaty. Senator William Fulbright, among others, had urged that it be designated a treaty and be submitted for advice and consent by the Senate. Also involved was the

[26] UST, vol. 14, p. 1406; TIAS, no. 5437.

[27] Senate Hearings on U.S. Security Agreements, pt. 11, pp. 2308, 2390-2391, 2401. Benjamin Welles, in his book *Spain: The Gentle Anarchy* (New York: Praeger, 1965), suggests: "By recognizing belatedly Spain's desire for prestige, the United States had turned the 1953 'tenant-landlord' agreement into a defense partnership, if not a full alliance." (p. 308.)

[28] Senate Hearings on U.S. Security Agreements, pt. 11, p. 2360.

[29] UST, vol. 20, p. 847; TIAS, no. 6699.

[30] UST, vol. 21, p. 1677; TIAS, no. 6924.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

question of whether the United States was making a military commitment to Spain by the terms of the agreement. Undersecretary Johnson insisted that no military commitment to intervene in Spain's behalf was intended by the agreement, and that to submit it for Senate advice and consent would only heighten the implication that a defense commitment was in fact intended and established.[31]

Although the language of the 1963 joint declaration was omitted from the 1970 agreement, the latter continued, in essence, the military arrangements between Spain and the United States that had developed since 1953. In the preamble to chapter 8 of the agreement it was stated that

> . . . both Governments, within the framework of their constitutional processes, and to the extent feasible and appropriate, will make compatible their respective defense policies in areas of mutual interest, and will grant each other reciprocal defense support as [specified].[32]

Speaking for the executive branch, Undersecretary Johnson affirmed that no additional authority or claim could be made for presidential action on the basis of the document as it stood. Under his own authority, the president would, however, be justified in intervening to protect American forces stationed at Spanish bases.[33]

The Spanish accord was related indirectly to the North Atlantic Alliance under article 35 of the former agreement:

> Both Governments consider it necessary and appropriate that the cooperation for defense regulated by this Chapter form a part of the security arrangements for the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas, and to that end they will endeavor to work out by common accord the liaison deemed advisable with the security arrangements for those areas.[34]

Although Spain is not a member of NATO, the Spanish government, with the support of the United States, hopes to be able to join eventually. Other NATO members have objected to Spanish membership because of the nature of its regime. By means of the agreement of friendship and cooperation, however, the United States provided Spain with indirect ties to the NATO structure.

Administration assertions to the contrary notwithstanding, members of Congress remained uncertain as to the American commitments intended or implied by the Spanish agreement. Senator Claiborne Pell's comment is representative of that feeling: "I have

---

[31] U.S. Senate, *Spanish Base Agreement, Hearing*, before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 91st Congress, 2nd Session, 1970, pp. 13-14, 19-20. (Hereafter cited as Senate Hearing on Spanish Base Agreement.)

[32] UST, vol. 21, p. 1677; TIAS, no. 6924.

[33] Senate Hearing on Spanish Base Agreement, pp. 25-27.

[34] UST, vol. 21, p. 1677; TIAS, no. 6924.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

read the agreement quite carefully and it seems to me it is really a masterpiece of draftsmanship because, to my mind, it would permit the dominant branch of Government, be it executive or legislative, to interpret it anyway it wishes."[35]

In order to clarify the understanding of the Senate, Senator Frank Church introduced a resolution affirming that "nothing in said agreement of Friendship and Cooperation between the United States and Spain shall be deemed to be a national commitment by the United States."[36] The resolution was subsequently adopted, making the Senate's viewpoint a matter of public record. In 1974, however, President Nixon and Prince Juan Carlos signed a declaration of principles between Spain and the United States that contained wording closely paralleling that of the 1963 declaration. The more recent document stipulated "that a threat to or an attack on either country would be a matter of concern to both and each country would take such action as it may consider appropriate within the framework of its constitutional processes."[37] The possibility of creating an American defense commitment by presidential declaration remains to be tested in practice.

The Congress, however, did not want to wait for such an eventuality before exercising its role in policy determination. That opportunity arose when an agreement for continued use of the Spanish bases was signed on January 24, 1976. The new arrangement took the form of a treaty of friendship and cooperation between the United States and Spain. This format had been urged by the Spanish government as well as by members of Congress. Unlike the earlier executive agreements that it replaced, the treaty was sent to the Senate for advice and consent. While military provisions constitute an important part of the treaty, the United States continues to deny the existence of a commitment to the defense of Spain.[38]

Transmittal of Executive Agreements to Congress

Since the president takes primary responsibility for the conduct of foreign relations, Congress must rely heavily upon the executive branch to transmit relevant information from its sources. During the Symington investigations of national commitments, the Senate learned for the first time of certain secret agreements made

[35] Senate Hearing on Spanish Base Agreement, p. 36.
[36] Senate Resolution 469, in *Congressional Record* (Washington: GPO, 1970), p. 41167.
[37] The text of the declaration can be found in the *Department of State Bulletin*, August 5, 1974, p. 231.
[38] *New York Times*, January 25, 1976.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

by the president with foreign governments. Since 1950 the secretary of state has been required by law to compile and publish treaties and all other international agreements concluded by the United States each year. Those agreements considered by the executive branch to be of a sensitive nature, however, have not been published. Yet such secret agreements might be the most critical from the standpoint of United States policy and commitments. Congress has therefore considered access to the terms of all executive agreements as a fundamental step in its efforts to oversee their use.[39]

Senator Clifford Case introduced legislation in 1971 that sought to assure the transmittal of all executive agreements to Congress. In that bill, the issues of presidential authority to enter into executive agreements and the necessity for their approval by Congress were not raised. The act, as adopted, requires the secretary of state to "transmit to the Congress the text of any international agreement, other than a treaty, to which the United States is a party" within sixty days of its entry into force.[40]

A similar proposal had been introduced by Senators Homer Ferguson and William Knowland seventeen years earlier. The State Department at that time suggested amendments to the bill which the Foreign Relations Committee agreed to incorporate. No action was taken on the proposal by the full Senate, but it was reintroduced in the next Congress; subsequently it was passed by the Senate on July 11, 1956, but not acted upon in the House. At the time, the measure was endorsed as a "modest alternative to the Bricker amendment."[41]

Appearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1971, John R. Stevenson, legal adviser to the Department of State, recommended that a procedure for transmitting the text of executive agreements not be formalized as a statutory provision. He suggested, rather, that "practical arrangements" be worked out for that purpose between the Department of State and the relevant congressional committees.[42] The terms under which such an arrangement would be implemented were not specified.

It is generally acknowledged that Congress has a need — in fact, the right — to know the terms of agreements with foreign states so that it can exercise its responsibilities in international

[39] Senate report no. 591, 92nd Congress, 2nd Session, 1972, p. 4.
[40] Public Law 92-403; 86 Statutes 619; 1 USC, sec. 112b (1970, supp. 3).
[41] A summary of the bill's legislative history can be found in Senate Hearings on Executive Agreements, p. 5.
[42] *Ibid.*, pp. 60-61.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

affairs.[43] Yet, the executive branch has insisted upon the importance of protecting sensitive or classified agreements from public scrutiny, including congressional access. The determination of classified status for international agreements rests exclusively with the executive branch, permitting more discretion on the part of the president than Congress is willing to accept. Nevertheless, the Case Act included the provision that

> any such agreement the immediate public disclosure of which would, in the opinion of the President, be prejudicial to the national security of the United States shall not be so transmitted to the Congress but shall be transmitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives under an appropriate injunction of secrecy to be removed only upon due notice from the President.[44]

With that proviso, Congress insisted that the full texts of all international agreements other than treaties be submitted within sixty days. Executive departments and agencies were later notified by the Department of State that all instruments specifying rights and obligations of the United States should be forwarded to Congress under the terms of the Case Act.[45] The act was not intended to have retroactive effect for the some 4,360 agreements in force at the time, although it was hoped that the executive branch would make available a complete record of such agreements. In spite of the comprehensive requirement of the legislation, the Department of State's legal adviser held out the possibility that a president might feel compelled to resort to the doctrine of executive privilege in order to justify withholding information that related to international agreements.[46] Furthermore, the White House reiterated that the act could not be intended to interfere with the president's authority in foreign affairs.[47]

After two days of hearings by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Case Bill was approved and sent to the floor where it passed by a vote of 81 to 0 on February 16, 1972.[48] The following day it was referred to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, whose Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Develop-

---

[43] See David M. Sale, "The Legal Basis upon Which Congress May Have a Right of Access to the Texts of All Executive Agreements," in House Hearings on Executive Agreements, pp. 23-29.

[44] 86 Statutes 619; 1 USC, sec. 112b (1970, supp. 3).

[45] Rovine, pp. 187-188.

[46] Senate Hearings on Executive Agreements, pp. 87-89.

[47] White House press release (December 11, 1970), in *American Journal of International Law*, January 1973.

[48] *Congressional Record* (Washington: GPO, 1972), p. 4094.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ments conducted hearings and called Senator Case as one of its witnesses. The House gave its approval to the measure by voice vote on August 14.[49] Thus, Congress established its right to be informed of all executive agreements subsequently concluded.[50]

An illustrative application of the Case Act relates to the interim agreement on the Sinai signed by Egypt and Israel on September 4, 1975. As an integral part of the agreement, the United States offered a proposal for the establishment of an early-warning system in the area, to be manned by 200 United States civilian personnel. In a joint resolution authorizing implementation of the proposal, Congress specified that its action "does not signify approval of the Congress of any other agreement, understanding, or commitment made by the executive branch."[51] Two classified memorandums of agreement between the United States and Israel had, in fact, been drawn up; these contained certain American assurances to Israel as an inducement for it to sign the interim agreement.[52] The memorandums constituted executive agreements and were to be submitted to Congress under the secrecy restriction of the Case Act. Although it was not asked to approve the memorandums, Congress might be requested in the future to make authorizations and appropriations necessary for their implementation.

Some members objected to the limited role that Congress played in the matter and suggested that the memorandums be submitted for approval in treaty form. The Senate Legislative Council asserted that the memorandum on military equipment, energy needs and violation of the agreement, in particular, would be without force and effect under both domestic and international law unless it were to receive the advice and consent of the Senate as a treaty.[53] The State Department's legal adviser argued in reply that

> . . . a legal requirement that a particular type of agreement has necessarily as a matter of law to be submitted as a treaty would constitute an unacceptable interference with the President's capacity to serve as negotiator

[49] *Ibid.*, p. 28087.

[50] Representative Les Aspin has asserted that some 400 to 600 agreements concluded since the passage of the Case Act have not been forwarded to Congress as required by the act. The items in question, however, are not classified as executive agreements by the White House. (*New York Times*, August 15, 1975.) The State Department reports that the texts of 657 executive agreements have been transmitted to Congress in accordance with the act. Twenty-nine agreements have been submitted under the "injunction of secrecy" provision since 1972. (*Department of State Bulletin*, June 16, 1975, p. 829.)

[51] House Joint Resolution 683, sec. 5; Public Law 94-110; 89 Statutes 573 (October 13, 1975).

[52] The memorandums were published in the *Congressional Record*, October 9, 1975, pp. S17969-S17970.

[53] *Ibid.*, pp. S17957-S17965.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in international affairs, and for that reason would probably be unconstitutional. Be that as it may, there is certainly no legally authorized international agreement which by law must be submitted as a treaty.[54]

In order to secure congressional approval of American participation in the early-warning system, the administration gave assurance of full compliance with the Case Act. Secretary of State Kissinger informed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the documents provided to it included "all the undertakings, commitments, and assurances which the United States regards as legally binding."[55] The records submitted for congressional information also contained what the executive branch characterized as "important statements of diplomatic policy," which did not constitute international legal commitments.

Military Base Agreements and Fiscal Control

Aside from promoting congressional awareness of international agreements concluded by the executive branch, the Case Act did not require or authorize Congress to act further in order to implement them. Nor was the legislature invited to pass judgment upon the terms of such agreements. As a matter of political strategy, executive agreements have sometimes been used in place of treaties to avoid the possibility of a Senate vote that might block ratification. Congress has continued to question this state of affairs, suggesting that the executive agreement has been used too frequently and indiscriminately by the executive branch in order to lessen the role of the legislature in the conduct of foreign affairs.

Announcement of the conclusion of military base agreements with Portugal and Bahrain in December 1971 aroused further concern over the use of executive agreements rather than treaties. The policy implications of those agreements extended to the United States' relations with the Middle East, the African continent, the NATO Alliance and the Indian Ocean region. This alone suggested that full public consideration should be given to the accords. It was again Senator Clifford Case who took the initiative by introducing a resolution to express the sense of the Senate that the two agreements should be submitted for approval as treaties. Following hearings before the Foreign Relations Committee, the measure was given a favorable report for action by the full Senate membership. By a vote of 50 to 6, Resolution 214 was adopted on March 3, 1972.[56]

---

[54] *Ibid.*, November 14, 1975, p. S20103.
[55] Senate report no. 415, 94th Congress, 1st Session, 1975.
[56] Senate report no. 632, 92nd Congress, 2nd Session, 1972; *Congressional Record* (Washington: GPO, 1972), p. 6870.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Since 1951 Portugal had granted the United States rent-free use of Lajes Field air base in the Azores.[57] The agreement was concluded to further the purposes of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, of which both states were members. An extension of the use agreement (until December 31, 1962) was signed in 1957.[58] By the time it expired, the United States and Portugal had disagreed over the latter's policies toward its African colonies. In the absence of a formal agreement, Portugal continued to provide base rights for the United States. An exchange of notes between the Portuguese minister of foreign affairs and the United States secretary of state, on December 9, 1971,[59] further extended the arrangement until February 3, 1974, in return for certain economic and military considerations by the United States valued at some $436 million.[60] In recent years, the Azores base has taken on increasing importance in conjunction with submarine-tracking and air-rescue operations.

Bahrain, a Persian Gulf sheikdom under a protective treaty with the United Kingdom, served as a base for vessels of the U.S. Middle East force since 1949. When Bahrain discontinued its relationship with the United Kingdom in 1971, to become an independent state, the United States negotiated an agreement to assure continued use of facilities there.[61] The agreement also regulates the status of American naval personnel while in the territory of Bahrain. Either party may terminate the agreement upon one year's notice.

The two agreements were presented by the administration as the continuation of long-standing arrangements for the use of facilities in the Azores and Bahrain. In order to minimize domestic concern about potential military involvement by the United States in those areas, it was decided to designate them as executive agreements rather than treaties. While it is difficult to evaluate objectively the relationship established under the two agreements, the Senate suggested that they were of more basic importance to United States policy abroad than the executive branch was willing to acknowledge.[62] In recent practice, the tendency has been to use executive agreements more often than treaties in the regulation of such potentially critical relationships. This apparent choice, some have argued, is contrary to the intention of the Founding Fathers, who did not

[57] UST, vol. 5, p. 2263; TIAS, no. 3087.
[58] UST, vol. 8, p. 2353; TIAS, no. 3950.
[59] UST, vol. 22, p. 2106; TIAS, no. 7254.
[60] Senate report no. 632, 92nd Congress, 2nd Session, 1972, p. 3.
[61] UST, vol. 22, p. 2184; TIAS, no. 7263.
[62] U.S. Senate, *Executive Agreements with Portugal and Bahrain, Hearings on S. Res. 214*, before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 92nd Congress, 2nd Session, 1972, pp. 3, 29-31, 74. (Hereafter cited as Senate Hearings on Portugal and Bahrain.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

make specific reference to the executive agreement in the Constitution.[63]

The State Department supported its choice of instrument in these cases by reference to the Circular 175 procedure that it had established for the instruction of its negotiators. The designation of executive agreements was justified here for several reasons. Neither was considered to constitute a defense commitment. In the case of Bahrain, the United States was making arrangements for the use of port facilities. American base rights on Portuguese territory in the Azores were not tied to any obligation on the part of the United States to defend the territory. The initial arrangement in 1951 was made in conjunction with the NATO defense treaty, which had, in fact, been approved by the Senate. Thus, it was maintained that the executive agreement concerning base rights was an entirely appropriate measure, pursuant to a treaty in force. Furthermore, the president as commander in chief has the power and responsibility to secure military facilities abroad and does so by means of executive agreements. Congress, for its part, gives de facto approval to the agreements by authorizing and appropriating funds to maintain the facilities.[64]

Even though the Department of State justified both agreements on constitutional grounds, members of the Foreign Relations Committee emphasized the need to involve Congress at an early stage in the negotiation of international agreements. Congressional concern with the two agreements at issue extended beyond the question of the means by which they were concluded. Each carried implications for United States foreign relations in critical areas of the world. The strategic location of Bahrain on the Persian Gulf is potentially significant for American policy in the Middle East. As Soviet and American naval forces have increased their presence in the Indian Ocean, Bahrain offers important port facilities for both powers. Portugal's policies toward its African colonies aroused opposition from forces calling for it to grant them self-determination and to protect human rights. The United States was considered to be giving approval and support for the Portuguese regime extending economic benefits in return for base rights in the Azores. These facilities serve as a base for surveillance of submarine operations in

[63] Raoul Berger, "The Presidential Monopoly of Foreign Relations," *Michigan Law Review*, November 1972.

[64] "Department of State Memorandum of Law Regarding Conclusion of Agreements with Portugal and Bahrain" and "Department of State Memorandum of Law—Procedures for Implementing the Commitments Contained in the North Atlantic Treaty," in Senate Hearings on Portugal and Bahrain, pp. 14-16, 37-39; see also discussion pp. 35-36.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Atlantic Ocean and of the western end of the Mediterranean Sea. Congress, therefore, insisted that it be informed of arrangements made by the executive branch on behalf of the United States and that it have an opportunity to influence the terms of all executive agreements.[65]

The administration was unwilling, nevertheless, to comply with the request expressed in the Senate's resolution that the two agreements be submitted for approval as treaties. There followed a series of attempts by Congress to nullify the effect of the agreements by refusing to appropriate funds for their implementation.[66] Such measures usually had been avoided in deference to presidential initiatives in foreign affairs, but out of a sense of frustration at being unable to restrain executive power, certain members of Congress felt compelled to take action.

An opportunity arose when the legislature considered authorizing funds for foreign military aid during FY 1973. The Foreign Relations Committee attached amendments to the Senate bill which would have prohibited funds to carry out the agreements with Bahrain and Portugal unless these agreements were submitted to the Senate as treaties. A similar restriction would have applied to future agreements, if made without the advice and consent of the Senate, under whose terms United States combat troops were to be stationed, or nuclear weapons stored, on foreign territory. In Senate-floor action, the provision relative to Bahrain was deleted, operations of the Export-Import Bank were exempted from the restrictions, and the limitation on funding for the storage of nuclear weapons was eliminated. Subsequently the Senate defeated the entire measure.

The House version of the authorization bill temporarily included a provision that would have required suspension of aid to Portugal unless the executive agreement on the Azores base received approval by resolution in both houses of Congress. Efforts to pass the authorization bill in the Ninety-second Congress were abandoned in conference after agreement proved impossible on two provisions: (1) that funds be made available to Portugal only if the base agreement were submitted as a treaty and (2) that no funds be authorized for future military base agreements unless they were similarly approved. Senator Case attempted to attach similar restrictions to a bill authorizing funds for the Department of State in FY

[65] *Ibid.*, pp. 39-42.

[66] For a summary of these actions, see *Congressional Quarterly Almanac* (Washington: Congressional Quarterly, 1972), pp. 449-474, and *ibid.* (1973), pp. 803-811. The following discussion is based upon those sources and the public documents cited therein.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1974.[67] Both provisions were deleted from conference reports on the bill. In this instance, however, the authorization bill received subsequent approval by both houses despite disagreement over the need to control the use of executive agreements by means of Congress's fiscal power.

Congressional forces, concerned about efforts to increase the American military presence in the Indian Ocean, also have sought to block the appropriation of funds for expansion of air and naval facilities on Diego Garcia. This tiny coral island, owned by the United Kingdom, sits astride the sea lanes of the Indian Ocean some 1,000 miles south of the Indian subcontinent. Its strategic location makes it a valuable post for naval surveillance and a support base for American naval forces in the area. In 1966 the United States and the United Kingdom signed an agreement making the British Indian Ocean Territory available for mutual defense purposes.[68] By an exchange of notes in 1972, it was further agreed that the United States would be permitted to "construct, maintain, and operate a limited naval communications facility on Diego Garcia."[69]

Increased Soviet naval activities in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean areas, as well as concern over the availability of oil supplies for American naval vessels, resulted in administration requests for funds to expand the Diego Garcia facility. Authorization of $18.1 million for military construction on the island during FY 1975 cleared the Congress on December 14, 1974. Included in the legislation was a provision requiring the president to certify "to the Congress in writing that the construction of any such project is essential to the national interest of the United States."[70] Within a sixty-day period following receipt of any such certification, either the House or the Senate may pass a resolution of disapproval, thereby precluding expenditure of the funds. On May 12, 1975, President Ford informed the Congress that the Diego Garcia facilities were essential to the national interest in accordance with the provisions of the Military Construction Authorization Act of 1975.[71] In a final effort to block expenditures, Senator Mike Mansfield offered a

[67] The Senate version of Department of State-USIA authorizations for FY 1975 contained a section requiring congressional approval of "any military base agreement between the United States and a foreign country before funds can be expended to carry out the agreement." (Senate report no. 838, 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, 1974, pp. 18-19.) That section was deleted from the conference version before its adoption. See House report no. 1447, 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, 1974, pp. 13-14.

[68] UST, vol. 18, p. 28; TIAS, no. 6196.

[69] UST, vol. 23, p. 3087; TIAS, no. 7481.

[70] Public Law 93-552, sec. 613(a)(1); 88 Statutes 1745.

[71] *Congressional Record,* May 12, 1975, p. S7776.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

resolution of disapproval,[72] which failed to pass the Senate by a vote of 43 to 53.[73]

Congressional Authorization of Executive Agreements

By refusing, or threatening to refuse, funds for the implementation of executive agreements with foreign powers, Congress finds itself in a difficult position. Such action, following, as it were, the conclusion of an agreement with the executive authority of another state, could prove an embarrassment for the United States, bringing into question its negotiating procedures and its intention to implement international commitments. Domestically, action of the sort contemplated by Congress has been criticized as undermining the American tradition of bipartisanship in foreign policy matters, evident in the period after World War II, and as reviving the conflict over congressional and executive prerogatives in international affairs.

Legislation proposed by Senator Sam Ervin in 1972 included procedures to assure the notification of Congress and to secure its approval of agreements made by the executive branch on behalf of the United States with other countries. In essence, Senator Ervin explained, S. 3475 "recognizes that the Founding Fathers' concept of shared powers in the area of international agreements has been substantially eroded by the use of so-called Executive agreements."[74] The Ervin measure would have required the secretary of state to transmit all such agreements to Congress, although agreements affecting the security of the United States, as determined by the president, might be submitted to Congress under an injunction of secrecy. In this respect, Ervin's bill paralleled the one introduced earlier by Senator Case that was subsequently adopted as Public Law 92-403. Going beyond that, the bill would have required that no executive agreement might enter into force if both houses of Congress were to pass a concurrent resolution of disapproval within sixty days of the agreement's transmittal. Congress would thus be in a position to exercise a veto over the implementation of executive agreements. This requirement might be compared to the constitutional provision requiring Senate advice and consent to the ratification of treaties.

In hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Separation of Powers, chaired by Ervin himself, the

[72] Senate Resolution 160, *ibid.*, May 19, 1975, pp. S8651-S8654.
[73] *Ibid.*, July 28, 1975, pp. S13926-S13972.
[74] *Congressional Record* (Washington: GPO, 1972), p. 12031.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

question was repeatedly raised as to whether Congress could constitutionally impose those conditions upon the conclusion of executive agreements. Witnesses arguing in the affirmative generally took the position that the power to approve executive agreements was justified by the "necessary and proper" clause, particularly when interpreted in conjunction with Congress's treaty-making function.[75] The definition of executive agreement contained in the bill (sec. 2) was broadly drawn to include

> . . . any bilateral or multilateral international agreement *or commitment*, other than a treaty, which is binding upon the United States, and which is made by the President or any officer, employee, or representative of the executive branch of the United States Government.[76]

It was maintained that Congress has the power to require the executive branch to submit for approval those agreements made pursuant to statutory authorization. The president, however, might feel some constraint in negotiating with other states if his agreements were subject to later disapproval by Congress.[77] If, on the other hand, the president were considered to be an agent of Congress for the purposes of such negotiation, it could reasonably be expected to review resultant executive actions.[78] The use of a concurrent resolution, not having the force of law, to nullify an agreement made in accordance with earlier statutory authority, however, would be of highly questionable validity.[79] Agreements made pursuant to treaties, duly ratified, could be considered to have received the advance approval of the Senate, acting according to constitutional procedures on behalf of the legislative branch.[80] To reject later implementing-agreements would, no doubt, create serious international political consequences, even if the action were consonant with domestic constitutional provisions.

Perhaps the most serious objection to the congressional option of blocking executive agreements from taking effect has to do with agreements on matters for which the president has sole responsibility: for example, the extension of recognition to foreign governments or the conclusion of cease-fire agreements.[81] In such circumstances, Congress might well be put in the position of violat-

[75] See, for example, the testimony of Arthur J. Goldberg and Clark M. Clifford in U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, *Congressional Oversight of Executive Agreements, Hearing on S. 3475*, before the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers, 92nd Congress, 2nd Session, 1972, pp. 17-18, 36-37. (Hereafter cited as Senate Hearing on Congressional Oversight, 1972.)

[76] *Congressional Record* (Washington: GPO, 1972), p. 12031. (Emphasis added.)

[77] Senate Hearing on Congressional Oversight, 1972, pp. 259-260, 264-265.

[78] *Ibid.*, pp. 338-340.

[79] *Ibid.*, pp. 25, 33-34, 126, 313.

[80] *Ibid.*, pp. 124-125.

[81] *Ibid.*, pp. 25, 64-66, 126-127, 309-313.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ing the principle of separation of powers, which the Ervin Bill was intended to preserve. It should be emphasized at this point that instruments other than treaties, commonly referred to as executive agreements, have various constitutional bases and purposes to serve. The Ervin Bill, with its broad definition and inclusive provisions, was perhaps too ambitious in its effort to oversee and limit the improper use of so-called executive agreements. The detailed examination of these issues in hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Separation of Powers, while contributing to an understanding of the matter, did not result in further legislative action on the bill during the Ninety-second Congress.

Senator Ervin, nevertheless, persisted in his efforts to reassert the role of Congress in foreign affairs, particularly in regard to the conclusion of international agreements, and he reintroduced the bill that would permit Congress to block, by concurrent resolution, the implementation of executive agreements. In the later version, a provision was added exempting "any executive agreement entered into by the President pursuant to a provision of the Constitution or prior authority given the President by treaty or law."[82] This would serve to remove objections expressed earlier about the power of Congress to control the broad variety of executive agreements but, at the same time, would preclude the "legislative veto" of most such instruments. Although the measure passed the Senate by voice vote in 1974, it failed to receive action in the House before the end of the Ninety-third Congress. While only limited progress could be claimed in the effort to assure congressional concurrence in the implementation of executive agreements, the emergence of new foreign policy issues would keep the matter alive.

One such issue was the offer of nuclear technology and equipment to other states. The worldwide proliferation of nuclear weapons and materials has greatly increased environmental and security hazards. In the Middle East, where a volatile military and political situation already exists, the development of nuclear capabilities is particularly critical. Soon after President Nixon's announcement, in June 1974, of plans to negotiate nuclear agreements with Egypt and Israel,[83] members of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy introduced legislation (S. 3698) to amend the Atomic Energy

[82] S. 3830, sec. 5, in *Congressional Record,* November 21, 1974, p. S19868. See also Senate report no. 1286, 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, 1974.

[83] See discussion in U.S. Senate, Committee on Appropriations, *Foreign Assistance and Related Programs — Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1975, Hearings,* before a subcommittee, 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, 1974, pp. 995-999, 1008-1009, 1012-1013. See also U.S. House, *Resolutions of Inquiry into Proposed Nuclear Agreements with Egypt and Israel, Hearing on H. Res. 1189 and 1219,* before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, 1974.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Act.[84] Under that act, agreements providing for military cooperation in the nuclear field were subject to rejection by concurrent resolution of both houses of Congress within a sixty-day period of their submission.[85] The amendment would extend that provision to agreements involving reactors "capable of producing more than five thermal megawatts or special nuclear material for use in connection therewith."[86] Thus the offer of nuclear materials to other states, even for ostensibly peaceful purposes, could not be undertaken without involving Congress. The joint committee would be required to make its recommendation to Congress concerning any such agreement, and would have to offer a resolution of support or nonsupport for a vote in each house. Disapproval by both houses would bar implementation.

Attempts to require affirmative votes by both houses before a nuclear agreement could be put into effect were rejected before the bill received final approval.[87] Likewise an amendment to require that all nuclear agreements take treaty form did not survive.[88] Nevertheless, the adoption of the amendment to the Atomic Energy Act represented a successful effort by Congress to bar implementation of executive agreements in the field of nuclear technology.

During the Ninety-fourth Congress, several efforts were made to revive legislation that would permit a congressional veto of executive agreements.[89] Like the Ervin bills before them, these measures, in the words of S. 632, were intended to "preserve the separation of powers and to further the constitutional prerogatives of Congress by providing for congressional review of executive agreements." Each established a sixty-day period in which both houses, by concurrent resolution or (under S. 1251) by Senate resolution alone, might block an agreement's entry into force. The definition of executive agreement in S. 632 followed that of the Ervin bills discussed above. Section 3 of Senator Glenn's bill (S. 1251) included within the meaning of executive agreement

> . . . any bilateral or multilateral international agreement or understanding, formal or informal, written or verbal, other than a treaty, which involves, or the intent [of which] is to leave the impression of, a commitment of manpower, funds, information, or other resources of the United States, and

[84] House report no. 1149, 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, 1974.
[85] Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 42 USC, sec. 2153d (1970).
[86] Public Law 93-485; 88 Statutes 1460 (October 26, 1974).
[87] House report no. 1299, 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, 1974, p. 3.
[88] *Congressional Record*, July 10, 1974, pp. S12124-S12126.
[89] S. 632, S. 1251, H.R. 4438.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

which is made by the President or any officer, employee, or representative of the executive branch of the United States Government.

Constitutionally based criticism of these bills generally repeated the issues raised in the 1972 hearings before the Separation of Powers Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee: the sixty-day waiting period, the use of a concurrent resolution to block an executive agreement, and interference with the president's independent powers. Congress adjourned for the 1976 election without completing action on these measures.

A Fundamental Dilemma: The Distribution of Foreign Policy Responsibilities

During the late 1960s and the decade of the seventies, the United States has had occasion to reassess its role in world affairs and the policies governing that participation. U.S. international agreements other than treaties have been closely related to the issues and controversies of the period. Although these "executive agreements" are legal instruments used in the conduct of foreign relations, their political implications are significant. Since the president is primarily responsible for the formulation and implementation of United States foreign policy, the executive agreement has been considered largely a concern of the executive branch. As Congress has sought to reassert its role in foreign affairs, it has had occasion to examine more carefully some of the assumptions and consequences surrounding the use of this type of agreement.

Executive agreements have been the basis of U.S. commitments — explicit and implicit — to foreign states. Through practical experience, Congress and the American public have grown wary of open-ended obligations and secret commitments. In the Case Act, Congress established a method for keeping itself informed of international agreements other than treaties to which the United States became a party, while giving appropriate protection to sensitive information. The very obligation of having to notify Congress places the president under scrutiny, so that foreign commitments are less likely to be assumed without thought for their political consequences. Furthermore, Congress has sought to assure its involvement in decisions leading to international obligations as part of its constitutional prerogatives.

In practice, distinctions between treaties and executive agreements remain blurred. While the Constitution assures the Senate a role in the treaty-making process, it makes no explicit

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

reference to executive agreements. In large part Congress seeks fewer and more restricted executive agreements, favoring treaties as instruments of foreign affairs; the executive branch prefers having the option to use either as it deems expedient. Attempts by Congress to require a treaty format rather than an executive agreement generally have been unsuccessful, and the executive branch has been able to use the executive agreement for a wide variety of purposes. The treaty of friendship and cooperation with Spain is a significant exception in this regard.

Congress has concentrated upon two alternatives in its efforts to circumscribe the character and number of executive agreements being negotiated:

First, it has sought to withhold the funds necessary to implement agreements of which it does not approve. The "power of the purse" provides the legislature with a means of influencing the executive branch. However, recent attempts to withhold or restrict funds requested to carry out executive agreements have met with only limited success. Since this tactic is applied after the terms of an agreement have been negotiated, the momentum of presidential action in foreign affairs may make it difficult for Congress to take countermeasures at that point.

Second, Congress has attempted to subject each executive agreement to a congressional veto or to require the approval of both houses of Congress before an agreement may enter into force. Efforts to incorporate such a requirement into the statutory law of the United States for all nontreaty agreements have been unsuccessful to date. Politically it might prove more feasible to adopt this provision with regard to specific categories of executive agreements. In the area of nuclear technology, for example, agreements have been made subject to disapproval by Congress, acting within sixty days after an agreement is submitted. The chances of adopting a Bricker-style amendment to the Constitution seem remote. The State Department's legal adviser believes, however, that an amendment to the Constitution would be required to achieve the balance between the legislative and the executive branch that Congress is seeking.[90]

The expressions of concern from Congress about the use of executive agreements may be symptomatic of opposition to certain foreign policy initiatives by the executive branch. In time, the

[90] Monroe Leigh, "The Congress, the President and Executive Agreements," *Proceedings and Committee Reports of the American Branch of the International Law Association: 1975-1976* (New York: American Branch ILA, 1976).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

enthusiasm for exercising congressional oversight might recede as particular issues lose their importance. The best course of action for Congress might well be to use the means of control already available to it, rather than to seek new statutory authority. As one congressional witness has pointed out, that "certain comfortable ambiguity"[91] which now exists might be lost if each agreement were required to be submitted for review and possible disapproval of implementation. Congressional involvement could then be construed as authorizing the conclusion of executive agreements and acknowledging the commitments that they contain.

The controversy over executive agreements represents a fundamental dilemma over the distribution of foreign policy responsibilities that may prove to be insoluble. The attempt to reach an accommodation is a healthy exercise of the constitutional system of shared powers. Congress, for its part, has already given the executive branch notice that it intends to review more carefully the use to which executive agreements are put and, where politically feasible, to block or seek revision of those that it believes do not represent acceptable policy. This may constitute the best means of encouraging the executive branch to share more information and to include members of Congress in the process of policy formulation.

[91] Professor R.R. Baxter, in Senate Hearings on Congressional Oversight, 1975, p. 219.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE RISE OF MILITARY SALES AS A U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE INSTRUMENT

by David J. Louscher

Since 1961 a revised assessment of the utility and/or feasibility of grant programs has occasioned a dramatic shift in the foreign assistance policies of the United States. Arms sales have increasingly become the primary instrument of assistance to other countries. Today, the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program is much larger in monetary terms than either of the traditional programs, the Military Assistance Program (MAP) and economic grants and loans.

In exploring the amplification of arms sales as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy, this study illustrates the impressive size and growth of FMS; discusses the attitudes that favored the inception of the program; examines the factors that contributed to its increased growth; describes its multiple purposes; and lastly considers the apparent decline in support for FMS.

By 1975, Foreign Military Sales had become the United States' major assistance program. In fiscal year 1975, $8.5 billion in military equipment was sold to over sixty countries, and it was estimated that such sales would amount to $11 billion in fiscal year 1976. Figure 1 illustrates the comparative size of FMS and the economic assistance program, showing the clear decline of the latter and the rise of military sales.[1] Figure 1 alone strongly suggests that the United States has altered its foreign aid strategy. Figure 2 illustrates that not only has there been a shift to military aid, but in addition the United

[1] FMS data shown in Figure 1 are from U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Arms Sales and Foreign Policy*, a report prepared by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff, 90th Congress, 1st Session, 1967, in *Congressional Record*, July 27, 1967, p. 4014; U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Hearings on H.R. 15628: To Amend the Foreign Military Sales Act*, 91st Congress, 2nd Session, 1970, p. 17; U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Expenditures and Arms Trade 1963-1973* (Washington, 1975); *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, March 29, 1975, p. 656. MAP figures are from U.S. Department of Defense, *Military Assistance and Foreign Military Sales Facts, April 1972*, Defense Security Agency, 1972, p. 3; and *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, March 29, 1975, p. 656.

David J. Louscher is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Akron, Ohio. In cooperation with two other scholars, he is currently involved in a five-nation study of legislative policy-control of weapons systems choices.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FIGURE 1
OMPARISON OF ECONOMIC AID AND ARMS SALES, 1949-1974



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FIGURE 2
COMPARISON OF MAP AND ARMS SALES, 1950-1974



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

States is now more inclined to sell such equipment rather than to give it to others.[2]

One parenthetical comment should be made with regard to trends in assistance: as with economic growth assistance or military grant assistance, over the years there has been a shift in sales recipients. For example, until 1964 about 80 per cent of arms sales each year were to Europe, Japan, Canada and Australia. By 1974, however, these countries accounted for only 14 per cent of total arms sales.[3] Again as with economic grant and military grant assistance, certain countries have been major recipients: of the $10,299 million in economic development assistance available from 1958 to 1969, India received $2,850 million or 28 per cent. In 1974 Iran was the largest recipient of FMS, purchasing 45 per cent of the arms sold by the United States.

The first substantial rise in arms sales came in 1962, when military exports jumped to $1.5 billion. Also, in April 1962 the concept of military exports as a government activity was institutionalized through the creation of an Office of International Logistics Negotiations (ILN) within the Office of International Security Affairs of the Department of Defense.

Why did FMS emerge as a major foreign policy instrument? What factors led to its dramatic amplification? It is the thesis of this article that the enlarged foreign military sales effort developed from three different, but not unrelated, attempts by Congress and the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations to find effective solutions to three major policy problems.

The first was a search for an inexpensive economic and military assistance instrument. The second, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, centered around efforts to deal effectively with the United States' adverse balance of payments in the international economy and its resultant decrease in the nation's gold supply. The third undertaking was prompted by the concern of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara about problems in logistical cooperation and weapons standardization within the Atlantic Alliance. Related to this third problem-solving objective was McNamara's attempt to reorient the defense policies of America's allies toward the doctrine of "flexible response."

---

[2] Arms sales data-sources for Figure 2 are listed in footnote 1; foreign aid figures are from *Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1962-1972* (Washington: Congressional Quarterly Publications, 1962-1972), XVII-XXVIII.

[3] U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *The International Transfer of Conventional Arms: Report to Congress*, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, 1974; for 1974 figures see *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, March 29, 1975, p. 657.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A diverse set of actors was involved in each of these activities, and to a limited extent each involved different actors. Certainly military exports were encouraged by diverse groups for different reasons, each perceiving an expanded sales effort as contributing to the resolution of its specific problem. America's mammoth foreign military sales effort, in short, developed from a convergence of preferences regarding an effective way to resolve several policy problems.

Grant Assistance: The Search for an Alternative

The goals of foreign assistance derive mainly from premises legitimatized during the Truman Administration. One fundamental assumption was that the Soviet Union was an aggressive force. This compelled the United States to adopt a strategy that would prevent an imbalance of power from occurring, primarily in Europe and secondarily in the rest of the world.[4] Foreign aid was perceived as assisting the preservation of American security in at least three ways, according to Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul H. Nitze:

> (a) by fostering an improved climate of political independence and individual liberty; (b) by improving the ability of free countries and international organizations to deter or, if necessary, defeat Communism or Communist-supported aggression; (c) by facilitating arrangements for individual and collective security and stability in the developing free countries essential to their more rapid social, economic and political progress.[5]

Five administrations in the postwar period, and several congresses, have generally agreed on the legitimacy of these goals.[6] The greatest discussion, disagreement and variability has focused on the best *means* of implementing them. Foreign Military Sales developed out of a search for a "better" instrument.

Prior to the beginning of the Korean War, most foreign assistance took the form of economic grants (nonreimbursable aid). The authorized funds for 1949, for example, amounted to $6.91 billion. Of this amount, 80 per cent was for economic reconstruction

[4] Seyom Brown, *The Faces of Power: Constancy and Change in United States Foreign Policy from Truman to Johnson* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 55.

[5] U.S. Senate, Committee on Banking and Currency, *Hearings on S. 1155: Export-Import Bank Participation and Financing in Credit Sales of Defense Articles*, 90th Congress, 1st Session, 1967, p. 25.

[6] Some roll-call studies have shown a slow decline in congressional support for the goals of foreign assistance. See, for example, Charles O. Lerche, *The Uncertain South* (New York: Quadrangle, 1964), pp. 58-94.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and 20 per cent was for military rearmament. The year 1950 marked a shift in the means of implementing assistance goals, with emphasis now on rearmament rather than reconstruction. This shift was reflected in the aid categories; of the $8.5 billion provided in 1950, $5.7 billion was designated for the rearmament of America's allies.

While the Korean War perhaps stimulated this rearmament, the termination of the conflict reinforced the trend by providing huge reservoirs of arms to assist allied governments. According to one analyst, it allowed the United States to convert its industrial capacities that had been mobilized during the war to supplying Europe with military equipment.[7] The increased emphasis on military equipment as a way of implementing foreign assistance goals is indicated by Figure 3; from 1953 to 1961, military assistance usually constituted at least half of the funds provided for foreign aid.

During the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations the search for an effective foreign aid instrument was compounded by a parallel search for an inexpensive instrument. Although many members of the Eisenhower Administration wanted to spend less on foreign aid, this desire conflicted with equally important foreign policy goals, namely, to contain communist advances throughout the world, which required more, not less aid. Thus, much of the search for a cheaper instrument was conducted and supported by Congress. Moreover, within Congress opposition to grant assistance[8] was particularly high among midwestern members of the President's own party,[9] although southern Democratic opposition in the House in the late 1950s rose to as high as 50 per cent of Democratic congressmen.[10]

In 1954 this extensive congressional sentiment against grant assistance expressed itself effectively. Evidently sensing some congressional disquietude, the Administration asked that 10 per cent of the nonmilitary funds authorized be in the form of loans rather than grants. The House Foreign Affairs Committee accepted this proposal. However, from the floor of the House the bill was amended to require that 50 per cent of the nonmilitary funds be in the form of loans. In the Senate a similar amendment introduced by Senator Homer Capehart was defeated by a vote of 57 to 53. Nevertheless, a compromise reached during the House-Senate conference

[7] Harold A. Hovey, *United States Military Assistance* (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 10.

[8] Differentiated from other forms of assistance in that it is nonreimbursable aid.

[9] Leroy N. Rieselbach, *The Roots of Isolationism: Congressional Voting and Presidential Leadership in Foreign Policy* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966), pp. 105-139.

[10] Lerche, p. 62.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FIGURE 3
TRENDS IN FOREIGN AID, MILITARY AND ECONOMIC, 1946-1961*



Source: Congress and the Nation: 1945-1964 (Washington: Congressional Quarterly Publications, 1965), p. 162.
* Shaded areas represent proportion of total foreign aid that is military aid. Figures by calendar year.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

on the bill provided that 30 per cent of the authorized funds should be in the form of loans. This action by Congress marked the beginning of annual attempts to reduce grant assistance and to find some substitute for it. One way for the Eisenhower Administration to mollify Congress was to reduce aid funds available to Europe.

Communist advances in Indochina and the Middle East and increased anti-Americanism in Latin America had apparently convinced the Administration that it should increase both military and economic aid to these areas, but Congress seemed intent on reducing aid everywhere, not just to Europe. Noting this, the Administration requested only $3.5 billion for foreign aid for fiscal 1955, nearly a billion dollars less than the amount appropriated the previous year. Funds for NATO countries were cut from $1.8 billion to only $800 million, and the cut in funds available to Europe consequently made more aid available for other parts of the world.

This turn of events was important for the future of military exports, for each following year Congress would make further demands that aid to Europe (both military and economic) be cut or terminated. The repercussions of these demands on America's European allies eventually became considerable, for the NATO countries depended on the Military Assistance Program (a grant program) for the acquisition of modern and sophisticated weapons.[11] Aid cuts by Congress had the effect of reducing the availability of weapons and increasing the desire of Europeans and Defense Department officials such as Henry Kuss for a solution to what Kuss called the "tremendous hiatus" in military supplies to Europe.[12]

Meanwhile, many congressmen discovered what they considered to be a superior form of assistance, PL-480. The Agriculture Trade and Development Act of 1954 essentially permitted the United States to transfer its agriculture surpluses to foreign countries lacking convertible currencies to pay for them. Public Law 480 makes it possible for the United States to accept inconvertible local currencies in exchange for agriculture surpluses. The currencies accepted are owned by the U.S. government,[13] and the United States may loan back to the foreign country the currency it has received. Such loans are to be used by the recipient country to purchase American equipment and commodities.[14]

---

[11] Hovey, p. 41.

[12] U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Hearings on the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964*, 88th Congress, 2nd Session, 1964, p. 509.

[13] For a discussion of this arrangement, see Robert E. Asher, *Grants, Loans and Local Currencies: Their Role in Foreign Aid* (Washington: Brookings, 1961), pp. 10-13.

[14] Memorandum submitted by C. Douglas Dillon, under secretary of state for

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The idea of selling surplus agriculture products in this way was encouraged by those who were attempting to alleviate the domestic agricultural crisis. However, many also perceived that PL-480 was "not just a disposal program but a supplement to, and indeed a superior substitute for, 'money' aid as well."[15] It represented another major attempt by the legislative branch to compel the executive to seek alternatives to grant assistance and to search for other forms of "cost-free" aid. *PL-480 appears to have created legitimacy for the idea that a sale of a commodity to a country constitutes "aid."*[16]

Emphasis on loans rather than grants was given further support in the following years. In 1957 the Administration decided that aid for economic development should consist of technical assistance, with the bulk of aid coming from loans for major development projects, and a Development Loan Fund (DLF) was proposed. Those who were opposed to grant assistance greeted the proposal with some enthusiasm. Many felt that the DLF would finally put aid on a "businesslike" basis. The early loans, however, were "soft"; that is, repayable in a currency other than the dollar. Then, as the adverse balance of payments began to develop, the United States found it necessary to demand that the loans be "hard" and repayable in American currency. In 1959, President Eisenhower was compelled to insist that DLF loans be given to countries under the stipulation that the funds would be used to purchase only American goods. In 1961, President Kennedy insisted that all DLF loans be hard. These two presidential actions marked the final stages in the evolution of economic aid from grant assistance in money and commodities to credit assistance for the purchase of American products. The development continued throughout the 1960s. By 1964, for example, the loan/grant relationship was 70 per cent to 30 per cent.[17]

Because Congress and the White House were interested in a strategy that would encourage other developed nations to "share" the aid burden, the Eisenhower Administration launched a concerted campaign to persuade European countries to enlarge their foreign aid programs. Also, Senator Mike Monroney introduced a resolution urging the Administration to consider forming an International Development Association, which the Senate endorsed in

economic affairs, U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, *Hearings on Mutual Security Appropriations for 1960*, 86th Congress, 1st Session, 1959, pp. 364-376.

[15] Andrew F. Westwood, *Foreign Aid in a Foreign Policy Framework* (Washington: Brookings, 1966), p. 51.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 52.

[17] U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Hearings on the Foreign Assistance Act of 1965*, 89th Congress, 1st Session, 1965, p. 103.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

July 1958. The Senate's action on the Monroney Resolution has often been heralded as an example of congressional initiative in policymaking.[18] However, its basic intent was to create a multinational loan fund so that other wealthy nations might contribute to the foreign aid burden.

Secretary of the Treasury Robert Anderson strongly urged the European nations and Japan to accept the Monroney proposal, primarily because he interpreted it as shifting the aid burden from America's shoulders.[19] In a press conference before his August 1959 trip to Europe, President Eisenhower indicated that one of the primary purposes of his visit was to encourage European leaders to make greater contributions to underdeveloped countries.[20] In September he attended a meeting of the International Monetary Fund especially to urge finance ministers from the advanced countries to give more economic assistance to the less advanced countries. In his State of the Union address in January 1960 he again made known his desire that the European nations assume more responsibility in this area. The Senate Democratic leadership gave enthusiastic support to his call for a more equal sharing of foreign aid costs among NATO allies.[21]

The Kennedy Administration also perceived the effort to reduce the U.S. share of economic assistance to be important. In a message to NATO's Permanent Council, President Kennedy reiterated Eisenhower's plea for a more equitable sharing of assistance costs.[22] For example, considerable pressure was put on West Germany to increase its foreign aid from about $600 million in loans tied to German purchases to approximately $1 billion in low-interest loans not requiring the purchase of German products. Moreover, Franz Josef Strauss, West Germany's defense minister, revealed that his country had been requested by the Kennedy Administration to assume the entire burden of aid to Turkey.[23] U.S. aid to Turkey at that time was about $150 million.

The expanded Foreign Military Sales program did not develop directly from these attempts to decrease U.S. expenses but resulted instead from repeated inadequacy of several alternative efforts, and was facilitated by the changing attitude toward foreign

[18] James A. Robinson, *The Monroney Resolution: Congressional Initiative in Foreign Policy Making* (New York: Henry Holt, 1959).
[19] *New York Times*, September 30, 1959, p. 36.
[20] *Ibid.*, August 26, 1959, p. 16.
[21] *Ibid.*, January 8, 1960, p. 2.
[22] *Ibid.*, January 17, 1961, p. 2.
[23] Speech before the Overseas Press Club, New York, January 17, 1961; for the text see the *New York Times*, January 18, 1961, p. 7.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

assistance within Congress and the Administration during the late Eisenhower and early Kennedy years. What the above review has tried to demonstrate is that this attitude was manifested in a series of problem-solving activities directed toward finding a cheaper way to implement the *goals* of foreign aid effectively.

The growing dollar deficit in the international balance of payments was one of the causes contributing to the motivation to reduce grant assistance, multinationalize credit assistance and find a cheap foreign aid instrument. By the end of the 1950s the U.S. balance of payments deficit had become a major crisis for the Eisenhower Administration and Congress.

International Balance of Payments Pressures: The Search for Relief

By 1959 a new influence had impinged itself on the character of American foreign policy: the excess in foreign monetary payments over receipts totaled over $10 billion during the years 1958 through 1960.[24] Such an imbalance was settled by increased dollar indebtedness and outflows of the nation's gold reserves. Consequently, by 1960 foreign holdings of the dollar had surpassed America's holdings in gold for the first time in American history.[25] Moreover, there was a substantial decline in the nation's gold supply; from the end of 1957 to the beginning of 1960 the gold reserve in the Treasury had declined nearly $5 billion.[26]

Among the causes of this mounting deficit was increased private investment by American firms in foreign countries, particularly in Europe; from 1956 through 1959 it had reached $3 billion a year, though in 1954 it had been only $1.6 billion.[27] Another cause was foreign aid. Economic assistance in the form of grants and credits, although declining from its high in the early 1950s, amounted to about $1.6 billion a year.[28] In the minds of many economists, a third factor, one not easily described, was that the export sectors of American commerce were not as dynamic as they had been in the early 1950s.[29] But by far the greatest contribution to the deficit came from increased military expenditures abroad. For-

[24] "Statement of President Eisenhower," *Department of State Bulletin*, December 5, 1960, p. 860.
[25] Richard N. Gardner, "Strategy for the Dollar," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1960, p. 433.
[26] "Statement of President Eisenhower," p. 860.
[27] William B. Dale, *The Foreign Deficit of the United States* (Stanford, Calif.: International Industrial Development Center, Stanford Research Institute, 1960), p. 46.
[28] Robert B. Anderson, "The Balance of Payments Problem," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1960, p. 424.
[29] Gardner, p. 433.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

eign military expenditures had climbed from $576 million in 1950 to an average of $3 billion a year after 1958.[30]

In reaction to the growing deficit, the White House issued numerous directives requesting that agencies reduce expenditures in foreign countries, cabinet members uttered admonitions to industry,[31] and the Administration and Congress made attempts to "tie" economic assistance to the purchase of American products.[32] News commentators speculated on what might develop for the security of the West if the deficit problem was not solved and on how the problem would circumscribe American security policy.[33] For purposes of this study, however, interest is focused on the concerted diplomatic effort in the fall of 1960, directed primarily by Treasury Secretary Anderson (with substantial personal support from President Eisenhower), to alter the unfavorable balance of payments trend. It was from this particular problem-solving effort that a number of administrators discovered the monetary potential of military sales.

Anderson, who had become extremely concerned about America's declining monetary situation, convinced Eisenhower that some form of dramatic action was imperative to salvage America's gold situation. Consequently, on October 8, 1960 the President sent a letter to West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, asking that Germany assist the United States in alleviating its balance of payments problem. Adenauer's reply on October 21 suggested that the defense and finance ministers of the United States meet with those of West Germany. Accordingly Eisenhower decided to send a delegation to Germany headed by the secretary of the treasury, with the assistance of Douglas Dillon, under secretary of state for economic affairs. Within days, however, the cabinet-level discussions were elevated to a "presidential mission" and expanded to include talks with top officials in London and Paris.

On November 14, as plans progressed, Anderson was summoned to Augusta, Georgia, for an "important conference" with the President.[34] In a press conference following this meeting, he made it clear that his visit to Bonn had the status of a presidential mission. After reiterating the threat to American security and economic well-being posited by the huge deficit, the Secretary stated:

---

[30] Statistics are from U.S. Department of Commerce; cited by Dale, p. 46.
[31] See, for example, Anderson, p. 429.
[32] See Westwood, p. 81, and Gardner, p. 433.
[33] See, for example, C. L. Sulzberger, "Mr. Eisenhower's Last and Cruelest Dilemma," *New York Times*, November 22, 1960, p. 4.
[34] *New York Times*, November 15, 1960, p. 25.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The President has instructed me to pursue with Chancellor Adenauer and other representatives of the German Republic matters of mutual interest in the international financial field, including *the cost of U.S. troops in West Germany* and assistance to developing countries.[35]

Anderson had been active in getting the President to accept the proposition that unless the allies — particularly West Germany — made a substantially larger contribution to allied financial costs, the United States would be compelled to reduce its troop strength in Europe. In 1959, reportedly, Treasury and Budget Bureau officials almost succeeded in persuading Eisenhower to withdraw at least two divisions and seven fighter-bomber squadrons, and only strong opposition from General Lauris Norstad, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and the Department of State had dissuaded him.[36] By fall 1960, however, the Administration was less opposed to such drastic measures; in a press conference prior to Anderson's departure for Europe, the President uttered a veiled threat to NATO members when he said that a troop cut would be a decision he would not like to make, but "I do think that the time is coming when all of us will have to study very carefully what should be our proper proportion of the load."[37]

To indicate, both to the nation and the world, just how serious the Administration was about decreasing the dollar deficit, a presidential directive was issued to various federal agencies limiting their offshore expenditures. This action was intended to save nearly a billion dollars a year. The secretary of defense was instructed to reduce dependents overseas from 484,000 to a limit of 200,000. Military expenditures abroad were to be kept to a minimum. Foreign goods were to be replaced by American goods whenever possible. The secretary of state was directed to reduce personnel in other countries. Foreign aid agencies were to place "emphasis on financing goods and services of United States origin."[38] Even the Central Intelligence Agency was ordered to cut its overseas personnel.

But the most drastic action contemplated was Secretary Anderson's proposal to Chancellor Adenauer during his conference with five German cabinet ministers, that West Germany reimburse the United States $600 million a year for America's troop deployment costs in that country. The Germans reacted negatively, considering

[35] *Ibid.*, November 16, 1960, p. 1. (Emphasis added.)
[36] Sulzberger, p. 5.
[37] Text of press conference, *New York Times*, November 15, 1960, p. 25.
[38] "Statement of President Eisenhower," pp. 860-863. For an examination of these measures, see Walter S. Salent *et al.*, *The United States Balance of Payments in 1968* (Washington: Brookings, 1963), pp. 198-204.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

such a direct payment for troop costs to be a "touchy political issue" domestically.[39] One member of the American delegation, Henry Kuss, indicated that the Germans interpreted Anderson's proposal to be similar in nature to "reparations."[40] Adenauer and Finance Minister Erhard expressed their willingness to consider other alternatives to "help the dollar." However, Anderson became adamant in demanding direct payments for troop costs; he refused to entertain proposals for "indirect payments."[41]

Meanwhile a significant suggestion was made by Defense Minister Strauss to lower-level members of the American team. According to Kuss, he pointed out that the United States and the German Republic had complementary problems: Germany a large requirement for more advanced military equipment, and the United States, a need to increase its exports to Germany. If they developed a system of cooperative logistics, the consequence would be to offset the U.S. balance of payments deficit.[42]

During their trip back to Washington Kuss mentioned his discussion with Strauss to Anderson and Dillon, who found considerable merit in the proposal. "The day after we landed in Washington," he recalled, "I was ordered to return to Germany and expand on the idea."[43] Accordingly, on January 9, 1961 a five-man delegation of State, Treasury and Defense personnel arrived in Bonn for talks. Again the Germans suggested that, among other things, a huge purchase of American arms might help the dollar.[44] The American negotiators responded by requesting that West Germany agree to purchase $600 million a year in military equipment from the United States.

Initially the Germans were shocked at the magnitude of the request; it was the same figure that Anderson had proposed and they were reluctant to make such a huge commitment. However, throughout the spring and summer of 1961 talks concerning other aspects of an "offset agreement" progressed well. In October, when President Kennedy sent U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell L. Gilpatric to Germany to encourage the plan, Gilpatric and Strauss quickly reached an agreement for a German purchase of $600 million worth of U.S.-produced military equipment.[45]

---

[39] *New York Times*, November 22, 1960, p. 1.
[40] Interview with Henry J. Kuss, former deputy assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, April 1, 1970.
[41] *New York Times*, November 24, 1960, p. 1.
[42] Kuss interview.
[43] *Ibid.*
[44] *New York Times*, January 9, 1961, p. 64.
[45] *Ibid.*, October 29, 1961, p. 1.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Retrospectively, in addition to the Anderson initiative, which had the effect of directing American problem-solving efforts to the offset arrangement, seven significant alternatives appear to have been considered and to some extent implemented by officials to ameliorate the dollar deficit. One route was for the United States to devalue the dollar, but in an election year such an unpopular action seemed infeasible. Moreover, the European nations would not have supported it because they had great quantities of dollars, and to solve the deficit European cooperation was deemed essential.

A second possibility was to alter tariffs and investment laws to encourage European investors to invest in U.S. industries. However, the feasibility or success of this option was undermined because it might be a considerable time before it had an impact. Also, the impact was likely to be small in any case, simply because investment opportunities were more attractive in Europe than in the United States.

A third possibility was to liberalize international trade through mutual reductions in tariffs. Though the idea had potential, it was felt that this path would be a long and tedious one involving a concerted fight to get congressional approval,[46] followed by extended negotiations.

Another option, discussed earlier, was to encourage Europeans to increase their foreign aid programs and to grant credit assistance not tied to the purchase of the donor's products. The Germans, after considerable pressure from the United States, did increase their foreign assistance from $600 million in 1960 to $800 million in 1961. However, increased European aid would have no direct effect upon the balance of payments problem: it would only contribute to lower U.S. assistance costs in the future. Moreover, many European nations already had economic assistance programs that were relatively larger than that of the United States, when population and gross national product were considered.

International monetary reform was among other tools considered. Part of the deficit problem had developed because interest rates were higher in Europe than in the United States, making it attractive for U.S. private investors to send their dollars overseas. It was possible that a number of nations could agree to uniform interest rates. In 1959, Great Britain and France, in an effort to assist the dollar by discouraging the private dollar flow to Europe, actually made reductions in the official discount rates for interest.

[46] *Ibid.*, November 13, 1960, p. 31.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

But here again, this action seemed to have little impact in reducing U.S. private investment on the continent.[47]

A sixth way consisted of reducing American expenditures abroad. It was hoped that in the first year this would save a billion dollars, but this approach, too, had limited potential, for it was essentially a stop-gap measure. It was doubtful that the reductions could be sustained, and even more doubtful that they could be expanded. Besides, nonmilitary expenditures abroad were relatively small, and a reduction of military expenditures almost inevitably involved troop cuts. Many members of the Defense Department feared that such withdrawals would destroy NATO's efficacy by setting a precedent for other allied countries to do likewise. NATO already was 20 per cent below its troop strength goals. Moreover, President Kennedy was adamantly opposed to this option.

Another possible way to decrease the deficit was to encourage American industry to become more competitive in export trade, but aside from issuing a few admonitions to private industry, administrators seemed to find it difficult to be active in this area.

All the above options had rather extensive limitations with respect to obtaining immediate relief from balance of payment pressures. In comparison, the sale of military equipment had considerable potential, for as military grant assistance was gradually curtailed by Congress, a hiatus developed regarding certain military supplies for Europe. Europeans, especially West Germans, were eager to obtain new equipment. Military offset agreements contributed dollars to reduce the deficit, and they could constitute large contributions. In short, the deficit could be decreased through expanded exports, and here was an export in which the United States had a favorable market advantage. Much of the sophisticated equipment desired by other nations was being produced only in the United States. In addition, this was a tool administrators could control; rather than relying on industry to initiate the export of military items, they could themselves intervene by arranging for increased sales through diplomatic negotiations.

The idea was given further support by Kennedy, who viewed a program of expanded exports as a primary instrument for solving the deficit problem. In a message to Congress in February 1961 he said: "In seeking overall equilibrium, we must place maximum emphasis on expanding exports . . . and the Government must play a more vigorous part in helping to enlarge foreign markets

[47] *Ibid.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

for American goods and services."[48] As an aspect of his desire for the government to play a "vigorous part" in export expansion, he directed the secretary of defense to "urge the purchase of new weapons and weapons systems by those of our allies who are financially capable of doing so."

An expanded military sales program, moreover, interested not only those concerned with the monetary stability of the nation; military strategists encouraged the effort because it appeared certain to increase the military strength of America's allies and assist in promoting a revised strategic doctrine.

Allied Logistical Problems: The Search for Coordinated Weapons Systems

While a number of officials and congressmen were searching for alternatives to grant assistance and for solutions to the balance of payments deficit, others were becoming concerned about the lack of integration among the various logistical systems of America's allies. The most salient manifestation of this concern developed out of events surrounding the 1961 Berlin crisis. On July 25, 1961 President Kennedy responded to Premier Nikita Khrushchev's threat to turn over the access routes to Berlin to East German officials by, among other actions, placing National Reserve troops on active duty and announcing a troop strength increase of 25 per cent. The mobilization during the crisis compelled officials to obtain information about allied logistics.

Defense Secretary McNamara requested of the Joint Chiefs of Staff a report on the state of NATO's logistical system as well as a report on what weapons would be needed to augment the forces of America's allies should it become imperative to do so quickly. The Chiefs of Staff replied that they were unable to determine precisely what the allies had in terms of weapons systems. Only in Turkey and South Korea did the United States have adequate information about its allies' logistics.[49] During the crisis it became apparent that each nation in the Atlantic Alliance had different kinds of equipment, with different specifications, to perform similar functions. One NATO member was using no fewer than nine different rifles.[50] Each nation had its separate supply depot. Consequently, one

[48] U.S. Congress, House, Document 84, 87th Congress, 1st Session, February 6, 1961.

[49] Kuss interview; see also James L. Trainor, "Can the U.S. Maintain the Momentum of Its Export Sales?," *Armed Forces Management*, January 1967, p. 36.

[50] George Thayer, *The War Business: The International Trade in Armaments* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1969), p. 183.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

allied army would have a shortage of an item while another would have a surplus. The Chiefs perceived this lack of integration to be dangerous in the event of war.

But how did this lack of integration develop, and why did the United States have so little information about the logistical systems of its European allies? Primarily, because each ally had a large variety of supply sources. In the early and middle 1950s, the lack of standardization had been minor simply because the Europeans depended to a great extent on the U.S. Military Assistance Program for their supplies of major weapons systems — for example, in 1953 MAP deliveries to NATO countries, except Turkey and Greece, amounted to $2.8 billion — but by 1962 this sum had declined to $412 million.[51]

Needless to say, military grant assistance to Europe declined rather precipitately in the late 1950s, since Congress was intent on reducing military assistance to that area. Indeed, in 1959 the Senate Appropriations Committee added to the fiscal 1960 Military Assistance appropriation a provision for the Administration "to cut off military assistance progressively to countries capable of providing and maintaining their own military forces."[52] In 1960 Congress prohibited new commitments of military grant assistance to West Germany, the United Kingdom and Luxembourg; in 1961 new commitments to France were prohibited.

As long as the United States had been the major supplier of weapons to these countries, the Department of Defense had had relatively adequate information on what weapons the allies had, their quantity and state of usefulness. American grant assistance to Europe also provided for standard weapons throughout the alliance. Defense Department spokesmen thus interpreted the 1961 logistics problem to be a consequence of congressional attempts to reduce MAP for Europe. Said Deputy Assistant Secretary Kuss:

> the cooperative logistics problem actually developed from the gap that resulted from congressional pressure to reduce grant assistance. When it was reduced, then we didn't know what our allies had — we no longer had logistics cooperation.[53]

To remedy the situation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended to McNamara that an office be organized to deal with the "coordination of allied logistics."

---

[51] U.S. Department of Defense, *Military Assistance Facts: 1964*, a report prepared by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1964.

[52] Quoted by Hovey, p. 77.

[53] Kuss interview; see also *Hearings on the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964*, p. 509.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Kennedy gave further impetus to the creation of an office to coordinate and monitor logistics among America's allies. The President was rather disturbed when France, in 1961, sold a number of Mirage fighters to Australia. He questioned how the United States had allowed a situation to develop whereby an ally as friendly as Australia would feel compelled to procure its weapons from France. He asked McNamara to study the problem.[54] Accordingly, in the summer of 1961 a task force was appointed, headed by McGeorge Bundy and including Paul Nitze, Henry Kuss and several members of an interest group for defense industries, the National Security Industrial Association. These specialists also recommended that an office be organized to handle logistics coordination. In April 1962, as noted earlier, the concept of foreign military sales was institutionalized through an Office of International Logistics Negotiations formed within the Defense Department. Kuss was appointed its head.

Factors in the Continued Growth of Foreign Military Sales

This explanation of how military sales were amplified from an average of $500 million a year to a program overshadowing economic or military grant assistance would be incomplete without consideration of the factors that sustained the program once it was institutionalized. Basically, those factors that led to the program's inception continued to encourage its growth. The balance of payments deficit remained substantial throughout the 1960s and compelled decision-makers to develop instruments that would ameliorate it to any degree. Congress continued to reduce military grant assistance and to press for alternatives to grant assistance. Senator Frank Church expressed a typical congressional sentiment of the early 1960s:

> For three years now I have been trying to get the bill amended to provide that no further grants of aid shall be made to countries that the President finds are fully capable of purchasing, without undue burden to their economies, the aid proposed to be given.[55]

Similarly, in 1967, looking retrospectively at her support for the sales effort in the 1960s, Representative Edith Kelly, a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, said:

> I should say at this point that one of the key considerations which influenced my actions in these instances [congressional votes to expand the

[54] Kuss interview.

[55] U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *The Foreign Assistance Act of 1963*, 88th Congress, 1st Session, 1963, p. 130.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

authority of FMS] and which I am certain was also in the mind of other members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, was *our desire to achieve a more equitable distribution of the burden of our mutual defense undertaking.*[56]

Congressional demands for equalization of defense costs among America's allies were a primary force in the expansion of the sales effort.

Perhaps another contributing factor was the Kennedy Administration's revision of the basic defense strategy for the West. The secretary of defense, in particular, feared that the Atlantic Alliance had relied too heavily on nuclear weapons for deterrence of aggression. Wanting to expand the means of responding to a Soviet challenge to Europe, McNamara proposed that the United States and Europe increase their conventional forces to provide for a more "flexible response."

In October 1961 Gilpatric was sent to Europe to convince the NATO members of the wisdom of McNamara's strategy and to encourage them to increase their conventional forces. He also made it clear that Washington would not pay for this buildup, but that it would welcome purchases of weapons produced in the United States.[57] It is difficult to measure precisely how many European purchases of American arms resulted from this strategic revision. From 1962 to 1965 they amounted to $4.7 billion,[58] while sales to Europe in the 1950 to 1961 period had averaged less than $500 million per year. Thus, European purchases of American arms were up significantly from their pre-1961 average.

The Nixon Doctrine

By 1968, the Nixon Doctrine gave even further impetus to the growth of FMS. In his Guam speech, President Nixon stated:

> . . . in cases involving other types of aggressive (other than nuclear) attacks, we shall furnish military aid and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.[59]

In his 1970 State of the Union message, he said: "The nations of each part of the world should assume the primary responsibility for their

---

[56] *Congressional Record,* July 27, 1967, p. 20515.
[57] *New York Times,* October 30, 1961, p. 30.
[58] U.S. Department of Defense, *Military Assistance and Foreign Military Sales Facts: March 1970,* a report prepared by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, p. 23.
[59] *Hearings on H.R. 15628: To Amend the Foreign Military Sales Act,* p. 2.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

own well-being; and they themselves should determine the terms of that well-being."[60] During testimony before Congress in 1970, Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard declared that these two statements of the President required that "we must continue, if requested, to give or to sell them [i.e., allies] the tools they need for this bigger load we are urging them to assume."

Associated with the Nixon Doctrine was Congress's continued drive to encourage more "burden sharing" by America's allies and to find a substitute for grant assistance. The Foreign Assistance Bill of 1973 was declared by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to be a "major overhaul" of foreign aid. Reported by a vote of 14-3, it provided that military grant assistance would be phased out in four years. In addition, during those four years all grant recipients would be required to pay 25 per cent of the amount of the total grant to the United States. The local currency generated would be used by the United States to meet its aid costs in the recipient country.[61] As stated by the chairman, Senator J. William Fulbright, the reform was designed to require "true burden sharing which is the basic meaning of the Nixon Doctrine."[62] The Senate sustained the Foreign Relations Committee's move to replace grants with sales by a vote of 50-42. The House also voted 210-193 to replace grants with sales.

All foreign assistance was increased during the years 1968 through 1974, rising from $5.3 billion to $12.8 billion. The percentage that was arms sales also continued to increase, from 49 per cent of total foreign assistance in 1968 to 64 per cent in 1974. The expanded role of FMS is revealed by the fact that sales increased from $2.6 billion to $8.4 billion in 1974 alone, an increase of 323 per cent.

The Purpose of FMS

In the process of its development FMS has become a multipurpose instrument. Its purposes may be examined in terms of the objects it is intended to affect and the behavior desired for those objects.[63] The objects can be divided into two categories: (1) foreign nations and the international system; and (2) domestic industries and the economy.

The first set can be subdivided into developed nations,

---

[60] *Ibid.*

[61] U.S. Congress, Senate, *Report No. 93-189: Foreign Military Sales and Assistance Act*, 93rd Congress, 1st Session, June 1973.

[62] *Congressional Record*, June 25, 1973, p. S.11900.

[63] See Austin Ranney, "The Study of Policy Content," in *Political Science and Public Policy*, edited by Ranney (Chicago: Markham, 1968), p. 7.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

which are predominantly European, and underdeveloped nations. Certain desired courses of events associated essentially with European nations include: strengthening America's allies; encouraging greater logistics cooperation; upgrading European defense systems; and persuading allies to assume a greater share of alliance costs. The following desiderata are essentially designed to affect underdeveloped countries: generating regional power balances; controlling arms races; maintaining influence; and strengthening allies.

Certain other desired courses are intended to affect American industry and the American economy. These include reducing overseas manpower demands on the United States; subsidizing American defense industries; reducing defense costs; and lowering the balance of payments deficit.

These FMS purposes have been presented and reiterated by four administrations, those of Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon and Ford. The following is a presentation of the administrative rationale for FMS during these years.

During the Johnson Administration, McNamara argued that a primary foreign policy goal and a major FMS objective was to assist other nations in deterring and defeating communism and communist-supported aggression. Standardization of weapons throughout NATO, he contended, could be an important method of increasing the defense capabilities of the alliance. FMS would not only distribute superior equipment to all members, but would facilitate increased interdependence. European purchases of American equipment would have several advantages. They would ensure that the allies had (1) compatible ground installations; (2) standard equipment for joint operations during international crises; (3) interchangeable supply systems during combat; and (4) they would perhaps facilitate an acceptance of American tactical and strategic doctrines associated with specific weapons systems.[64]

FMS is also expected to assist "forward defense" countries (that is, those on the perimeter of communist nations) in deterring communist aggression. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird maintained that the basic objective of arms sales was to provide these countries with the necessary deterrence capability, and failing that, to ensure that they could withstand an attack until support forces arrived from the United States. By increasing their strength, Laird contended, the United States is permitted greater strategic flexibility:

> In brief, it is my belief that effective national forces in forward defense countries provide an in-place deterrent for which U.S. forces based outside

[64] *Congressional Record*, July 27, 1967, p. 4015.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that country are not a complete equivalent. To provide this deterrent on a long-term basis in such countries by deploying U.S. forces would tie them down, restrict the flexibility of U.S. decision-making, and create [a] host of economic and political problems inherent in the stationing of foreign troops in sovereign nations.[65]

The Ford Administration has insisted that arms sales to countries located near the Soviet Union, such as Iran or Saudi Arabia, are a means of providing assistance to them in coping with threats from Moscow. Moreover, said Secretary of State Kissinger, "There is a security problem which these countries feel. [It is] caused by a neighbor supported by Soviet or other Communist countries."[66]

Another use of FMS often pointed out by officials is that arms sales to the underdeveloped areas of the world can be instrumental in preventing arms races. During the Johnson Administration, McNamara explained this function to Congress:

> In most instances we have no military commitments to the underdeveloped countries. The amount of sales agreements does not give them a capacity to fight along our side in any significant fashion. Here, the objective is quite different. The objective is in many cases to hold down an arms race, to avoid establishing [military] relationships among nations.[67]

It has also been argued that arms sales will provide the United States with influence concerning the internal and external policies of many underdeveloped countries. In discussing arms sales to the Persian Gulf in 1973, Joseph Sisco, assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs, contended that the sales program permits the United States to be a moderating influence in regional arms races: "Our whole basic approach is from the point of view of caution, restraint, not upsetting the balance and doing the minimal that we think is required in the situation."[68]

Earlier, Rusk and McNamara had declared that arms sales provide the United States with an instrument to generate moderate arms purchases by underdeveloped countries.[69] Said McNamara, if an underdeveloped country purchases a particular weapons system from the United States, say a certain fighter aircraft, it will be "locked-in" to that system for several years; expansions or replacements will necessitate renewed negotiations with the United States.

---

[65] "International Security Affairs Concerned with Shrinking Budget," *Armed Forces Management*, October 1969, pp. 87-88.

[66] Quoted by Richard J. Levine, "Munitions and the Mid-East," *Wall Street Journal*, February 18, 1975, p. 1.

[67] U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Hearings on S. 1872: The Foreign Assistance Act of 1967*, 90th Congress, 1st Session, 1967, p. 312.

[68] U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Hearings on New Perspectives on the Persian Gulf*, 93rd Congress, 1st Session, 1973, p. 29.

[69] *Hearings on S. 1872: The Foreign Assistance Act of 1967*, p. 207.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Moreover, it is hoped that by a form of "pre-emptive selling"[70] Washington can prevent an influx of military equipment into underdeveloped countries from arms-producers less interested in regional arms control. By being able to provide credit for such sales, the United States is given added leverage in bargaining about how large a force a country ought to possess. Officials claim that they can look at the overall military situation of a region and then sell weapons in accordance with their perceptions of what a particular nation's "minimum" defense requirements are.

Thus, even though it would seem that arms buildups cannot be controlled by arms sales, many officials feel that the sales effort actually helps to control and inhibit new races. Packard concluded that through FMS "We can, in effect . . . have a greater moral influence on this whole matter than if we stayed out of it."[71] Although some nations may not be dissuaded from purchasing sophisticated new equipment, the U.S. sales program can help them not to divert too large an amount of domestic resources for military purposes. This point is illustrated by a statement of Under Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach:

> It may be impossible for us to prevent the Latin American Governments from acquiring sophisticated aircraft they have decided to buy. If we refuse to sell, they can buy in Western Europe. Furthermore, the United States has an aircraft, the Northrop F-5, which meets their needs. The alternatives to the F-5 planes are planes of far more advanced design and far greater expense. Their introduction into Latin America would escalate arms spending in that region to a new and much higher level.[72]

Arms are often sold to countries as a demonstration of respect for *their* interpretation of the situation. As Secretary of Defense Schlesinger put it: "We are dealing with sovereign nations whose perception of their needs may not coincide with our own."[73] The sale represents an act of good will by the United States.

Another claim has been that arms exports assist in maintaining a balance of power in many regions. Under Secretary of State Eugene Rostow, testifying before Congress in 1967, developed this argument. A balance of power was said to be generated when one country possessed the capability to dissuade a prospective enemy from attacking. Rostow maintained that the principal objec-

---

[70] *Arms Sales and Foreign Policy*, p. 4016.

[71] *Hearings on H.R. 15628: To Amend the Foreign Military Sales Act*, p. 8.

[72] "U.S. Arms to the Developing World: Dilemmas of Foreign Policy," address before the Institute for International Relations, Stanford University, Stanford, Calif., November 17, 1968.

[73] Quoted by Levine.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tive in selling arms to Israel, for example, was "to prevent serious power imbalances which might encourage hostilities."[74]

FMS is furthermore intended to have an impact on the U.S. economy, since the sales effort is expected to reduce defense costs. Testifying before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in 1968, Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Warnke indicated that he perceived credit assistance for military sales to be among the most inexpensive defense instruments available to the United States:

> In many instances these are the cheapest defense dollars that we spend. By equipping the indigenous people to contribute to their own defense and hence to the defense of the free world, we make it unnecessary to get directly involved in these situations.[75]

In May 1968 Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford indicated that there was "no way to determine precisely what any nation's fair share of the burden of collective defense should be," but he observed that arms purchases seemed to be a method whereby our allies would be able to increase their ability to "provide for their defense needs from their *own resources*."[76] In reference to the NATO allies, Assistant Secretary of Defense G. Warren Nutter said, "We hope they can share a bigger part of the burden instead of our carrying such a big load."[77]

Another way FMS can reduce defense costs is by limiting the United States' manpower requirements in meeting its commitments. President Nixon indicated in his Guam speech, which set forth the Nixon Doctrine, that "we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility for providing the manpower for its defense."[78] Several military strategists expected that FMS would facilitate this aspect of the Nixon Doctrine by providing sophisticated equipment and training for indigenous forces, for according to one official, FMS is keyed to the "utilization of allied, rather than U.S. manpower whenever possible." Moreover, the use of indigenous forces creates and maintains larger armies at less cost to the United States than if it were to deploy adequate force levels in these countries: for example, Nationalist China can maintain sixteen troops for the cost of one U.S. soldier; Korea can maintain twenty, and Turkey can maintain twelve. If we were to

---

[74] *Hearings on S. 1155: Export-Import Bank Participation and Financing in Credit Sales of Defense Articles*, p. 20.

[75] U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Hearings on S. 3092, Foreign Military Sales*, 90th Congress, 2nd Session, 1968, p. 42.

[76] *Ibid.*, p. 6. (Emphasis added.)

[77] "International Security Affairs Concerned with Shrinking Budget," p. 90.

[78] *Hearings on H.R. 15628: To Amend the Foreign Military Sales Act*, p. 2.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

maintain equivalent forces in these countries, stated Lieutenant General Warren, "it would cost the United States over 12 billion dollars [a year] in pay, allowances, subsistence and clothing alone."[79] Thus, FMS has been perceived as permitting an increase in the number of "combat ready" allied troops at minimum cost to the United States.

Besides the central rationale for FMS — its overall contribution to lowering the balance of payments deficit — it has been of important assistance to economically desperate defense industries. In 1967, Paul Nitze informed Congress that in the period 1962 through 1967, FMS had made possible a billion dollars in profits to American industry. Over the same time period it provided 1.4 million man-hours of employment for American labor.[80] Along this line, during the Johnson Administration Defense Department officials frequently claimed that as a substitute for more costly security instruments FMS reserved precious resources for solving domestic problems. For example:

> Competing claims on total national resources urgently needed to solve challenging problems at home make it especially important to employ the most economical possible means of attaining any single objective.[81]

Does an instrument with so many functions lead to policy contradictions? It is apparent to the author that the validity of the claims for FMS has not been thoroughly assessed, but demonstrating that it does or does not do what it is intended to do would be a major research task beyond the scope of this article. The principal concern of this study is to illustrate how FMS gained such widespread acceptance as a foreign assistance instrument. It is important to note, however, that its use for so many purposes has generated increasing opposition and criticism, possibly threatening the consensus of support for it.

Continued Congressional Support?

Though FMS has become the principal foreign assistance instrument of the United States it has now come under considerable attack from one of its chief supporters: Congress. Is it therefore in danger of being abolished or replaced? Insight into this problem can be gained by examining the nature of congressional censure.

---

[79] Lt. General Robert H. Warren, deputy assistant secretary of defense for military assistance and sales, *ibid.*, pp. 44-45.

[80] U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Banking and Currency, *Hearings on H.R. 6649: Export-Import Bank and Credit Sales of Defense Articles*, 90th Congress, 1st Session, 1967, p. 6.

[81] *Arms Sales and Foreign Policy*, p. 4014.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

By the spring of 1975 a veritable policy storm had blown into Washington concerning FMS generally, certain goals, specific sales and specific procedures, yet it would be wrong to conclude that this has meant a demise in congressional support for the program. Growing criticism of one element or other of the instrument does not necessarily mean a decline in support for arms sales. Principally, seven types of challenges have arisen. They include: (1) complete rejection of FMS, a belief that the United States should not sell arms for any reason; (2) attacks on certain FMS goals; (3) criticism of sales to certain regions; (4) opposition to sales to certain countries; (5) opposition to specific kinds of equipment being sold or to certain sales deals; (6) criticism of specific administrative procedures; and (7) concern for a greater congressional input into sales decisions.

(1) Complete rejection of FMS or complete opposition to arms sales is difficult to illustrate. There is an occasional outburst on the House or Senate floor; a statement of moral indignation that the United States is "taking blood money" from other countries.[82] Yet, it appears that few congressmen are opposed to arms sales generally. Most, as we have indicated, have viewed them as a visible alternative to grant assistance. The 1973 vote on the Foreign Military Sales and Assistance Act shows the complexity of the congressional attitude: the Senate voted 50 to 42 and the House 210 to 193 to replace military grant assistance with sales. It is interesting to note that S. 1443, a bill to expand sales, was promoted by some of the most outspoken critics of specific aspects of FMS, among them Senators Church, Eagleton, Fulbright, Hughes, Javits and Kennedy. Conversely, opposition to the bill included staunch FMS supporters — and most Republicans — who were opposed to eliminating the grant program. Those who voice specific criticisms usually want to continue to sell arms but want some particular goal or action changed.

(2) Senator Edward Kennedy's criticism of selling arms to gain influence is typical. Said Kennedy in February 1975:

> The record of this thesis is a dismal one, we thought this was true with India and Pakistan, and yet they went to war three times in the past decade. The Russians believed they could secure influence with various nations in the Middle East through the supply of arms, and yet they, too, have not been able to escape the consequences . . . of wars caused in part by Soviet arms supply. . . .

[82] Senator J. William Fulbright, in U.S. Congress, Senate, *Report No. 1358*, 89th Congress, 2nd Session, 1966.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Surely we lose more of that fabled ability to control events when, through arms programs, we enhance and intensify a government's ability for independent military action.[83]

Senator Frank Church challenged the goal of selling arms "to control a potential arms race and dampen it down." "By adopting the notion that we can defuse arms races by supplying arms," he said, "we implicate ourselves in a chain reaction, the end of which we cannot possibly foresee."[84] To support his point, the senator cited the sale of fifty subsonic A-4B combat aircraft to Argentina in 1966, the motivation being to circumscribe an arms race in Latin America. But the purchase of the A-4Bs, though they were of lower quality than originally desired by Argentina, prompted Chile to purchase twenty-one British Hawker-Hunter fighter jets, an aircraft deemed by many to be superior to the A-4B. This forced Peru to begin negotiations to purchase even more advanced weapons from either the United States, Great Britain or France. After the United States refused to sell the advanced aircraft, Peru purchased twelve Mirage V fighter-bombers from France. In turn, the acquisition of such advanced weapons by Peru and Chile prompted Argentina to press for more advanced aircraft. To Senator Church, such developments demonstrated that FMS had not been instrumental in "dampening" an arms race.

(3) Because of considerable opposition to sales to certain regions, Congress has since 1966 imposed "ceilings" on arms sales to Latin America and Africa. As of 1975, the Administration is proscribed from selling more than $150 million in arms to each of these regions. More recently concern has been expressed about sales to the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, for since 1973 the United States has sold $10 billion in arms to the latter area alone.[85] In 1974 sales to Persian Gulf countries constituted 61 per cent of the total FMS effort. Among the countries of the Middle East, FY 1974 purchases added up as follows: for Israel, $2,117.6 million; Jordan, $50.9 million; Lebanon, $9.7 million; Turkey, $17.1 million.[86]

Congressman Lee Hamilton, chairman of the subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia, became convinced after holding hearings on arms sales to the Persian Gulf that "our arms supply

[83] *Congressional Record*, February 22, 1975, p. S.2410, and February 27, 1975, p. S.2794.

[84] *Ibid.*, June 26, 1967, p. 17309.

[85] *Ibid.*, May 7, 1975, p. 7610.

[86] U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, *Report of the Special Committee on the Middle East*, 94th Congress, 1st Session, March 1975. (Cited hereafter as Middle East report.) The figure for Israel includes $1.5 billion for which payment was waived by Congress.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

policy creates as many suspicions as it may alleviate fears."[87] His view is widely held at the Capitol. In February 1975 Senator Kennedy proposed a six-month moratorium on arms sales to the Gulf; in July he proposed a total moratorium until the United States fully studied its policies in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. On November 3, 1975, sixty-eight members of the House and twenty-eight members of the Senate signed a letter to Secretary of State Kissinger expressing grave concern about arms sales to the Persian Gulf. In their view such sales become "a destabilizing influence in politically volatile areas such as the Middle East." They urged Kissinger to call an international conference of arms-exporting nations to reduce the flow of arms to the region.[88]

The Armed Services Committee's special subcommittee on the Middle East, chaired by Congressman Melvin Price, which toured the area in February 1975, reported that while it opposed any unilateral moratorium on sales, it favored an attempt to reach an international agreement on limiting arms in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf.[89]

(4) A fourth type of criticism concerns opposition to certain countries receiving arms. After Turkey invaded Cyprus in July 1974, with arms supplied by the United States, for example, Congress proscribed any further grants, sales or deliveries to that country. Throughout the spring and summer of 1975 the Ford Administration attempted to have the ban lifted, and the Senate finally acquiesced, by a vote of 42 to 39. However, on July 24 the House rejected the Administration's proposal, 223 to 206. Similarly, from time to time proposals are acted upon to proscribe sales to Greece, Pakistan and certain dictatorial regimes.

(5) The sale of certain kinds of equipment or the details of specific sales agreements may be objected to. Two examples of this type of opposition to FMS are the Vinnell contract with Saudi Arabia and the proposed sale of Hawk missiles to Jordan. The $77 million contract under which the Vinnell Corporation of Alhambra, California, would send 1,000 employees to Saudi Arabia to train the National Guard was subjected to considerable congressional scrutiny and opposition. Many congressmen feared that this kind of procedure could lead to something comparable to the early commitments to South Vietnam. Most emphatic was Senator Kennedy:

---

[87] *New Perspectives on the Persian Gulf*, p. vi.

[88] A copy of the letter may be obtained from the office of Congressman John Seiberling, chairman, Arms Control and Disarmament Committee of Members of Congress for Peace through Law.

[89] Middle East report, p. 22.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Yet, if there is anything that we should have learned from our recent experience in Southeast Asia, it is the dangers which arise from military arrangements in which thousands of Americans train "internal security forces" for another country. No matter what the possible advantages, we should be loath to enter lightly into any such arrangement.[90]

On the other hand, the special subcommittee on the Middle East reported that the contract was not inconsistent with past procedures and that, at no cost to the United States, the Vinnell contract "contributed positively to the U.S. relationship with one of the most important oil producing nations in the world."[91]

Subsequently, on July 10, 1975, the Defense Department notified Congress that it had negotiated a contract to provide Jordan with fourteen batteries of the Hawk ground-to-air missile system and eight batteries of the Vulcan anti-aircraft gun at an estimated price of $350 million. Resolutions were at once introduced in both Houses objecting to the sale. In the floor debate congressmen were concerned that a sale to Jordan including these particular weapons would be destabilizing for the area. Typical was the view of Congressman Stephen Solarz:

This sale has significant strategic implications and will result in an important qualitative change in the Middle East balance of military power. It is a well-known fact that Jordan refrained from opening a third front against Israel because it lacked air cover and an effective air defense against Israel. With this very sophisticated weapons system King Hussein will no longer have any excuse for failing to open another front should open war again occur in the Middle East.[92]

Both the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House International Relations Committee reported out resolutions opposing the sale. On July 28, however, Senator Clifford Case, a leader of Senate opposition on the issue, proposed that the Ford Administration compromise by selling Jordan lesser quantities of Hawk and Vulcan batteries. Secretary Kissinger and Under Secretary Sisco reached a compromise with Representative Jonathan Bingham and Senator Case on September 16. Two days later, on September 18, Jordan announced that it would not buy the Hawk missiles because of "insulting" limitations imposed on their use.

(6) Occasionally, since 1962, members of Congress have become critical of specific procedures used by the Administration for implementing FMS. In 1967, for example, several committees were alarmed that the Export-Import Bank was being used to finance sales, because 27 per cent of the loans authorized by the bank that

[90] *Congressional Record*, February 27, 1975, p. S.2794.
[91] Middle East report, p. 17.
[92] *Congressional Record*, July 21, 1975, p. E.3987.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

year were for arms purchases by foreign countries. Extensive hearings were held and Congress voted to prohibit the bank from financing sales to underdeveloped countries — this until 1973, when it reversed itself. The use of the bank to finance sales was criticized in 1967 because members of the Banking and Currency Committee doubted that it was chartered for such purposes and thought it should not be used to encourage or facilitate arms buildups among countries which should be spending most of their funds on social services.[93] Eventually the Foreign Relations Committee recommended removing the restriction because, said its chairman, underdeveloped countries were further disadvantaged by not having credit for defense purchases.[94]

Throughout 1967 and 1968, a number of subcommittees were inclined to criticize the FMS decision process. Indeed, members of the Senate Subcommittee on Near East and South Asian Affairs held a series of hearings on the question of how well sales decisions were coordinated with other policies and what agencies or personnel participated in a sales decision.[95] In 1973 Congress became critical of the large role played by government agencies in selling arms. In that year 84 per cent of sales were through government channels. The 1973 act encourages agencies to turn greater numbers of arms transactions over to "free enterprise."[96]

(7) The final type of congressional response to FMS is a sporadic but growing drive by relevant committees to gain greater control over sales decisions. Until 1967 few congressmen, even those on the foreign affairs committees, were aware of the program's existence. Largely owing to reports in the *New York Times* about some sizeable sales to Iran, a major debate took place in the spring and summer of 1967 concerning who was responsible for the congressional ignorance. A vast number of congressmen felt that the agencies had deliberately obfuscated information about FMS to prevent Congress from intervening in sales decisions. As a result of that controversy, Congress required that the Administration present semi-annual reports on all credits and guarantees to underdeveloped countries. Also, semi-annual reports predicting or forecasting credit sales, annual reports predicting total yearly sales, and semi-annual reports of all military exports on the U.S. Munitions List must be sent to Congress.[97]

---

[93] U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Banking and Currency, *Senate Report No. 493 on S. 1115*, 90th Congress, 2nd Session, 1967.
[94] *Congressional Record*, June 25, 1973, p. S.1190.
[95] U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Hearings on Arms Sales to the Near East and South Asian Countries*, 90th Congress, 1st Session, 1967.
[96] U.S. Congress, House, *Report No. 1641*, 90th Congress, 2nd Session, 1968.
[97] *Congressional Record*, June 6, 1974, p. 59851.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Again in 1973, many congressmen were exercised about the quality of information they were receiving concerning arms sales. Senator Gaylord Nelson sponsored legislation to give Congress the "up to date" information it needed. His proposal became law in 1974. The Nelson Amendment, as it is called, requires the President to report to both Houses of Congress any single deal to any one country that amounts to over $25 million. If after thirty days neither House objects, the sale will be permitted. Agreements with one country amounting to a total of $50 million for the year must also be subject to this procedure. The Nelson Amendment represents a major effort by Congress to have, at a minimum, a policy veto over arms sales decisions.

The year 1975 produced the greatest criticism of FMS since 1967, yet a consensus still appears to exist for its continued use. Nearly all the opposition is directed toward some specific element rather than to the program generally. Possibly multiple dissatisfaction or opposition for varying reasons could lead to a coalition opposed to FMS — after all, it expanded because it solved problems for a variety of decision-making groups — but it is this author's view that increased criticism should not be interpreted as a decline in support for arms sales as a major foreign policy instrument. Remember, the program does implement a number of Congress's highly valued goals: it is a substantial contributor in easing the balance of payments deficit, an alternative to direct U.S. intervention, and a key instrument in the congressional drive for "burden-sharing" among our allies.

All in all, it seems certain that the instrument will no longer be ignored or neglected by Congress. From 1962 to 1967, most members were scarcely aware that the United States sold arms. Even after the 1967 debate over FMS, little attention was given to arms sales decisions until 1973. In the intervening years, until 1975, the relevant committees would hold hearings on FMS for only one or two days while hearings on the economic grant assistance program would be held for six weeks or longer.

The increased congressional intervention in the past year may finally represent a recognition by congressmen that an arms sales decision in many parts of the world *is* the foreign policy of the United States. The growing criticism of specific sales decisions or certain procedures may reflect less a decline in support and more a realization that FMS has become the United States' primary foreign assistance instrument.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

WEAPONS PROCUREMENT COLLABORATION: A NEW ERA FOR NATO?*

by Frederic M. Anderson

During the past decade or so the unparalleled detente in East-West relations and the unrelenting pressure of increasing defense costs have led the members of the North Atlantic Alliance to reappraise their security relationship. In particular, the Americans and their European allies have expressed a common interest in finding ways to reduce the price of their security without introducing instability to the worldwide, and more importantly, the European balance of East-West power. Following their disheartening experience in the Vietnam war, and responding to the persistent balance of payments problems of the late 1960s and early seventies, many Americans demanded a reduction of the U.S. military role in the defense of Europe, at the same time suggesting it was high time for the Europeans to take over a larger share of the "burden." And indeed, throughout the mid-seventies there has been a rising tide of opinion in the United States as well as in Western Europe that "the European contribution to the NATO effort is insufficient," that "it should be increased, if not through higher expenditure, in any case through better organization."[1]

At the same time, the European allies have been anxious to gain a stronger position in alliance decision-making and have felt an increasing need to guard against the possibility of an American withdrawal from Europe. In response to these pressures the West Europeans have witnessed a growing consensus that greater cooperation and integration in "European" defense is desirable and in fact indispensable. This is not to say that demands for European defense integration are new — indeed, the idea has a rather long history —

* The assertions and opinions contained in this paper are those of the author and should not be taken as representing the views of the U.S. government or the U.S. Air Force.

[1] Ernst H. van der Beugel and Max Kohnstamm, "Western Europe and America in the Seventies," *Atlantic Community Quarterly*, Fall 1972, p. 295.

Captain Frederic M. Anderson, USAF, is a pilot in the Strategic Air Command. He received his Master's in political science from the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, and is particularly interested in strategic studies and West European affairs.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

but rather that recent pressures and progress in other forms of integration have given the demands a new note of urgency and have created a more receptive environment.

Proponents of a more effective European contribution to NATO vary considerably as to the level of defense integration and the framework for cooperation that they envision. At the one extreme, the need for a new "European defense community"[2] with a unified European command structure receives some limited support.[3] The idea is not to replace NATO, but to give it a more unified European component. More pragmatic observers believe that a fully integrated structure is still beyond current political limits and can only be viewed as a rather long-range goal. In the meantime, however, they strongly support the notion that increased cooperation and functional integration in defense can greatly improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the European contribution to NATO.

One of the most promising ways in which alliance effectiveness can be improved is through increased European as well as transatlantic collaboration in weapons procurement.[4] Collaborative procurement promotes weapons standardization, which in turn offers opportunities for common logistics and joint training, all of which can increase the military effectiveness of NATO forces. For example, General Andrew J. Goodpaster, NATO's supreme allied commander from 1969 to 1974, has estimated that with improved weapons standardization the military effectiveness of allied forces could be improved by 30 per cent to 50 per cent for most units, and by as much as 300 per cent for some tactical air units.[5] Furthermore, by reducing the redundancy in purely national programs and offering economies of scale, collaborative procurement promotes the more efficient use of national resources and thereby helps to counter the rising costs of national defense.[6] At the same time it promotes a harmonization of national defense policies and, to some

[2] Throughout this paper the term "European defense community" (EDC) is used quite generally to mean a highly integrated European defense structure; it is not necessarily synonymous with the structure proposed by the French in 1950.

[3] See for example Lord Gladwyn, "The Defense of Western Europe," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1973, pp. 588-597; François Duchêne, "A New European Defense Community," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1971, pp. 69-82.

[4] In this paper the term "collaborative procurement" is used very generally to mean the obtaining of weapons via cooperative processes, which may include joint research and development, production or purchase, or some combination of these.

[5] Thomas A. Callaghan, Jr., *U.S./European Economic Cooperation in Military and Civil Technology*, revised ed. (Washington: Georgetown University, Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 1975), p. 35.

[6] Callaghan (pp. 36-38) estimates that the annual allied dollar waste from duplicative national efforts in research, development and procurement, and from redundant logistics systems, is somewhat over $10 billion.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

extent, even of national foreign policies. For these and other reasons, a more fully integrated system of weapons procurement can be an effective source of military, economic and political integration for the West Europeans.[7] On a transatlantic scale it should also strengthen the bonds that unite the United States, Canada and the Europeans under NATO and greatly reduce the cost of alliance defense. Moreover, a new level of NATO cooperation will help to counterbalance some of the political tremors that have shaken alliance confidence in recent years.[8]

All of this begs the question of whether or not the current system of collaborative procurement within NATO, and particularly among the European members of NATO,[9] can and will be improved. An earlier research paper[10] examined in detail the case for collaboration, the main obstacles and difficulties that historically have impeded progress, the record of successful and unsuccessful projects, and the present "state of the art" in Western Europe. That research established that European collaboration efforts might assume one of three alternative patterns in the near future.

One option would be for the Europeans to create a strong and independent (from the United States) defense-industry base, under the control of a centralized, supranational procurement authority. The goal would be to construct a highly rationalized and fully integrated European defense industry, which could fill European needs and compete successfully against the United States and other world producers. As a second option, the Europeans might abandon further efforts to create such an integrated industrial base as the foundation for joint procurement, at least for major weapons systems, relying instead on existing national industries. Major weapons would be produced under licensing agreement or purchased off the shelf from other producers, such as the United States. The third alternative, and the one deemed most likely in the earlier research, is for the West Europeans to continue to pursue the present form of *ad hoc*, inefficient collaborative procurement, cooperating with

[7] For a more complete analysis of the functional integrative effects of collaborative procurement, see Frederic M. Anderson, "International Collaboration in Weapons Procurement: The Implications for Western European Integration," seminar paper presented at the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., January 1975.

[8] Witness the recurring threats of U.S. troop withdrawals from Europe, the Greek and Turkish threats against continued alliance membership as a result of their Cyprus dispute, and the recent communist political gains in Italy and Portugal.

[9] The emphasis in this paper is placed on the European collaborative system, since it is felt that transatlantic cooperation can only be improved after intra-European progress. As will be shown, however, the two systems can hardly be separated.

[10] See fn. 7, above.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

American industry whenever technologically or economically beneficial, and making only gradual, evolutionary improvements in their procurement machinery. On balance it appears that this option incurs the lowest net costs and encounters the least political resistance. Half-hearted pursuit of this option, which would result in stagnation, will not be sufficient, however. As one observer has noted, the present state of *ad hoc* collaboration can only add to the impression of "a lack of common identity and purpose in Europe [which] in turn affects American views of the European defence effort and weakens the credibility of the Alliance."[11]

Major Obstacles to Improved Collaboration

In order to achieve the level of alliance military strength and efficiency that they need and clearly desire, the Europeans must agree to accelerate improvements to their procurement systems as much as possible by making renewed and concerted efforts to overcome the remaining obstacles. Several political barriers remain, presenting very difficult problems — yet they are not insurmountable. Given a stronger European (and American, as will be seen) commitment, they can be overcome. The collaborative procurement system can then be substantially improved, bringing in turn much greater rewards. It remains for the North Atlantic allies to recognize the potential and make the more concerted efforts.[12]

Primacy of Short-Term, National Interests

The record of European joint procurement efforts from the mid-1950s through the present has clearly established one of the more important barriers to improved cooperation: the primacy given by individual governments to the realization of short-term, and often rather narrow, national interests. In a majority of the cases, national governments have chosen to participate in particular projects primarily in response to the promise of short-run economic benefits, rather than in an effort to promote the longer-term common benefits of an integrated European procurement system. A

[11] Roger Facer, *The Alliance and Europe. Part III: Weapons Procurement in Europe—Capabilities and Choices* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper no. 108, 1975), p. 39.

[12] It must be pointed out that the long-run progress of detente might lower the perceived "threat" in Europe to such an extent that the Europeans see little need to maintain a large-scale defense capability, and that some of the incentive behind collaboration in defense procurement might therefore be lost. For the immediate future, however, the factors encouraging increased cooperation will likely remain predominant.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

single project may have been attractive because it offered access to the more advanced technology of one of the partners (high technology is inherently attractive because it is thought to be the sine qua non of industrial development); it may have offered access to a weapon system that would otherwise have been beyond the economic means of a single partner; or it may have been attractive because production-sharing promised to sustain a weak or dying sector of the nation's defense industry. At the same time, a potential national participant has often avoided (or even withdrawn from) a particular project (1) when it did not secure design leadership; (2) when the project involved too great a drain on national technology (again, technology is seen as an economic resource); (3) when it meant the procurement of a weapon system not fully consistent with national military doctrines and requirements; or (4) when the nation felt it would not be adequately reimbursed under the principle of *juste retour,* that is, getting back in industrial or financial terms as much as it put into a single project.

Such behavior can easily be justified on the basis of understandable national priorities. The very real problem arises, however, that continued behavior according to such short-term national interests has prevented the establishment of an ongoing and efficient system of joint procurement. In fact one observes a record of individual, *ad hoc,* bilateral and trilateral projects that fail to reflect any long-term continuity. Furthermore, individual projects have remained rather small, and the management structures and associated political and industrial linkages between nations have tended to deteriorate in the period between projects. As a result, the potential economic, political and military benefits of large-scale integration in procurement have not yet been fully realized. Before they can be realized, some hard choices must be made.

This is not to say that progress in joint procurement has been totally absent. Commendable advances have been made, as demonstrated by the current MRCA (multirole combat aircraft) project linking Britain, Italy and the German Federal Republic. To date this is the largest and most advanced indigenous European project in NATO history.[13] But further progress appears unlikely in the absence of serious commitments by the West European governments to their longer-term mutual defense and economic interests. The

[13] Current plans call for a total production of 807 aircraft at a price (September 1975) of about $8.4 million each. See J. Van Elsen, *Report on the Activities of the Sub-Committee on European Defence Co-operation* (Brussels: North Atlantic Assembly International Secretariat, September 1975), pp. 7-9.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

members of the European Economic Community have faced a parallel dilemma in the past and are familiar with the arguments. They have also made real progress in responding to the necessities of common-good programs. What is needed is a stronger commitment by the West European governments (and by the United States!) to the common objective of achieving an effective European defense capability while holding total (rather than national) costs to a minimum; a commitment by national governments to help create, jointly finance and utilize a stronger central procurement agency, which can coordinate future projects and distribute the benefits across many projects (in an effort to reduce the inefficiency caused by *juste retour*); and a commitment to accept some of the shorter-term economic and political hardships that may precede the longer-term benefits of improved procurement collaboration.[14]

Fortunately, the past six months have seen considerable progress in this particular area of concern. On both sides of the Atlantic, national governments have taken a new and apparently very serious interest in the success of weapons standardization and joint procurement efforts within NATO. Recent initiatives and new political support (to be discussed in more detail later) may indeed signal a needed break with the past. If the Europeans and the Americans can at last agree to commit themselves on a unanimous and long-term basis to the advancement of common-good objectives, then it appears that one of the very crucial constraints to improved collaboration might be removed in the near future.

Confusion Between Improved Collaboration and a New EDC

Another major barrier to progress stems from confusion between the implications of improved procurement cooperation and the implications of a new EDC. Some argue that procurement integration can hardly be separated from large-scale defense integration, or as one observer has noted, "that one cannot imagine a European Armaments Agency without a European General Staff."[15] This pervasive, though quite incorrect, equation leads those who resist total defense integration to resist advancements in procurement integration for many of the same reasons. Closer analysis

[14] For example, on a national basis such hardships might be associated with a further rationalization of European defense industries and some additional loss of national sovereignty in defense planning and decision-making.

[15] René Foch, *Europe and Technology: A Political View* (Paris: Atlantic Institute, Atlantic Paper no. 2, 1970), p. 49. Foch rejects this notion, arguing instead that the European Coal and Steel Community has proved that functional integration can precede total political integration.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

reveals, however, that functional integration in procurement can be successful in the absence of total defense integration, and that the constraints on the former are much less severe than those on the latter.

As suggested earlier, considerable debate surrounds the topic of a new EDC. Lord Gladwyn, for one, has supported the notion that the Europeans have the capability to build a credible deterrent that could fill the gap left by possible American nuclear and conventional force-cuts in Europe. Moreover, he believes that "it is only common prudence for the West European democracies, if they wish to ensure their freedom in the long run, to build up and to streamline their conventional defenses and to establish, within the Alliance, some kind of unified command."[16] François Duchêne has offered the more cautiously formulated proposal for "a more coordinated West European defense system [which] could not replace the American nuclear guarantee, but . . . could reinforce it and make it more credible, which would be especially welcome if the totals of West European forces and of American forces in Europe both go down."[17] On the other hand, there appears to be a broad consensus that large-scale defense integration in Europe is presently neither possible nor desirable, but can only be viewed as a long-term prospect. In support of this notion, Karl Kaiser has written that the Europeans could probably provide for their own security if (1) Europe were totally united economically, politically and militarily, and (2) the Europeans could create a genuinely unified nuclear force, subject to centralized control. He maintains, however, that neither condition is likely to be fulfilled in the near future. The prospect of a European defense identity, independent of American support and presence, therefore remains rather remote.[18]

At the same time there are others who suggest that defense integration in the form of a new EDC, even if possible, would yield undesirable consequences. First of all, it might well encourage the Americans to reduce their security commitment to Europe sooner than desired, resulting in an unstable imbalance of power in Europe. Secondly, attempts to create a unified European defense organization would very likely meet with intense Soviet and East European opposition. Undoubtedly Moscow would do everything possible to prevent the creation of an independent European nuclear force as part of an EDC. In the face of such strong Soviet

[16] Gladwyn, p. 596.
[17] Duchêne, pp. 76-77.
[18] Karl Kaiser, *Europe and the United States: The Future of the Relationship* (Washington: Columbia Books, 1973), pp. 96-98.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

resistance, pursuit of defense integration in Europe would likely threaten the whole future of East-West detente. Quite obviously the West Europeans have a sincere interest in the successful promotion of detente, since it offers the possible rewards of reduced tensions in Europe and increased trade with the communist bloc. As a result, the West Europeans are understandably reluctant to take steps that might place those rewards in jeopardy.

In view of these multilevel constraints and deterrents to large-scale defense integration, it is not difficult to understand why West Europeans generally oppose any attempt to create a new EDC. However, the same constraints and deterrents do not act with equal magnitude against a higher level of functional integration in the area of weapons procurement.

The record of joint procurement projects has proved that collaboration can be successful in the absence of total defense integration. Given sufficient will, the European nations have been able to establish workable political and industrial bodies that, with the advice and cooperation of separate (though most often allied) national military establishments, have carried out large-scale cooperative efforts: e.g., the F-104G project (involving West Germany, Holland, Italy and Belgium) and the Sidewinder missile purchase (which involved eight NATO nations). Certainly the present level of cooperation in procurement can be improved in the absence of a unified European nuclear force and without the establishment of a unified European command structure. Indeed, even the fullest exploitation of joint weapons procurement should not depend on the precondition of full-scale defense integration. It thus appears that justifiable resistance to a new EDC should not stand in the way of improved cooperation at the limited level of weapons procurement.

Moreover, a higher level of procurement integration should not threaten relations with the United States or the Soviet Union if properly handled. (The Atlantic relationship will be examined later.) Certainly the threats to detente can be minimized, particularly if improved West European cooperation is accompanied by East-West confidence-building measures undertaken in the context of MBFR and CSCE. Already the Soviet Union has shown a willingness to accept the economic and political integration developing within the EEC, so improved cooperation in response to strong economic incentives at the defense-procurement level should not appear unreasonable. Moreover, in a period of detente the West Europeans must not be lulled into dropping their security guard. Instead they should continue taking steps to improve the effective-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ness of their defense capabilities as a hedge against a possible U.S. withdrawal or the failure of detente. Furthermore, improved procurement collaboration can provide a useful foundation in the event an independent West European defense community should one day become necessary or more desirable. In the meantime, procurement cooperation will help to ensure the security of Western Europe by making more effective the European contribution to NATO, by promoting the more efficient use of community resources, and by hedging against the instability and large-scale changes in the European balance of power that would be inimical to European, American and Soviet interests.

French Resistance to Collaboration Under NATO

Throughout the postwar period, the majority of joint West European weapons-procurement projects have taken place within the framework of NATO. Primary responsibility for promoting joint procurement since the late 1960s has been attached to the Eurogroup (and its subgroup, EURONAD); in view of the substantial progress already made, many feel the Eurogroup should be developed into the central procurement authority of the future.[19] Indeed, a 1974 study by a North Atlantic Assembly subcommittee concluded that with respect to future European defense cooperation, "the Eurogroup undoubtedly represented the most appropriate and efficient framework within which the European allies should work."[20] One of the critical constraints on such an approach, however, lies in French resistance to unified collaboration within the NATO framework. Despite its willingness to cooperate with NATO countries — on a limited, *ad hoc* basis — on those particular projects that have captured French interest, the French government has consistently opposed the linkage of European defense cooperation to NATO and has steadfastly refused to participate in Eurogroup planning.

The French very likely have many reasons for disliking the Eurogroup as a forum for defense integration, but three appear to be crucial. The first lies in a fear of the possible supranational char-

[19] The Eurogroup is an informal group of defense ministers and NATO permanent representatives from ten of the European NATO countries, presently including Belgium, Denmark, West Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. France, Iceland and Portugal have so far not participated. EURONAD is a group of national armaments directors from the same Eurogroup countries. See *Aspects of NATO: The Eurogroup* (Brussels: NATO Information Service, November 1972).

[20] J. Van Elsen, *Report on the Activities of the Sub-Committee on European Defence Co-operation* (Brussels: North Atlantic Assembly International Secretariat, November 1974), p. 19.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

acter of the Eurogroup, which might infringe on French national sovereignty and independence. The second lies in the fact that improved cooperation within the Eurogroup with French participation would clearly be inconsistent with the long-standing French policy of nonintegration with either of the superpower blocs; at the same time, it would likely meet with some Soviet resistance. The third lies in the French concern about America's indirect but strong influence over NATO, and therefore over the Eurogroup. Clearly these issues will have to be addressed before the French can be enticed to take a more active role.

It is reasonable to ask at this point why the other Europeans cannot proceed without the French. Several arguments appear to militate against such a course of action. First of all, in terms of total dollar output, the French have what is probably the second largest defense industry in Europe (second to the British).[21] At the same time, the French possess some of the most advanced weapons technology in Europe (and in the world, for that matter). For Eurogroup members to cooperate more formally in weapons procurement in the absence of the French would therefore incur economic costs at the very least. Economies of scale would not offer such large potential rewards, French weapons technology would likely be withheld, and the economic benefits of large-scale, long-term rationalization of European defense industries would be reduced. Moreover, the long-range prospects for developing a highly integrated European defense community would be jeopardized. Certainly such a structure would be severely weakened, if not doomed to failure, by French nonparticipation. And if the other Europeans now reinforce the Eurogroup (a subgroup of NATO, remember) as the initial foundation of a long-term defense integration effort, before gaining French approval, they will no doubt reduce the chances of French participation in a future EDC. The Eurogroup's members therefore have had good reason to proceed rather cautiously, making every attempt to explore any initiative that might induce a change in French policy.[22]

Fortunately, there appear to be several factors already at work that are weakening the French position. For one thing, the French have for some time feared that detente might lead to a U.S.-Soviet bargain (perhaps in the context of MBFR) that could leave Europe dangerously exposed. It is important to remember that France's independent security policy is in fact largely dependent on

[21] Facer, Table 9.
[22] *Ibid.*, pp. 44-45.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the American nuclear and conventional force deterrent based in Europe. If those forces were reduced, the French would likely seek closer defense cooperation with their European allies; they are already promoting increased cooperation as a hedge against that eventuality, although within a framework outside of NATO. Moreover, the nuclear stalemate brought about by current superpower parity has clearly forced the French to recognize the need for stronger and more efficient conventional European forces, and they no doubt realize that present forces can be greatly improved through better allied cooperation. Furthermore, the recent tremors felt in the alliance during the Cyprus and Middle East crises, and the threat posed by the increasing strength of the communist parties in Portugal, Italy and even France, very likely add to French fears that their long-range security will depend on closer European defense collaboration. And as allied cooperation continues to advance in her absence, France clearly runs the risk of being excluded from potential arms markets in Europe, a not unimportant factor for a country that depends heavily on export sales of weapons.[23]

The other Europeans and even the United States have made considerable efforts during recent months to promote better allied collaboration and to induce a new level of French participation. In August of 1974 the U.S. Congress firmly expressed its interest in improving NATO military effectiveness by adopting the Nunn Amendment as part of the 1975 Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act. That amendment directed the U.S. secretary of defense to assess the military and economic costs of nonstandardization of weapons among NATO forces, and to examine possible ways to promote standardization. Following the publication of Thomas Callaghan's previously cited study, which called for a radical improvement in the standardization of NATO's weapons and equipment via two-way trade in a North Atlantic common defense market, governmental and public debate of this important issue intensified in both Europe and America. In May of 1975 the Eurogroup defense ministers agreed to initiate a much more vigorous approach to NATO weapons standardization, while the U.S. Congress adopted the Culver-Nunn Amendment to the 1976 Defense Appropriation Authorization Act. The importance of that amendment cannot be overstated, for it clearly established a new U.S. national policy. Under section 814(a), it is stated:

[23] In fact, the very survival of the French aerospace industry, a major defense industry that has experienced poor financial results since 1972 (primarily attributable to ailing commercial and military sales by Aerospatiale, the largest French aerospace firm), would seem to necessitate increased cooperation across European borders.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It is the sense of the Congress that equipment, procedures, ammunition, fuel and other military impedimenta for land, air and naval forces of the United States stationed in Europe under the terms of the North Atlantic Treaty should be standardized or made interoperable with that of other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the maximum extent feasible. In carrying out such policy the Secretary of Defense shall, to the maximum feasible extent, initiate and carry out procurement procedures that provide for the acquisition of equipment which is standardized or interoperable with equipment of other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization whenever such equipment is designed primarily to be used by personnel of the Armed Forces of the United States stationed in Europe under the terms of the North Atlantic Treaty.[24]

By the late fall of 1975 the Eurogroup defense ministers had prepared specific initiatives designed to gain French support. At meetings in November and December they agreed in principle to (1) establish a European defense procurement secretariat, (2) begin a dialogue with the United States and Canada aimed at developing specific proposals for improving transatlantic cooperation and two-way purchasing of defense equipment, and (3) "extend cooperation in European armaments procurement in an independent forum open to all European members of the North Atlantic Alliance."[25] By agreeing to establish a new forum independent of NATO and the United States, the Eurogroup ministers were clearly yielding ground to French demands. Yet their efforts brought almost immediate rewards. Although French officials continued to reject any formal association with the Eurogroup, they did express strong interest in improving the interoperability of European weapons systems, and they agreed to meet with the Eurogroup members in Rome on February 2, 1976, at the first session of the so-called Independent European Program Group (EPG). At that meeting the participants agreed to the establishment of a definite work schedule for the exploration of improved cooperation in the armaments field; a second meeting was scheduled for April 9.

Despite this substantial recent progress, the future of the EPG and the French commitment to participation remains unclear. The political issues surrounding the future course to be taken by the EPG demand delicate handling. Because of the sensitivity of Gaullist politicians, the other Europeans and even the Americans must continue to ease the French transition with utmost care. As one observer has noted, "for the French, co-operation must develop under a

[24] U.S. Senate, Armed Services Committee, *European Defense Cooperation, Hearing* before the Subcommittee on Research and Development and the Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel (Washington: GPO, March 31, 1976), pp. 59-60.

[25] "The Eurogroup: Final Communique," *NATO Review*, February 1976, p. 29.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

European flag,"[26] which suggests that the Europeans must first of all develop a more united policy concerning future relations with the United States. On the other hand, the United States must continue to encourage the development of a more independent "European" effort. And finally, the French must continue to seek a more pragmatic and flexible policy toward NATO. In sum it appears that all parties must continue steps toward common ground if a mutually satisfactory and lasting arrangement is to be made, whether in the context of the EPG or in some other forum. Such a solution cannot be indefinitely delayed; the Europeans are unlikely to wait much longer or yield further to French demands. Nor should a solution sacrifice the progress already made within the Eurogroup, for that would be an unjustifiable cost. Given a continued concentration of effort from all sides, however, an arrangement can very likely be found that will allow the NATO allies, including the French, to enjoy the benefits of a higher level of procurement cooperation.

Contradictions in U.S. Foreign Policy

Americans have traditionally been disposed to maintain good relations with the countries of Western Europe, for they have recognized a fundamental commonality of Western history and culture and have acknowledged that important political and economic interests are shared. More recently the Americans have recognized that the security interests of the United States have become inextricably linked to those of Western Europe. Following the end of World War II and the onset of the Cold War, successive American administrations made intense efforts to promote the building of a strong Western Europe that could resist the spread of Soviet influence; it was acknowledged that "the domination of Western Europe's industrial and human resources by the Soviet Union would be fatal to the security of the United States."[27] Postwar administrations supported the concept of a politically and economically united Western Europe, believing that a unified Europe would be a stronger Europe and that unity would serve as the "best basis for long-term Atlantic cooperation."[28] Moreover, it was hoped that a more cohesive Western Europe could take over a greater responsibility for its own defense and relieve the United States of persistent balance of payments problems associated with troop-stationing in Europe.

[26] Facer, p. 46.
[27] van der Beugel and Kohnstamm, p. 298.
[28] Wilfrid L. Kohl and William Taubman, "American Policy Toward Europe: The Next Phase," ORBIS, Spring 1973, p. 53.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

For these reasons the development of the European Economic Community, and more recently the emergence of a European caucus within NATO,[29] received verbal support from the United States, at least until the economic and political crises of the early 1970s erupted.

From the standpoint of the United States, European unification appeared desirable as long as it entailed simultaneous progress toward political and economic integration. But by the late 1960s it had become evident that economic unification was rapidly outdistancing political unification, and that the West Europeans had indeed achieved a remarkable level of economic strength vis-a-vis the United States. When signs of increasing economic protectionism within the EEC began to appear (particularly in the form of the Common Agricultural Policy), the Nixon administration responded in the early 1970s by suggesting that European unity could become inimical to American interests if it entailed an unacceptable level of "economic regionalism."[30] Moreover, America's confidence in its traditional position as leader of the alliance was further shaken by rather sudden European demands for a greater say in alliance policy-making. As tensions within the alliance over conflicting trade and monetary policies rose, the United States finally responded by linking the future of its European security guarantee to the resolution of the economic problems that were undermining alliance stability. As Dr. Kissinger implied in his Year of Europe speech, on April 23, 1973, the Europeans could not expect to enjoy the protection of U.S. forces and at the same time engage in economic confrontation. If the Europeans wished to retain the American security blanket (a foregone conclusion), they would have no choice but to make concessions to American economic and political interests.

The Europeans are no doubt convinced that the United States would, if adequately provoked, take steps to reduce its military presence in Europe. Indeed, they have anticipated an American troop withdrawal ever since Senator Mansfield's efforts in the mid-1960s. The Nixon Doctrine of the late sixties, calling for reduced foreign commitments, appeared to increase the likelihood. And the more recent Jackson-Nunn Amendment (November 1973) has made it law that U.S. forces will be reduced by a percentage equal to the percentage amount that the balance of payments deficit during a single fiscal year is not "offset" by the Europeans. This very clear

[29] Duchêne, pp. 80-81.

[30] Richard Nixon, *US Foreign Policy for the 1970s: Shaping a Durable Peace*, a report to the Congress, May 3, 1973 (Washington: GPO, House doc. no. 93-96, 1973), p. 65.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

threat has left the Europeans with an inescapable dilemma, for it means that European integration in certain areas (which the Europeans want and need) cannot advance without risking a reduced American security commitment (which they certainly do not want). In the area of procurement collaboration, increased cooperation that is in any way exclusive of the United States could force the American hand. At the same time, the offset agreements achieved in response to the Jackson-Nunn Amendment and earlier American pressures have greatly retarded the development of a more independent, European defense procurement system, since purchases of U.S. weapons have constituted a large portion of the offset transactions. It has been estimated, for instance, that sales of U.S. equipment to NATO Europe in the early 1970s, which averaged about $625 million annually, offset approximately 30 per cent of the foreign exchange costs of stationing American troops in Europe, with West Germany making the largest share of such purchases.[31] Under the 1974-1975 agreements military sales were used to offset roughly half of the anticipated $2.1 billion in U.S. military expenditures that entered the FY 1974 international balance of payments account.[32] Since the Europeans have had little choice but to meet U.S. demands for offset reimbursements, the European arms industries have been deprived of potential European markets, and defense industrial growth has no doubt been suppressed.

The main point to be made here is that U.S. policy has been characterized by very real contradictions that have placed the Europeans in a difficult position and no doubt have weakened European confidence in American integrity: on the one hand, U.S. policy has supported European unity and demanded a stronger and more effective European contribution to NATO; on the other hand, by threatening troop withdrawals and forcing U.S. arms sales via the offset agreements, it has severely impeded European unification and prevented the evolution of a more effective European defense effort. Certainly one could build a case to justify some aspects of American policy during the early 1970s. But in the present context, several factors seem to support the demand for a more consistent and less self-centered foreign policy.

First of all, many of the economic tensions of the early seventies have been reduced by the establishment of more realistic floating exchange rates and the achievement of other improvements

[31] Facer, Table 23; Kaiser, pp. 102, 114.
[32] *Europe's Defence: Some Basic Facts* (Brussels: NATO Information Service, November 1974), p. 7.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in international monetary and trade systems. Partially as a result of several dollar devaluations, U.S. net exports to Western Europe increased substantially between 1973 and 1975, considerably easing the overall balance of payments problem with that area.[33] This is not to say that the balance of payments problem has totally disappeared. As a result of the 1973 energy crisis, however, the problem for both the Americans and the West Europeans has shifted in the direction of OPEC. Moreover, the energy crisis has placed the United States in a stronger position vis-a-vis the West Europeans, since the United States is currently less dependent on foreign oil imports. Consequently, considerable weight has been taken out of the argument that the West Europeans can better afford to finance alliance security than can the United States. Nevertheless, the Europeans have responded to U.S. demands that they take over a larger share of the burden (1) by making real increases in their defense budgets, (2) by modernizing their weapons and equipment under the European Defense Improvement Program (EDIP), and (3) by agreeing to offset total U.S. foreign exchange costs on military account in compliance with Jackson-Nunn.[34]

The United States has clearly been pleased with these European efforts, and has accordingly reaffirmed its support for European integration. Also, congressional pressure for U.S. troop cuts has nearly vanished. Nevertheless, the offset agreements continue to constrain the development of a stronger European defense contribution. Negotiation of these agreements has become increasingly difficult, particularly for the West Germans, who in the 1974 agreement promised to fully offset American balance of payments costs of over $2 billion. As Kaiser has pointed out, the agreements have become more and more burdensome for the Germans as their "needs for military equipment from the United States declined with the completion of rearmament and with the growing pressure for standardization and production of arms within Europe."[35] Although the United States is becoming increasingly dependent on arms sales (particularly aircraft) to offset its worldwide balance of payments deficit,[36] methods other than the forced arms sales under the offset agreements need to be found to settle its foreign exchange costs in Europe. Some progress has already been made in this area, as the

[33] *Survey of Current Business*, May 1974, pp. S-22-23, and May 1976, pp. S-22-23.
[34] *Europe's Defence . . .*, pp. 1-9.
[35] Kaiser, p. 115.
[36] See Robert Hotz, "New Export Sales," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, October 14, 1974, p. 7; also "The Arms Dealers: Guns for All," *Time*, March 3, 1975, pp. 34-44.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Germans have endeavored to pay for American barracks-modernization and have purchased low-interest U.S. Treasury securities to cut down the flow of American dollars in Europe. Also, in apparent recognition of the contradictions surrounding purchases of military equipment for the sake of offset, the United States has recently concluded a new agreement with West Germany which sets no specific figure for a German purchase of U.S. weapons and equipment. Despite this recent progress, efforts to find other methods of reducing the offset burden must continue.

One possibility is to establish an alliance-supported "offset fund."[37] Such a fund, to which all the allies — including the United States — would contribute a portion of the dollars spent by U.S. forces in Europe, would be used by NATO to finance the purchase of *some* U.S. arms, as well as other NATO projects. It would have the advantage of "Europeanizing" the offset problem (thereby reducing the direct burden on West Germany), while simultaneously easing the U.S. balance of payments problem by taking dollars out of normal circulation. As an alternative method of sharing the burden, the Europeans might agree to take over some percentage of the U.S. logistics effort, thereby reducing the cost of American troop-stationing in Europe and perhaps eliminating some of the redundancy in the allied logistics machine as well. Whatever solution is chosen, the United States must clearly acknowledge, at the very least in the form of a congressional resolution, that forced arms sales are contrary to the needs of the Europeans and can no longer be used as the principal method of settling American balance of payments deficits with the European allies.

Another barrier to the long-range stability and strength of the alliance lies in the continued threat of a unilateral American troop withdrawal from Europe. Of couse such a withdrawal would help to ease the problem of U.S. foreign exchange costs just discussed, but a unilateral reduction cannot be made for that reason alone. Moreover, the Europeans have shown their willingness to offset those foreign exchange costs in compliance with the Jackson-Nunn Amendment, and most observers seem to agree that bringing American troops back to the United States will not allow budgetary savings unless those troops are demobilized. Furthermore, the Americans appear to have recognized that a sudden unilateral troop cut of substantial size would in fact threaten present European stability.

[37] François Duchêne, "Western Security Policies in the Era of Negotiation: Choices in the Next Phase" (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, mimeo., February 1973), pp. 4-5.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In spite of these factors, however, the Europeans continue to fear that a U.S. withdrawal might follow a change of administration policy or renewed congressional pressure, and they are reluctant to encourage such a withdrawal by too boldly increasing their defense cooperation. Many observers[38] are suggesting that under these circumstances it is appropriate for America to make a long-range troop commitment to Europe, thereby adding a great deal to the future credibility of the alliance. If made on the basis of serious intraalliance negotiations, or following successful MBFR negotiations, such a commitment might well include a small reduction in American troop numbers, which would help to ease the foreign exchange problem and could contribute to an easing of the East-West confrontation in central Europe. At the same time, a long-range American commitment could be balanced by European promises to make a larger and more effective contribution to alliance defense, by promises to reduce and avoid protectionism against American competition in a growing European arms industry, and by continued willingness to help the United States solve its balance of payments problems on military account. If such a commitment were made on the basis of a congressional resolution, it would add stability and strength to the alliance, which is certainly in the best interests of the United States. It must, however, be made in a context that encourages greater European defense cooperation and recognizes the right of the Europeans to a stronger position in alliance policymaking.

In the future, the ease with which the Europeans are able to assume greater responsibility for alliance security will depend in large measure on the extent to which additional improvements in the international trade and monetary systems are first brought about. Although considerable progress has already been made in the monetary system, much remains to be done in the area of trade restrictions and barriers; these continue to exist on both sides of the Atlantic[39] and could very well bring renewed tensions to the alliance. Serious American efforts to bring attention to remaining trade problems have already begun, and they must continue without resort to the divisive "linkage" policy of the recent past. American stress on linkage — the concept that ties together the solution of economic, political and

[38] Andrew J. Pierre, "Can Europe's Security Be 'Decoupled' from America?," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1973, p. 775; Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., "European-American Defense Burden-Sharing," *Atlantic Community Quarterly*, Summer 1975, p. 204; Duchêne, "A New European Defense Community," p. 81; Kaiser, pp. 110-113.

[39] For an enlightening discussion of existing trade barriers, see Robert E. Baldwin, "Nontariff Distortions of International Trade," in Robert E. Baldwin and J. David Richardson, eds., *International Trade and Finance* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974), pp. 143-163.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

security issues — has already forced the Europeans to make a more balanced contribution to the alliance, but not without severely testing the integrity of the alliance. Clearly the Europeans have justifiable reasons for disliking the use of this sort of leverage: economic and security issues have often involved very different problems and have required very different solutions. Moreover, many Europeans argue with displeasure that the linkage concept allows the United States to "exploit the security issue in order to extract economic concessions from Europe."[40] In view of the large improvements already made in the European contribution to the alliance, the renewed use of linkage by the United States to resolve remaining trade issues might just be the final straw for the Europeans, forcing them to conclude "as Mr. Heath once did in public, that it is not acceptable to pay repeatedly in economic terms for a security presence that could at best remain stable."[41]

For the members of the alliance (and indeed, for all countries) to enjoy the benefits of freer trade, concerted efforts must be made (presumably within the GATT framework) to reduce the remaining barriers to intraalliance trade. Freer trade promises to raise community welfare and, in the context here, to help reduce the cost of weapons whose high prices are often sustained through artificial protection.[42] On the American side, attention has recently been focused on the "Buy American Act," which prohibits the Defense Department from buying foreign-produced weapons and equipment unless the price is 50 per cent lower than the price of comparable American-made goods. This act, and the associated traditional American policy of giving exclusive preference to American-made weapons, has not only given costly protection to American defense industries, but has also artificially limited the market and growth potential of European defense industries. Alliance trade in military equipment has been forced into a one-way path across the Atlantic, and the Europeans are doing all of the purchasing — a fact that has become an increasing source of irritation for our alliance partners.[43] Perhaps as a result, European protectionism in kind has also begun to work against improved transatlantic cooperation.

A major reassessment of American policy in this area is

---

[40] Kaiser, p. 115.

[41] Duchêne, "Western Security Policies . . . ," p. 7.

[42] For a discussion of the costs of trade barriers and a strong argument for their reduction, see C. Fred Bergsten, "The Cost of Import Restrictions to American Consumers," in Baldwin and Richardson, eds., pp. 129-139.

[43] During the 1960s, the Europeans purchased some $8 billion worth of U.S. military equipment, while the United States purchased $700 million worth from Europe. *European Defense Cooperation, Hearing*, p. 12.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

already under way. Beginning with passage of the 1974 Trade Act, Americans expressed a new willingness to work toward reducing remaining barriers to international trade. Following passage of the previously mentioned Nunn and Culver-Nunn amendments, the Department of Defense began taking important strides to improve the interchange and standardization of alliance weapons. In an obvious effort to open up a more equitable two-way street of arms cooperation with the Europeans, the Defense Department recently decided to purchase the Franco-German Roland-II surface-to-air missile and the Belgian MAG-58 machine gun, and it is looking seriously at other European systems.[44] The most crucial steps taken, however, have concerned the outdated Buy American Act. In the 1977 Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act, Congress approved specific legislation designed to soften the impact of the former act. In section 802(a)(2), the secretary of defense is given authority to waive the Buy American restrictions when he determines it necessary for the sake of cost effectiveness and weapons standardization.[45]

Despite these encouraging gains, problems still remain and must be addressed. It appears that conservative interpretations of this new legislation may yet prevent the secretary of defense from waiving the Buy American Act at his discretion.[46] Also, there are numerous other statutory and administrative restrictions still in effect that will continue to hinder the improvement of U.S.-European weapons standardization.[47] Moreover, the Europeans are undoubtedly bound by similar legislative and policy constraints. Clearly the process of change has just begun. Alliance strength and effectiveness will not experience large-scale improvement till these remaining barriers to trade and cooperation are removed. They can be removed if recent progress in the United States is followed by new initiatives on the other side of the Atlantic. Specific industries, both here and abroad, will certainly have to pay a price for readjustment, but the overall benefits to the alliance in terms of improved national and community welfare, lower weapons costs, more efficient use of

[44] *Ibid.*, pp. 156-161.

[45] See *Conference Report* (Washington: GPO, House report no. 94-1305, June 23, 1976), pp. 9-11. It is also worth noting that in section 802(a)(1) Congress strengthened the opening wording of the Culver-Nunn Amendment from "It is the sense of Congress" to "It is the policy of the United States."

[46] There is still some debate over just how much freedom the secretary of defense has been given in the purchase of foreign-made military equipment. See "Cost, Quality Stipulated in Foreign Buys," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, July 12, 1976, p. 19.

[47] For a listing of potential procurement constraints, see *European Defense Cooperation, Hearing*, pp. 125-130.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

defense budgets, a stronger European defense-industry base, and a new level of alliance cohesion should more than offset this price.

The Question of a European Procurement Authority

The absence of a central procurement authority with broad responsibility for coordinating national efforts on multiple projects is another major political problem that has long impeded the progress of European and even transatlantic procurement collaboration. As mentioned earlier, the Eurogroup is the organization that has made the most substantial progress toward assuming this role. However, there remains considerable doubt among Europeans whether the Eurogroup actually offers greater potential than do several other possible organs. The conflict appears to center around French unwillingness to participate in a NATO-related organization and around other Europeans' desire to avoid threatening the stability of the alliance by selecting a framework separate from NATO. Other issues compound the problem.

There exists a consensus in Europe that further progress in collaborative procurement requires the establishment of a single multilateral body that can coordinate cooperation among governments and national industries. Furthermore, it appears that such a body should have a permanent secretariat that can maintain continuity from project to project, and that national defense ministers should sit at the executive level of the organization. Moreover, for reasons already given, the success of such a body at promoting long-range European defense cooperation is likely to depend greatly on full French participation and clear American political support. In the recent past, considerable debate has been focused on at least three alternative organs that might assume this role: the Eurogroup, the Western European Union and an EEC subgroup. Other organs have also been proposed, but most seem to be altered forms of one of these three, or an eclectic combination of two or more of them.[48] Since none of these candidates has been acceptable to all of the interested parties, progress toward choosing one has been slow indeed. With the late 1975 agreement by the Eurogroup and France to establish the previously mentioned Independent European Pro-

[48] Alastair Buchan, for example, called for a "European Advanced Projects Authority"; see *The Implications of a European System for Defence Technology* (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1967), pp. 19-20. René Foch (pp. 48-49) called for a "European Armaments Agency," which would make extensive use of existing EEC organs, and Lord Gladwyn has proposed a multilevel approach making use of EURONAD, the Davignon committee of the European Community, and the FINABEL group of army chiefs of staff from the Western European Union countries (Facer, p. 43).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

gram Group, however, it now appears that a mutually satisfactory arrangement may at last have been found.[49] Given continued allied support and careful attention to several crucial political issues, this new body may indeed lead the way to a new era of NATO cooperation.

Perhaps the most important issue facing the new EPG is the question of French intentions and commitment. Clearly the political and economic factors mentioned earlier, together with the efforts already made by the Eurogroup, have induced a more cooperative French attitude. Yet the French remain adamant about remaining outside of NATO, and they are reluctant indeed to accept any diminution of national sovereignty. Moreover, they will certainly react unfavorably to any U.S. effort to influence the progress of the new group. Their primary interest in the EPG involves the rather limited goal of improving the interoperability of European weapons. With these factors in mind, other Europeans will have to tread lightly indeed as they pursue new levels of defense cooperation via the EPG. At the same time, however, the French government must continue to seek more pragmatic policies that break loose from the chains of Gaullist orthodoxy.

For the United States, actions with regard to the EPG must also be carefully considered. In the past, inconsistencies in American policies toward Europe have clearly limited the progress made by the Eurogroup. Also, because of fears for American economic interests and perhaps because of worries about possible negative Soviet reaction, the United States has been reluctant to give explicit verbal support to Eurogroup efforts. Following the recent reappraisal of these policies, however, Americans have demonstrated a new willingness to encourage improved European, as well as transatlantic, cooperation in weapons procurement and standardization. Indeed, at a precedent-setting meeting between European parliamentarians and members of the U.S. Senate, Department of Defense and Department of State in March 1976, American participants and contributors clearly acknowledged the need for improved cooperation and affirmed their support for the EPG.[50]

These American efforts to reinforce European progress

[49] At the second meeting of the EPG on April 9, 1976, various subgroups were established, and it was agreed to hold a third meeting in September at the secretary of state level. See "Positive Outcome of the Rome Session of the 'European Programme Group,' " *Atlantic News,* April 14, 1976, pp. 1-2.

[50] See the statements and letters in *European Defense Cooperation, Hearing,* pp. 3-4, 24, 53, 100, 161-165. Also see James E. Goodby, "Standardization of NATO Equipment Discussed by Department," *Department of State Bulletin,* April 26, 1976, pp. 556-558.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

must continue, since the Europeans are somewhat reluctantly straddling a thin tightrope stretched carefully between NATO and the French. Yet the United States must encourage without attempting to direct, for the French are still too sensitive to the specter of U.S. domination. Moreover, for the sake of European strength, the United States must take special steps to promote the French transition. The idea of offering American nuclear technology as an inducement to closer French participation[51] seems at the moment rather contentious. Efforts can be made, however, to spread the benefits of American conventional weapons technology and experience. Not only will this help to build a stronger European defense-industry base, it will also satisfy French interests and desires. If these efforts are accompanied by an absence of explicit American pressure with regard to the EPG, then the likelihood of closer French participation will be increased. Furthermore, if American support for the EPG results in a reciprocal transatlantic exchange of weapons technologies, interests on both sides of the Atlantic will be well served.

On the European side of the triangle, several issues must be addressed before the EPG can hope for real success. First of all, a satisfactory solution regarding the future status of the Eurogroup and all of its subgroups must be found. Although some have suggested that the EPG should assume all Eurogroup responsibilities as quickly as possible, it would seem premature to disassemble this successful organ and its working subunits before the EPG gains a firmer foundation of political support.

There is also a very real problem associated with the pervasive attitude of quid pro quo, which has aroused irritation at recent discussions of pending transatlantic procurement efforts.[52] The West Germans, for example, have stated quite clearly that they are treating the U.S. decision on the Leopard-2 (AV) tank as a test of the American commitment to two-way-street cooperation. If the United States decides against the Leopard, the Germans will very likely decide against the American AWACS (airborne warning-and-control system).[53] Although this sort of thinking can be justified on the basis of national political and economic necessities, it is unfortunately very similar to the tit for tat implicit in *juste retour,* the divisive policy that has hindered cooperative progress in the past. Clearly a demand for quid pro quo purchases cannot be honored in

[51] Duchêne, "Western Security Policies . . . ," p. 6.
[52] See Clarence A. Robinson, Jr., "Hurdles Confront Standardization," *Aviation Week & Space Technology,* June 21, 1976, pp. 14-17.
[53] See the statement of Carl Damm, member of the German Bundestag, in *European Defense Cooperation, Hearing,* pp. 5-7.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

every case, since the procurement decision on competitive systems must be based primarily on honest considerations of the cost, effectiveness and standardization qualities of each weapon. Yet procurement decisions cannot be made without some regard for the national priorities that have led to quid pro quo demands. Obviously the North Atlantic allies must treat this issue with care, and all parties must demonstrate a new willingness to make reciprocal concessions. Without such concessions, the allies can hardly anticipate improved cooperation.

Finally, the EPG members must agree to a common policy with respect to future cooperation with the United States. They must decide at the outset the extent to which they desire to cooperate or compete with the United States. A common decision to promote an economic relationship unmarred by trade protectionism would greatly encourage the United States to take the policy steps mentioned earlier. On the other hand, if the Europeans decide to restrict the penetration of U.S. technology and weapons to European markets, America would likely respond in kind and would certainly be reluctant to reduce its linkage leverage on the NATO Europeans. A more appropriate decision would be to promote a mutual interpenetration of markets and a freedom of competition that, in the long run, should help to lower national defense costs and raise the general level of economic welfare. Moreover, the Europeans must make it clear that improved European collaboration will not prevent transatlantic collaboration on projects too large for either side, nor eliminate joint European purchasing of American-made weapons when that option offers economic advantages. To promote better transatlantic cooperation it might even be appropriate to establish permanent EPG representatives in Washington; these delegates could dispel mutual suspicions and mistrust and could prevent parties on either side of the Atlantic from feeling excluded from important procurement decision-making.[54] French objections to such a plan should not be strong if the plan is merely part of a new and more balanced Atlantic relationship. If the EPG members will do their share, and if the United States will do its share, recognizing as it must that the primary *raison d'être* of the EPG is to improve the European contribution to the alliance, then

[54] Duchêne, "Western Security Policies . . . ," p. 8. Duchêne's idea was to establish Eurogroup representatives in the United States, but the same argument can be made for the EPG. The intent would be to establish a forum for continued, frank discussions between European and American parliamentarians, as was suggested at their first meeting on March 31, 1976. See *European Defense Cooperation, Hearing*, pp. 2, 45.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

there is a good chance that the EPG can become the focus of improved European weapons-procurement collaboration. It can then enjoy the fruits of American support and very likely the eventual full cooperation of the French.

The Challenge to the North Atlantic Allies

The central theme of this paper has been that improved collaboration in weapons procurement is one very efficient means by which the North Atlantic allies can make better use of their national resources, add to their mutual security by increasing NATO's military effectiveness and, in the European context, promote the overall process of West European political, economic and military integration. Improvement in the current system of procurement collaboration will not be possible, however, until important constraints are removed. While many economic and political barriers remain, the attempt here has been to focus only on those major political hurdles that, once put aside, should offer a relatively clear road to rapid progress. Other problems should then present less difficult choices.

It is first of all necessary for the NATO governments to accept the political and economic consequences of making long-term commitments to the pursuit of common-good objectives. By accepting some shorter-term national costs they stand to reap the much greater long-term benefits of improved cooperation in weapons procurement. Since procurement collaboration can be distinguished from across-the-board defense integration, improving the intra-European collaborative process should not meet with intense Soviet and American opposition, particularly if special steps are taken to allay superpower fears. Although French abstention has hindered progress in the past, present economic and political pressures appear to have softened the French position. If the other Europeans and, perhaps more importantly, the Americans will make continued efforts to meet the French halfway, there is a good chance the French can be induced to cooperate more fully in the future.

Much remains to be done by the Americans. Contradictions in U.S. foreign policy continue to impede the progress of European as well as transatlantic collaboration. The United States must continue efforts aimed at reducing economic protectionism on both sides of the Atlantic, but it is necessary to do so without stressing the divisive linkage concept of the recent past. Means other than forced military equipment sales need to be found to offset American troop-stationing costs in Europe, and a new long-term

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

troop commitment to Western Europe must be made to add stability and credibility to the alliance. Given European promises to promote reciprocal political and economic cooperation, together with sufficient public and congressional support, the United States should be able to make the changes in its foreign policy that, when added to a more balanced relationship with the EPG, will make continued progress in European and transatlantic defense cooperation a reality. Finally, the Europeans *and* the Americans need to improve the machinery and capabilities of the EPG so that it can become the permanent center of ongoing European, and even transatlantic, procurement collaboration.

The tasks ahead are therefore clear. Perhaps it is only the goals that remain obscure. It is time for the North Atlantic allies to reaffirm their common goals of alliance security, economic welfare and world peace. Great progress can be made in the pursuit of those goals if the recommended steps are taken. It remains for the NATO allies to accept the challenge.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD LATIN AMERICA: AN IMMODERATE PROPOSAL

by Michael J. Francis

There is increasing evidence that the foreign policies of the Latin American governments are turning against the United States. The Latin Americans have strongly supported Panama's efforts to gain control of the canal; in April 1973 the Organization of American States passed a resolution calling on Washington to control U.S.-based multinational corporations; Latin American support for the continued isolation of Cuba has crumbled; outgoing Mexican President Luis Echeverría consistently criticized the United States and pointedly praised the heroic struggle of the Vietnamese against superior military technology; and as far back as 1969, in the "Consensus of Viña del Mar," the Latin American governments declared that "private investment should not be considered assistance" and stridently demanded that the United States modify its tariff system vis-a-vis Latin America instead of retaining the present system which serves to "obstruct . . . the rapid social and economic progress of the developing countries."

This rebellious spirit symbolizes a continuing deterioration in U.S. relations with Latin America and presages difficulties for the foreseeable future. The following analysis summarizes the pivotal changes in Latin American thinking on economic development that helped to produce this situation and attempts to outline some possible new standards for Washington's Latin American policy that would both avoid the current sources of antagonism *and* help Latin America to develop.

Dependencia

At the risk of being trite, the first fact to be established is that much of Latin America's population lives in poverty. Endless statistics can be cited to establish the depth and immediacy of the

Michael J. Francis is Professor of Government and International Studies at the University of Notre Dame and was Visiting Scholar (political science) at the University of Michigan for 1975-1976. He writes primarily on Chilean politics and inter-American relations, and his book on hemispheric relations during World War II is forthcoming.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

problem but perhaps a single figure can capture the situation: the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America believes that one million children die each year in Latin America from malnutrition and its effects. *One million.* On top of this are the many who survive youthful malnutrition but mature into listless adults with below average intelligence due to dietary deficiencies.

One can argue that poverty is unrelated to foreign policy — the well-dressed Latin American diplomat seems utterly unconnected to the beggar in the streets of Valparaíso. But there is a direct linkage in that the Latin American masses and elites are increasingly dissatisfied over the poverty of the lower classes. In all countries this discontent has been translated into the promotion of rapid economic development. Official government policy toward economic growth sounds more or less the same whether the spokesman is from semi-feudal Nicaragua, Jean-Claude Duvalier's Haiti, the Paraguay of General Alfredo Stroessner, or Peru's nationalistic reformism. Methods differ but the ends are surprisingly similar.

The foreign policies of the Latin American countries are one vehicle in this search for economic development.[1] Issues such as communism are not the major preoccupations of the Latin American chancelleries. The goal in all Latin American political systems is economic growth, and foreign policy must serve that end. Historically, this conscious search for the easiest road to economic development is hardly new — at the latest it dates from the end of World War II. But what is changing is an increasing consensus on a few core ideas that explain the area's economic and political difficulties. This "theory," or interpretation, makes the adoption of anti-U.S. positions at international meetings increasingly likely and could lead eventually to a collapse of friendly relations between Washington and Latin America.

The word that characterizes the theory is *dependencia* (dependency). To oversimplify the concept,[2] the dependency inter-

[1] See Gustavo Lagos, *International Stratification and Underdeveloped Countries* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1963).

[2] There is a wide range in the quality of writings on dependency, and almost any generalization on the subject would be disagreed to by some of those utilizing the dependency mode. Perhaps the most subtle and interesting writer is the Chilean economist Oswaldo Sunkel. Two of his most available writings in English are "National Development Policy and External Dependence in Latin America," *The Journal of Development Studies,* October 1969, and "Big Business and 'Dependencia': A Latin American View," *Foreign Affairs,* April 1972. The most serious work in English examining this explanation of society is Joseph A. Kahl, *Modernization, Exploitation and Dependency* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1976). In Spanish a good starting point is Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, *Dependencia y desarrollo en América Latina* (Mexico: Siglo Veintiuno, 1969). Ronald H. Chilcote provides "A Critical Synthesis of the Dependency Literature" in *Latin American Perspectives,*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pretation states that the economies and policies of the developed countries condition and limit the economic growth of Latin America (and other less developed countries, or LDCs). Specifically, the economic relationship the LDCs have with the rich states keeps Latin America poor and growing bananas while the industrialized countries grow richer. In other words, although today's industrialized societies were once poor and then grew prosperous, contemporary conditions and the workings of the world economy now make economic growth more difficult. Because Latin America missed the tide, it is left to wallow in the shallows of economic deprivation.

The core idea here has a distinctly Leninist flavor. But much of the economic sophistication of the theory resulted from the writings of Latin Americans attached to the UN's Economic Commission for Latin America. Under the leadership of Argentina's Raúl Prebisch, the concept of declining terms of trade for primary products and a center/periphery distinction began to be commonly accepted propositions in discussions of the economies of developing countries. Using ECLA perspective, the dependency theorists project the future of Latin American countries (unless dramatic alterations are forthcoming) more pessimistically than ECLA itself.

This interpretation runs counter to Walt Rostow's classic book, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto*.[3] Rostow believed in a more or less linear developmental process in which the LDCs moved at varying speeds toward the "take-off" stage leading to rapid economic growth. The rate at which they advanced was primarily contingent on the domestic policies they adopted. Rostow's ideas coincided with Washington's policy toward the economic development of the LDCs and therefore was widely disseminated (and somewhat less widely accepted). However, countries such as Argentina, which clearly had reached the "take-off" stage in many respects, have not experienced the subsequent development which Rostow's model would seem to predict.[4] There are, of course, ways to fit the Latin American experience into Rostow's theory, but the fact remains that his ideas have fallen into disfavor among the economists of the LDCs.

One facet of the dependency thesis that particularly distresses Washington is the interpretation of the effect of foreign

Spring 1974. For many of the dependency ideas written in "social sciencese," see Douglas A. Chalmers, "Developing on the Periphery: External Factors in Latin American Politics," in James N. Rosenau, editor, *Linkage Politics* (New York: Macmillan, 1969).

[3] New York: Cambridge University Press, 1960.

[4] Eldon Kenworth, in "Argentina: The Politics of Late Industrialization," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1967, utilizes a form of the dependency model.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

capital on economic and social development. Although the United States, from its historical experience with private capital (not necessarily foreign capital), believes the creation of an attractive climate for foreign capital induces development, the dependency theorists are less sanguine. Some claim, with support from U.S. Department of Commerce statistics,[5] that foreign investors took capital out of Latin America at a rate of over half a billion dollars a year during the 1950-1965 period and that foreign capital, in fact, bleeds the recipient country of its resources.[6] Other dependency theorists seem to indicate that foreign capital promotes a type of economic growth that leaves the bulk of the population in poverty and seriously skews income distribution against the lower classes. Evaluating the pros and cons of the foreign investment question is far beyond the scope of this discussion — the point is that Latin America increasingly accepts the idea that foreign capital has a detrimental effect on its countries.

Some of the dependency theorists add that the relationship between LDCs and rich states creates a ruling elite in the countries of Latin America. This clique profits from its nation's subordinate position and, having absorbed the mentality of the elite in the developed countries, therefore opposes any attempt to alter the dependency situation.

As for solutions to this cul-de-sac, the political Left (represented by the ill-fated Allende experiment) believes the only hope is to throw out the profiteering foreign investors and break the old bonds with the United States; for example, stop importing U.S. technology that may be unsuited for LDCs, lessen the flood of U.S. movies and TV programs that drown the national entertainment industry's development, and so forth.

Although most Latin American governments resist going as far as Allende did in following the implications of the dependency model, the dogma that the United States has bled Latin America of its capital — and therefore prospered at its expense — shows itself increasingly in the speeches of Latin American politicians and representatives. This leads to strident demands that the United States change its system of trade in order to allow the Latin Americans better, if not preferential, treatment. In view of past exploitation,

[5] Data quoted in Harry Magdoff, *The Age of Imperialism* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969), pp. 198, 202.

[6] *Ibid.;* also Andre Gunder Frank, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1963) and *Underdevelopment or Revolution* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969). One can argue that Magdoff and Frank are not, strictly speaking, in the *dependencia* school, but their ideas are extremely close.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Latins argue, Washington "owes" this to its hemispheric neighbors.

Blaming the United States for Latin America's problems is scarcely new. Certainly part of the dependency perspective's popularity is that it ascribes responsibility for Latin America's difficulties to Washington — thereby glossing over the historical ineptness of some of the governments in their pursuit of development. Charismatic politicians and slow-witted generals have left a pathetic trail of mismanagement among the delicate problems of economic growth in many Latin American countries. What is unique is that the dependency model presents an elaborate justification for anti-Yankee policies and suggests some methods by which Latin Americans can control their own development.

Washington's Position[7]

Needless to say, official Washington takes a critical view of the dependency analysis and the independent foreign policies it has prompted. Because the United States has enjoyed a dominant position in the hemisphere during the twentieth century it has with varying degrees of success cajoled, bullied, and at times forced the Latin American countries to do as it wanted. Whatever the morality of the situation, the facts of international life have been that powerful countries dominate weaker neighbors. In the United States' case, since the 1930s this domination has seldom involved the actual use of force (exceptions being the 1954 overthrow of the Guatemalan government, the 1961 Bay of Pigs effort, and the Dominican intervention of 1965). But Washington has taken an active interest in (1) the degree to which the foreign policies of the Latin American countries are anti-communist and (2) the treatment of U.S. investors in Latin America.

Although the rhetoric surrounding Washington's Latin American policy has changed (from Alliance for Progress to low

[7] This article began as an attempt to describe Washington's policy and point out some dilemmas, but numerous well-done pieces of an up-to-date nature do this. In particular see the work of Yale Ferguson, "An End to the 'Special Relationship': The United States and Latin America," *Revista/Review Interamericana*, Fall 1972, and "United States 'Malign Neglect': A Latin American Response" (paper presented at the International Studies Association Convention, New York, 1973). Also see Lawrence E. Harrison, "Waking from the Pan-American Dream," *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1971-1972; Martin Needler, "Toward a Reappraisal of United States Foreign Policy in Latin America after Vietnam," in Robert W. Gregg and Charles W. Kegley, editors, *After Vietnam: The Future of American Foreign Policy* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1971); Edward J. Williams, *The Political Themes of Inter-American Relations* (Belmont, Calif.: Duxbury Press, 1971); and Abraham F. Lowenthal, "United States Policy Toward Latin America: 'Liberal,' 'Radical,' and 'Bureaucratic' Perspectives," *Latin American Research Review*, vol. 8, no. 1, 1973.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

profile), the general substance of the policy has varied little since the late 1950s. The United States continues to use aid as much as a reward for a country's friendship as for economic development, continues to give foreign aid primarily in the form of loans to pay for the purchase of goods in the United States, continues to advocate that the Latin Americans open themselves to more private investment (even the Alliance for Progress gave private capital a major role), continues to worry about the treatment of this private investment which it urged on the Latin Americans in the first place, continues to support anti-communist governments that stay in power by repression, and continues to pour police equipment and advisers into the hands of governments that are intolerant of dissent.[8]

A Policy for the Post-Vietnam Era

Professor Kenneth Thompson offers the following warning to academicians proposing advice to policymakers:

> In fact, the private citizen, and particularly the moralist, does no one a service by merely exhorting from the sidelines. He who persistently calls for a new policy for this area or that problem misunderstands the nature of foreign policy. His voice is like that of a man calling from the platform to a friend caught in the subway rush. For the friend crushed and hemmed in by surging humanity the outsider can hardly be of much help. The milieu in which the two men must act is so utterly different that insistent demands to do this or that can only be confusing.[9]

Despite this well-justified warning, for three reasons the remainder of this article is a "shout in the subway" devoted to suggesting a "new" policy for Latin America.

First, and most important, this policy distinguishes an extreme that can be useful in discussing the range of possible policies. It is extreme in the degree to which it removes Washington from influencing Latin American domestic political processes without at the same time refusing to assist the Latin Americans in their attempts to develop. Although at times the United States speaks piously of allowing Latin Americans to choose their own course of development, it is responsible for a significant flow of influence to Latin America. If Washington and Latin America truly want Latin America to develop "on its own," the suggested policy is a step in that direc-

[8] Agency for International Development representatives will claim that assistance for Latin American police departments is designed to help "humanize" their operations, but one must wonder if they are getting efficient faster than they are becoming humanized.

[9] *Understanding World Politics* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975), p. 157.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion. Second, for all the obvious economic difficulties of the policy, I believe it to be an improvement over the present policy — and an improvement less subject to improper and inconsistent administration by Washington because its guidelines are relatively clear and strict. Third, it serves to make the degree to which we are influencing Latin American political systems more obvious. Neither Washington nor the Latin American capitals really understands the nature of the current relationship in terms of the flow of influence,[10] but this policy suggests some aspects of how authority and influence operate in the system.

The outline of such an influence-less "new" posture would appear to be (A) a simplified recognition and diplomatic relations policy, (B) an additional criterion for evaluating Washington's decisions dealing with Latin America, (C) a new framework for the aid program, and (D) a reappraisal of Washington's relationship with the U.S. investor in Latin America.

(A) In order to be as noninterventionist as possible in Latin American affairs the United States should commit itself to a continuation and formalization of the de facto recognition policy followed since the Lyndon Johnson Administration.[11] Furthermore, the breaking of diplomatic relations used as a weapon in relations with Latin American countries should be abandoned. An intelligent argument can be made for the idea that recognition or the formality of diplomatic relations should be used to punish or reward Latin American governments.[12] However, there are two major problems with the withholding of these gestures: First, Washington cannot always get what it wants in return for recognition, and if it fails it is left isolated from the unrepentant country. Our threat to refrain from recognizing can be used by nationalistic Latin American leaders to rally popular support, as in the case of the Castro government. Second, in view of the many domestic pressures entering Washington's decision-making process, rational judgments on questions of recognition and diplomatic relations are dubious at best. One of the general advantages of the policy put forward in this article is the degree to which it is automatic in execution because it removes a

[10] This should not indicate that the author somehow "understands" this process either. It is an exceedingly complex situation that demands systematic study.

[11] James Cochrane, "U.S. Policy Towards Recognition of Governments and Promotion of Democracy in Latin America Since 1963," *Journal of Latin American Studies*, November 1972.

[12] See Yale Ferguson, "The United States and Political Development in Latin America: A Retrospect and a Prescription," in Ferguson, editor, *Contemporary Inter-American Relations: A Reader in Theory and Issues* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972), pp. 348-391, although he backs away from that position in "An End to the 'Special Relationship'. . . ."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

number of questions from the realm of intragovernmental debate; e.g., is this new government "acceptable enough" to be recognized?

(B) The Washington foreign policy decision-making bureaucracy must always evaluate alternative choices in light of how they involve the United States in the decision-making processes of the Latin American countries. This means more than simply allowing the Latin American government to accept or decline a foreign aid package. Frequently the mere availability of such assistance constitutes an offer the Latin American country "can't refuse." Money allocated to create economic infrastructure has been dissipated by Latin American governments to solve immediate political problems. What I am suggesting is that programs substantially written in Washington (or prompted by hints from Washington) tend to be wasted more than programs inhering in a Latin American frame of reference. The Latin Americans will enthusiastically assure Washington of the helpfulness of an aid program but then proceed to squander and badly administer it. One way to lessen this tendency is to make sure that the programs spring from the Latin American governments.

Needed is an entirely new setting in which Washington is more open to initiatives and ideas from Latin America than concerned with preserving the present system in which rewards flow from Washington in return for proper behavior. It must be recognized that the Latin American governments, for better or worse, are operating from different societal arrangements and philosophical bases than the United States.[13] So Washington's suggestions are liable to be incongruous with the Latin American reality.

(C) The idea of lessening Washington's role in Latin American decision-making processes becomes delicate when one attempts to formulate economic assistance programs that allow the recipient governments to experiment without forcing them to adhere to Washington's model of development. The aim should be to devise programs that are automatically financed and allocated to all countries regardless of their political orientation.

On the other hand, it is impossible to believe that the U.S. government is prepared to finance directly economic experiments of which it seriously disapproves. One possible solution

[13] In *Spanish America, 1900-1970: Tradition and Social Innovation* (New York: Norton, 1973), Fredrick Pike makes an attempt to define what he believes to be the corporate underpinnings of Latin American culture and society, in contrast to U.S. interpretations of them. Also see the special issue of *The Review of Politics*, January 1974, edited by Pike and built around the theme of corporatism and social and political structures in the Iberian world. It contains provocative pieces by Pike ("Corporatism and Latin American-United States Relations") and Philippe C. Schmitter ("Still the Century of Corporatism?").

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

would be to offer to assist programs in a number of categories that have some degree of support in the U.S. Congress but are also sufficiently varied to allow both democratic and totalitarian reformist governments to find assistance. There is a North American value judgment of a reformist nature underlying the suggestions. But on the basis of public statements of both the Latin American Right and Left, these programs are varied enough to be of assistance to any government's attempts to better its people's living conditions — a task, it was argued earlier, all the governments of Latin America now recognize to be important.

Some possible categories of programs follow:

(1) Any agrarian reform that betters *both* land distribution and production.

(2) Any elementary education program — regardless of its ideological content.

(3) Because Latin American hopes for import substitution industries have waned as a result of these industries using excessive amounts of foreign exchange to import technology and materials, the creation of state or privately owned industries that produce exports could be financed.

(4) Housing programs that actually reach the lower classes — even if the housing is miserably substandard by U.S. criteria.

(5) Medical programs designed to benefit the masses, such as preventive medicine planning, provision of potable water, control of alcoholism, and family planning information and birth control devices *if* the Latin American government initiates and operates the population program.

(6) Programs that stimulate organizational efforts among peasants and rural slum dwellers — the kind of organizations these groups need in order to allow their demands to be heard and considered by the government.

(7) Programs to professionalize bureaucracies. No matter what arguments or explanations are offered in defense of the gigantic and lethargic Latin American bureaucracies, no reforms are going to be carried out through governmental channels unless bureaucracies have the ability to function.

Each country should be given an allotment of foreign assistance credit based on its ability to finance its own projects, its ability to execute the programs and its population. Thus, if an Allende prefers not to operate agrarian reform in such a way as to increase production (which proved to be a serious mistake in the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Chilean case) or if Brazil wishes not to spend money for the stimulation of popular organizations, they can simply present aid applications for their share of the money and omit the programs inconsistent with their developmental strategy. This should allow the Latin American country to divert its resources into experimental channels distasteful to the U.S. Congress.

It would be well to devise a system of professional economists and political scientists (primarily from Latin America) to make the judgments necessary to execute this program. The Latin representatives should not be appointed by their governments (but perhaps by ECLA) in order to avoid the log-rolling aspects that have characterized some other efforts at organizing a Latin American input into aid programs. If at times this group makes decisions contrary to what the Department of State believes to be wise, the department could view it as a learning experience for the group rather than as a disaster.[14]

(D) A thorough rethinking, free of immediate domestic political pressures, is necessary to ascertain the proper degree of protection to be provided for U.S. investors abroad. Obviously at some point political forces in the United States must be considered, but present State Department thinking seems so confined by "political realities" that it has lost any firm picture of what, in general terms, would be the most advantageous policy for all parties concerned. At times one almost feels that Department of State spokesmen believe Lenin's thesis that capitalism must continue to expand abroad in order to prevent its internal collapse.[15] Certainly North American businessmen are not averse to that position — either from belief or as a ploy to persuade Washington to come to their assistance.[16]

In part the considerable complexity of this subject lies in the fact that three parties are concerned: official Washington, the investor and the host government. None of the parties can control the relationship, which forces all of them into a bargaining situation

[14] For reasons of brevity the present proposal ignores a number of other consequential facets of the U.S.-Latin American relationship that deserve examination. For example, the staggering debts the Latin American countries have accumulated due to past loans (made in the name of development) present an increasing problem. The "buy American" restrictions need study. The idea of trade favoritism and advantages for which the Latin Americans have pressed is another issue needing to be confronted — although the author does not favor this approach if it becomes simply a way of passing a hidden foreign assistance cost on to the American consumer.

[15] See the remarks of Secretary of State Dean Acheson as quoted in William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (New York: World, 1962), pp. 235-237.

[16] Writers such as Magdoff who accept Lenin's interpretation of imperialism pounce on these remarks. For a classic example see Magdoff, p. 184.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that detracts from their relations being stable and beneficial. There may be innate conflicts of interest among the three but these are currently resolved at a level having little to do with the deeper significance of the foreign investment relationship and thus hindering a clear balancing of the significant interests.

Since the Department of State has not clearly defined its position on the degree to which it will "protect" the foreign investor in Latin America, Washington is undoubtedly given more flexibility, but the price of flexibility is uncertainty. From the point of view of maximizing one's payoff, uncertainty (am I bluffing or not?) may be an excellent bargaining ploy for the United States, but operating on a good poker player's strategy is not conducive to the establishment of a day-to-day system of interaction.[17]

Beyond the question of bargaining positions, there is growing evidence that an undiscriminating open door to foreign investment is not the panacea for the host country it has been claimed to be. For example, a short article by Princeton economist Shane Hunt in a RAND Corporation study done for the State Department[18] raises serious doubts regarding President Richard Nixon's October 31, 1969, comment to the Inter-American Press Association that "properly motivated private enterprise has a vitally important role to play in social as well as economic development in all of the nations [of Latin America]."[19] One can also argue that, even if Nixon was correct in his grasp of LDC economies, current Latin American political realities suggest that the private investor may not be worth protecting in terms of the negative image such actions give the United States.

As for the other parties in this triangular foreign investment relationship, companies from the United States must forswear such actions as ITT's attempts to wreck the economy of Chile[20] — although in fairness to ITT there were many Chilean businessmen who were quite willing to take part in such a venture. But ITT's actions confirm the widespread Latin American suspicion that multi-

---

[17] This is not to say that Washington should tie its hands by clarifying all aspects of its foreign policy. Flexibility is valuable in most situations, but at this point in history the question of foreign investment needs to be regularized.

[18] Luigi Einaudi, editor, *Latin America in the 1970s* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1972), pp. 127-146.

[19] This is the version from the White House press secretary. When the Department of State's Bureau of Public Affairs released a version of the speech (publication 8501), these remarks were considerably less forceful on the subject of private investment.

[20] On the ITT affair see U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign Policy, Hearings,* before the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, 93rd Congress (Washington: GPO, 1973), parts 1 and 2.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

national corporations view themselves as being above the national laws of any single nation, particularly of the LDCs.

For their part in ending the foreign investment plight, it would seem beneficial if the Latin American governments established clearer ground rules for the new investor — and then enforced the rules uniformly. The Andean investment code is an example of a group of countries trying to clarify and regulate the ground rules. But in these situations the governments must concentrate on the fairness with which guidelines are enforced. The Mexican experience (with a weaker code) indicates that the rules can be circumvented by payoffs to corrupt officials. If the investor is forced to cut corners with rules, the Latin American government must expect that his vulnerability to governmental sanction at the whim of some politician will encourage him to try to remove his profits as quickly as possible — which is one of the developments the codes are trying to prevent.

The outline of this new relationship is already beginning to clarify itself. Host governments and foreign investors are gaining experience at administering and working within investment codes. Washington's policy should be one of quietly attempting to facilitate the effective operation of these codes — regardless of how it may judge their provisions. If it is convinced of the beneficial effects of foreign investment, it should be willing to let the Latin Americans make some "mistakes" and learn by experience. The Brazilian growth rate — no matter how ill-distributed it may be — constitutes a major showcase for the Latin Americans. But some countries may decide that the provision of extensive social services and income redistribution at the cost of traditional economic growth — a la Cuba — is a more attractive model of development. If so, the United States does not have the wisdom or any "right" to oppose this decision.

Lest anyone believe that a less interventionist policy in protection of the foreign investor would represent some major concession by Washington, it should be realized that in the two most recent controversial expropriations in Latin America (IPC in Peru and the copper companies in Chile) the huffings and puffings of the Hickenlooper and other amendments accomplished very little. (The reprehensible CIA role is, of course, another matter.)

From Today's Policy to Tomorrow's

Simply as an illustrative device and without attempting any false sense of the scientific, the four variables listed below will

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

help to compare this policy with those of the last twenty years. The first category can be titled "Obvious degree of involvement in Latin American decision-making processes." By this we mean the Alliance for Progress's strong declaration that it would support only certain types of liberal reforms and that all Latin American governments should adopt these "democratic left" programs. The second category, "Hidden degree of involvement," refers to factors of U.S. influence stemming from the nature of inter-American relations: U.S. control of credit, military assistance programs, quota controls, and the like. In a sense these are "fall back" channels of influence implicit in the relationship unless some set of rules systematizes the situation. "Degree of protection for foreign investors" is self-explanatory. "Assistance for development" relates more or less to the amount of aid provided.

Categories	*Eisenhower*	*Kennedy*	*Johnson*	*Nixon*	*"New Policy"*
Obvious degree of involvement in Latin American decision-making processes	Low	High	High	Low	Very low
Hidden degree of involvement	Medium	High	Medium	Medium	Low
Degree of protection for foreign investors	High	Medium	High	High	Low
Assistance for development	Low	High	High	Medium	High

The major criticisms of the policy will come from those who believe that Latin Americans are incapable of running their governments in a manner conducive to development. One group of these critics will be the free enterprise conservatives who see most governmental assistance as wasted regardless of what conditions may be attached. Without attempting any thorough discussion of this position, two observations are in order: First, the much referred to Brazilian economic miracle is definitely a boom directed by central planning, as opposed to a sudden unleashing of entrepreneurial talents in Brazil. Second, for better or worse most Latin Americans are convinced that governmental intervention in the economy is necessary.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Another expressed criticism may be from Washingtonians who favor strong emphasis on economic development, but primarily for countries most dedicated to the political and social status quo. These geopoliticians would regard the priorities of fundable aid categories as generally too humanistic, due to their suspicion that programs of real agrarian reform and housing have too few returns in "tough," "realistic" and "power" terms. They freely admit that, contrary to public rhetoric, aid goes chiefly for political, not economic, reasons. Besides a moral argument that might be made to the deaf ears of this group, the program is defensible by simply adjusting the relationship so that it can be more profitable in "realistic" and "power" terms to the United States. Surely it is of benefit to Washington to have friendly relations with the countries of Latin America. Again it needs to be emphasized that this "new policy" does not lack dilemmas and disadvantages — it is defensible only when viewed against current policies.

A third school of critics would be those from the Kennedy government-in-exile team of Alliance for Progress supporters. Underlying the Alliance was the assumption that Washington (or at least liberal Democrats) knew what was best for Latin America. A sophisticated version of the argument would be that the Latin American political systems are frequently balanced in such a way as to make genuine reforms (or their effective administration) politically impossible. Therefore some outside agency such as the U.S. government has to intervene subtly (or not so subtly) with offers of financial support in order to break the political impasse. This is a serious criticism of the "new policy." But it would be more effective had the Alliance been successful. In part the Alliance's failure lies in the degree to which it tried to remake Latin American political systems on a glorified pluralistic model of the United States.[21]

A final group of critics would be among academic radicals who see the entire United States-Latin American relationship as one exploitative for U.S. capital. Although their criticisms are frequently telling, their solutions seem totally unrealistic short of the millennium. The "new policy" is obviously designed to be more acceptable to Washington than to Berkeley — but it does have the potential for removing some of the more odious aspects radicals find in the dependency system.

[21] I tried to develop this theme in "La Ayuda económica de Estados Unidos a América Latina como instrumento de control político," *Foro Internacional*, April-June 1972. This was the Spanish version of a paper delivered in 1971 at the Latin American Studies Association in Austin, Texas, entitled "United States Economic Assistance as an Instrument of Political Control."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Two other substantial criticisms of the program need to be mentioned. First, if Latin Americans have previously spoiled their chances for development, why continue to provide them support? One of the underlying assumptions of this article is that the Latin American governments are getting better at administering their economic assistance, although the current nature of the world economic system may be making this more difficult for those lacking oil reserves. Economists are more plentiful in Latin America. There is more historical experience regarding development than there was in the 1940s and 1950s. There is more pressure on the governments for development — to the point where all Latin American governments recognize development as a goal. Unfortunately in the United States many observers have tended to confuse democracy with governmental honesty and efficiency. But the cases of Brazil, Cuba and Peru should disabuse anyone of the idea that dictators are necessarily bungling and corrupt. It also may be that some of the regimes in Latin America are profligate simply due to a scarcity of resources and that if more means were available the populace would be more demanding and critical of the government.

Another valid criticism may concern the program's salability. New policies and programs, Department of State people argue, must be seen in terms of what the Congress will accept. This "hands off" strategy including less direct intervention in support of private investors may alienate certain constituencies essential to the passage of foreign assistance programs. But at some point one must express faith in State's ability to sell, and Congress's ability to recognize, a better policy if one is found.

This "new policy" constitutes a damnation of the policy Washington followed toward Allende's Chile and a judgment of the Johnson/Nixon/Ford policy toward Cuba. But it also means that Paraguay and Brazil should be allowed to move in the direction indicated by their political situations. The core from which the "new policy" springs is that the Latin American experience has a texture beyond the comprehension of official Washington, and to muddle in this well is to poison it. There are difficulties inherent in executing the policy. Whether the cure is worse than the disease is a matter for individual opinion. However, it should be emphasized that all alternative policies have trade-offs. In this world of sovereign states seeking security and prosperity, we are doomed to solve one problem only to be confronted with another. No policy will be without its drawbacks.

Perhaps this entire analysis can be interpreted simply as

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

another example of the propensity of observers to see impending doom in Latin America. But that is *not* the point: Latin America is not going to "go down the drain" or anywhere else. The point is that a series of deepening problems in hemispheric relations can be alleviated (not avoided) by beginning some soul-searching about what the pattern of inter-American relations should be ten years from now and how to get from today's policy to tomorrow's.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE PANAMA CANAL: A FRESH START

by Charles Maechling, Jr.

The Panama Canal is back in the political spotlight, not for the first time since 1903 when the United States acquired the fifty-mile-long strip between the Atlantic and Pacific as a protective corridor for the canal itself. Negotiations for gradual retrocession to Panama of control over the Canal Zone, now in their twelfth year since the 1964 riots, resumed in October 1976, but with the economic and strategic stakes as high as they are, further progress was unlikely until after the U.S. elections. Public emotion over the canal issue tends to run high, and Congress has repeatedly demonstrated its reluctance to approve any agreement that would abrogate the 1903 treaty or relinquish United States rights.

The negotiations are still grounded in the Kissinger-Tack agreement on principles of February 7, 1974. In this joint declaration the United States agreed to abrogate the 1903 Hay–Bunau-Varilla Treaty, which created the Canal Zone and still regulates its status, and to replace it with a new agreement of fixed duration. The new treaty would restore sovereignty over the zone to Panama but would reserve operational control of the canal to the United States until an indeterminate date at least twenty-five years later. Within this framework the principal U.S. negotiator, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, over a four-year period has worked out a proposed settlement, not too different from earlier draft treaties negotiated by the Johnson administration. This latest proposal would (1) gradually phase out the attributes of U.S. sovereignty in the zone during a transitional period, (2) increase Panamanian participation in the operation of the canal before turnover, (3) augment in various ways Panama's share of economic benefits from the canal, and (4) yield title to more than half the zonal territory until the date when all rights, title and control of the zone vest in Panama. Separate agreements would provide for joint U.S.-Panamanian defense of the canal, which according to Secretary Kissinger at a 1975 southern governors' conference, will be maintained by the United States "uni-

Charles Maechling, Jr., currently with the law firm of Kirlin, Campbell and Keating, served on the politico-military staff of Secretary of State Dean Rusk and as Special Assistant to Averell Harriman. Mr. Maechling has written extensively on international law and foreign relations, his legal specialties being international and comparative law, maritime law and economic regulation. He has been an adviser to three foreign governments and to numerous foreign business firms.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

laterally" and "for a long time," and will allow a gradual rise in canal tolls to give Panama annual revenues of over $50 million.

Ambassador Bunker has testified that his instructions from President Ford called for him to "give up the Canal over a period of time." Whether such a drastic cession of U.S. rights in the zone would be politically feasible, however, remains an open question. Thirty-seven senators are now on record as opposing any diminution of U.S. "sovereign rights and jurisdiction" (Senate Resolution 301, 93rd Congress, March 29, 1974), and the House of Representatives has voted to deny funds for the negotiation, though this was subsequently converted into a joint Senate-House resolution stipulating protection of American interests. President Carter's preelection position was for retention of at least de facto control.

Despite the multinational origins of the Panama Canal, and its totally transnational function in world trade, current negotiations remain fixed in the same bilateral track that has characterized the U.S. approach to the canal since the date of Panamanian independence in 1903. The effect has been to take the canal out of its global context and to downgrade the vital question of its economic future — treating it as a counter in U.S.-Latin American political relations, with all their tensions and historical resentments. The Kissinger-Bunker approach was dictated more by concern for maintaining the inter-American system than for preserving a vital strategic and economic asset. The predictable result was that long-term strategic and economic interests were constantly sacrificed for short-term political advantage. In three important respects this approach paved the way for future concessions by redefining the U.S. position. *First,* the 1903 treaty was reinterpreted to make the residual sovereignty of Panama more significant than it actually is. *Second,* American defense needs were redefined to downgrade the canal's strategic importance. *Third,* the canal's economic value was depreciated by emphasizing its scale limitations with respect to vessel capacity.

The Sovereignty Issue

The legal question of who has sovereignty over the Canal Zone is so bound up with Latin American political sensitivities that at first glance it appears cosmetic and artificial. Actually, the question masks vital issues of jurisdiction, and therefore realities of political control, especially during a period of transition. In its effects on the future status of U.S. forces in the zone, it also has strategic implications.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The key provisions of the Hay–Bunau-Varilla Treaty are articles 2 and 3. Article 2 "grants to the United States in perpetuity the use, occupation and control of a zone of land and land under water for the construction, maintenance, operation, sanitation and protection of said Canal of the width of ten miles." Article 3 grants to the United States "all the rights, power and authority within the zone mentioned . . . which the United States would possess and exercise if it were the sovereign of the territory . . . to the entire exclusion of the exercise by the Republic of Panama of any sovereign rights, power or authority."

By the plain language of article 3, exclusive sovereign rights over the zone are vested in the United States, leaving only a sort of titular or residual sovereignty in Panama. What does this formulation mean — and does it matter?

On this point, the views of Panama and the United States naturally differ. Within a year of the signing of the treaty, the government of the new republic had made its first claim of sovereignty over the zone, and shortly thereafter the United States issued its first interpretation of article 3. Secretary of State John Hay declared that in signing the treaty the residual sovereignty residing in Panama had been "mediatized" (i.e., converted) by Panama's own acts. In 1906 his successor, William Howard Taft, characterized it as "titular sovereignty," of little significance other than to satisfy the Latin American addiction to "names and forms." In 1923 Secretary Charles Evans Hughes declared that the language expressly excluding Panamanian sovereignty in effect settled the question.

So the matter stood until the 1936 treaty of friendship and cooperation between the United States and Panama, which without directly amending article 3 somewhat diluted the U.S. position by describing the Canal Zone as "territory of the Republic of Panama under the jurisdiction of the United States." However, in 1955, when a second agreement affecting the zone (the Eisenhower-Remón Treaty) was being negotiated, Assistant Secretary Henry S. Holland reverted to the earlier position that effective sovereignty remained with the United States. No further concessions were made until after the "flag riots" of 1964, at which time President Johnson instructed the State Department to reach a new agreement with Panama that would terminate the 1903 treaty and "recognize the sovereignty of Panama." Ever since, U.S. negotiators, apparently in order to pave the way for relinquishment, have ascribed to the "titular sovereignty" of Panama a juridical significance never contemplated by their predecessors. The most authoritative U.S. gov-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ernment statements to date — the Kissinger-Tack agreement of February 7, 1974, and Ambassador Bunker's speeches of May 22 and December 2, 1975 — show the extent to which the United States has retreated from its original position. The former refers to Panama as the "territorial sovereign," while Ambassador Bunker, relying on the 1936 treaty, flatly states that "under the law we do not have sovereignty in Panama."

This description may accord with the position taken by Panama practically from the date of cession; it does not fit the traditional definition of sovereignty under international law. Brierly and Brownlie, the two leading authorities on public international law, agree that sovereignty (a) is territorial in scope and (b) consists in essence of a bundle of jurisdictional rights, of which the primary one, in Brownlie's words, is "jurisdiction, *prima facie* exclusive, over a territory and the permanent population living there." If one applies this test to the Canal Zone, taking account of the complex network of rights and duties that regulate relations between the two countries, the attributes of sovereignty exercised by the United States are self-evident:

Government: The United States is the exclusive governing authority in the Canal Zone. The zone government is by law an agency of the federal government whose chief executive, the governor, is appointed by the president of the United States.

Laws: The United States Congress is the exclusive legislative body of the Canal Zone, and in this capacity it has enacted a civil code and a variety of supplemental statutes. By specific inclusion, Congress makes various provisions of U.S. law applicable to the zone.

Courts: A system of United States courts, consisting of magistrates' courts of limited jurisdiction and a U.S. district court for the Canal Zone, administers justice in the zone. U.S. courts have consistently refused to recognize the jurisdiction of Panamanian courts within the zone, ruling that this would constitute the "exercise of a sovereign right in the Canal Zone which is prohibited by the treaty."

Both Congress in its legislation and the federal courts in their decisions often draw a distinction between the legal status of the Canal Zone and that of the United States proper, a fact made much of by proponents of the theory that the United States has jurisdiction, but not sovereignty, within the zone. Thus, in the application of customs and tariff legislation, the Canal Zone is treated as outside the United States. The same is true for immigration legislation, while children born to Panamanian parents within the zone are considered to be Panamanian citizens. For purposes of ocean transportation and importation of goods, the Supreme Court has

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

held that Canal Zone ports are "foreign" — but they are "domestic" under the Ship Mortgage Act of 1920. And the U.S. Constitution does not *ipso facto* apply within the zone: The governor has deportation powers, and the Bill of Rights for zone residents is a separate one enacted by Congress. Only canal employees and federal civilian and military personnel (and a few others falling into special categories) can reside within the zone.

On the other hand, in defense and national security legislation, the Canal Zone is usually specifically included within the definition of "territory under the jurisdiction of the United States." The same is true for labor legislation, such as the Employers Liability Act, the 1920 Merchant Marine Act and the 1927 Longshoreman's Act.

Mail, currency, the flag and taxes present a mixed picture. The zone issues its own postage stamps, but mail to the United States is defined as "domestic" for purposes of rates, and only U.S. and Panamanian currency are legal tender within the zone. Ever since a U.S. presidential decree in 1959, the U.S. and Panamanian flags are required to be flown side by side as a concession to Panamanian "titular sovereignty." Law enforcement also reflects a pragmatic and sensible approach; special "hot pursuit" and extradition provisions apply along the long, unguarded borders. The United States withholds Panamanian taxes from Panamanians that work in the zone.

In order to play down the express renunciation of Panamanian sovereignty in article 3, supporters of the theory of Panamanian sovereignty — which since 1967 include the State Department and its negotiators — have made much of these differences in the application of U.S. laws and have stressed the limited cessions of jurisdiction for special purposes. They now rest U.S. rights under the 1903 treaty on jurisdiction alone, as if the zone were analogous to occupied Germany after World War II. The argument is that because the zone is not an "incorporated territory" of the United States, and not subject to automatic or at least uniform application of U.S. law, it cannot be the subject of U.S. sovereignty.

But quite apart from the obvious fact that the totality of remaining U.S. rights over the territory of the zone easily fits every definition of sovereignty under international law, the Panamanian-sovereignty position fails to recognize that each inclusion or exclusion of the zone from the application of U.S. law, and each narrowly limited cession of jurisdiction, is itself the product of U.S. congressional legislation or executive order. Each limited transfer of juris-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

diction has been an assertion of U.S. sovereignty, not a denial of it. With Panama excluded from exercising these functions under article 3, it is hard to see where sovereignty resides, except with the United States.

For what it is worth, the historical record seems to support this view. Contrary to popular opinion in Panama and the United States, reiterated as recently as March 25, 1976, in editorials and columns in the *Washington Post* and elsewhere, the 1903 treaty was not "imposed upon a supine Panama." The United States had earlier negotiated the Hay-Herrán Treaty with Colombia by which it acquired the right to construct, operate and control a canal across the isthmus in a zone ten kilometers wide. In that agreement, the United States expressly recognized the sovereignty of Colombia, subject to the United States' right to defend the canal and to establish a system of mixed courts for the administration of justice. The independence of Panama — then a mere geographic expression — was engineered by a small group of prominent conspirators headed by the French engineer-adventurer of Suez fame, Philippe-Jean Bunau-Varilla; it was he, representing the new Republic of Panama, and not the State Department, who drafted the treaty that bears his name. The Hay-Herrán Treaty was used as a model, but Bunau-Varilla rejected the limited cession of sovereignty in that agreement in favor of a formula of his own devising, namely the ambiguous "as if" language of article 3. As he recounted in his book *Panama Canal* (1913), this was done in order to bind the United States to its commitment to pay $10 million to the country selected for the site. Moreover, he wrote, "[if I] enumerated in succession the various attributes of sovereignty granted, I ran the risk of seeing, in the Senate, some other attributes asked for. To cut short any possible debate I decided to grant a concession of sovereignty *en bloc*."

When Secretary Kissinger, in his speech announcing the eight principles of agreement, said that the United States proposed to "restore" Panamanian sovereignty over the zone, he unwittingly stated the truth: since 1903, effective sovereignty has resided with the United States and not, as Ambassador Bunker claims, with Panama. To maintain otherwise not only downgrades a perfectly solid position under international law; it provides Panama with a legal basis for subjecting U.S. rights and privileges in the zone to disabilities and burdens that might not be covered or otherwise anticipated in future written agreements. It gives the United States the status of a tenant at sufferance rather than that of a long-term lessee, both in law and in world opinion.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Strategic Issue

To make cession of the Canal Zone palatable, the State Department has recently taken to understating the canal's importance to U.S. strategic and economic interests. From a defense standpoint, for example, it is argued that because the canal cannot accommodate vessels larger than 950 feet in length, 106 feet in beam and 40 feet in draft — "Pan-Max" in the shipping vocabulary — U.S. defense plans are now irrevocably predicated on the assumption of a two-ocean navy. This is the assumption in the November 1975 report of the Congressional Study Mission of the House International Relations Committee, and it is the conclusion of recent articles on the subject in *Foreign Affairs* (October 1975) and *Foreign Policy* (Winter 1975-1976). However, this position poses the defense problem only in terms of an all-out nuclear conflict; it conveniently ignores the fact that limited wars have been the rule since 1945. In the latter context the role of the canal is vital. During the Korean War, U.S. public-vessel transits through the canal rose from 443 in 1950 to 1,064 in 1953, before declining. During five years of the Vietnam war (1965-1970), such transits rose from 284 to 1,068 annually, before declining; 95 per cent of all military cargo was carried by ship. Moreover, except for the big aircraft carriers, warships are getting smaller, not larger. The day of the battleship is over, cruisers are stabilizing in size below World War II dimensions (for some missions giving way to the new class of frigates), and nuclear submarines and special-purpose vessels are well within the capacity of the locks.

In an age where the limitations on American overseas power are imposed as much by economic and social constraints as by military ones, the canal is more important than ever. Closure of the canal by nuclear attack would be bad enough, but it would at least occur in a cataclysmic context that would minimize its impact. But closure by reason of some lesser politico-military crisis could cripple a limited U.S. response. From Norfolk to Yokohama a trip through the Panama Canal, versus a voyage around the Cape of Good Hope, saves 5,666 miles and fuel to match. From San Francisco to New York 8,000 miles are saved by eliminating Cape Horn. The necessity of operating within the strait jacket of a $100-billion-plus defense budget, while at the same time keeping up with technological advances, puts a premium on strategic flexibility and economy of operations as never before. With naval dockyards and repair facilities on each coast cut back to the point where they can no longer accommodate a sudden onrush of arrivals, every penny

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

spared from routine overhaul and operating costs stretches out the total defense capability. Moreover, the U.S. balance of payments now plays as vital a role as does military power in determining the extent to which the United States can honor its commitments. With dependence on foreign oil rising over the 40 per cent mark, the notion that the United States can cavalierly dismiss the staggering fuel costs and operational risks entailed by stringing ship movements and logistic support "around the horn" would be the height of folly.

In its broader impact, the disruption to transcontinental transportation patterns caused by the emergency diversion to truck and rail of cargo normally carried by sea could have a disastrous impact on the domestic economy. Closure during an emergency short of war would find the government less able to deal with the crisis than if it had war powers. Conversely, should transcontinental rail and truck routes ever be disrupted by attack or internal disturbance, the canal would immediately become an indispensable life line. No one can predict the shape of future crises or foresee the future political complexion of the Southern Hemisphere. The Panama Canal is a strategic asset too valuable to trifle with, as we would find out to our great cost if forced to do without.

The Economic Issue

Denigrating arguments have also been applied to the canal's economic role. It is alleged that since U.S. intercoastal trade now constitutes only 3 per cent of all cargo shipped through the canal, and since the largest supertankers and bulk carriers are too big for it, its importance has declined to the point that hanging on to it is no longer worth the political price. Moreover, the inevitable escalation of canal operating costs is supposed to exert a chilling effect on future cargo transits; presumably, cargo will be routed round the capes, or shifted to transcontinental rail and truck routes, in arithmetic proportion to each increase in tolls. These arguments ignore the character of the technological revolution now going on in the shipping industry and couch the trade issue in too narrow terms.

With regard to vessel sizes, it is true that increasing numbers of supertankers and bulk carriers — perhaps 1,000 by latest estimate — are too wide or of excessive draft to transit the canal. It is also true that in absolute figures the number of commercial transits has begun to level off and at present is in a zero-growth pattern. Commercial transits in peacetime rose from some 4,000 or

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

6,000 annually in the interwar period to 11,000 in the early 1960s, and they are now stable at about 14,000, having reached a peak of over 15,000 in 1974. During this period, however, world cargo *tonnage* has risen dramatically and with it the tonnage transiting the canal — from 114 million long tons in 1940 to over 140 million long tons in 1975, with a sharp drop to 117.4 million in 1976 after the Suez Canal reopened. Clearly, more cargo is being carried in fewer and more specialized ships, but the notion that this trend is universal, or will continue indefinitely, is not borne out by projections. According to a 1974 Cornell University study, economies resulting from ship scale are striking only in the so-called bulk trades, and these more in oil tankers than in ore carriers. Except in the case of supertankers that operate only between the deep-water ports of the Persian Gulf and offshore discharge points in Europe and the United States, ships having a cargo capacity beyond 100,000 dead-weight tons — 65,000 is "Pan-Max" — encounter such severe restrictions in port and loading facilities as to make their size uneconomical. (Ore carriers, for example, need to pick up cargoes over a far wider range of ports than do tankers, and to operate economically they require nearby deep-water loading and discharge facilities.) Beyond a certain point in dead-weight tonnage, scale economies are more than offset by a constricted scope of operations.

General-cargo vessels, now increasingly specialized as a result of the container revolution, are also growing in average size, and in fact the largest vessels to transit the canal to date have been the British-registered container ships *Tokyo Bay* and *Kowloon Bay* (950-foot length and 105-foot beam). But at least in the liner trade these vessels may now be reaching their own ultimate size, limited as they are by today's gantry-equipped port facilities and turnaround time, since assemblage of container cargo appropriate for each scheduled voyage becomes progressively more complicated the larger the vessel. The new classes of medium-size container ships, automated bulk carriers and barge-carrying LASH vessels are still comfortably within "Pan-Max," while the few remaining passenger vessels, now exclusively in luxury cruise service, have shrunk dramatically from the record dimensions of the interwar period. As technology, rather than size, becomes the key to shipping modernization for all but the bulk trades, turnaround time will become more crucial than ever. Scale limitations may provide an argument for enlarging and modernizing the canal, but they hardly support doing away with it.

From the standpoint of U.S. trade, closure of the canal

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

could have catastrophic consequences on shipping costs, especially fuel. Seventeen per cent of U.S. ocean-borne commerce passes through the canal, and 70 per cent of all ships transiting the canal have the United States as their destination. Shipping costs of exports and imports now amount to $3 billion a year. Even if these figures were halved to reflect U.S. exports alone, the effect of a sudden rise in export costs on the U.S. trade balance would be drastic. Additionally, most of the canal's cargo is in bulk commodities: in 1975 coal and coke represented 18 per cent of the tonnage; petroleum products, 17 per cent; grain, 13 per cent; and ores, 9.5 per cent. Eastern coal and western oil, carried in conventional-size bulk carriers, are now the canal's most important shipments. If, as predicted, North Slope Alaskan oil creates a glut on the West Coast at the same time that fuel shortages worsen on the East Coast, the canal will play a vital equalizing role for domestic energy prices. It has recently been reported that Standard Oil of Ohio and other North Slope producers are already programming medium-sized tankers (maximum of 60,000 dead-weight tons) to use the Panama Canal, at least until West Coast refineries are converted to process the high-sulfur Alaskan crude, or until new pipelines are built to supply the Middle West and New England.

The canal is even more important to other countries than to the United States — though why this should be an argument against continued U.S. control is not clear. Cargo tonnage is expected to reach 160.3 million in 1980 and 184.9 million in 1985, most of it in commodities. Latin American commerce is vitally dependent on the canal: 77 per cent of Nicaragua's trade, 50 per cent of Ecuador's, 41 per cent of Peru's and 32.5 per cent of Colombia's passes through it, and petroleum shipments to the U.S. Gulf and East coasts from the west coast of South America are a particularly important factor. But the canal is also a life line for Japan and the other countries of the Pacific. Forty-two per cent of all westbound canal tonnage is destined for Japan, and 23 per cent of all eastbound tonnage originates there. Coal and coke shipments dominate cargo movements through the canal, and in 1945 some 92 per cent of these shipments was destined for the Japanese steel industry. One can imagine the crippling effect of a sudden closure on the Japanese economy, with its precarious trade balance. This is not to mention the adverse impact such a closure would have on countries like Australia and New Zealand, which have crucial European and U.S. East Coast markets.

The toll system relates to this trade picture. In 1913, when

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the canal opened, tolls were set at a low figure. They were recomputed at $0.90 per ton in 1938 and have been raised three times since then — by 19.7 per cent in 1974 and by recomputations amounting to increases of 19 per cent and 20 per cent in May and November of 1976, respectively. Whether these increases are too low or too high in light of worldwide inflation and a catastrophic rise in shipping costs has been a matter of lively dispute. A study by the U.S. Maritime Administration dated May 15, 1976, indicates that there are definite limits beyond which tolls cannot be raised without risking serious shrinkage in revenues, especially those coming from the commodity trade.

Only the remarkable growth in tonnage transiting the canal, coupled with technological improvement, has permitted maintenance of a relatively constant toll rate. Until five years ago, the canal broke even as an operating concern and actually showed an annual profit, even after deduction of the rental payment to Panama of $2.3 million a year. But the cost of operating the canal is now about $250 million annually, and there was a deficit of $11.8 million in FY 1974 and of $8.2 million in FY 1975. Toll revenues and credits only accounted for $143 million in 1975, another $87 million coming from supportive services, and the two most recent increases were deemed necessary to offset an anticipated deficit of $36.5 million from July 1975 to October 1977. Since enactment of the Panama Canal Reorganization Act of 1950 (PL 81-841) significant elements of the true maintenance costs of both canal and zone have been defrayed by the U.S. government under other budgetary headings. For forty years the Panama Canal has been a well-run, low-cost enterprise, responsibly administered and heavily subsidized by the United States on behalf of the world community.

The more one examines shipping and trade projections, especially the 1974 estimates prepared for the Panama Canal Company by Economic Research Associates, the more it becomes apparent that the Panama Canal is a crucial element in the global transportation system. To analyze the canal's economic importance solely in terms of its direct impact on the American economy distorts the problem. A sounder approach is to focus on the potential effects of a closure on world commerce, particularly on those countries whose economies are dependent on the price of raw materials.

The Local Issue — Panama

This brings the question of treaty revision down to the current negotiations, which were suspended pending the change-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

over in the U.S. presidency. There is little doubt that the true issues are not economic but political, and that they involve the canal as a residual symbol of U.S. domination over Latin America rather than as a bona fide grievance susceptible of reasonable compromise. Proponents of treaty revision, both in Latin America and the United States, have felt it necessary to present a pitiable picture of a severed, impoverished Panama, divided like Weimar Germany into two separate halves by an American corridor inhabited by 40,000 affluent, privileged U.S. soldiers, civilians and dependents. The Canal Zone is, of course, characterized as a "colony" in the most pejorative sense — though hardly one crying for self-determination!

It would be more accurate to say that the canal unites rather than divides Panama. Thirty per cent of the Panamanian GNP is derived from the canal and the zone; three-quarters of the canal's employees, though admittedly on the lower side of the pay scale, are Panamanian; taxes withheld from these employees are regularly remitted by the U.S. government to the government of Panama; the level of U.S. aid to Panama is the highest, per capita, of any country in the world — $227 million in 1972; and incalculable economic benefits accrue to every level of Panamanian society because of the canal and the fourteen U.S. military installations in the zone. The result is that Panama now has the fourth highest GNP per capita in Latin America and enjoys an assured income, including $2.3 million annually in transit fees, that is the envy of its neighbors. (The draft treaty of 1967 — never ratified — provided for a royalty of from $0.17 to $0.22 per long ton of cargo. If applied to cargo transiting the canal in 1973, this would have raised the annual payment to $22 million — an indication of the probable character of any future settlement.)

To keep couching the political problem in terms of nationalistic shibboleths illustrates the trap of the sovereignty concept and the deplorable way in which the United States supinely adopts the ideological vocabulary of its Third World adversaries. Independent though it may be politically, only by courtesy can Panama be considered a discrete cultural or economic entity. Local politics have followed the usual Latin American pattern of ineffectual and corrupt parliamentary democracy, punctuated by military rule. The republic's economy, which depends heavily on Swiss-type bank accounts and flag-of-convenience registry for shipowners, is of a more or less proprietary character, and the bulk of its agricultural and mineral wealth is owned by foreign corporations and a few local families. The usual mythology, in which fictional grievances against the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

United States and Colombia play a necessary part, serves to impart some sense of nationality, but from a historical viewpoint Panama is a wholly synthetic creation and would not exist were it not for the canal. Notwithstanding Teddy Roosevelt's "I took Panama" boast, all authoritative European and American histories agree that Panamanian independence was brought about by a handful of conspirators drawn from the local oligarchy who were working in concert with a few international financiers, rather than through conscious U.S. government manipulation. Moreover, the USS *Nashville,* with its landing party of forty-two marines in dress whites, had less to do with the instant success of the revolution — if one can so dignify a bloodless coup participated in by fewer people than are on a football team — than did the neat trick of the conspirators, who in collusion with officials of the Panama Railway Company, lured the two commanders of the 500-man Colombian security force to the other side of the isthmus for a parley and then paid them off after jailing them.

This is not to say that there are no inequities in the present relationship, nor that the sight of wealth and abysmal poverty side by side does not generate discontent. Some of the worst irritants — U.S. defense rights in Panama proper and commissary competition with the local economy — were eliminated in treaties signed in 1936 and 1955, but the sharp contrast of affluent Canal Zone residents living cheek by jowl with those of a poor Third World country remains. American employees of the Panama Canal Company, mostly blue-collar, enjoy an artificially high standard of living and often display an unseemly arrogance in their relations with less fortunate neighbors. The child workers of Panama's factories do in truth look over at the zone golf course to watch the men at play. But the political solution proposed by the treaty advocates will neither improve the lot of poor Panamanians nor safeguard the vital interests of the United States and the global shipping community.

The negotiations will continue along their present unsatisfactory course as long as the United States remains locked into its current narrow and defensive posture. The central weakness of this position is that despite the canal's global importance, Washington since 1903 has insisted on treating the Canal Zone's status as a matter exclusively between the United States and Panama. The obvious motive behind this policy — apart from ritualistic obeisance to national sovereignty — is to confine a touchy political relationship to one small country of vastly inferior bargaining power while at the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

same time keeping other fingers out of the pie. The United States has a commitment to Great Britain under the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of 1900 to keep any isthmian canal open to the shipping of all countries, but is not otherwise trammeled in operation of the canal or the exercise of sovereign rights in the zone. Proposals for internationalizing both the Panama and Suez canals were circulated after the 1956 Suez crisis, but these were swiftly rejected by both the United States and Panama. At that time, the United States still regarded the Panama Canal as an indispensable strategic facility, and despite its domination of NATO and the inter-American political system, saw no reason to share control. Panama preferred an unsatisfactory, but lucrative, dependency on its big brother to any broader system of control that might weaken its exclusive claim to the zone.

Twenty years later, despite drastic changes in regional allegiances and power relationships, the issues in the negotiations — restoration of Panamanian sovereignty, increased Panamanian participation and royalties, and arrangements for defense — continue to be framed in the same bilateral terms. The U.S. negotiators cling to the illusory advantage that is supposed to derive from a one-to-one relationship with a small and weak "good neighbor." Panama clings to its geographic monopoly and wrings as much political leverage as it can out of its dependent status in order to secure a seat on the UN Security Council, receive a high level of economic assistance, and acquire various other benefits and privileges.

In the meantime, Panama has become an integral part of the Third World power bloc known as the Group of 77, which in the UN General Assembly, the OAS, UNCTAD, the law-of-the-sea conferences, and other forums increasingly takes positions against the United States. With some modifications, the regime of General Omar Torrijos displays the same kind of Marxist-nationalist orientation as do similar regimes in Peru, Libya, Syria, Somalia and elsewhere in the Third World. During the proposed twenty-five-year transition period after the new treaty is executed and before final turnover, the strident "antiimperialism" of the Panamanian politicians and military is not likely to be modulated. At the end of the century, we may find ourselves relinquishing the last attributes of effective sovereignty, not to a cooperative "good neighbor" but to one of the weaker components of a much larger and not wholly friendly coalition. The long-term problem is not that Panama will become strong and independent — as was the case of Egypt in relation to the Suez Canal — but that it will be too unstable and vulnerable to withstand the ideological currents flowing within Latin America and over from

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Africa. The notion that Panama can be "managed" indefinitely is an illusion.

Our insistence on preserving the one-to-one negotiating relationship with Panama automatically introduces the whole history of U.S.-Latin American political relations as a backdrop. We tacitly acknowledge this in the way that we subordinate vital long-term strategic and economic interests (response capabilities in conventional and guerrilla warfare, the U.S. trade balance, and the economic well-being of Pacific and Asian client-states) to such short-term political advantages as may accrue from catering to Latin American political sensitivities.

The current scenario envisions a new treaty that will phase out the attributes of U.S. sovereignty over a twenty-five to fifty-year period. After ratification, Panamanian participation in the operation of the canal is supposed to gradually increase until turnover is complete. Defense of the canal is no longer to be predicated on absolute U.S. control over bases and installations but rather on a series of bilateral lease and status-of-forces agreements, similar to those we have concluded with Spain and Iceland. Privately, the U.S. negotiators intend the agreements to spell out every conceivable safeguard for the protection of U.S. military personnel, civilians and property in the Canal Zone during the transition period. What is glossed over, however, is that the retrocession of sovereignty to Panama will not only transfer a vast residue of rights forgotten, or not considered worthy of mention, but will also convey the inherent right to modify, cancel or otherwise annul the very safeguards provided for.

Moreover, by acquiring sovereignty Panama will also acquire the right to control transit through the canal, unfettered by any legal obligation to the world community. Even if a future treaty were to contain ostensibly ironclad provisions for assuring unimpeded transit for U.S. vessels, there is no way to prevent these from being abrogated at the first "provocation," either by calling the Panamanian pilots off the job or by raising tolls in a discriminatory way. The United States, at least, has an obligation under the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty to keep any isthmian canal "free and open to the vessels of commerce and of war of all nations," on terms of entire equality and without discrimination as to "conditions and charges of traffic." The Republic of Panama has no such legal obligation and is hardly likely to assume one. There is no assurance that in some future altercation, perhaps unrelated to the canal itself, Panama will not suspend the transit rights of foreign vessels whose governments

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

are temporarily out of favor with Panama or one of its ideological allies. Nor is there any assurance that Panama will not use its new-found power to impose discriminatory tolls and restrictions for political purposes. In fact, on one occasion, General Torrijos has already offered toll-free transit to three Latin American states in return for their support in the UN.

The current bilateral approach not only imperils U.S. interests but seems perfectly calculated to embroil the United States — and only the United States — in confrontations with Latin America. Given the current tide of Third World resentment, it is naive to suppose that Panamanian nibblings and encroachments will not begin the day that a new treaty is ratified. Yet U.S. interests in the canal are vital, and the subject is so politically sensitive with the electorate, that no U.S. administration could risk not taking immediate action on harassment of U.S. personnel or interruption of traffic. It therefore seems likely that the first abrogation of American rights under the status-of-forces agreement, the first denial of transit to a U.S. vessel, or the first imposition of discriminatory taxes or other burdens on the U.S. community would precipitate a crisis. If a guerrilla threat or extensive sabotage were then to develop, the response could certainly not be confined to Panama. And since escalating hostilities would surely provoke a hostile Latin American reaction, the most likely eventuality would be unilateral closure of the canal by Panama. At this juncture, the United States — and only the United States — would be forced into a Suez-type recapture that, even if successful, would be achieved at the cost of whatever might remain of the inter-American system.

The Possibility for Something Better

From the standpoint of both United States interests and those of the world community, some formula for internationalization of the canal might offer a more stable and less combustible political solution than would relinquishment of control to Panama alone. International status would vastly magnify the political and economic consequences to Panama of arbitrary closure of the canal or even discriminatory operation. The political and military responsibility for keeping the canal open and operational would be broadened — from the United States alone to a coalition of users and other beneficiaries who would have an equal stake in its security. The canal would be defused as a powder keg of resentment and friction and converted to a neutral facility in the service of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

global community. An international umbrella would be provided for reoccupation of the area by the United States should this ever be necessary. The canal would be recognized for what it is — a key element of the global system of trade and transportation.

There is really no basis for believing that an international authority, backed by the leading maritime and trading powers, would be a more risky repository of sovereign rights than would a volatile Central American republic. If the sole object of a new treaty is to reduce tension and keep the canal open, why make this dependent on the tenuous relationship between the United States and Latin America?

The Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of 1900, virtually forgotten today, could provide the foundation for a fresh start in the canal negotiations. An offer by the United States to abrogate the 1903 treaty with Panama and renegotiate the status of the canal on the basis of a multilateral extension of the Hay-Pauncefote commitment — with the United States the custodian of the canal and guarantor of nondiscriminatory transit for the world community under a new, international authority — would be a striking initiative in the interest of peace. It would bring the principal European and Asian users into the picture and invest the canal with an apolitical, supranational character that would remove it from the arena of nationalistic rivalries. In such a regime, technical administration of the canal system could be opened up to the personnel of the participating nations; Panama could be given a guaranteed quota in certain employment categories. If combined with subsidization of the canal's modernization and enlargement by the Inter-American Development Bank, an open sore of resentment and rivalry could be converted into a dynamic experiment in international collaboration.

The world community deserves something better than polarized negotiations with the prospect of arbitrary closure and armed confrontations at the end of the road. The Carter administration is in a position to make a fresh start along lines less hazardous to the United States and more constructive for the world community.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PACIFIC BASIN ENERGY DEVELOPMENT AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY*

by Robert F. Ichord, Jr.

More than a year has passed since President Ford proclaimed a "New Pacific Doctrine." Ford's Honolulu speech of December 7, 1975 stressed basic elements of continuity in U.S. Pacific policy — partnership with Japan, desire to normalize relations with China, interest in the stability and security of Southeast Asia, the United States' military commitment to South Korea, and economic cooperation. Yet as an untested Jimmy Carter takes over the reins of U.S. foreign policy, it has become abundantly clear that a new balance of power among the United States, the Soviet Union, China and Japan is emerging in the Pacific in the wake of revolutionary events in the Middle East, Indochina and China itself, the last brought on by the death of Mao Tse-tung.

Energy is a key variable in this changing situation. Throughout the Pacific Basin, governments and multinational corporations are engaged in major efforts to develop oil and energy resources and diversify petroleum supplies. The large oil-importing countries, Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan and South Korea, have launched nuclear power programs, while the oil-exporters, Indonesia, Malaysia and China, are attempting to increase productive capacity and expand oil exports. To earn vital foreign exchange for reconstruction, Vietnam is developing its large coal deposits with a view toward exporting to Japan and other markets and appears interested in cooperative arrangements with foreign companies in offshore oil exploration. Major petroleum development activity is under way in Alaska, and the completion of the Alaskan pipeline in 1977 is expected to result in a large surplus of oil on the U.S. West Coast, which could be exported to Japan. Across the North Pacific, the

* The views expressed herein should not necessarily be interpreted to be those of the U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration.

Robert F. Ichord, Jr., a Foreign Affairs Officer with the U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration, was formerly a consultant to the Hudson Institute and a grantee of the East-West Center's Technology and Development Institute. He is the author of *Energy Policies of the World: Indonesia* (University of Delaware, Center for the Study of Marine Policy, 1976).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Soviet Union is attempting to unlock its huge petroleum and coal reserves in Siberia through joint agreements with Japanese and American firms. And despite nationalistic policies of the past several years, Australia and Canada, with their sizable uranium and coal deposits, as well as oil and gas potential, are destined to put their stamp on the Pacific Basin's growing energy interdependence.

What are the implications of these burgeoning energy developments for U.S. Pacific policy? This article examines various possibilities facing the new administration with general reference to the policy premises articulated in Mr. Ford's Honolulu speech.

Japan, the Sino-Soviet Conflict and East-West Relations

By dint of its industrial strength and advanced technology, Japan plays a pivotal role in the triangular power relationship among the Soviet Union, China and the United States. American foreign policy in Asia and the Pacific has been predicated on a strong U.S.-Japanese security relationship[1] and the industrial growth and integration of Japan into the economy of the West. In his New Pacific Doctrine speech, President Ford referred to Japan as "a pillar of our strategy," and in 1976 both the Republican and Democratic presidential platforms reaffirmed Japan's paramount position in the United States' Asian interests and policy.

U.S. military, economic and diplomatic actions in large measure have been aimed at limiting Soviet and Chinese influence in Japan, preventing a resurgence of Japanese militarism, securing Japanese access to Asian raw materials and markets, and protecting vital military and economic supply lines. American multinational oil companies, which provide the bulk of Japanese oil imports from the Middle East and Indonesia, have occupied a central position in this structure of power.

Yet over the past several years important changes have taken place in the relationship, flowing from the dramatic developments in Middle East oil, the communist takeover in Indochina, the U.S. military withdrawal from Thailand, the U.S. rapprochement with China and, most recently, revelations of the Lockheed payoff scandal.

The Arab oil embargo and OPEC price hikes have stimulated increased Japanese efforts to diversify sources of petroleum

[1] Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson provided this rationale for a strong military commitment to Japan in his testimony before the Symington Subcommittee on U.S. Security Agreements Abroad in 1970: "A likely alternative to a strong U.S.-Japan security relationship might well be the development of a unilateral Japanese strategic (i.e., nuclear) military force." Cited in Roland Paul, *American Military Commitments Abroad* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1973), p. 47.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

imports and to develop domestic nuclear and nonnuclear energy alternatives. OPEC nationalization of U.S. oil-producing affiliates, although not leading to direct bilateral deals on the scale originally envisioned, has reduced the leverage of U.S. companies over Japan's oil supply.[2]

The communist victories in Cambodia, South Vietnam and Laos, and the U.S. military withdrawal from Thailand, have created uncertainties in Japan about the credibility of U.S. military commitments to Southeast Asian countries in which Japan has large economic interests and where intense anti-Japanese sentiment exists (e.g., Thailand and Indonesia). More emotionally, Washington's failure to consult with Japanese leaders on the initiative toward Peking and the U.S. handling of the Lockheed case have undercut the position of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party.

These events have generally pushed the Japanese in the direction of greater foreign policy independence and expanded relations with China and the Soviet Union. Relations with Peking and Moscow are at present amorphous, due to the death of Mao and the struggle for political succession in China. Whether to develop Chinese natural resources, especially oil, for export to Japan and the West in exchange for Western technology has been a key question in this political confrontation.

There is little doubt that both China and the USSR have large petroleum and coal reserves that could help to reduce Japanese dependence on OPEC governments and U.S. oil companies.[3] Chinese crude oil production has been increasing rapidly over the past three years, from an estimated 53 million tons in 1973 to approximately 78 million tons in 1975.[4] China surpassed Indonesia in 1975 as the leading oil producer in Asia, with exports of low-sulphur crude oil to Japan reaching an estimated 8.1 million tons. Although the 1976 exports to Japan may drop to less than 7 million tons, the 1980 export-volume could conceivably be as much as 25 million tons if "moderate" political forces consolidate and retain control over Chinese economic policy. Even so, this amount would probably

[2] The share of the American majors in Japanese crude imports is estimated to have dropped from 49.5 per cent in 1974 to 46.3 per cent in 1975. See *The Petroleum Economist*, August 1976, p. 294.

[3] According to the *Survey of Energy Resources*, a report of the 1975 World Energy Conference, the USSR has 23.2 per cent of the world's proved recoverable reserves of coal, 8.8 per cent of its crude oil reserves, and 31.5 per cent of its natural gas, while China holds 15.5 per cent of world coal reserves, 1.9 per cent of crude oil reserves, and 1.3 per cent of natural gas reserves.

[4] *The Petroleum Economist*, January 1976, p. 7.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

represent less than 10 per cent of Japan's total oil imports, which during 1975 came to 4.58 million barrels per day.[5]

For close to a decade the Soviet Union has attempted to gain Japanese participation in schemes to develop Siberian oil and gas. From 1966 to 1970 the Soviets proposed three major joint energy projects: (1) the development of the Tuymen oil fields in the East Ural region and the construction of a 2,500-mile pipeline from Tuymen to the port of Nakhodka; (2) the development of natural gas fields in the northern part of Sakhalin Island; and (3) the development of the large Yakutsk natural gas fields and the construction of a pipeline from Yakutsk to an LNG (liquified natural gas) plant at Magaden on the northern coast of the Sea of Okhotsk.[6] It was not until 1971, however, after the threatened OPEC oil embargo and the Tehran Agreement, that the Japanese took a serious interest in these projects.

Negotiations on the Tuymen project began in 1971 with the Soviets indicating that they could supply Japan with about 800,000 barrels of crude oil per day starting in 1976. A preliminary Soviet-Japanese agreement was signed in February 1972. But the situation changed dramatically in 1972 following President Nixon's visits to Peking and Moscow. American companies backed by the State Department now wanted to participate in the project and take a share of the oil piped from western Siberia. Thus, what began as a strictly bilateral Soviet-Japanese project became embroiled in Soviet-American detente diplomacy.

Trilateral discussions proceeded, however, on the Yakutsk gas project. The U.S. State Department strongly backed the $4-$5 billion venture, which involved the American firms El Paso Natural Gas and Occidental Petroleum and proposed to develop Yakutsk gas for export as LNG to the United States and Japan (50/50) beginning in 1982. In June 1974, Assistant Secretary of State Ingersoll submitted the following statement to Congress: "We should pay due attention to the strong Japanese desire for U.S. participation in the Yakutsk natural gas project and to the beneficial effects on U.S.-Japanese relations of close cooperation in third country raw material development projects, particularly those involving energy."[7] A preliminary

[5] MITI's (the Ministry of International Trade and Industry's) current expectation is that crude oil imports will increase to 6.8 million barrels per day in 1980. *Ibid.*, August 1976, p. 294.

[6] See David I. Hitchcock, Jr., "Joint Development of Siberia: Decision-Making in Japanese-Soviet Relations," *Asian Survey*, March 1971, p. 285.

[7] Senate Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, *Hearings on Investments by Multinational Companies in the Communist Bloc Countries*, June 19, 1974, p. 114.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

accord was reached in Paris by representatives of the United States, Japan and the Soviet Union in November 1974.

But despite State Department support for the project, the Yakutsk venture was killed by U.S. congressional actions linking trade concessions with the emigration of Soviet Jews (the Jackson Amendment) and setting limits on Export-Import Bank lending to the Soviet Union. In December 1974, Congress voted into the Export-Import Bank authorization bill a ceiling of U.S. $300 million for any new credit to the Soviet Union and established a subceiling of U.S. $40 million in loans and guarantees that could be used for energy development in the USSR. The preliminary agreement for the Yakutsk project had called for U.S. Export-Import Bank credits of $100 million.

Faced with this setback, the Japanese on January 28, 1975 agreed to participate in oil and gas exploration with the Soviet Union on the continental shelf around Sakhalin Island. The initial commitment was $100 million in credits from the Japanese Export-Import Bank. Japan would in return be entitled to 50 per cent of any oil and gas produced. Gulf Oil Corporation, a U.S. major that was also involved in the Tuymen discussions, is providing technical assistance to the project. The Japanese decision to participate in the Sakhalin exploration followed commitments of $450 million in credits for the development of coal in the Yakutsk area and $500 million for forestry development in eastern Siberia.

The shelving of the Yakutsk project along with Moscow's continued refusal to return the four northern islands to Tokyo seems to have strengthened the Chinese position vis-a-vis Japan. Indeed, Japan has made a firm commitment, despite Soviet opposition, to push ahead to sign a treaty of friendship with China. Peking has sought to augment its position by undercutting the price of comparable-quality Indonesian crude oil delivered to Japan and by avoiding conflict with Tokyo over the issue of offshore rights and boundaries. On the latter point, Selig Harrison believes that "China is soft-pedaling its claims to the disputed Senkaku Islands and hopes to induce Japan to pigeon-hole its own claims by stepping up oil exports."[8]

The position of the new Carter administration on joint Siberian oil and gas projects will therefore be of key importance to both U.S.-Japanese relations and the U.S. goal of normalizing relations with China. Unless the Sakhalin exploration uncovers a bonanza, it seems unlikely that the Soviet Union can match the expected growth in Chinese oil exports to Japan. Although Japanese

[8] Selig Harrison, "Time Bomb in East Asia," *Foreign Policy*, Fall 1975, p. 25.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE I

JAPANESE ENERGY SUPPLY, REAL AND PROJECTED

(% by resource)

Resource	*FY 1973 (Actual)*	*FY 1983 (Forecast)*
Indigenous		
Hydro	4.6	3.7
Geothermal	...	0.5
Oil and gas	0.9	1.9
Coal	3.8	1.9
Other*	0.2	...
	9.5	8.0
Imported		
Nuclear†	0.6	9.6
LNG	0.8	7.9
Coal	11.7	11.2
Oil	77.4	63.3
	90.5	92.0

* Charcoal, firewood, lignite, etc.
† Dependent on imported enriched uranium fuels.
Source: The Petroleum Economist, September 1975, p. 335.

commitments for Siberian coal development are substantial, Japan may find it increasingly difficult to maintain its "equidistance" policy in the future.

Future Japanese energy imports from China and the Soviet Union will also be influenced by developments on the demand as well as the supply side of the equation. Although some Japanese forecasts see a 5 per cent annual increase in energy demand through 1985, it is by no means clear that economic growth of this magnitude can be realized in the next few years, given Japan's slow rate of economic recovery from the recession of 1974-1975.

With indigenous hydroelectric, coal, geothermal and petroleum potential limited, the Japanese government is concentrating its domestic energy development efforts on nuclear power. But even here the nation is totally dependent on imports of enriched uranium from the United States and France. Japan's Advisory Committee for Energy, a consultative body to the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, forecasts a large-scale increase in nuclear power to 49 million kW in FY 1983 (9.6 per cent of total energy supply) from an actual 2.3 million kW in FY 1973 (0.6 per cent of total supply). (See Table I.)

Strong political and environmental opposition exists, though, as in the United States, to the construction of nuclear power plants. Japan's eight nuclear reactors in 1975 were operating

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

at an uneconomical 50 per cent of capacity, and radioactive leakages from plants north of Kyoto and Tokyo were causing widespread alarm. Environmental groups have filed court suits to block new plants.[9]

The United States has a major political and commercial interest in the outcome of this domestic political battle. A decision to downplay nuclear power would not only have a substantial impact on U.S. exports of nuclear reactors and enriched uranium but would probably increase pressures on Japan to import petroleum and coal from China and the Soviet Union.

The United States, of course, has the option of attempting to offset these pressures by supplying Alaskan oil or natural gas to the Japanese. Although Japan presently receives small quantities of LNG from Alaska, the export of Alaskan crude oil would require congressional amendment of the Alaskan Pipeline Bill. U.S. government officials have indicated publicly that if an arrangement for the export of Alaskan oil to Japan is worked out, it would probably take the form of an exchange whereby Middle East oil originally destined to the Japanese market would be shipped to the U.S. East Coast.

In sum, the new administration will have to wrestle with how to manage the 400,000-600,000-barrel-per-day surplus of Alaskan oil expected on the U.S. West Coast over the next several years.[10] The decision on whether or not to export Alaskan oil to Japan is likely to have far-reaching implications for the future of the U.S.-Japan partnership.

Indonesia, ASEAN-OPEC Links, and North-South Relations

East-West energy issues interact in major ways with the North-South confrontation. In the Pacific Basin context, for example, increasing Chinese and/or Soviet energy exports to Japan may serve to mitigate Japanese economic expansion in Southeast Asia while at the same time reducing Japanese dependence on the Middle East and U.S. oil corporations. From a different theoretical perspective, denial of Chinese and Soviet energy to Japan could intensify U.S.-Japanese competition for oil and gas in Southeast Asia and strengthen the bargaining power of ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations).

Indonesia is the focal point for considering North-South relations in the Pacific Basin. The eighth leading oil exporter in the

[9] Henri Hymans, "Turning Off Nuclear Power," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, April 11, 1975, pp. 33-34.

[10] *Wall Street Journal*, October 25, 1976, p. 1.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

world, Indonesia is a member of ASEAN, OPEC and CIEC (Conference on International Economic Cooperation). It is also strategically located astride the principal sea lanes from the Middle East and the Indian Ocean to Japan and the Pacific.

Since the Suharto military takeover in 1965, the Indonesian government has sought, on progressively more stringent terms, the participation of Western oil companies in developing the country's oil and gas resources. To date, over forty oil companies, mainly American, have signed "production-sharing" contracts with the government and have invested over $3 billion in oil exploration and development.[11]

Caltex, an Eastern Hemisphere joint venture between Standard Oil of California and Texaco, is the leading producer, accounting for 63.6 per cent of total production in 1975. (See Table II.) Since 1973, its share of production has fallen due to sagging demand in Japan and increasing production from new offshore fields, but despite lower output in 1975, Caltex Indonesia made a profit of $782.2 million. The strategic importance of these earnings to the parent companies is indicated by the fact that Caltex's total profit of $851.2 million amounted to 59.5 per cent of Texaco's and 63.9 per cent of Socal's total profits in 1975.[12]

Indonesian government policy has sought to maximize crude oil exports. During 1973-1975 they constituted approximately 76 per cent of total crude oil production. Jakarta's goal, as reflected in the Second Five-Year Plan (1974/75-1979/80), is to increase this percentage further through the development of alternative domestic energy resources (coal, hydro, geothermal) and through increased imports from the Middle East for domestic consumption.[13]

The bulk of the nation's crude oil production is exported in unprocessed form to Japan and the United States. In 1975, Japan received 49 per cent of Indonesia's crude oil exports (11 per cent of total Japanese crude oil imports) and the United States took 36 per cent (9 per cent of total U.S. crude oil imports). As shown in Table

[11] Oil and gas exploration and development expenditures by foreign companies amounted to $286 million in 1972, $393 million in 1973, $807 million in 1974, $1,047 million in 1975, and an estimated $1,000 million in 1976 (not including outlays for field development of the Huffco and Mobil LNG projects). American Embassy (Jakarta), *Industry Outlook Report: Indonesia's Petroleum Sector*, June 21, 1976, p. 17.

[12] Leon Howell, "Why It Hurts as Much as Helps," *The Asia Mail*, October 1976, p. 19.

[13] See Robert F. Ichord, Jr., *Energy Policies of the World: Indonesia* (University of Delaware, Center for the Study of Marine Policy, 1976) for a discussion of Indonesian efforts to develop coal, geothermal and hydro resources. A new 100,000-barrel-per-day refinery, recently opened at Cilacap in south-central Java, processes crude oil from the Middle East.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE II

INDONESIAN CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION, 1973-1975, BY COMPANY

(thousand barrels daily)

Company	*1973*	*%*	*1974*	*%*	*1975*	*%*
Caltex	965.9	72.2	909.2	65.3	830.9	63.6
Pertamina/Lemigas	101.5	7.5	128.8	9.2	90.1	6.8
Union/Japex	72.8	5.4	101.4	7.3	107.0	8.2
Atlantic Richfield	64.0	4.8	90.5	6.5	78.3	6.0
Natomas Group	37.4	2.8	54.2	3.9	41.8	3.2
Exxon/Mobil	64.4	4.8	46.5	3.3	38.9	3.0
Petromer Trend	9.4	0.7	30.5	2.2	63.1	4.8
Asamera	17.7	1.3	18.8	1.3	16.7	1.2
Tesoro	4.0	0.3	7.2	0.5	8.5	0.6
CFP	...	...	2.4	0.2	18.9	1.4
Associated Australian	1.3	0.1	1.5	0.1	1.2	0.1
Huffington	...	...	1.6	0.1	10.6	0.8
TOTAL	1338.4		1392.6		1306.0*	

* Includes new annual production of 26,700 barrels by Phillips and 111,946 barrels by Cities Service.

Sources: American Embassy (Jakarta), *Indonesia: Petroleum Industry Developments and Outlook,* (1973/74), p. 21; *Petroleum Intelligence Weekly,* February 17, 1975, p. 8; American Embassy (Jakarta), *Industry Outlook Report: Indonesia's Petroleum Sector,* June 21, 1976, p. 22.

III, the record for 1974 and 1975 was marked both by a fall in the volume and share of exports to Japan and an increase in exports to the United States.

During 1976 exports to the United States continued to

TABLE III

INDONESIAN CRUDE OIL EXPORTS

(thousand barrels)

Country	*1972* (*% of total*)	*1973* (*% of total*)	*1974* (*% of total*)	*1975* (*% of total*)
Japan	207,813 (69)	263,972 (71)	234,827 (62)	178,247 (49)
United States	58,691 (20)	79,671 (22)	100,275 (27)	129,146 (36)
Trinidad	18,961 (6)	18,626 (5)	35,550 (9)	37,739 (10)
Other	13,626 (5)	7,274 (2)	8,253 (2)	17,937 (5)
TOTAL	299,091 (100)	369,543 (100)	378,905 (100)	363,069 (100)

Source: American Embassy (Jakarta), *Industry Outlook Report: Indonesia's Petroleum Sector,* June 21, 1976, p. 24.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

grow and in April 1976 reached an average 511,000 barrels per day. This level made Indonesia the third leading supplier of imported crude to the United States, after Saudi Arabia and Nigeria. Although Indonesian oil production was well below capacity in the two preceding years, the rapid growth in exports to the United States suggests the potential for significant competition between Japanese and American markets in the future.

A key question in this regard is the extent to which Alaskan oil, which will begin flowing in late 1977, will displace Indonesian crude imports in U.S. West Coast markets. Alaskan oil, unlike Indonesian oil, is generally high-sulphur and cannot be directly burned in electric utilities. Indonesia's premium, low-sulphur crude, with its high gasoline yield, is ideally suited to the pollution-conscious, automobile-dominated markets of California and the West Coast. Thus, these technical and environmental factors will militate against any reduction in the level of Indonesian imports.

Competition between U.S. and Japanese companies has also been evident with respect to the financing and export price of Indonesian natural gas. Two large LNG plants, costing close to $3 billion, are presently under construction in North Sumatra and East Kalimantan. These plants will process gas from fields being developed by Mobil Oil and Huffco, and Japan has already extended over a billion dollars in credits to Indonesia for the projects. A large portion of the Japanese loans is going toward the purchase of LNG technology in the United States. As in the case of the proposed Yakutsk LNG project, LNG exports will be directed (at least from the North Sumatra plant) to both Japanese and American markets.

Indonesia's success at rapid development of its petroleum resources and at generating large foreign exchange reserves through exporting its oil production makes it a striking model for other Southeast Asian and Third World countries seeking to tap their indigenous petroleum resources. Although the financial crisis of the state oil company Pertamina has severely tarnished Jakarta's record,[14] the impact of the Indonesian experience can clearly be seen in Malaysia, Burma and the Philippines. These countries have adopted Pertamina's system of sharing production with foreign firms and are building integrated national oil companies.

[14] On May 20, 1976, Minister of Mines Sadli announced, Pertamina had amassed a debt that now stood at $6.2 billion, including $2.3 billion in foreign exchange debts, $3.0 in tanker debts, and $900 million in local currency debts. When added to the $7 billion or so in loans Indonesia has contracted for under the IMF-World Bank framework, the Pertamina debt means that the government will be faced with an increasing debt service ratio (as much as 20 per cent) over the next decade. This will severely limit development efforts.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

An important question therefore concerns the prospects for increased regional petroleum cooperation in Southeast Asia. The basic pattern of interaction in the past has been one of fragmentation, as Southeast Asian countries competed for oil company risk-capital and put the economic goal of maximizing revenues ahead of the political goal of regional cooperation. The premium price obtained by Indonesian oil in Japanese and U.S. markets led to a diversion of exports to those markets. With oil production committed to Japan and the United States, Jakarta was forced to refuse requests by Thailand and the Philippines for emergency crude oil supplies during the Arab embargo.

Several factors suggest some change in this pattern. First, the ASEAN countries on October 15, 1975 established ASCOPE, the ASEAN Council on Petroleum. The organization seeks to promote active collaboration and assistance in the development and utilization of petroleum resources; establish joint training, research and service facilities; and exchange information through periodic meetings and increased contact with appropriate international and regional organizations. Second, the development of national oil companies both in the Middle East and in Southeast Asia opens the way to increased bilateral and multilateral deals. Southeast Asian importing countries are seeking to reduce their dependence on the Middle East. In 1975, the Philippines took 1.5 per cent of Indonesia's exports. Both Thailand and the Philippines are adapting their refineries to permit the processing of paraffinic Indonesian (and Chinese) crude oil.

A third factor is the competition between similar-quality Chinese and Indonesian crude oil in Japanese and regional markets. During 1974 and 1975 China undercut Indonesia's delivered price in Japan. Increased competition in the future may lead to price moderation in Indonesia and a decreasing price margin between Indonesian low-sulphur and Middle East high-sulphur crude oil, which will make Indonesian crude more attractive economically to regional consumers.

In addition, when Alaskan oil begins flowing to the U.S. West Coast, it may leave Indonesia with some surplus capacity that could become available to other Southeast Asian countries. Resumption of Indonesian petroleum exports to Australia is also a strong possibility.

Finally, political and economic developments in Vietnam may impact on regional petroleum cooperation. The Vietnamese government is moving rapidly to develop its offshore petroleum

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

potential. Bids are currently being received from two Singapore-based, European oil service companies for the construction of an oil supply base at the tip of Vung Tau Peninsula, and the Vietnamese minister for oil and gas has reportedly discussed a possible exploratory drilling and training program with several Norwegian companies.[15] The Vietnamese experience may stimulate greater government involvement in other Southeast Asian countries and encourage the adoption of more regionally oriented policies.

The United States in the past has given strong backing to ASEAN members. In his Pacific Doctrine speech Ford stated: "We serve our highest national interest by strengthening their self-reliance, their relations with us, their solidarity with each other, and their regional security." Whether the Carter administration will make concrete commitments in support of regional energy cooperation in Southeast Asia remains to be seen. The basic thrust of U.S. efforts will likely continue to be the rapid development of domestic petroleum resources in Southeast Asia for export to Japan and the United States.

Australia and Canada: Economic Nationalism and the Role of Foreign Investment

With their large energy and mineral reserves, Australia and Canada are centers of resource politics in the Pacific Basin. Besides being the second and third leading suppliers of coking coal to Japan, they — along with South Africa — hold approximately two-thirds to three-fourths of the world's proved low-cost uranium reserves and production capacity.[16] These uranium reserves are of vital importance in the nuclear development plans of Japan and the United States.

Over the past several years, both countries have experienced a strong reaction against previous all-out resource exploitation by U.S., European and Japanese corporations. While this "economic nationalism" was most vocal in Australia under the Whitlam Labor government, Canada's phasing out of oil exports to the United States and its export and foreign ownership restrictions on uranium have concerned U.S. and Japanese corporate and government officials. At the January 1976 meeting of the International Energy Agency, a dispute developed between Japan and Canada over future

[15] Ho Kwon Ping, "A Base for the Search in Vietnam," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, October 22, 1976, pp. 41-42.

[16] Mason Willrich and Philip M. Marston, "Prospects for a Uranium Cartel," ORBIS, Spring 1975, p. 169.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

energy supplies. The Japanese, along with West Germany and Denmark, reportedly threatened to withdraw acceptance of the U.S.-initiated proposal for a guaranteed minimum price for oil unless they were assured nondiscriminatory access to Canadian energy supplies.[17]

In both Canada and Australia, the question of energy policy has been a subject of intense conflict between the federal and provincial governments, with provincial leaders generally opposing attempts by the federal government to centralize energy policy and discourage foreign investment by curtailing exports, nationalizing foreign companies and increasing their tax burdens.

In Australia, former Prime Minister Whitlam and his controversial energy minister, Rex Connor, established a policy of seeking total Australian ownership in the four primary energy areas — coal, oil, natural gas and uranium. The Labor government curtailed the development of new uranium, coal and natural gas deposits and placed bans on the export of uranium and natural gas.

Although the new government under Fraser has sought to encourage foreign investment in energy resources and has supported exports to Japan and the United States, the recently enunciated foreign investment policy aims at a minimum of 50 per cent Australian equity in new resource ventures, with 75 per cent required in uranium projects. Australia's socialist-oriented labor unions have reaffirmed the ban on uranium exports from the Mary Kathleen mine in Queensland, and an environmental impact study is being conducted to decide whether the development of major new uranium discoveries in the Northern Territories and Western Australia should proceed.

Only recently, evidence has surfaced pointing to the existence of an international uranium cartel, consisting of the Rio Tinto-Zinc group (U.K.-based) and producers in Canada, Australia, France and South Africa, which has been a major factor in pushing the market price of uranium oxide from $16 a pound in 1972 to between $30 and $40 a pound in 1976. Documents, reportedly from the files of Mary Kathleen Company (an Australian subsidiary of Rio Tinto-Zinc), containing agreements dividing up the world uranium market, were discovered. (See Table IV.) They reveal how the Australian export ban necessitated drawing up a new market allotment plan in 1973.[18]

Disclosure of this cartel comes at a time when the United

[17] *New York Times*, January 31, 1976, p. 37.

[18] James Srodes, "Sharing the Uranium Spoils," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, September 10, 1976, pp. 38-40.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE IV

INTERNATIONAL URANIUM CARTEL AGREEMENTS

(% of market in capitalist countries)

	1972 Agreement		*1973 Agreement*	
	1972-77	*1978-80*	*1972-77*	*1978-80*
Canada	33.50	23.22	37.3	21.86
Uranex (France)	23.75	19.26	4.5	13.65
Nufior (S. Africa)	21.75	19.26	24.2	18.38
Australia	17.00	24.44	7.6	27.81
Rio Tinto-Zinc	4.00	13.82	26.4	18.30

Source: Far Eastern Economic Review, September 10, 1976, p. 39.

States is adopting a policy, as outlined in President Ford's October 28 statement on nuclear policy, that delays the commercialization of nuclear reprocessing technology and proposes a three-year moratorium on exports of reprocessing technology by other countries as well as the United States. These developments clearly point to the need for the development of new sources of uranium supply and the expansion of U.S. enrichment facilities if growing world nuclear fuel demands are to be met.

On its part, the Canadian federal government has moved to attain greater self-sufficiency and reduce imports to eastern Canada by phasing out crude oil exports to the United States and constructing a pipeline from Montreal to Sarnia. This interprovincial pipeline is expected to transport 250,000 barrels per day by January 1977. Exports to the United States, which averaged 1.2 million barrels a day in September 1973, have fallen to below 450,000 barrels a day. Canada expects to eliminate all oil exports to the United States by 1981. The phase-out is already seriously affecting U.S. refineries in the northern tier states. With the establishment of a government-funded oil company, Petro-Canada, a more active role in oil exploration is also assured. Under its enabling legislation, Petro-Canada will receive $1,500 million over its first five years for domestic petroleum exploration.

Energy policy trends in Australia and Canada have seriously undermined foreign investment confidence in future development. In Australia, which unlike Canada is a net importer of petroleum, the number of exploratory oil wells drilled has declined from 101 in 1972 to between 12 and 18 in 1976.[19] Oil production, 90 per cent of which comes from ESSO-BHP Bass Strait fields, constituted

[19] *The Petroleum Economist*, October 1976, pp. 387-388.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

150 million barrels or approximately two-thirds of total crude demand in 1975. With increasing import demand and rising costs, the oil-import bill shot up to over A$916 million in 1975, compared with A$720 million in 1974 and A$251 million in 1973.[20] The impact of this deteriorating energy situation on domestic inflation and unemployment was no doubt a major factor in Whitlam's defeat.

In western Canada, where most of the country's oil production of 1.6 million barrels per day originates, drilling activity has steadily declined in recent years, as drilling rigs have left for work in the United States. Although substantial petroleum reserves are thought to exist in the frontier areas of the Mackenzie Delta and the Arctic Islands, oil reserves in western Canada have continued to fall.

Thus, in both Canada and Australia, whether the central government can develop new oil and gas resources, while at the same time restricting petroleum exports and increasing national control over multinational oil companies, has been a key question. In Australia, Whitlam's downfall seems to have prematurely ended the experiment. In Canada, the gamble continues. An industry publication comments on the risks:

> To persist in the phasing out of exports would extend peak production and postpone the future decline of conventional crude supplies for only three or four years, while raising problems through political opposition from the provinces, the loss of funds now used to keep down costs in the east, the damage to overall trade relations with the U.S. and in particular the risk of losing U.S. company investment in long-term energy projects.[21]

Diffusion of Nuclear Technology and U.S. Military Commitments

Australia's and Canada's nationalistic policies have come to the fore, not entirely by coincidence, at a time when major Pacific Basin governments are rushing to embrace nuclear power — notably Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and the Philippines. The United States maintains close security relations with each of these governments and is their prime supplier of enriched uranium and nuclear reactor technology.

Japan presently has 27 U.S.-type light-water reactors in operation, under construction or firmly planned. By the end of 1976

---

[20] *Ibid.*, April 1975, p. 147.
[21] *Ibid.*, December 1974, p. 446.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

its 12 commercial reactors will have a combined capacity of 6,300 MW. The Japanese have concluded enrichment contracts with the U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration covering the fuel needs of 58 power reactors with a total capacity of 51,645 MW.[22]

Taiwan is constructing four nuclear power plants and has two additional reactors on order. General Electric and Westinghouse are the suppliers. Taiwan's total installed nuclear capacity is expected to be 4,924 MW by 1981.

South Korea, which ratified the Nonproliferation Treaty in April 1975, under pressure from the United States, has one of the most ambitious nuclear development programs in the world. The Seoul government has outlined a $32 billion plan to build 25 nuclear reactors by the year 2000. The goal is to increase nuclear's share in total electric generating capacity to 15 per cent by 1980, 34 per cent by 1984 and 52 per cent by 2000. Under this program, four 600 MW plants are to be constructed by 1978, including the first two now being put up by Westinghouse.[23] The United States has concluded enrichment service contracts covering the fuel needs of these four reactors and totaling about 2845 MW.

The Philippine government is also counting on nuclear energy to reduce oil dependence. In 1973 the National Economic Development Authority submitted a plan to President Marcos, which he approved, specifying reduction of the nation's oil dependence from 93 per cent to a low of 74 per cent by 1985.[24] This will be achieved in part through reducing petroleum demand in the power generation sector, which in 1972 consisted of 74 per cent thermal plants consuming 14.7 per cent of national petroleum supply. Nuclear power capacity is expected to account for 18.5 per cent of total generation capacity by 1985. On June 15, 1974, the Philippines signed a letter of intent with Westinghouse for two atomic reactors of 600 MW each. Recently, however, it appears that escalating reactor costs will allow the government to proceed with only one nuclear plant.

The rush of Asian governments to nuclear power has major geopolitical implications. As Seth Lipsky has commented:

> Such burgeoning plans for nuclear power plant construction could have important strategic implications for Asia — by transferring a significant

[22] U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration, *U.S. Nuclear Export Activities* (ERDA doc. no. 1542), April 1976, pp. 3-103.

[23] *Petroleum Intelligence Weekly*, August 4, 1975, p. 11.

[24] "National Energy Plan and Policies," pt. 1, *NEDA Development Digest*, December 14, 1973, p. 2.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

portion of its dependence for fuel from the oil-exporting nations of the Middle East to those nations having uranium and just as importantly possessing the facilities to enrich the ore so that it can be used in reactors. At the moment, the U.S. is by far the biggest supplier of enriched uranium. All these moves would tie an arc of nations along China's flank even closer to the West.[25]

As India's mid-1974 atomic bomb test dramatically confirmed, there are grave dangers inherent in the international spread of nuclear technology, especially reprocessing technology — not only the danger of national governments diverting fissionable materials into nuclear weapons production but also the risk of terrorist-group thefts of plutonium, which will be traded in increased amounts between nations. For those nations that have depended on large amounts of U.S. military and economic aid, a "nuclear blackmail" policy may be one way of ensuring a continued U.S. commitment.[26]

The Ford administration vigorously sought, with mixed success, to dissuade South Korea, Taiwan and Pakistan from purchasing reprocessing plants and fostered, until recently, the idea of establishing multinational regional fuel-cycle centers as a means of meeting future reprocessing needs of groups of countries while minimizing the possibilities for diversion of materials.

The Ford policy, as reflected in the president's October 28, 1976 statement and in ERDA document no. 1542 (April 1976) on *U.S. Nuclear Export Activities,* supported a major U.S. role as an exporter of light-water reactors to developing countries, as a means of maintaining influence over the world market and meeting its obligation under article 4 of the NPT to assist developing countries in the peaceful application of nuclear technology and thereby enhance nonproliferation efforts. As the ERDA report concludes: "Not only has leadership in the nuclear power marketplace given the U.S. considerable leverage with respect to the nuclear policies of many individual countries, but also it has enabled the U.S. to play a leading role in creating a viable framework of international safeguards and controls for civil nuclear cooperation."

Whether this nuclear export policy will stand up in face of the probable spread of reprocessing technology and enrichment

[25] Seth Lipsky, "Asia Joins the Race for Atom Power," *Far Eastern Economic Review,* November 22, 1974, p. 55.

[26] Since 1946, U.S. economic and military assistance to Taiwan, South Korea and the Philippines has totaled $6.4 billion, $12.1 billion and $2.5 billion, respectively. The proposed level of U.S. foreign military credit sales to South Korea increased from $126 million in FY 1976 to $275 million in FY 1977.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

technology (in the case of Japan and Australia), as well as increasing problems of international terrorism and nuclear waste disposal and transport, remains to be seen. Whatever the eventual outcome of the emerging political battle over nuclear exports, the United States would be wise to launch a greatly expanded program to promote the development and dissemination of technologies for tapping renewable energy sources (wind, solar, wave, ocean thermal, biomass) in developing countries, as an alternative to central-station nuclear and fossil-fuel systems.

A Pacific Basin Energy Quadrangle?

U.S. interest in minimizing conflict with Japan over energy, and in reducing pressures on Japanese leaders to enter into exclusive energy supply arrangements with China or the Soviet Union, supports rapid energy development in Southeast Asia, Australia and Canada. U.S. policy can therefore be expected to back the Indonesian government in its drive to maximize petroleum exports through development of indigenous coal, geothermal and hydroelectric power resources for domestic consumption, and to encourage the new Australian leadership in its efforts to restore Japanese confidence in Australia as a reliable source of coal, uranium and natural gas.

Indonesia and Australia will also increase in direct strategic energy importance to the United States as Washington lifts its ban on imports of uranium and as growing energy demand and environmental concerns lead to expanded imports of low-sulphur Indonesian crude oil and LNG on the West Coast.

In sum, what seems to be emerging is a "Pacific Basin energy quadrangle," encompassing Japan, Indonesia, Australia and the United States. Key uncertainties in this pattern of interdependence in primary energy flows are the export of Alaskan oil to Japan, the export of Indonesian coal to Japan, and the export of Australian LNG to Japan and/or the United States. At the same time China, the Soviet Union and Canada will be major forces influencing this configuration. President Ford's decision on the eve of the election to sell two Cyber-172 computers to China — one for use in oil exploration — indicates support for Chinese energy development efforts and the expansion of China's role in the Pacific Basin energy system.[27]

It is clear that the United States has a vital stake in the

[27] *New York Times*, October 29, 1976, p. 1.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

development of an expanded energy system in Asia and the Pacific, both as a means of reducing dependence on the OPEC countries of the Middle East and of meeting the growing energy and development needs of the many poor countries of the region. Furthering the goal of international energy cooperation in the Pacific Basin represents one of the great challenges facing the new Carter administration.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"EQUIVALENCE" AND SALT II

by Christopher M. Lehman and Peter C. Hughes

The early months of the Carter administration will undoubtedly be taken up with a broad policy review covering all aspects of governmental responsibility. One of the more important of those areas will be defense policy and, more specifically, strategic nuclear weapons policy.

The United States faces an ongoing Soviet strategic force build-up that, unless present trends are reversed, may soon provide the Soviet Union with a clearly measurable strategic superiority. These trends assume particular significance because the SALT II negotiations were stalemated for most of 1976 and because the SALT I interim agreement expires in October 1977. With these problems confronting President Carter, it is crucial that his administration come to grips with the elusive yet nonetheless fundamentally important question of what represents strategic "sufficiency" under contemporary international conditions.

For the past twenty-five years the United States has based its strategic policy on the dual objective of deterrence and stability, and it seems unlikely that this objective will change. The strategies formulated to meet this objective, however, have varied from administration to administration, and force postures have shifted accordingly. In the 1950s the strategy was "massive retaliation"; in the 1960s it was "controlled response," although the terminology of "assured destruction" was much in vogue; and in the 1970s the Nixon and Ford administrations subscribed to a policy of "essential equivalence."

Carter and the Policy of Equivalence

In assessing the United States' strategic deterrence posture the Carter administration will have to contend with an increasingly active Congress, interested in participating in the policy formulation

Christopher M. Lehman is a doctoral candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, and coauthor, with Jacquelyn K. Davis and Nils H. Wessell, of *SALT II and the Search for Strategic Equivalence* (FPRI Monograph no. 19, 1975).

Peter C. Hughes is a doctoral candidate at the Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

process, as reflected, for example, in the congressionally mandated policy of equivalence.

The so-called Jackson Amendment, which was adopted as part of the legislation (Public Law 92-448) approving the SALT I interim agreement, stipulated that the United States should not have levels of intercontinental strategic forces inferior to those of the Soviet Union. This congressional mandate was reaffirmed with the May 5, 1976, passage of Senate Resolution 406. Included in the resolution, entitled "The Importance of Sound Relations with the Soviet Union," was an Allen-Byrd amendment reiterating that equivalence is the only acceptable basis for the U.S.-Soviet strategic force balance and for a permanent SALT agreement. During his campaign President Carter stated that he, too, favored a rough equivalence between the strategic forces of the United States and the Soviet Union. In light of the congressional mandate and Carter's own policy statements, one can expect that equivalence will be a part of the present administration's policy.

The critical question yet to be answered, however, is, How will the Carter administration define equivalence?

The Nixon administration characterized the SALT I agreements as establishing "parity," or a rough equality between the forces of the two sides, even though the Soviets were allowed larger numbers of land- and sea-based missiles. The quantitative advantages granted to the Soviet Union were to have been offset by the qualitative advantages possessed by the United States. Nixon's support of the Jackson Amendment, however, was a recognition that this was a temporary balance and that any future arms control agreements would have to be based on quantitative equality, since technology would tend to equalize.

The concept of equivalence was further refined in the years after SALT I, leading to Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger's 1974 public enunciation of the policy of "essential equivalence." An exact symmetry in strategic forces was not necessary, he maintained; instead, the overall capabilities of U.S. strategic forces should be a match for the overall power of Soviet strategic forces. Furthermore, according to Schlesinger, the Soviet strategic forces should not enjoy a wider range of options than that available to the United States. Although Secretary Schlesinger refrained from delineating a specific level and combination of forces that would represent essential equivalence, he did cite three general criteria: (1) both sides should maintain survivable second-strike reserves; (2) there should be symmetry in the ability of each side to threaten

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the other, including a balance in counterforce options; (3) there should be a perceived equality between the offensive forces of both sides.[1]

But strategic equivalence has quite a different meaning for proponents of the doctrine of "mutual assured destruction" (commonly referred to as MAD). According to the advocates of this doctrine, so long as each side has the ability to destroy a major portion of the other's population and industry in a second-strike, then both sides have an equal, offsetting nuclear capability. Therefore, proponents of MAD argue that the relative size and capabilities of strategic forces are meaningless, and that nuclear superiority is devoid of operational meaning.

The Carter administration will likely be contemplating these alternative strategic doctrines in the months to come, and the decision on this matter will critically affect the strategic posture of the United States for years to come. Decisions on strategic force modernization — the B-1 and the M-X missile (now in the R&D stage) immediately come to mind — will be vitally affected, as will the conduct of the SALT II negotiations.

Equivalence and SALT

It is likely that there will be little movement at SALT in the first several months while the policy review is still going on; however, once the review is over, the outcome at SALT will likely depend heavily on which definition of equivalence is adopted.

If the MAD doctrine prevails, then an early SALT agreement will be possible. The terms of a SALT II agreement were supposedly 90 per cent complete by the summer of 1976, with only the issue of the cruise missile and the Soviet Backfire bomber reportedly standing in the way of a final agreement based on the Vladivostok guidelines. With mutual assured destruction as the criterion for judging the adequacy of a SALT II agreement, and with the added benefit of an equal aggregate ceiling on the strategic launchers of both sides, it would not be difficult for the Carter administration to exclude Backfire and include the cruise missile in that agreement. The SALT II agreement could then be hailed as a "cap on the arms race," having been based on the Vladivostok guidelines similarly described by President Ford. The administration could claim that the agreement was also based on the principle of equivalence (because of the

[1] U.S. Department of Defense, *Report of the Secretary of Defense, James R. Schlesinger, to the Congress on the FY 1975 Defense Budget and the 1975-1979 Defense Program* (Washington: GPO, 1974), p. 44.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

equal aggregate ceiling), and that our ability to massively attack the Soviet Union, even after a Soviet preemptive attack, would guarantee deterrence.

If, however, the policy of essential equivalence (as expressed by former Secretary of Defense Schlesinger) is adopted, then the chances of an early SALT II agreement are more remote. In applying the broader concept of equivalence to the current SALT negotiations, there are a number of important asymmetries (either existing or developing) that are not addressed in the Vladivostok guidelines. The issues of missile throw-weight, cruise missiles, Backfire, and civil defense are all matters that may directly affect the overall strategic balance — and they are all crucial to an overall essential equivalence in U.S. and Soviet strategic capabilities.

Missile Throw-Weight

Under the terms of the Vladivostok accord, missile throw-weight is not specifically restricted. Moreover, because of the substantial disparity in size between the current generation of Soviet and U.S. ICBMs, the USSR will be permitted to deploy land-based-missile throw-weight several times greater than that of the United States. It has been estimated that the Soviets could deploy as much as 12 million pounds of such throw-weight under the terms agreed to at Vladivostok.

If this throw-weight is coupled with MIRV technology and deployed in the numbers permitted, the Soviets would gain a major hard-target capability; that is, they could destroy a major portion of our land-based ICBMs in a surprise first-strike and still retain substantial missile forces for postattack deterrence. At the same time, because of the inferior throw-weight of the U.S. land-based ICBM force, and because much of the U.S. MIRV capability is currently in the less accurate SLBM force, the United States would not have a similar capability vis-a-vis Soviet land-based missiles. In this context, then, throw-weight becomes an important index for measuring strategic capabilities.

A primary U.S. goal at SALT had been to prevent the Soviets from gaining such a first-strike capability. In fact, in a unilateral statement issued by the U.S. delegation and submitted to the Senate with the ABM treaty, it was asserted that an objective of the follow-on negotiations would be "to constrain and reduce on a long-term basis threats to the survivability of our respective strategic

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

retaliatory forces."[2] Yet, despite this unilateral statement, the terms of the Vladivostok accord would permit the Soviet Union precisely that capability which the United States has sought to avoid for so many years.

Needless to say, a Soviet preemptive strike capability not only runs contrary to a U.S. policy of essential equivalence but, more importantly, threatens strategic stability. If the Soviet Union is allowed to maintain unilaterally its throw-weight advantage at the levels envisioned, it will be capable of launching a saturation attack against U.S. targets that would destroy a high percentage of this nation's military forces; the number of missiles still available to the Soviets would enable them to credibly threaten U.S. cities with certain destruction. In retaliation, the best the United States could do would be to launch its primarily soft-target second-strike force, which would entail assured destruction of its own cities and population in return.

The significance of this scenario is not its likelihood, which may be quite low, but rather the potential existence of this Soviet capability and the consequences — whether political or military — that could result from such a Soviet advantage. The SALT I agreement and the Vladivostok guidelines, then, should they become embodied in a formal SALT II treaty, will in and of themselves have little or no constraining effect on the Soviet drive for military preeminence. Indeed, former U.S. SALT negotiator Paul Nitze has warned that

> there is every prospect that under the terms of the SALT agreements the Soviet Union will continue to pursue a nuclear superiority that is not merely quantitative but designed to produce a theoretical war-winning capability. Further, there is a major risk that, if such a condition were achieved, the Soviet Union would adjust its policies and actions in ways that would undermine the present deterrent situation, with results that could only resurrect the danger of nuclear confrontation or, alternatively, increase the prospect of Soviet expansion through other means of pressure.[3]

"Grey Area" Systems

When President Ford and Secretary Brezhnev reached agreement on the broad guidelines for a SALT II treaty at Vladivostok in November 1974, the principal weapons systems considered

---

[2] U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *The Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and History of Negotiations*, February 1975, p. 146.

[3] Paul H. Nitze, "Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of Détente," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1976, p. 207.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

were ICBMs, SLBMs and long-range bombers. Since then, however, cruise missiles, the Soviet Backfire bomber and, more recently, the Soviet SS-20 intermediate-range missile have come to the fore as weapons systems that could upset the strategic balance. They are called "grey area" systems since they can have either a tactical or a strategic mission.

The Cruise Missiles

Although the cruise missile was not an issue at Vladivostok, it has now become a major issue in the SALT negotiations. After Vladivostok, the United States and the Soviet Union reportedly discussed a range limitation of 600 kilometers for sea-launched cruise missiles. Such a limitation would place the United States at a distinct disadvantage vis-a-vis the USSR. The high concentration of U.S. population and industry along the East and West coasts, and all targets in NATO Europe, would be vulnerable to Soviet cruise missiles with a 600-kilometer range. U.S. sea-launched cruise missiles, however, would require a far greater range in order to inflict any significant damage on Soviet or Warsaw Pact industry and population centers. Such a range limitation would also seriously erode the importance of the SLCM as a theater weapon.

If press reports have been accurate, the United States government also considered inclusion of the air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) under the 1,320-MIRV-launcher limitation. If accepted, this proposal would convert every ALCM platform (B-52, FB-111, B-1) into a MIRV vehicle, which in turn would limit the number of U.S. SLBMs and ICBMs that could be MIRVed. In short, the acceptance of such a proposal would be to eliminate the ALCM because it would no longer be cost-effective to continue the program.

Cruise missiles also present an arms control problem because of verification difficulties. As an illustration of this point, the Soviets, with relatively simple and undetectable propulsion and operational changes, could more than double the range of the Shaddock without making any external configuration changes. It would, therefore, be in the United States' interest to set a higher range-limitation for the submarine-launched cruise missile and thus offset any Soviet incentive for violating an agreement. A limitation on numbers of sea-launched cruise missiles would be especially difficult for either side to monitor, since it would be rather simple to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

conceal large numbers of them.

In any event, if cruise missiles are to be included in a SALT II agreement, it must be made certain that the provisions restrain each side equally and that such provisions are verifiable by national technical means.

Backfire

Another unresolved SALT problem is the Soviet Union's Backfire, a variable-geometry bomber now in the deployment stage. Since the Soviets claim that the Backfire is a medium-size bomber with intermediate range, they have insisted that it not be counted toward the 2,400-vehicle ceiling set at Vladivostok. The United States, in the interest of equivalence, should insist that Backfire be included in the aggregate total of "strategic" vehicles.

This bomber, without any modification whatsoever, is capable of reaching and striking the United States. On one-way missions, possibly landing in a nonaligned Western Hemisphere country, Backfire could cover the entire United States. Flying from the Arctic region, where these planes could be expected to be launched, the Backfire, unrefueled, could strike across the U.S. Northwest, where a good portion of our ICBMs are based, and return to base. An agreement that prohibits the basing of Backfire in the Arctic region, however, would be more symbolic than substantive. Because of their mobility, Backfire bombers could quickly be sent to the Arctic. Thus, even if one accepts the Soviets' interpretation of the weapon's capabilities, the Backfire would still impact significantly on the U.S.-Soviet strategic balance.

Doubts about the validity of the Soviet claim that Backfire is not intended for intercontinental purposes are also raised, since all of the B-class Backfires seen to date have refueling capabilities and, as such, clearly have intercontinental capability. Although it might be postulated that the USSR would require an extensive tanker fleet to make the Backfire truly intercontinental, this argument has limited validity. Large cargo carriers can be readily converted to tankers, either by installing "pots" under the wing or by providing inside "liners." Such a conversion could be accomplished within a matter of hours, and a large number of the Bison bombers could also be quickly converted to tankers for the Backfire. There is, moreover, disturbing evidence of Soviet plans to deploy a strategic-tanker version of the IL-76 military-transport jet in large numbers.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The SS-20

Recently, attention has been drawn to yet another new Soviet weapon system that may compound the difficulty of achieving a SALT II agreement based on the principle of essential equivalence. The Soviet Union is now introducing a regional, MIRVed ballistic missile, the SS-20. This missile, which the Soviets are reported to be in the process of deploying against targets in Western Europe, is composed of the first two stages of the SS-16 intercontinental-range missile. But in its present form, the SS-20 could have a range of up to 4,000 miles (more if the number of reentry vehicles is reduced). There are no constraints under SALT as to the numbers that could be deployed.

As Dr. Fred Iklé, director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, has pointed out, the Soviet negotiators want to impose limitations on U.S. intermediate-range systems, such as the medium-range cruise missiles, "at a time when we are witnessing a massive, unwarranted and unexplained" expansion of Soviet medium-range nuclear weapons.[4] Furthermore, Dr. Malcolm Currie, the director of defense research and engineering, has noted that the SS-20 can be converted to an SS-16 configuration with intercontinental range with only "simple modifications," and that deployment of the SS-16 will add to "the already dangerous emerging offensive asymmetry with our own forces."[5]

Soviet Civil Defense

An issue that may complicate the SALT negotiations still further is the Soviet Union's civil defense program. Several analysts have recently pointed to the increasing activity of the USSR in civil defense and have concluded that the Soviet war-survival capability is "crucially altering the strategic balance." It is pointed out that the Soviets are devoting major financial and manpower resources to a comprehensive war-survival program, including the following: (1) population survival measures (e.g., shelter construction, evacuation and dispersion programs, stockpiling of food, fuel and other necessities); (2) a long-range program of industry dispersion as well as the hardening of key Soviet industries; and (3) the hardening of facilities for protecting political leadership, military command and control, and communications centers.[6]

[4] *New York Times*, September 1, 1976.
[5] *Defense/Space Business Daily*, October 29, 1976.
[6] Leon Gouré, *War Survival in Soviet Strategy: USSR Civil Defense* (Miami: University of Miami Center for Advanced International Studies, Monograph in International Affairs, 1976), p. xii.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Soviet civil defense programs, when coupled with the extensive air defenses already deployed and a strategic doctrine that emphasizes survival and a war-winning capability, are dangerously eroding the U.S. deterrence posture. Thus, the Soviet Union may rapidly be moving to a position where it can negate the United States' assured destruction capability. If it succeeds, or even if it is perceived to succeed, the USSR will be able to exploit the situation politically (or, if necessary, perhaps militarily). In the words of Foy D. Kohler, former U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union:

> In crisis situations this [civil defense] factor could decisively influence both sides' risk calculations and consequently their relative ability and willingness to hold a hard line. The Soviet Union could confront the U.S. with its ability to keep Soviet populations and resource losses within acceptable limits . . . as against the certainty of U.S. losses of 50 percent or more of its population and of a very large portion of its industry. This would place the U.S. at a great disadvantage in the management of the crisis and in its negotiations with the Soviet Union. Instead of a "balance of terror" which equally restrains both sides, the "terror" would be mainly on the part of the U.S.[7]

A Basis for Long-Term Stability

The Carter administration must decide on a basic strategic doctrine before it can proceed with the many important defense decisions that will be required in the coming months. Only after doctrine is established can the United States coherently pursue strategic arms limitation negotiations and properly assess the overall adequacy of U.S. strategic forces.

If President Carter and his advisers accept assured destruction as the basic criterion for measuring equivalence, then a SALT agreement predicated on the Vladivostok accord becomes possible. However, there has been recent concern over Soviet civil defense capabilities and how these might affect the U.S. second-strike capability. Through its civil defense program, which was rapidly expanded after the signing of the ABM treaty, the Soviet Union has quite legally circumvented the strategic security thought to have been obtained by the United States when that treaty was signed. Moreover, through these activities the Soviet Union has made it apparent that it does not accept the West's concept of mutual vulnerability, which the United States considers to be the essence of deterrence. The Soviets appear convinced that if a nuclear war occurs there will be a winner and a loser, even if both sides suffer

[7] *Ibid.*, p. xvi.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

enormous and unprecedented devastation. To deter an adversary holding this belief, the United States must have credible war-fighting options that will deny that opponent any possibility of achieving military advantage through a nuclear exchange. Only by eliminating the prospect of military advantage can deterrence be adequately maintained.

Unfortunately, a SALT II treaty based on the Vladivostok accord would not preclude the USSR from gaining a strategic war-winning capability. This capability will undermine strategic stability between the superpowers if offsetting measures are not undertaken. Soviet throw-weight advantage at the levels permitted under the Vladivostok terms will permit the Soviet Union to deploy a major hard-target capability against U.S. land-based ICBMs and still retain a significant portion of its strategic forces for postattack deterrence.

In the interest of strategic stability it would be better if both the United States and the Soviet Union were precluded from maintaining forces beyond those required for a minimum deterrence posture. In the absence of Soviet agreement, however, the United States has no alternative but to maintain capabilities equal to those of the Soviets in order to preclude their perceiving any advantage in initiating a nuclear war.

Given the Soviet strategic force build-up, complemented by its activities to protect Soviet society from the consequences of a nuclear war, the policy of equivalence then assumes critical significance. It is a policy that, in the absence of a major reassessment of U.S. strategic deterrence doctrine, and because of the growing asymmetries in U.S.-Soviet strategic doctrine and capabilities, has become the ultimate critical measure for assessing the adequacy of the United States' deterrence posture.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

POLAND BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS: THREE DECADES OF FOREIGN POLICY

by Arthur R. Rachwald

Poland's foreign policy has not received adequate attention among American scholars,[1] who have believed by and large that while the Soviet Union might become increasingly tolerant of independent economic and even political developments in the satellite countries, no substantial deviation from Moscow's international line would be permitted. Only those few dramatic attempts at escape from Soviet tutelage have received attention in the United States, since the only test of a truly independent foreign policy in Eastern Europe has been defiance of the Kremlin's supremacy there. This attitude is a consequence of questioning both the domestic sovereignty of the East European communist regimes and their voluntary participation in the Warsaw Pact.

Although these presumptions might still be relevant, the compulsory quality of domestic and international relations within the Soviet alliance does not warrant the conclusion that the ruling communist parties are merely Soviet agents without any concept of foreign policy. Foreign policy goals themselves, however, may explicitly eliminate the possibility of flagrant insubordination to Moscow. Acceptance of limited dependence on the Soviet Union, one of the world's superpowers, is obligatory for many communist regimes — including that of Poland — whose domestic sources of power are not adequate to command respect at home and abroad; and the conditions of dependence are not unwelcome, since they increase security and limit responsibility.

From the moment of the Nazi attack on Soviet Russia in 1941, the Poles have recognized the necessity of coming to terms with the Russians, but the London emigres were not willing to pay the price. From territorial disagreement the dispute widened to include the political future of Poland. After the discovery of the Soviet

[1] See the comments made by Charles Gati in "The Forgotten Region," *Foreign Policy*, Summer 1975, p. 135 ff.

Arthur R. Rachwald has studied at Maria Curie Sklodowska University, Lublin, Poland, and at the University of California, Santa Barbara. At present he is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Chaffey College, Alta Loma, California.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

crimes in Katyn, Stalin simply introduced a government for Poland that was "friendly" toward Russia. Yet it would be wrong to conclude that there was nothing indigenous in this regime. In response to the political and military realities created by the defeat of Nazi Germany and by the diplomatic decisions made at Yalta and Potsdam, the foreign policy of communist Poland has been designed to achieve three salient goals:[2]

(1) *Security* — This is a definite policy aimed at preventing the reappearance in Europe of a configuration of forces in which Poland would again be a victim of invasion.

(2) *Territorial Integrity* — The questionable settlement of Polish frontiers by the big powers has made this a special issue in the general concern with national security.

(3) *Recovery* — As a result of dependence on Western economic assistance, the international conduct of Poland has a direct bearing upon political and economic recovery.

Security

Reexamination of Poland's role in European politics was undertaken by a small group of leftists who pointed out the mistakes of the exiled government in London. The "London Poles" naively expected their international protectors to secure for Poland its eastern territories claimed by Russia, forgetting that the Curzon line was a British invention and that the Red Army's military success eliminated any necessity of compromise on the part of Stalinist Russia. A more fundamental misconception was the association of Poland with irrelevant allies. Since the Napoleonic wars the Poles had fought in Western Europe "for your freedom and ours" without reciprocity, while their fate was in the hands of Russians. Consequently, it was in the vital interest of Poland to gain access to Soviet leaders and arrange a reconciliation, bringing to an end historical Polish-Russian antagonisms, the source of which was a mutual desire to rule over the Ukraine, Belorussia and Lithuania. After the defeat of 1920, the Soviets did not intend to assault Poland's independence, and the Curzon line would fulfill Soviet ambitions while the Oder-Neisse line would salve Polish pride.

A socioeconomic revolution in Poland was an implicit but clear second precondition for Polish-Soviet reconciliation, the neces-

[2] The concept of foreign policy goals as an analytical tool was introduced by Wolfram F. Hanrieder, *West German Foreign Policy, 1949-1963* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1967), pp. 1-10. See also, by the same author, *The Stable Crisis* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), pp. ix-xiv.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sity of which the Polish Left had no intention of questioning. On the contrary, the Polish Left viewed the socialist model of development as a short cut to modernity as well as an additional guarantee of national security. Ten centuries earlier, Poland had become the *Christiana republica* and had divested itself of the domination of the Teutonic Roman Empire; in the twentieth century, the "people's republic" neutralized Russian messianism. Thus, the idea of "friendship" with Soviet Russia has a solid domestic foundation and became an absolute priority in Poland's domestic and international policy. The Poles have a clear understanding of the alternatives (partitions, Katyn and the Warsaw Uprising, to mention a few examples), and the wisdom of pro-Soviet foreign policy has not been contested, even in times of domestic revolt. The present political content of national independence does not include the privilege of being anti-Russian, leaving the extent and cost of Soviet patronage the only disputable questions. In April 1945, the newly imposed regime signed a treaty of friendship and mutual assistance with the Soviet Union in which the bitter political realities were cloaked in elegant diplomatic language.[3]

The original understanding of the Polish-Soviet alliance was that this basic arrangement would not become an exclusive one. "Poland wants to maintain her alliance with Great Britain and desires to enter into an alliance with France,"[4] wrote Warsaw's first ambassador to Washington after the war. It was expected that the collapse of Germany would bring a new international order in Europe, ending the politics of balance of power and the need for a cordon sanitaire separating the East from the West. But with the Cold War, Poland's hopes of having its national security guaranteed by a coordinated system of treaties with big powers became unrealistic, and France was the only Western country that for a while seriously considered mutual alliance. This was, however, precluded by a division of Europe; even partial return to the Versailles system could not be worked out, since Poland wanted to continue the 1921 Polish-French alliance, stripped of its anti-Soviet tones, which in the new circumstances would tie France to Moscow against the United States rather than against Germany. The treaty with the Soviet Union

[3] *Polska Ludowa — Zwiazek Radziecki, 1944-1974, Zbiór Dokumentów i Materiałów* [People's Republic of Poland — The Soviet Union, 1944-1974, Collection of Documents and Materials] (Warsaw: Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej and Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych Zwiazku Socjalistycznych Republik Radzieckich, 1974), pp. 57-60.

[4] Oskar Lange, "Poland's Foreign Policy," *Poland of Today*, March 1946, pp. 4-5.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

could be supplemented only by mutual ties with other communist regimes.

This serious setback to the policy that was to preserve the "Polish way" did not discourage Warsaw from asking for assistance under the Marshall Plan, and Wladyslaw Gomulka, then first secretary of the Communist Party, refused to contribute to the division of Europe, by opposing establishment of the Cominform. In fact, nobody else could have better insight into the consequences of an exclusive reliance on Moscow than could the Polish communists, who, during the purges in 1930 and the Nazi-Soviet division of Eastern Europe, had several times been victims of Soviet politics. Gomulka's concern was fully justified, and when international tensions reached a critical point at the end of the 1940s, "Gomulkaism" was found guilty of disloyalty to Moscow and suppressed. Stalin sent Marshal Konstanty Rokossowski to assume command of the Polish armed forces and to join the Politburo of the Polish party. His mission was described by Khrushchev: "it goes without saying that the reactionary forces which had come to the surface correctly understood that Rokossowski would never raise his hand against the Soviet Union, nor would he lead the Polish army against the Soviet army."[5] National security ceased to be the legitimate business of the Poles.

The process of de-Stalinization brought only limited improvements. The "thaw" was parallel to the remilitarization of West Germany, and Poland feared that the admission of the German Federal Republic to the Atlantic Pact would involve a commitment on the part of all Western countries, including the United States, to assist Bonn in unifying Germany within the 1937 borders. Thus, when the 1952 Paris agreement was ratified, Poland subscribed to the Warsaw Pact, relying for its security on three separate yet interlocking bases: bilateral alliance with Soviet Russia, bilateral treaties with East European states, and membership in a regional security organization.

The Soviet bloc survived the shock of the 1956 turmoil, but it was no longer a centrally controlled unit. The Stalinist monolith was transformed into a complex organization of individual states and rulers bound together by a considerable community of interest. The Warsaw Pact became a mutually protective association guided by Moscow, the strongest party. Because of these circumstances, Khrushchev granted Gomulka license to lead the Poles toward socialism on the road of their own choice. The Communist Party

[5] Strobe Talbott, ed. and trans., *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974), p. 176.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of Poland got a free hand in its domestic policies (yet it could not try to "wither away" into political pluralism) in exchange for acceptance of Soviet guidance in foreign affairs. This restriction, however, did not exclude the possibility of a voluntary initiative so long as it was acceptable to Moscow.

The Poles must have discovered that Soviet insistence on the all-European security conference was of no value in dealing with those political issues requiring instant remedies: for example, the possibility of arming the Bundeswehr with nuclear weapons. Thus originated the idea of partial, temporary compromise between East and West — the "narrowing" of the security issue in political, military and geographic terms for the intermediate period before final settlement. This notion first emerged in the Rapacki Plan, which proposed establishment of a nuclear-free zone in central Europe *under the control of the superpowers.*

Although Poland's primary intention was to prevent elevation of West Germany to the status of a nuclear power, almost as significant was the request that the Soviet nuclear forces be withdrawn from Poland (in exchange, obviously, for the American withdrawal from West Germany). This time, the Poles asked for less than in October 1956, when Gomulka requested the Red Army to leave. But the Rapacki Plan would have removed nuclear weapons from the military-strategic balance of power in central Europe, making Poland a more equal partner of its giant neighbors. The alternative, nuclearization of the Polish armed forces, was out of the question. How could anybody in Moscow think about arming with nuclear weapons an ally that just a year earlier had threatened to fight unless concessions were granted?

Another positive aspect of the Rapacki Plan was, in the opinion of Warsaw, that it was designed to preserve the American role in Europe. Unlike the Kremlin, the Polish leaders at that time did not question the legitimacy of American participation in the European balance of power, knowing that no other antidote existed for German and Russian nationalism. The plan would have set limits on the military duties of the United States in Western Europe, while giving the United States both control over the Soviet Union's implementation of the plan and an opportunity to engage in political and economic relations with East European countries. Relaxation of tensions would have a spillover effect on "low politics." On this point, however, the Poles were wrong: so long as stability in Europe was based on the balance-of-power principle, there could be no substitute for military force.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The second Polish attempt to pull central Europe out of the mainstream of the Cold War was similar in purpose but more limited in scope. The Poles continued to believe that global and regional political-strategic issues were separable, and at the end of 1963, Warsaw suggested freezing nuclear weapons production and banning transfer of nuclear weapons already deployed in central Europe (the Gomulka Plan). This second diplomatic failure ended Poland's individualism and the emphasis on the role of small powers or partial solutions. The nonproliferation agreement initiated by Moscow and Washington revealed that normalization on the local level could come only as an effect of a direct U.S.-Soviet understanding. In 1964 Minister Rapacki endorsed the Soviet line stressing a need to resolve the "problem of European security in its entirety."[6]

Further political integration within the Soviet bloc was the alternative. Discouraged Poles signed the Bucharest Declaration (July 1966) and endorsed Soviet insistence on centralization and intrabloc discipline. The declaration contained a listing of the political objectives of each state, fortified by the principle of one for all, all for one. It included also an unceremonious attack on the United States, which was represented as a foreign power in Europe whose aims were "alien to the genuine interests of the European people's security."[7] The communist leaders pointed to the example of French defiance of the United States, unaware at that time that it would become contagious only among themselves and would lead to political erosion within the Soviet bloc. The period of relative democratization within the Soviet bloc had ended, and the new leaders of the Kremlin, with Gomulka's assistance, transformed the alliance into a tightly controlled team resembling the Cominform, losing, however, Romania and Albania, and keeping Czechoslovakia only by force.

Gomulka, with Ulbricht, became the most faithful servant of Moscow, and he expected that in return for his contribution to a multilateral approach, Poland would get a portion of any future benefits. When President De Gaulle made an attempt in 1967 to encourage a more independent Polish foreign policy and to build a Polish-French alliance (he in fact only repeated an initiative originally advanced by the Poles themselves), Gomulka, with no deeper inquiry into new possibilities, said no, preferring praise from the Soviets for his "realism." The following year he rejected Alexander

[6] *The Polish Viewpoint: Disarmament, Denuclearization, European Security; Documents, Declarations, Statements* (Warsaw: n.p., 1967), p. 36.
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 54.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Dubcek's plan to introduce a program of liberalization simultaneously in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland.[8] Such a common front against Moscow would have had a greater chance than ever to succeed, but Gomulka had exactly the opposite intention — to preserve the facade of bloc unity and internal harmony. The invasion of Czechoslovakia, the suppression of reformists, and the Brezhnev Doctrine were much more compatible with his realpolitik.

Yet this policy was not without logic. The status quo in central Europe would be preserved regardless of cost and had to be one of the principal reasons for the reexamination of West German policy toward the Soviet Union and its allies. Poland was second after the Soviet Union to normalize its relations with the German Federal Republic, which ended a long but justifiable obsession with the Oder-Neisse line and above all reversed the direction of the Polish-Soviet alliance. Khrushchev observed in 1956 that "Poland needs the friendship of the Soviet Union more than the Soviet Union needs the friendship of Poland."[9] In 1970 Chancellor Brandt laid the foundations for the new order in Europe. A Polish journalist has admitted that "after so many years spent in drudgery, anxiety and forcing questions without answers, we can wipe the sweat off our brows, and take a look around the whole of Europe with the feeling of the man who built the foundations and begins to construct his home."[10]

A perceptive observer can see, however, that the geopolitical position of Poland has not improved substantially. The Polish nation is once again between two superior neighbors, Soviet Russia and Germany, some comfort being furnished by the existence of two German states and Soviet troubles with China. Poland, too weak to control its own fate, and conscious of the fact that is security is derived from the general framework, can only contribute to the operation of the international system. Poland's international orientation is conditioned by past experience. It is known in Warsaw that the thirty-year peace in Europe is unprecedented, and that the multilateral balance of power (either that of the Congress of Vienna or the Treaty of Versailles) has been unfavorable to the Poles. In the international context, a source of Poland's misfortune is that the country is too small to impress the major actors in European politics, yet too big to be left alone. It is a natural conclusion that a Europe dominated by the Soviet Union and the United States is the best

[8] *The Reminiscences of Wladislaw Gomulka*, with the comments of Ignacy Szenfeld (New York: Radio Liberty Committee, 1974), p. 14.
[9] *Khrushchev Remembers . . .*, p. 205.
[10] Quoted in the *New York Times*, July 19, 1972.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

shelter for Poland. At the price of limited sovereignty, an effective system of constraints was imposed on German and Russian nationalism, and the Poles now fear that any global shift in the existing power structure might be fatal. Warsaw is not eager to provoke a major reshuffling by taking the "Romanian path," for example, but that may occur anyway as a result of unification of Western Europe, "Finlandization" of Western Europe (Moscow would gain new allies worth more than Poland), or a Sino-Soviet war.

For this reason, Poland's foreign policy in the 1970s has been designed to promote detente without widening its tendency to sabotage the underlying fabric of international order. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the MBFR talks are enthusiastically supported by Poland as opportunities to reduce tensions in Europe and to open channels of economic intercourse with all countries. A shift from power politics to negotiation created a demand for the diplomatic services of the Poles, who are on good terms with the Soviets and enjoy sympathetic understanding in Western capitals. Because of domestic pressure and a need for economic aid from the highly industrialized countries, the government of Poland has a compelling interest in making detente "irreversible." Thus, Presidents Nixon and Ford found improvement of U.S.-Polish relations a useful addition to the progress with Moscow, in hopes that Gierek might temper the belligerence of Soviet "hawks" and influence the expected orderly transfer of power in the Kremlin. In Washington, on the other hand, Gierek is welcomed as a spokesman for the entire Soviet alliance as well as the leader of Poland who does everything that is safe in order to get something for his own country.

Similar reasons motivate the leaders of European states to seek close diplomatic contacts with Poland, where foreign policy has become a central point of attention, and Poland actually has its own web of bilateral contacts with Western governments. Relations with France, West Germany and the Scandinavian countries are at the forefront of Polish interest in Europe, and although there is still no Polish-French treaty, the two governments have established permanent channels of consultation in all security matters. At the present time, Polish-French relations are governed by a declaration containing principles of peaceful coexistence and a pledge to refrain from the use or the threat of force, to respect sovereignty, and not to interfere in domestic affairs.[11] This appears an act of defiance

[11] Eugeniusz Gajda, *Polska Polityka Zagraniczna, 1944-1974* [Poland's Foreign Policy, 1944-1974] (Warsaw: Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej, 1974), p. 280.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

against the Brezhnev Doctrine. Poland now can logically refuse to participate in the police actions of the Warsaw Pact, particularly since another invasion would constitute a violation of the precious treaty with West Germany, in which both sides agreed to "settle all disputes exclusively by peaceful means and refrain from any threat or use of force in matters affecting European and international security and in their mutual relations."[12] It is unlikely that the Poles would like to provide an excuse for the Germans to disregard the treaty.

Although many effects of Poland's policy of "nonirritation" may be similar to what the Romanians managed to accomplish only by risking Soviet invasion, Poland has had to pay a price for its individualism. Frequently Poland has to act as a Soviet agent, and it has to consider Soviet reaction in practically every foreign and domestic political move. One can argue, however, that this homage to Russian imperial status is less disgraceful than was the Polish support of Napoleon during the conquest of Santo Domingo and Spain, and that it is not as senseless as was Polish aid to Churchill in the protection of the British Empire. Whether Moscow would try to use Polish troops against China is still an open question.

Still, the existing pattern of Polish-Soviet relations has some characteristics of genuine partnership. Political consultations between leaders of both countries are frequent, and major international negotiations conducted by Brezhnev are preceded by talks with Gierek and Honecker. The Soviet Union wants to create the impression that the rules of intrabloc behavior are also applicable to Moscow, and that the Stalinist practice of double-dealing (Poland and the German Democratic Republic in particular fear another "Rapallo") will not be repeated. It is not without significance that Gierek received the Order of Lenin for "outstanding achievements in development of friendship and cooperation" between Poland and the USSR.[13]

The emergence of the Polish-East German axis also has improved Poland's position within the Soviet bloc. The usefulness of close collaboration was recognized by Gomulka at the end of the 1950s, when he advocated establishment of the "northern tier," but this idea was scuttled by Ulbricht's dislike of "revisionists." A more rational attitude is characteristic of the new leaders who are aware of the similarity in national interests. Gierek has described the essence of Polish relations with the German Democratic Republic in

[12] *The Treaty Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the People's Republic of Poland* (Bonn: Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, 1971), p. 8. (Cited hereafter as FRG-PRP treaty.)

[13] *Polska Ludowa . . .* , p. 583.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the following way: "Poland is an important link in this community, and, moreover, it represents the immediate fallback position for the socialist German Democratic Republic. That is why there is complete identity of interests and mutual linkage of policy between our two countries."[14] His message must have been addressed as much to Moscow as to Bonn.

Poland's relations with the German Federal Republic are supplementary to the ties with East Berlin. On the one hand, the Polish government makes its own contribution to a division of Germany; on the other, in the words of Chancellor Brandt, "the Warsaw treaty is the foundation of a better understanding between Germans and Poles."[15] In fact, a peculiar feature of the *Ostpolitik* addressed to Poland is that a border agreement must lead to reconciliation between peoples. Yet, after the initial enthusiasm, the process of normalization was interrupted by the Polish demand to settle the "account of wrong," that is, compensation for the labor and suffering of the Poles during the war. West German hesitation to pay and implicitly admit guilt for the war was countered by drastic restrictions on the emigration of German nationals from Poland. A solution had to be found before the conclusion of the security conference in Helsinki, where the representatives of both countries worked out a package deal. The German Federal Republic literally bought for DM 2.3 billion (DM 1 billion in low-interest credit and DM 1.3 billion in indemnity to Polish citizens) passports for up to 125,000 individuals claiming German ethnic backgrounds.[16] Thus, there seems no longer to be any barrier to complete reconciliation. Historians of both countries are busy revising school textbooks to eliminate all mutually inimical images. As in the case of their relations with the Russians, the Poles are interested in creating a favorable psychological climate that may be of even greater value than present diplomatic statements. The policy of understanding among neighbors has become a component of Poland's effort to increase national security. This objective has actually been achieved, and *Die Zeit,* commenting on Gierek's June 1976 visit to West Germany, drew an analogy between the historical significance of French-German and Polish-German normalization.[17]

---

[14] Quoted in the *New York Times,* June 20, 1973.
[15] FRG-PRP treaty, p. 38.
[16] *Die Zeit,* August 15, 1975.
[17] *Ibid.,* June 18, 1976.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Territorial Integrity

Created by the Soviets in 1943, the Union of Polish Patriots (UPP) did not conceal its intent to develop into a rival government for Poland. Among the many accusations addressed to the London emigres was the charge that they were neglecting the territorial interest of the Polish nation. Instead of recovering the old Polish territories in the west and on the Baltic, argued the UPP, the "London government" preferred to bargain for essentially non-Polish land in the east.[18] The UPP endorsed the Soviet view that territorial disputes should be settled according to ethnographic principles, but in practice the communists surprisingly arrived at exactly the same conclusion as the "reactionary emigres." Mrs. Wasilewska, head of the UPP, proposed to leave two main cities located in this area — Wilno and Lwów — on the Polish side. She explained why no concessions were extracted from the Soviet patrons:

> The Union of Polish Patriots raised the question of Wilno and Lwów several times. The Soviet position is uncompromising in this, even with regard to Lwów. We have no real support either from England or America. Is it worth bringing pressure on the part of England and America to bear on Russia? If Russia comes to the conclusion that the whole of Poland wants friendly relations with her it will perhaps be possible to strike a bargain.[19]

For this reason, at the Teheran Conference, Stalin switched emphasis from the ethnographic principle to the more technical one of the Curzon line.

The issue of the eastern frontier surfaced again when the Red Army crossed the Curzon line, and the Union of Polish Patriots reorganized itself into the more indigenous Polish Committee of National Liberation (CNL). The CNL claimed to represent all "democratic" parties; actually, it was dominated by the communists and left-wing socialists. Yet it did not hesitate to ask Stalin for clarification of his willingness to correct the Curzon line for the benefit of Poland, and it suggested that all of East Prussia and Lwów be returned.

But this also failed. With a few minor exceptions, the CNL did not manage to secure for Poland a more advantageous frontier than that provided by the Curzon line. East Prussia was split between Poles and Russians, since Stalin wanted to have "a piece of the German land" for satisfaction. Elsewhere, all cities of some military

[18] *Polska Ludowa . . .* , p. 617.
[19] *Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations, 1939-1945* (London: Heinemann, for the General Sikorski Institute, 1961), vol. 2, p. 770.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

importance were retained by the Soviet Union for purely strategic reasons.[20] The CNL lost in the east but learned how to approach Stalin with the question of a western frontier for Poland.

The frontier recommended in Teheran, "along the Oder River," was presented as an unsatisfactory solution. More advisable in terms of strategy was the shortening of the border with Germany to a minimum and the lengthening as much as possible of Poland's frontier with Czechoslovakia. The Oder line was twice as long as the Oder-Neisse line, a fact that "as quickly as lightning" convinced Stalin which was the better,[21] and the border agreement between Soviet Russia and the CNL was a compromise. The Poles agreed to the Curzon line in exchange for a Soviet pledge to hand over to Polish authorities the Oder-Neisse territories, including the city of Szczecin (Stettin), located on the western bank of the Oder, and to support this territorial transfer in future diplomatic negotiations.

Despite some hesitation at the beginning (three times the Poles began to take over the administration of Szczecin), and after the Red Army looted the entire area, the Oder-Neisse territories were placed under Polish control. At the same time, Stalin met Truman and Attlee in Potsdam, where they produced a most confusing document — the Potsdam Protocol — which stated that "pending the final determination" Poland was authorized to "administer" the "former German territories" east of the Oder-Neisse line awaiting "final delimitation" at the peace settlement. The right to expel the remaining German population supplemented Poland's administrative authority.

The controversy over the Oder-Neisse line was not the first territorial contest to involve postwar Poland. Once the process of gathering the "Piast land" began (Piast was the first ruling dynasty of Poland), the Poles inquired whether Czechoslovakia would return still predominantly Polish Cieszyn, in Silesia. The Czechs advanced mostly economic arguments to substantiate their rights to this area, so Poland offered free transit on the Oder in exchange for territorial concessions. Yet the government of Czechoslovakia, unwilling to discuss such a possibility, responded by requesting a return of some formerly German territories now under Polish control. Thus began a short but highly emotional conflict that, without Soviet mediation, would have ended in war. The settlement was based on the status quo: the Czechs were left with pre-Munich frontiers, while the Poles

[20] Wlodzimierz T. Kowalski, *Polityka Zagraniczna RP, 1944-1947* [Foreign Policy of the Republic of Poland, 1944-1947] (Warsaw: Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, 1971), pp. 3-4.

[21] *Ibid.*, pp. 4-5.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

made a point that their state borders were conclusively defined at Potsdam.[22]

The initial understanding of the Oder-Neisse clause of the Potsdam Protocol was that the Western powers preferred to delay the acceptance of an already accomplished fact. President Truman called it a "compromise solution . . . necessary . . . to enable the new Poland to organize itself" and to "provide a short and more easily defensible frontier" with Germany. The *New York Times* concluded therefore that "it is apparent . . . that the decision formulated in Potsdam represents a definite settlement."[23] The protocol included a device to verify faithful execution of two other provisions addressed to Poland: holding "free and unfettered" national elections and expelling Germans "in an orderly an humane manner."

The first doubts about the wisdom of the Oder-Neisse line were inspired by the chaotic, painful transfer of Germans and by delaying tactics in preparing for national elections. The Warsaw regime adopted a pick-and-choose attitude toward the Potsdam agreement, respecting favorable and violating disadvantageous provisions. The condition of "free and unfettered" elections had substantial value for the Western powers as a method of resolving the future international affiliation of Poland. Viewed from the West, the Oder-Neisse line could be acceptable for a pro-Western Poland; for the Soviets, it would make sense only as an extension of their own influence and military frontiers.

Soon the entire Polish issue was further complicated by the fact that Poland lost its strategic importance once the control of Germany became a central security issue for both Moscow and Washington. These two rivals desired to extend their influence beyond military lines in Europe by winning the German people to their respective sides. The Germans were formally given a free choice between two socioeconomic systems, and the price for a decisive vote was support for the restoration of territorial integrity. Speaking in Stuttgart, Secretary of State James Byrnes declared that his government had not committed itself to recognizing any particular "extent of this area to be ceded to Poland,"[24] while Moscow secretly instructed the German communists to add a nationalistic lure to ideological propaganda. Ulbricht, deputy chairman of the East German Socialist Unity Party, formulated an original interpretation of the origin of the Oder-Neisse line. The British were presented as

[22] *Ibid.*, pp. 71-72.
[23] August 10, 1945.
[24] *New York Times*, September 7, 1946.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

inventors of this idea, the purpose of which was to strengthen the "reactionary emigres" in London; the Soviets, "as a faithful ally," merely consented to its implementation. Once the war was over, however, the Soviet Union acquired authority to stop this territorial allocation.[25]

Despite this nationalistic accent, the German communists did very poorly, "winning" elections only in the Soviet-occupied zone. No prize was to be given for such performance; the Soviet Union decided to keep the Oder-Neisse territories outside Germany at least so long as there was no permanent settlement.

There was still, however, another danger for Poland: namely, that its border would be settled directly by agreement between the United States and Soviet Russia. Warsaw could do very little to prevent such a possibility. The Polish ambassador to the United Nations threatened war in the event of a "Munich" for Poland,[26] and communist leaders were doing their best to convince Stalin of their unconditional commitment to the Soviet cause. It was implied that in Polish hands the Oder-Neisse line would enhance Soviet security better than would the diplomatic statements of the Western powers. Yet, the Poles knew that the situation was grave: expecting another war in the West, Stalin could decide to buy time for Russia exactly as he did in 1939. The Marshall-Molotov agreement could involve another partition of Poland, and this was not precluded until the Cold War. Division of Europe along the Elbe left Poland as the chief Soviet ally, more deserving of the Oder-Neisse territories than was the German Democratic Republic-to-be. In May 1949, the Soviet Union declared in Paris that the Polish-German border had been conclusively settled at Potsdam,[27] and the Poles retained the Oder-Neisse territories at the price of Stalinism.

With Eastern Europe separated by the Iron Curtain from the rest of the world, Poland regained some degree of control over its own fate. Failing to spread communism throughout Western Europe, the Soviets decided to establish themselves permanently in what was already their own part of the continent, and the Soviet zone of Germany was renamed the German Democratic Republic. Polish recognition of East Germany as a supposedly independent state was simultaneous with the Zgorzelec (Görlitz) agreement, which settled the border between the two countries. The treaty stated that the "established and existing frontier . . . constitutes

[25] *Ibid.*, April 16, 1949.
[26] *Ibid.*, September 18, 1946.
[27] *Ibid.*, May 28, 1949.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the state frontier between Poland and Germany."[28] This wording became known as the "Zgorzelec formula," the legal value of which was that it combined a conclusive determination of the frontier between Poland and one German state without violating the right of the Big Four to make the "final" decision. It was an important diplomatic victory for Poland, although the treaty had binding authority only between two Soviet puppets. For five years after Potsdam, the Poles had no legal grounds to appeal to Moscow for assistance with respect to the Oder-Neisse frontier. In order to have their hands free, the Soviets had deliberately dropped the obligation to support Poland's western frontier along the Oder-Neisse line from the Polish-Soviet treaty of friendship (April 1945), which followed the agreement with the Committee of National Liberation.

The Polish-East German treaty was a direct "casus belli" for a diplomatic and propagandistic conflict between Bonn and Warsaw. Chancellor Adenauer called the Oder-Neisse line "illegal," in violation of the Atlantic Charter, the Potsdam Protocol, and the rights of the German nation. His chief competitor and leader of the Socialist Party, Dr. Kurt Schumacher, warned against any compromise and advised formation of a strong political platform against the territorial status quo.[29] Both major parties in West Germany endorsed the policy of territorial revisionism, enumerating preconditions for Polish-German reconciliation. First, the unification of Germany within 1937 frontiers had to be arranged and West Germany recognized as the sole government of the German people. Second, the peace conference could be the only proper place for discussion of territorial questions. Finally, the regime in Poland must become "democratic."[30] Warsaw responded with such epithets addressed to Bonn as "war criminals," "fascists," "racists" and "revanchists," thus beginning two decades of mutual accusations.

The 1956 political revolt in Poland had no influence on the official attitude of Bonn toward the issue of the Oder-Neisse line. One must agree that

> to these great events Adenauer's contribution was negligible and characteristically tactless. At the height of the Polish crisis, when Poland seemed within an ace of becoming a Titoist state, Adenauer chose the moment for a singularly unfortunate intervention. With an eye to the millions of German refugees, whom he knew would be a key factor in the German

[28] Andrzej Leśniewski, ed., *Western Frontier of Poland* (Warsaw: Polish Institute of International Affairs, 1965), p. 31.

[29] F. J. Schmitt, ed., *Im Deutschen Bundestag, Deutschland und Ostpolitik* (Bonn: Pfattheicher und Reichardt, 1973), vol. 1, pp. 1-3, 7.

[30] *Ibid.*, p. 65 ff.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

election twelve months ahead, Adenauer truculently announced that the day would come when these expellees would return to their homes, east of the Oder-Neisse line. . . . Anything more likely to drive the Poles back into the arms of the Russians would have been difficult to conceive.[31]

And indeed, the Polish government explained to its people that the stationing of Soviet troops in Poland must be regarded as "indispensable, not only for the security of the Soviet Union, but even to a greater degree for our own security and the inviolability of our boundaries in vew of the scheming of German militarism."[32] Paradoxically, Adenauer saved Poland from the Hungarian experience.

Yet it would be incorrect to conclude that the return of Gomulka had no effect on West German-Polish relations. This successful domestic transformation in Poland, executed against Soviet will, convinced West German politicians that Warsaw was in control of the Oder-Neisse territories. During the first few years, Gomulka's regime had strong popular support; if Khrushchev hesitated to use Soviet troops against Gomulka, no Soviet leader would go to war with Poland to satisfy German territorial ambitions. Thus began the period of bilateral West German-Polish diplomacy.

As soon as the situation stabilized, several West German politicians, including Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano, visited Poland to investigate the possibility of a compromise on the territorial issue. These missions failed because Warsaw was eager to review only the alternative forms of recognition of the Oder-Neisse line. Polish counterproposals advocated establishment of formal diplomatic relations between both countries without mentioning the border dispute. The exchange of diplomatic envoys would have implied de facto recognition of all frontiers, and in the opinion of the Poles such a procedure would have been acceptable to the German people. Adenauer, most likely having *polnische Wirtschaft* in mind, responded that the Oder-Neisse territories ought to be "integrated into a superior economic system, such as the Coal and Steel Community, or the Common Market."[33]

New hopes arose in Warsaw when, in March 1959, President De Gaulle announced: "The reunion of the two parts into a single Germany which would be entirely free seems to us the normal destiny of the German people, provided they do not call into question their present frontiers."[34] The Poles concluded that they

[31] Charles Wighton, *Adenauer — Democratic Dictator* (London: Muller, 1963), p. 244.
[32] Quoted in the *New York Times*, November 4, 1956.
[33] Leśniewski, ed., p. 140.
[34] Quoted in the *New York Times*, March 26, 1959.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

already had two out of four great powers eager to recognize the Oder-Neisse line as "final," and Warsaw immediately proceeded to inquire about the American attitude, which in the context of the Potsdam Protocol was more important than anything the West Germans might want to say. Washington, however, replied that it was necessary to postpone discussion of all issues related to the Oder-Neisse question until there was a peace conference with the "entire German people."[35] In this way the American government implicitly endorsed the West German claim that unification must take place before the "final" settlement of the mutual border could be worked out.

The American reaction was perceived in Warsaw as a manifestation of the multilateral Western approach to the Oder-Neisse border, and it was natural to respond in kind. Since unification of Germany was a precondition for entering into territorial issues, Poland endorsed the Soviet and East German point of view that unification had to be worked out directly between the two German states. West German recognition of East Germany and its frontiers was to become an automatic first step to unification. East Germany turned out to be a shield of higher value for Poland than was the increasingly conciliatory attitude of West Germany. When in 1961 the German Federal Republic invited Poland to conclude a nonaggression treaty (which would imply de facto recognition of the Oder-Neisse frontier), Poland refused to spring a Rapallo-type trick on its western ally. Such a treaty, according to Warsaw, would permit Bonn to swallow the German Democratic Republic.

The last chance for direct Polish-West German settlement of the border question was missed in 1963, when Poland agreed to an exchange of trade delegations with the German Federal Republic. It was a farewell gesture to Adenauer and encouragement to the new government to transform economic relations into political understanding. In his "peace note," however, Chancellor Erhard repeated Adenauer's insistence on unification first and added the old cliche that "according to the international law, Germany still exists within the borders from December 31, 1937."[36]

It was the end of Gomulka's *Westpolitik*. As at the end of the 1940s, Poland turned toward Soviet Russia and other allies to construct a common front against West Germany: in the 1960s

[35] *Ibid.*, August 12, 1960.
[36] FRG-PRP treaty, p. 105.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Poland decided to prove that "there is no problem of frontiers . . . [but] there is a problem of peace in Europe."[37]

A trick was used to bind Khrushchev to the support of the Oder-Neisse line and stop him from "another Rapallo." During his 1964 visit to Poland, Khrushchev was suddenly invited to Szczecin and became an honorary citizen of that city. In his own words, "to have me formally associated with . . . [Polish] claims on this city is as good as having money in the bank."[38] Gomulka never trusted Khrushchev and was glad to see his fall at the moment when Adzjubej, Khrushchev's brother-in-law, was in Bonn discussing a compromise on the entire German issue. Brezhnev also visited Poland's western territories and his emphasis on intrabloc unity and cohesion facilitated negotiation of a renewal of the Polish-Soviet treaty of friendship. The new version included Soviet guarantees for the territorial integrity of Poland,[39] and at the Bucharest meeting of the WTO, Western recognition of the Oder-Neisse line was included among the preconditions for East-West normalization. Chancellor Kiesinger's willingness to respect this line until the peace conference with a united Germany was interpreted by Warsaw as a change of tactics but not of goals. The Poles did not hesitate to stimulate the German Federal Republic further by concluding the first treaty of mutual assistance with East Germany, in which a mutual obligation to defend existing frontiers was specifically stated. Poland became a guarantor of the East German state, and Gomulka revealed that it "was not coincidental, but a conscious and coordinated move, which hit and counterplotted plans of the new FRG government . . . to isolate the GDR and undermine the unity of the Warsaw Pact states."[40]

Poland began to appreciate fully the existence of the German Democratic Republic. Despite personal animosity and continuing rivalry over influence in Moscow between Ulbricht and Gomulka, a sense of mutual interest and interdependence moved them toward one another. Internationally handicapped, East Germany welcomed the political and diplomatic support of Poland, while the Poles, more than anybody else, were pleased with a division of Germany. The German Democratic Republic became the first German state equal, not superior, to Poland, the communist

[37] *Ibid.*, p. 106.
[38] *Khrushchev Remembers* . . . , p. 206.
[39] *Polska Ludowa* . . . , p. 369.
[40] Wladyslaw Gomulka, "Znaczenie Międzynarodowych Układow z CSRS, NRD, i Bułgarią oraz Konferencji w Karlowych Warach" [The Importance of International Agreements with Czechoslovakia, the GDR and Bulgaria, and the Conference in Karlovy Vary], *Nowe Drogi*, no. 6, 1967, p. 42.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

orthodoxy of the East German leaders being less dangerous than German nationalism.

Since nothing short of formal recognition of the Oder-Neisse line could have satisfied the Poles, they had to wait until Chancellor Brandt rearranged the diplomatic priorities of the German Federal Republic. Instead of the traditional order, which placed unification first, Brandt's *Ostpolitik* called for recognition of the status quo as a first step toward the ultimate goal — unification. The victory of the Socialist-Free Democrat coalition in the federal elections was a popular ratification of his foreign policy program, and Gomulka faced the alternative of signing a bilateral treaty with West Germany or continuing to wait for West German recognition of East Germany.

The choice was actually made by the Soviets, who engaged in negotiations with Bonn, and Poland was quick to do the same. Otherwise the Soviet West German treaty would resemble the Ribbentrop-Molotov deal. Thus, in 1970, for the first time since the infamous Polish-German declaration of nonaggression (1934), the representatives of both countries met, and a treaty normalizing mutual relations was produced. The final version of the treaty indicated that both sides were tired of the prolonged dispute and preferred compromise to another failure to find a common language. The preamble to the treaty has no reference to German guilt for the Second World War, and no "final recognition" could be extracted from Bonn. Thus, the "Zgorzelec formula" was repeated in order to satisfy the West German constitutional stance; the treaty stated that the Oder-Neisse line is a state border of Poland, and the German Federal Republic pledged not to "assert . . . [territorial] claims in the future."[41]

According to the West German interpretation of the treaty, it gives only de facto recognition, and additional agreements will be necessary to regulate this issue between Poland and united Germany. The Poles, however, declare the recognition to be final, since they do not recognize the existence of such a legal fiction as "Germany." Yet, Poland did not question the authority of the Big Four to approve the territorial status quo, and such a multilateral declaration was issued, concluding the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe:

> The participating states regard as inviolable all one another's as well as the frontiers of all states in Europe and therefore they will refrain now and in the future from assaulting these frontiers.

[41] FRG-PRP treaty, p. 8.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> Accordingly, they will also refrain from any demand for, or act of, seizure and usurpation of part or all of the territory of any particular state.[42]

Apparently, then, the Oder-Neisse line has become "final," its future having been bound to the fate of the international system established at Potsdam and acknowledged thirty years later at Helsinki.

Recovery and Internal Peace

"Never in the history of human conflict was the fate of so many decided so bluntly and by so few,"[43] observed a Polish officer after Yalta, where there was hardly any difference between the treatment of enemies and junior allies. The Poles in particular, their contribution to victory having been just second to the Big Three's, were arbitrarily assigned frontiers, government and, consequently, a socioeconomic system. The communists and their fellow travelers were not elected but only nominated according to the ideological preference of the Soviets — and because they demonstrated an excellent grasp of the opportunities and limits inherent in emerging international power relations. As a Polish scholar admitted, it is not the number of supporters, but the "rightness of program and political line"[44] that has determined the contest between the "London" and "Moscow" Poles. While the London emigres bothered themselves with the question of what the Poles wanted, the leftists knew that the only existing issue was what Poland could afford.

Besides purely ideological phrases, which have little propagandistic utility, there are two substantive arguments in the communists' self-justification of their rule in Poland. First, they were, in practice, the only political group in Poland that met Soviet standards for a "democratic" party. Thus, due to their efforts, the Potsdam Conference did not turn into another Congress of Vienna for Poland; and the task of guarding national independence requires the continuing care of the communists because of the proximity of Soviet power. The second objective of the Communist Party is to ensure and sponsor the economic development of Poland. Accomplishment of these two objectives, however, placed the ruling circles in a precarious position of dependence on the Soviet Union for

[42] *Department of State Bulletin*, September 1, 1975, pp. 324-325.
[43] Quoted in the *New York Times*, February 21, 1945.
[44] C. Zygmunt Iżykowski, "Stosunki Polsko-Radzieckie w Latach 1944-1972" [Polish-Soviet Relations in the Years 1944-1972], in Czeslaw Mojsiejewicz, ed., *Stosunki Polski z innymi Państwami Socjalistycznymi* [Poland's Relations with other Socialist Countries] (Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe-PWN, 1973), p. 17.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

security, on the United States (and now other highly industrialized Western countries) for economic aid, and on the Roman Catholic Church for domestic consensus. This paradox of communism in Poland has been recognized by all three postwar leaders — Bierut, Gomulka and Gierek — whose reigns were initiated by coordinated appeal to Moscow, Washington and the Catholic episcopate of Poland, and each of whom has faced a dilemma involving either security or national recovery and internal peace.

The "free and unfettered elections" provision of the Potsdam Protocol was a luxury Poland could not even dream about. Continuation of communist rule and the Soviet influence in Poland required that the election be fraudulent,, leaving the extent of the farce the only undecided issue. Stalin instructed the Poles that "the election must be won before the election,"[45] but peasant opposition rejected the communist proposal for a single ticket vote with 25 per cent allotment. It was not a time for a showdown, and the elections in 1947 were "won" by an 87 per cent majority. In private, the communists justified introduction of Soviet-like totalitarianism as an absolute necessity for the protection of Poland's nominal independence.[46]

Poland became immune to Soviet invasion but soon had to withdraw its application for Marshall Plan aid and take part in the nonexistent Molotov Plan. Foreign economic relations thus hindered national recovery because of the conditions of Soviet exploitation. In addition, once the highest value was attached to Soviet satisfaction, the campaign of political and ideological self-purification could not be stopped until all who looked askance at Stalin were purged. Soon only the "Muscovite" communists were left on the domestic political scene, and genuine popular support became irrelevant, since terror and Soviet backing were sufficient political assets. The time was ripe for an assault on the main contestant in the struggle for influence over the Polish soul — the Catholic Church.

In response to the Vatican's pro-German stance on the issue of the Oder-Neisse line, Warsaw chose patriotism as a weapon in the duel with the Church. The Polish episcopate would have to decide between loyalty to the pope or to the national interest. Such freshmen in Polish politics as the communists did not recognize that reorganization of the Polish state into a homogeneous national unit sponsored by Moscow was above all a triumph for Catholicism,

[45] Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, *The Pattern of Soviet Domination* (London: Sampson Low, Marston, 1948), p. 190.

[46] Arthur Bliss Lane, *I Saw Poland Betrayed* (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1948), p. 279.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

backed now by over 90 per cent of the population (the Communist Party has a rather stable 6 per cent membership) and by a thousand years of political expertise. The Church declared unconditional support for the Oder-Neisse line, and the communist policy of religious persecution enhanced the Church's image as a martyr to Sovietization and as protector of Western traits in Poland's national culture.

In October 1956, Wladyslaw Gomulka began his second, fourteen-year-long term as first secretary and proceeded to look for imaginative solutions to the huge backlog of inherited problems. The economic situation required special attention and instant remedy, including decollectivization of agriculture, improvement of management, Western credit, and an end to Soviet exploitation. Expansion of agricultural production became a key to economic stability: the agricultural sector was burdened with the task of providing foodstuffs sufficient for domestic consumption as well as for the exports to the West that were necessary to earn hard currency for industrial equipment. American rejection of Poland's request for credit on the purchase of machinery was a serious blow to the Poles, who were taking a political risk by accepting foreign aid, but the deliveries of wheat and fodder on extremely generous terms (repaid over a long period of time and in Polish currency) were actually an indirect subsidy of Polish industry. Polish farmers could produce more for export, stimulating industrial development. This relationship could not be stabilized, however, because the U.S. government wanted to have a continuing check on the political behavior of Poland, and no long-term agreement was concluded.

Khrushchev, obviously, did not approve of a "road to socialism" that required American assistance. It contrasted sharply with the Soviet experience and was in conflict with the principles of Soviet foreign policy. Gomulka's decision to redistribute the land to individual farmers was also viewed with suspicion: it could become a dangerous precedent, encouraging peasants in other countries, including the Soviet Union, to demand liquidation of state farms. The Soviets agreed to erase Poland's large debt (it was a cheat, and the Poles could not pay it anyway), but in retaliation they refused to increase exports of raw materials, and credit was not made available to Poland until mid-1962.[47] Poland was accused of an attempt to milk the Soviet Union, and *Pravda* reprimanded Gomulka and Tito, remarking that "the imperialists do not give anything to anyone for nothing. Everybody knows that American aid . . . leads

[47] Richard F. Staar, *Poland, 1944-1962: The Sovietization of a Captive People* (New Orleans: Louisiana State University Press, 1962), p. 111.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in one form or another to economic and political dependence."[48] Similar accusations came from other Soviet allies; the strongest charge was that of the East Germans, who described Gomulka's return as the work of "imperialist moles." Despite all of that, Gomulka took the calculated risk, knowing that he had the nation behind him.

The first symptoms of capitulation became visible at the end of 1957, when Gomulka signed a strongly anti-Western declaration concluding the celebration of the fortieth anniversary of the Bolshevik victory in Russia. Next, he condemned Tito's revisionism and approved the execution of Hungarian Premier Imre Nagy. Gomulka had no doubts about the importance of American aid, but he had to weigh economic needs against national security. West Germany and the United States did not want to recognize the Oder-Neisse line, and in general Poland's economy was much more dependent on Soviet raw materials and markets than on American wheat. Once the "antiparty group" was defeated, Khrushchev could pay more attention to the satellite parties. Thus, as Adam Bromke explains, "as long as there existed some alternatives, which enabled . . . [Gomulka] to digress from the Russian line without the impairing of ideological unity, he was willing to explore them. When pressed to the wall, however, he bowed to Moscow's will in the name of both Marxism-Leninism and political realism."[49]

The next step was made at the end of 1958, when Gomulka initiated a series of tough talks, accusing the United States of imperialism and interference in the domestic affairs of other countries. Later he took an entirely pro-Soviet position during the Berlin Crisis, justifying his policy by the "historical experience" of Poland. A credit-barter agreement was signed with Cuba for the supply of Polish industrial products in exchange for agricultural goods; this turned American aid to Poland into a subsidy for Castro. These developments culminated in Minister Rapacki's visit to Cuba, which the Poles named the "most expensive trans-Atlantic crossing since the Titanic."[50]

Although the United States had never attached any formal political conditions to its economic aid, it was expected that Poland would at least refrain from anti-American propaganda, and the reduction of American aid was proportional to Gomulka's belligerency. By 1963, Poland lost its most-favored-nation status, and the deliver-

[48] May 8, 1958; quoted in Adam Bromke, *Poland's Politics: Idealism vs. Realism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 135.
[49] *Ibid.*, p. 136.
[50] *New York Times*, September 14, 1961.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ies of agricultural commodities were terminated. The country was hit by economic crisis, and the rate of industrial growth dropped by one-half.[51] The Stalinist hard-liners began to dominate the party and managed to prevent implementation of already approved economic reforms. The "spirit of October" became a historic issue, and Gomulka had to look to Moscow for help against the Polish nation.

The celebration of the one-thousandth anniversary of Polish statehood and Christianization was chosen by Gomulka as an occasion to attack the Catholic episcopate, which not long before had exchanged letters with the German bishops advocating reconciliation of Poles and Germans. The millennium of Christianity in Poland was celebrated under the slogan We Forgive, while the government declared We Don't Forgive and unjustly accused the Church of willingness to make territorial concessions to the Germans. Yet, only four years later, when Poland signed a treaty with West Germany, the government appeared to be doing exactly what the Church had recommended, and the treaty became a triumph for the Church and of no help to Gomulka, whose political career ended just two weeks after the Oder-Neisse line was recognized.

Once the reversal of liberalization began, clashes between the party and the intellectuals erupted rather frequently, but generally Gomulka's nerve held until March 1968, when he had to face young scholars and students attacking the regime in the name of Marxism-Leninism. He responded with nightsticks and a wave of anti-Semitism, followed by expulsion of the Jews, some of them intellectuals; the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia provided him with an opportunity to emasculate the intraparty opposition of nationalistic "partisans" led by General Moczar. Gomulka supported the invasion not because he feared West Germany but because, in his own words,

> . . . the intervention was intended to demonstrate that the Soviet Union would never permit a man to come to power in a socialist country who did not enjoy the full confidence and support of the USSR. [He must have already forgotten his assent to power in 1956!] At the same time, all concerned knew that Moczar was not such a man. Therefore the intervention served the interests of our group and our country too. After August 1968 it became evident that Moczar would never hold a key post in the country.[52]

Two years later he fell victim to his own politics. Even from his own experience he should have known that, with the

[51] Michael Gamarnikow, "Poland's Economic Recession," *East Europe*, no. 3, 1963, p. 13 ff.

[52] *The Reminiscences of Wladislaw Gomulka*, p. 17.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

exception of extreme cases (e.g., Czechoslovakia in 1968), popular support must be valued more than an exclusive reliance on Moscow. In December 1970, the regime decided "to gain several additional millions,"[53] and the overused remedy for food shortage, increased prices to cut down consumption, was applied. Now the workers exploded, and Gomulka was removed from the office of first secretary. Most likely, Moscow was also glad to see Gomulka go, since the Soviets were relieved of the necessity of supporting an individual incapable of governing.

Edward Gierek followed precisely the established pattern. The first step was to remind his countrymen that Poland could exist as an independent state only as a socialist country in the Soviet sense (i.e., ruled by the Communist Party) and allied with Soviet Russia by "inseparable ties." Unconditional acceptance of these two demands of reality was proof of patriotism, and the rioting Polish workers were praised for their "admirable political consciousness," since no anti-Soviet slogans appeared in Poland during the bloody December events. Yet, the new regime redefined the content of socialism, shifting the emphasis from heavy industry to social welfare, from democratic centralism to socialist democracy, from the revolution carried on by the ruling Communist Party to "broad consultation with the working class and intelligentsia, respect for the principle of collective leadership and the democratization of intra-party and governmental structures."[54]

These were also the credentials he submitted in Moscow. Gierek made the point that he was not another Dubcek or Nagy but basically a pro-Soviet communist ("realist") eager to satisfy fundamental Soviet demands — those related to Soviet security. Otherwise, Gierek opposed any further Soviet interference in Poland's domestic affairs, and the dogmatic Soviet interpretation of the December events has never been made public in Poland. According to Moscow, the revolt was a counterrevolutionary provocation of kulaks and their children employed in the shipyards, aided by the Catholic Church.[55] Such a distortion of the facts was necessary to hide from Soviet workers the fact that the party can be wrong and that it will even make far-reaching political and economic concessions when pressed. Moscow must have concluded that in the interest of stability within the alliance, ideological conformity was not so

[53] *Ibid.*, p. 24.

[54] Edward Gierek, "Przemówienie na VII Plenum KC PZPR" [Speech on the Seventh Plenum of CC PUWP], in Stanislaw Macheta, ed., *Podstawy Nauk Politycznych* [Foundations of Political Science] (Warsaw: Ksiazka i Wiedza, 1972), vol. 1, p. 408.

[55] *Na Antenie*, no. 112/113, 1972, p. 46.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

essential as relative domestic consensus under strong party control.

The party itself was being overruled by the Soviets according to the ancient principle of *divide et impera,* which became an appropriate device at the time of collective leadership. In addition to Gierek's "Silesian group," there is an influential faction of neo-Stalinists led by Premier Jaroszewicz and Moczar's rather popular "partisans," all well represented in the Central Committee. Continuing rivalry among competing factions and their mutual interdependence create a check-and-balance relationship, preventing monopolization of power by any single individual or group and facilitating Soviet involvement as an arbiter.

Having settled the issue of relations with the USSR, Poland's fundamental security concern, Gierek proceeded to look for remedies to the painful economic crisis. Fortunately, he is the only postwar Polish leader who has not yet had to face in its sharpest form the dilemma of security versus economic recovery. The climate of detente, exactly what the Poles hoped to find immediately after the war, enables them to enjoy lucrative economic relations with highly industrialized Western countries without straining "friendship" with Soviet Russia. In fact, the Soviets themselves encourage the partial economic emancipation of Poland as a relief from the responsibility of subsidizing inefficient clients.[56]

The Japanese model of economic development has caught the attention of those Polish economists who would like to enlarge the contribution of foreign trade to the national income. Poland, with a guaranteed market in Soviet Russia, has attempted to expand trade with Western countries. The Poles borrow capital and technological know-how and try to organize domestic production of exportable goods below world market prices. This is possible because labor in Poland costs less than in Western Europe. The greatest advantage of this pattern of industrialization is that the regime can avoid a squeeze on domestic consumption. For the past five years the average annual increase of the gross national product, real wages and consumption has been well over 10 per cent. Thus, another paradox of Polish politics: this time, Western economic aid makes communist rule acceptable to the Poles, but it also makes Soviet Russia look like the source of all evil.

For the time being, at least, Poland finds it impossible to balance imports and exports. A huge foreign trade deficit, exceeding one-fourth of the total annual economic exchange, jeopardizes con-

[56] Adam Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1973* (New York: Praeger, 1974), p. 747.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tinuation of this policy, since foreign creditors are concerned with the future safety of their investments. Despite this trend, which the Poles expect to reverse as soon as investments begin to pay back, Poland has no difficulties in obtaining more capital in Western countries, because of the existence of realistic economic and political guarantees. After thirty years of intensive industrialization, an adequate economic base has been established to ensure productive use of foreign capital; the political climate is such that an attempt to reverse the policy of appeasement toward the consumer will instantly trigger another wave of internal turmoil. With the present geographic structure of Poland's foreign trade (over 50 per cent is directed outside the Soviet system), the regime in Warsaw is actually becoming an economic satellite of the United States and West Germany, while its political-military allegiance is on the Eastern side, and the safety of foreign credit in Poland is guarded by the political mood of the Poles.

But the Soviets do not sit by idly watching the separatist tendencies of Poland, and this independent involvement with the West is being checked by forceful integration and interdependence within COMECON. Together with other countries of Eastern Europe, Poland has to participate in financing and constructing common enterprises, another version of Stalinist joint-stock companies. Thus, at the very moment when the Poles are borrowing capital in the West, paying high interest rates, they have to provide COMECON with low-interest, long-term credit for industrial projects in Soviet Russia.[57] The Soviet gain, obviously, is not limited to purely economic profit, because in the larger sense the Russians benefit politically by acquiring additional means of control over their allies.[58]

Domestic consensus in Poland is based on the understanding that the regime is doing everything that is safe to promote national security and welfare. There is a strong feeling of self-confidence among the Polish people in their ability to extract concessions from the regime by force if necessary. Despite inflation, hidden price increases and even temporary meat shortages, Gierek has kept his promise to supply domestic markets with sufficient amounts of basic commodities, and his attempt in the middle of 1976 to raise food prices was successfully halted by rioting workers. The regime must subsidize prices, and it does not hesitate to spend precious hard currency to pacify the nation. For the first time in

[57] Jerzy Pekalski, "Struktura Obrotów Polski-Radzieckich" [The Structure of Polish-Soviet Economic Turnover], *Zycie Gospodarcze*, January 26, 1975, p. 13.

[58] Eugene K. Keef and others, *Area Handbook for Poland* (Washington: GPO, 1973), p. 188.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Poland's history, the ability to organize the economic life of the country is the strongest characteristic of the regime, although Gierek has not been willing to implement far-reaching reform of management, which would place efficiency above political supervision. Communism in Poland might be too weak to withstand decentralization. There is evidence that the initial enthusiasm of the Polish people has waned, and that the regime has entered a period of decay similar to that which happened a decade ago.

Conclusion: A Delicate Balance

Criticism of Gierek's rule is directed toward his overcautious approach to political modernization (democratization) and too slow emancipation from Soviet tutelage. Gierek succeeded in dismantling the Soviet pattern of the local power structure and substituted a simple and functional legislative (i.e., elected) model for an executive (i.e., nominated) one. This reform cut into the bureaucracy and may become a basis for revision of the election law. The three traditional administrative levels of the country were modified by removal of the intermediate structure. This change from seventeen to forty-nine districts (*voivodships*) deprived local leaders of a sufficiently strong power base to challenge the central authorities. Gierek, however, did not restore the office of the president, there is no rotation of cadres, and elections are still meaningless. And despite general opposition (which is why Poland's official name was not changed to the Polish Socialist Republic), the party monopoly of power and "friendship" with Soviet Russia have been written into the constitution.

"Customary law" requires each new group of leaders seeking reconciliation with the nation to pledge better treatment of the Church and to ask for an audience with Cardinal Wyszyński. It is now obvious that, despite competition for the Polish soul, the Church and the Communist Party are united by nationalism and neither wants to overstep the limits of Soviet tolerance. (A number of communists also admit to be Catholics.) Ratification of the Polish-West German treaty induced the Vatican to recognize the Polish prelates with dioceses in the Oder-Neisse territories as full-fledged bishops, and the government granted to the Church a title of ownership to its property located there. Genuine harmony has not been worked out because of a lack of agreement on the political status of the Church. The episcopate demands constitutional recognition and rights, while the party wants the Church to accept the political sys-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tem and "friendship" with Soviet Russia. Continuation of this internal strife hinders normalization of Poland's relations with the Vatican.

Clearly, the main strength of the communist regime in Poland has been a familiarity with the major effects of the Second World War and its continuation in the form of the Cold War. For now, the major puzzle is whether this regime will be able to tackle the problems facing it in the era of detente without losing a sense of reality and proportion as the prewar Polish regime did; that is, whether the communist leaders will take full advantage of new opportunities and satisfy the nation. Warsaw is facing the difficult task of balancing the Soviet demand for subordination, the Western expectation of growing independence, and the national ambition that Poland ought to be a truly pluralistic state belonging to Western civilization.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE EFFICACY OF TECHNIQUE: "PROTRACTED CONFLICT" REVISITED*

by Harvey Sicherman and Alan Ned Sabrosky

John Maynard Keynes caught the temper of the times when he wrote, "We are living, then, in an unsatisfactory age of immensely rapid transition in which most, but particularly those in the vanguard, find themselves and their environment ill-adapted to one another."[1] Americans, who usually count the United States in the vanguard of nations, have recently experienced just such a transition in relation to the rest of the world. The earth's most powerful democracy now faces the prospect of an international environment increasingly ill-adapted to its cherished political ideals.

Perhaps the pace and disquieting nature of the transition can best be illustrated by American relations with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. As recently as 1970, a reviewer of influential academic analyses of Soviet foreign policy had to resort to images of the zoo: the Great Beast, the Mellowing Tiger and the Neurotic Bear.[2] Yet, only two years later, Messrs. Nixon and Brezhnev were proclaiming a new era of Soviet-American cooperation in reducing tension, symbolized by an exchange of state visits and solemn

* This article derives from research on two major projects now under way at the Foreign Policy Research Institute: an assessment of the international challenges now faced by the United States ("Beyond Protracted Conflict," by Harvey Sicherman and Alan Ned Sabrosky) and a detailed prescription for U.S. foreign policy ("Beyond Detente," by William R. Kintner).

[1] John Maynard Keynes, "Clissold" (1927), in Keynes, *Essays in Persuasion* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1963), p. 353.

[2] William Welch, *American Images of Soviet Foreign Policy: An Inquiry into Recent Appraisals from the Academic Community* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970).

Harvey Sicherman is a Research Associate of the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He has specialized in studies of the Middle East and the impact of technology on international politics. His publications include *The Yom Kippur War: End of Illusion?* (Sage Publications, Foreign Policy Paper no. 4, 1976) and, with William R. Kintner, *Technology and International Politics: The Crisis of Wishing* (Lexington Books, 1975).

Alan Ned Sabrosky is Assistant Professor of Politics at the Catholic University of America and a Research Associate of the Foreign Policy Research Institute. A specialist in international security affairs and civil-military relations, he has published in numerous anthologies and professional journals, including the *Journal of Conflict Resolution, Asian Affairs, Intercollegiate Review* and *South-East Asian Spectrum.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

declarations of good intentions. The change in attitude toward the People's Republic was even more remarkable. Even as the United States fought a war in Vietnam designed originally to frustrate Chinese ambition, both Washington and Peking were celebrating a newly found common interest in improved relations.

This "immensely rapid transition" in America's policy toward its major adversaries corresponded with a change in American public opinion vis-a-vis international relations. To borrow again from Keynes, "The desire for a quiet life, for reduced commitments, for comfortable terms with our neighbors is now paramount."[3]

It turns out, of course, that the transition has not been so thorough nor the opportunity for comfortable terms so easy to grasp as we imagined only a few years ago. Doubts grow over the Chinese connection in the wake of Mao's death. As for the Soviet Union, former Secretary of State Kissinger, architect of detente, admitted recently, "Yet the hope that these [U.S.] policies would produce permanent stability, positive evolution of the Soviet system, and greater normality was only partially realized."[4]

Given such bewildering events, the natural reaction is to seek an explanation powerful enough to suggest the future even as it sorts out the past. As a measure of the distance we have come in our appreciation of Soviet policy and as a guide to some of the changes that have occurred, a revisit to *Protracted Conflict,* which was regarded by many as an insightful analysis of communist strategy, is enlightening.[5]

Originally published in 1959, *Protracted Conflict* advanced three principal propositions. First, the world was suffering a "systemic revolution," marked by challenges to the fundamental rela-

---

[3] "The Change in Opinion" (1921), in Keynes, p. 51.

[4] "The Permanent Challenge of Peace: U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Union," an address made in San Francisco on February 3, 1976, before a luncheon sponsored by the Commonwealth Club of San Francisco and the World Affairs Council of Northern California; in *Department of State Bulletin,* February 23, 1976, p. 203.

[5] Robert Strausz-Hupé, William R. Kintner, James E. Dougherty and Alvin C. Cottrell, *Protracted Conflict* (New York: Harper & Row, 1959). A Harper Colophon edition, incorporating revisions and an epilogue, was published in 1963. It is used here as the main source. Future references to *Protracted Conflict* will appear in the text between parentheses. In the *New York Times* (May 21, 1959), C. L. Sulzberger called *Protracted Conflict* "a remarkable and penetrating book, a brilliant, cold-blooded, skeptical analysis of the diplomatic techniques and aspirations of communism. It is profound, and its conclusions are direct, logical and terrifying." Bertram Wolfe said, "This slender book is the best that has so far been written, indeed, the first completely adequate book, on the nature of the war which the Communist Empire is waging for the conquest of the world." (Book review, *New York Herald Tribune,* July 18, 1959.) Henry Kissinger, then a professor at Harvard, provided this statement for the book's jacket: "*Protracted Conflict* is an important book dealing with one of the most crucial problems of our time. It should be read by everyone who wishes to understand the nature of our danger."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tionships within and among nations. This revolution, which was essentially of Western origins, could be seen most clearly in the progress of modern technology and the creation of new states from the disintegrating West European colonial empires. Second, the outcome of the revolution — the distribution of power in the new system — would be determined by the struggle between the American-led Western world and the Soviet-led Communist world. Third, the United States and its allies possessed the superior force in this contest but had no clear strategy to use it; the Soviet Union and its cohorts were inferior in strength to the West, but they had a definite method for waging the conflict — the strategy of "protracted conflict."

This strategy was distinguished by four operational principles: (1) the *indirect approach,* pursuing conflict by proxy while avoiding an overt clash with a superior force; (2) *deception and distraction,* employing propaganda and mendacity on a massive scale; (3) *monopoly of the initiative,* utilizing the "war zone-peace zone" concept, an attempt to focus international attention on change and conflict in the noncommunist areas while proclaiming the permanence of communist rule wherever Marxist-Leninist parties came to power; and (4) *attrition and persistence,* seeking to erode the opponent's will to continue the contest.

The first of these principles was the most important, the other three being subordinate to its requirements. Applying the analysis to the international situation, *Protracted Conflict* argued that Soviet leaders, aware of their country's evident inferiority to the West, had adopted a strategy that was at once defensive and aggressive, designed to protect communist gains while expanding communist power until the "correlation of forces" favored Moscow. Not that such a strategy was either new or peculiar to communism. Its antecedents could be found fully developed by earlier military strategists of both West and East.[6] But it meshed especially well with communist theory because the vision of protracted conflict — the weaker overcoming the stronger by evasive tactics, psychological warfare and persistent effort — corresponded neatly with the Marxist-Leninist thesis of class struggle (i.e., the communist minority organizing the weaker, but more numerous, working class to replace the initially stronger, but less numerous, capitalist-bourgeoisie). Lenin's theory of imperialism applied these notions

[6] See B. H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy* (New York: Modern Library, 1974), chap. 10. See also Sun Tzu, *The Art of War,* trans. by Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963) and Mao Tse-tung, "On Protracted War," in *Selected Works,* vol. 2 (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to an international situation marked by empires and colonies. Soviet policy toward the so-called Third World, together with its encouragement of an anti-Western "nonaligned" camp of less-developed states, updated the Leninist thesis without abandoning its essence.

The Cold War might thus be seen as an episode in the systemic revolution in which the communist powers, taking advantage of the tumultuous aftermath of the Second World War and the resentment arising from the impact of the West on the rest of the world, hoped to turn the distribution of power in their favor through the technique of protracted conflict. The persistence of the communist powers, guided as they were by a long-term view, might be underestimated. This in itself would give the communists an important increment of strength in a contest considered by them to be a zero-sum game between fundamentally competitive systems.

In the epilogue to the 1963 edition, the authors of *Protracted Conflict* reiterated their confidence in the original analysis and ventured a bold forecast of the agenda they believed would dominate the next decade:

(1) The major target of Soviet strategy would be U.S.-allied cohesion in building a world order based upon the Atlantic Alliance and West European unity.

(2) Problems in the Western alliance would be more significant to U.S. security than would the Sino-Soviet dispute "so long as both of these powers are fundamentally committed to the political (if not the physical) annihilation of the West." (p. 177.)

(3) The Soviet industrial system was beyond its peak development and would be plagued by increasingly serious technological difficulties.

(4) The major strategic question would be whether the United States would permit Moscow a respite in the arms competition, enabling the Soviet Union to build its arsenal despite economic constraints.

(5) Nuclear war would continue to be unacceptable and conventional war too risky for the communist governments in their current state of inferiority. The only safe violence would be the national liberation wars in the Third World, but these wars were not crucial to Europe's fate.

In reviewing this catalogue, it is important to note that the authors explicitly disavowed several notions popularly attributed to *Protracted Conflict*. They emphasized that the communists were not invincible or superhuman, that protracted conflict was not inevitable or eternal, and that international relations since 1945 were not a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

grim chronicle of defeats for the West. (p. 169 *et passim.*) At the same time, they pleaded for greater understanding of the communist approach to international politics, deeply rooted as it was in the Marxist-Leninist philosophy of conflict-as-the-source-of-progress. It would be as serious an error to believe that communist policy-makers could free themselves of this influence as to suggest that Western statesmen were unaffected by their own political cultures. Constant tension could be expected between the United States and the communist powers because of clashing political principles and the habitual communist exaggeration of foreign danger in order to justify the exactions of dictatorship. So deeply ingrained were these characteristics that "the Soviet leaders . . . long have realized that permanent, genuine coexistence between their system and ours is nonsense. . . . A struggle was and remains inescapable." (p. 147.)

The Record

Protracted Conflict has been criticized for insufficient evidence, exaggeration of the communist role in creating conflict, loose language and the "irrefutability" of its theory.[7] Perhaps the most significant defect of the book for today's reader is its portrayal of communist decision-making as that of a single rational actor, characterized in this case by a well-disciplined ideology with universal ambitions and a dominant center: hence, the phrases "International Communism," "the Communists," "Sino-Soviet bloc" and "Soviet strategy" appear frequently in *Protracted Conflict* as variations on the theme. In the light of events since the theory was advanced, however, it is now evident that neither the international communist movement nor even perhaps the Soviet Union itself can be understood in this framework.[8] Though the authors sought to correct this in the 1963 edition by recognizing that the Sino-Soviet rift was an important obstacle to Soviet (communist) efficiency, they concluded incorrectly that this was a dispute the West should not attempt to exploit. Exaggeration of the conflict between the two communist powers might lead to a relaxation of vigilance on the part of the Western states, thereby advancing the cause of both Moscow and Peking.

[7] See Welch; also Ole R. Holsti, "The Study of International Politics Makes Strange Bedfellows: Theories of the Radical Right and the Radical Left," *American Political Science Review*, March 1974.

[8] For a review and critique of the "single rational actor" approach, see A. L. Horelick, A. R. Johnson and J. D. Steinbrunner, "The Study of Soviet Foreign Policy: A Review of Decision-Theory-Related Approaches," Rand study no. R-1334, December 1973, p. 25 *et passim*. Also see Lawrence Freedman, "Logic, Politics and Foreign Policy Processes," *International Affairs*, July 1976.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The ultimate test of any thesis, however, lies in its capacity to explain events. The authors of *Protracted Conflict* wrote at a time when the danger from the Soviet Union and the international communist movement appeared very great indeed. Dissatisfaction with American efforts to meet this challenge pervaded both popular opinion and academic analysis. As Professor Henry Kissinger put it:

> The United States cannot afford another decline like that which has characterized the past decade and a half. Fifteen more years of deterioration of our position in the world such as we have experienced since World War II would find us reduced to Fortress America in a world in which we had become largely irrelevant.[9]

When the second edition of *Protracted Conflict* was published in 1963, these fears seemed unfounded. The United States and its cause appeared to be in the ascendant. The missile-gap alarm of 1960 had been dispelled by a five-to-one American superiority in strategic missiles and a three-to-one advantage in strategic bombers. The U.S. Navy held unchallenged global naval superiority. These capabilities more than overcame NATO's conventional inferiority on the European front.

Political and economic prospects appeared equally promising. The continental West European states were embarked upon a hopeful political experiment (the European Economic Community) in the context of unprecedented prosperity, and the British were eager to join. Despite the dissolution of the West European colonial empires, and the frequently anti-Western sentiments expressed by the successor states, the United States and its allies enjoyed majorities in the UN. International trade and development still revolved about the Bretton Woods arrangement, based upon the American dollar and the politico-economic systems of the industrial democracies. In short, the objectives of American postwar policy — "to create half a world, a free half . . . without blowing the whole to pieces in the process"[10] — seemed firmly rooted in the realities of diplomacy, arms and commerce.

In the face of these successes, the communist movement seemed to be in growing disarray. The developing antagonism between the Chinese and Soviet regimes was eroding a "Sino-Soviet bloc" against the West. Khrushchev's Soviet Union was a backward state whose military pretensions had been exposed by the Cuban fiasco in 1962, whose industrial and agricultural foundations were

[9] Henry A. Kissinger, *Necessity for Choice: Prospects of American Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961), p. 1.

[10] Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969), *apologia pro libro hoc.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

inadequate to fulfill extravagant promises of progress, and whose security was threatened with a two-front conflict because of Mao's hostility. Although communist regimes had been imposed throughout Eastern Europe and the Chinese version was installed safely in Peking, the Soviet Union was still a severely restricted continental power. These circumstances and the accession of Brezhnev and Kosygin to power in 1964 brought about a gradual but substantial change in Soviet foreign policy, a change apparently in accord with the "indirect approach" laid out in *Protracted Conflict*. The dramatic militance of the Khrushchev era was abandoned, and the old doctrine of "peaceful coexistence" — revived by Khrushchev himself after the Cuban Missile Crisis — replaced it. This attitude produced a new thaw in East-West relations, the third since 1945. Unlike its predecessors in 1955 and 1959, however, this one was to give a more lasting direction to Soviet policy.

The decision to adhere to the doctrine of "peaceful coexistence" for a prolonged period may rank as the major contribution to Soviet security of the Brezhnev regime. By endorsing the notion of some kind of accommodation with the West, albeit in the context of a continuing "conflict between systems," the steady Soviet acquisition of military power already begun by Khrushchev could proceed without unduly alarming its strongest opponent. Thus, the new style of Soviet diplomacy, eventually codified in the declaration of basic principles signed by Brezhnev and Nixon at the 1972 Moscow summit, facilitated Moscow's emergence as a global military power.

A brief review of events substantiates this assessment. Between 1958 and 1963 Khrushchev brought the Soviet Union into conflict with the West over Berlin, the Congo and Cuba, interspersed with threats over Lebanon and the U-2 incident — each time with dramatic intensity. After 1963, Moscow sparred with Washington through proxies in Southeast Asia (where the Soviet Union was not the only communist power involved, and where Washington focused on the Chinese role); it intrigued with Gaullist France to damage NATO, while promoting European security schemes that excluded the United States, and it sustained the vehement but ineffectual Castro campaign to spread revolution throughout Latin America. Even in the Middle East, where Soviet policy raised the greatest public alarm, Moscow very carefully avoided a direct confrontation with the United States. President Johnson took the threats conveyed to him at the end of the Six Day War seriously enough to redeploy the Sixth Fleet and to caution Israel against attacking Damascus, but not

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

seriously enough to publicize a national military alert.[11] Indeed, the first major evidence of a Soviet capacity to extend its military force beyond Europe — the resupply of Egypt and Syria after the Six Day War — did not receive extensive attention, even though this move probably cost Israel the political success it sought.

Moscow's response thus combined the indirect approach of protracted conflict with the steady accumulation of the strategic and conventional strength necessary to sustain a global foreign policy. In this endeavor, the Soviets were to benefit from a decade of American shortsightedness, some of it embarrassing to recall. Statements from American officials of the period evince an astonishing faith in long-lasting U.S. supremacy. Foremost was Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, whose decisions produced the basic American arsenal of the late sixties; he asserted in the spring of 1965 that the Soviet leaders "have decided that they have lost the quantitative race, and that they are not seeking to engage us in that contest."[12] In 1967 a State Department official gave this general assessment:

> If we look at the last twenty years there has been a shift from a period, first of all, of polycentrism in international affairs, to a period of bipolarity, to what is today a period of U.S. paramountcy. . . . The United States today is the only effective global military power in the world.[13]

With these advantages, both communist powers could be contained. If the process were pursued with sufficient vigor over a long enough period, so the argument went, it would compel the Soviets and the Chinese to reorder their priorities, thereby setting the stage for greater cooperation. This approach was tried out first on Moscow: through the Test Ban Treaty, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and, eventually, the strategic arms limitation talks, the United States and the Soviet Union sought to demonstrate how to control nuclear arms, thus preventing the panicky acquisition of such weapons by potentially less responsible states.[14] The Chinese, whose rhetoric advocated specialized revolutionary warfare, seemed to be much less pliable adversaries; it was hoped that a U.S. victory in Vietnam would change their minds.

---

[11] Lyndon Baines Johnson, *From the Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency* (New York: Popular Library, 1971), pp. 301-303.

[12] *U.S. News & World Report*, April 12, 1965, p. 52.

[13] Quoted in Alastair Buchan, *Power and Equilibrium in the 1970s* (New York: Praeger, 1973), p. 68.

[14] A succinct exposition of this approach may be found in W. W. Rostow's "Introduction: The Politics of Arms Control or How to Make Nuclear Weapons Wither Away," in William R. Kintner and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., eds., *SALT: Implications for Arms Control in the 1970s* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1973), pp. xv-xvi.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Vietnam war — the single greatest calamity of post-war American foreign policy — is an excellent example of how the indirect approach, unappreciated by Washington, served Moscow's purposes. The misapplication of U.S. force was joined to a distortion of target when the Maoist regime continued to be the chief object of the Asian version of containment. It became increasingly clear as the war escalated that the Chinese were not the mainstay of the Hanoi regime and were hardly able to foment trouble anywhere. After the failure of the Great Leap Forward and the break with the Soviet Union over arms and aid, Mao indulged in the great Cultural Revolution, which paralyzed his country for several crucial years. In the meantime, American policy sought to avoid the error of Korea, by not provoking Chinese intervention.

Simultaneously, the Soviet-American detente was to focus upon strategic arms without explicit reference to other issues. In view of Soviet priorities, it is not surprising that Moscow was quite interested in preventing nuclear proliferation but less anxious to pursue strategic arms limitation until its missile construction program was well under way. Given Washington's desire to pursue detente through strategic weapons control and to fight an anti-communist (and anti-Chinese) war in Southeast Asia, the Soviet role (as well as the determination of the Vietnamese communists) was consistently underplayed until the very end. As for the Chinese, when the Cultural Revolution abated, Peking's ideological commitment to Hanoi continued. It required the Czechoslovakian invasion, the Sino-Soviet border incidents of 1969, the growing Soviet strategic arsenal and the ascendancy of Soviet influence in Hanoi to awaken the People's Republic of China to its strategic blunder. Paradoxically, Moscow's very success in strengthening itself against both Peking and Washington was to facilitate Sino-American rapprochement in the decade to come.

The sixties were also a time of deterioration in U.S.-West European relations. The authors of *Protracted Conflict* were not alone in their belief that "the dominant motif within the Atlantic Community is a confident feeling that NATO is being slowly transformed from a treaty organization into an enduring partnership." (p. 178.) But the European Idea, made more compatible with Atlanticism by the Kennedy declaration of interdependence, was a victim of French opposition and growing European indifference in the context of the American security guarantee and general prosperity.

Both these conditions were the source of increasing trans-atlantic disputes, whose acerbity drained the alliance of its cohesion.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The machinations of Gaullist France, the debate over the "flexible response" strategy, the ambiguities of "parity" and "sufficiency," European criticism of the Vietnam war — all these contributed to deepening distrust of mutual fidelity. Relations were complicated further when the recovered European economies emerged as major competitors to the United States, and the Bretton Woods system — predicated on an outdated distribution of economic power — tottered under the weight of European and Japanese commercial success. That such prosperity was a primary objective of the United States did not disguise the unhappy conclusion of the decade: the United States remained the indispensable defender of its chief commercial rivals.

A similar overconfidence and lack of foresight marked the development of the energy crisis. In almost direct proportion to the increasing import of Middle East oil, European political and military influence among the oil producers declined. The United States, though relying less on imported oil, did just as badly in managing the emergency when it came.

In effect, the Atlantic allies had ceased doing "great things together." The pattern then became one of each country increasing its own national assets while holding to the same international institutional arrangements. In the meantime, the political vision needed to sustain these arrangements for the next generation proved lacking. The monetary and the energy problems were prime examples of obvious dangers, treated by ineffectual subterfuges, that exploded with devastating impact upon an already corroded political association. The consequence of failure in these fields was to open the very basis of allied prosperity and security to new forces with little reluctance to upset the economic order. The upshot was international inflation, aggravated by American deficit-financing of the Vietnam war, and a rapid erosion of the financial stability and mutual confidence that had been the product of twenty years of consultation and cooperation.

In this entire drama of decaying partnership, the Soviet Union played a curious role. Eager at first to impair the Common Market, Moscow later paid the supreme compliment of emulation when COMECON became the vehicle for greater coordination of the Soviet and East European economies. General De Gaulle's schemes of national independence were nurtured insofar as they promised to weaken NATO. When more important objects were in view, however, such as retaining control of Eastern Europe, a different policy emerged. In 1968 the Kremlin jettisoned half a decade

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of careful diplomacy, designed to erode NATO, by crushing Czechoslovakia's "experiment" when it appeared to endanger Soviet control of Eastern Europe or perhaps the Moscow regime itself. At the same time, the Warsaw Pact's edge in conventional forces and Moscow's burgeoning nuclear arsenal fed West European fears of American infidelity. But whatever the nuances of this protracted conflict, the economic crisis that overtook the industrial democracies in the early seventies, worsened by the energy crisis a short time later, was to Moscow's advantage, though not of Moscow's making.

If we compare the agenda put forth in 1963 by the authors of *Protracted Conflict* with the evidence available a decade later, we may conclude that —

(1) the major target of Soviet strategy — the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance — had indeed suffered, but more because of the inability of the United States and its allies to reform their economic and political relationships than because of Soviet tactics;

(2) the successful Soviet military build-up in the context of the Sino-Soviet dispute had rapidly increased Peking's stake in the political survival of the West;

(3) the Soviet industrial system, except for the favored military sector, was indeed plagued by various difficulties aggravated by the chronic failure of Soviet agriculture;

(4) the Soviet Union had been able to improve substantially its strategic military position without alarming its opponents in the West; and

(5) it was still too dangerous for the major powers to contemplate nuclear warfare, but the "wars of liberation" in Asia and Africa were, if anything, becoming more dangerous as the spread of armaments and potential involvement by rival superpowers continued to mount.

If the authors of *Protracted Conflict* erred in viewing the Soviet leadership as a single rational actor, if they exaggerated Moscow's influence over other communist states and in general mistook ideological harmony for operational unity, their basic theme of the indirect approach as a guide to Soviet strategy seems to have been borne out by the forementioned events. After 1963, the code of the indirect approach — conflict by proxy while avoiding a direct clash — enabled Moscow to survive critical years of both political and military weakness.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Systemic Revolution and the Movement of Power

By 1969, the characteristics of the international environment described in *Protracted Conflict* were changing rapidly. Signs of a new epoch appeared: the Sino-Soviet border clashes; the commencement of strategic arms limitation talks with the United States, where parity rather than superiority was Washington's objective; the political uproar attending the end of the foreign policy consensus in the United States.

Most students of international relations believed that the bipolar era, marked by the supremacy of the United States and the Soviet Union, was now giving way to a multipolar era, during which other states would intrude their growing power upon the domains of Washington and Moscow. Their equality in nuclear arms might become the basis for mutual restraint, and a general restriction of their resort to force might enter as an element of policy. Indeed, military force itself would no longer command near universal acceptance as the necessary handmaiden of foreign policy.[15] Instead, economic influence and a growing spirit of cooperation seemed more appropriate to a world of growing economic interdependence, beset by such problems as environmental pollution.

These visions of a more peaceful and prosperous period have yet to be fulfilled. Power in the seventies has proved elusive to define and sometimes difficult to locate.[16] The fragile Soviet-American consensus on the rules of the game at the nuclear level has come too late to dominate the interplay of world politics. The new players have yet to agree upon rules of their own, or even on the necessity for a rulebook.

A many-sided contest with several levels of struggle can be discerned, depending on the number and strength of the participants:

(1) The Chinese-Soviet-American relationship — bound on one side by Moscow's desire to hamper and contain the People's Republic while preventing an American-Chinese alliance; on another side by American and Chinese anxiety over Soviet strength; and on yet a third side by the U.S.-Soviet status as the only global military powers.

---

[15] See Seyom Brown, "The Changing Essence of Power," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1973, and F. S. Northedge, *The Use of Force in International Relations* (London: Faber & Faber, 1974). See also Klaus Knorr, *Power and Wealth: The Political Economy of International Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1973) and Susan Strange, "What Is Economic Power?," *International Journal*, Spring 1975.

[16] See Stanley Hoffman, "Notes on the Elusiveness of Modern Power," *International Journal*, Spring 1975.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(2) The less-developed countries' agitation for a new economic order — stimulated by the petroleum cartel's successful manipulation of oil prices and resisted by the developed countries, a negotiation from which the major communist states have excluded themselves.

(3) The expansion of the military capabilities of many smaller states, including the possibility of nuclear proliferation, in the context of violent regional disputes.

(4) The issues raised by technology, such as a new Law of the Sea, which involve virtually all states but which are complicated in turn by the contests above.

The dimensions of these disputes did not appear immediately. Indeed, the course of events during 1969-1972 suggested that the demise of the world described in *Protracted Conflict* had also wrought a profound change in the twenty-year rivalry between the United States and the major communist powers. Much of this was due to innovative American foreign policy. What came later to be called the Nixon Doctrine[17] revolved around four points: the detente with the Soviet Union, whose purpose was to stabilize the strategic arms equation and extend this collaboration into rules of restraint at other levels of conflict ("linkage"); the new partnership with allies, which involved initially American demands for greater "burden-sharing"; the encouragement of new "centers of power" (the PRC among them), which would play an important part in ensuring international stability; and the conclusion of the war in Vietnam, establishing a basis for a fresh consensus with Congress without shackling executive authority.

Perhaps the most significant elements in this approach were the concepts of linkage and new centers of power. The linkage theory operated to spectacular but short-lived American advantage. Cuba and Jordan during 1970, the Suez Canal during 1971, Cambodia during 1970, and South Vietnam during 1972-1973 — in all these theaters, the United States was able to induce Soviet restraint through a combination of local force, the "opening" to China, and a threat to scuttle detente. But once the major agreements of detente were concluded, such as the Berlin accords, the summit exchanges

[17] See *U. S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s: A New Strategy for Peace*, a report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, president of the United States, February 18, 1970, p. 2 *et passim*. Later versions of what came to be called State of the World messages were expanded to include the "Structure of Peace," supposedly laid solidly in the 1972 summits, and the economic disorders of 1973. The Watergate crisis apparently ended the flow of these extensive documents, which contain rich source material on the Nixon administration's view of the world — at least the view it wished Americans to share.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and SALT I, once the general atmosphere of a relaxation of tensions became manifest, Moscow felt free to resume its policy of exploiting regional conflict.

Already in December 1971, only two months before the Nixon visit to China, the Indo-Pakistani War demonstrated that neither Peking nor Washington could prevent the dismemberment of their Pakistani ally by a Soviet-armed India. In October 1973, the Yom Kippur War was facilitated by Soviet arms and accompanied by a Soviet appeal for economic warfare against the West, even as Moscow proclaimed the value of detente and peaceful coexistence. In 1975 the North Vietnamese victory over South Vietnam, in what had become a large conventional war, was made possible by heavy Soviet arms shipments during the preceding year. To climax the dismantling of linkage, the end of the Portuguese empire in Africa was distinguished by an impressive demonstration of Moscow's global reach, as the Soviets plucked their Cuban allies from the Caribbean and deposited them in Angola a hemisphere away.

These incidents were bold and classic cases of the indirect approach analyzed in *Protracted Conflict*. In South and Southeast Asia, the weakness of the newborn American-Chinese connection was exposed by local forces with heavy Soviet support. In the Middle East, Moscow's armaments and diplomacy exacerbated a regional conflict that revealed serious Western vulnerability — a situation not created by the Soviets but one that they hoped to exploit. Finally, in Vietnam and Angola, Moscow simply outbid American and Chinese competitors through a willingness to supply arms on a grand scale and demonstrated the utility of carefully controlled force.

The period of detente had yielded an embarrassing paradox. As Washington hailed the emergence of new centers of power in Western Europe, Japan and the People's Republic of China, a new era of mutual restraint and reduction of tension between the United States and the Soviet Union was proclaimed. But during the seven years of this sophisticated policy, the Soviet Union emerged as a second superpower with global military reach. Thus, the very instrument associated with tension — military power — was being enlarged, improved and extended by the Soviet Union at the same time that the relative capabilities of American conventional forces declined and the "relaxation of tensions" proceeded.

By 1976, the American position had become precarious: the stability of the nuclear balance was threatened by growing Soviet strength; NATO's war-fighting strategy had become more dependent than ever upon early nuclear intervention, thanks to the greater

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

numbers and quality of Soviet conventional forces in Europe; the Soviet navy had established a considerable force in the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean and the Sea of Japan; and Soviet airlift and base facilities increased Moscow's unprecedented capacity to intervene around the world. Against these facts, the dream of a new balance of international forces based on several centers of power, the opening to China, and the web of restraining links had yet to be realized.

Beyond Protracted Conflict: The Future of the Multilateral Era

The circumstances confronting American foreign policy today are thus very different from those described in *Protracted Conflict*. The "systemic revolution" of the fifties and sixties involved the emergence of many new states from the disintegrating European empires into an international situation where Western institutions still prevailed. Today, these institutions, where they have not collapsed or been transformed beyond recognition, are under severe strain. The persistent contest for world leadership — the struggle between the United States and a Soviet-dominated international communism postulated in *Protracted Conflict* — has also been altered dramatically. For much of the world, security is now influenced by the Sino-Soviet rivalry and by the still deep chasm between American and Soviet interests.

Put in a different perspective, the advent of a new international order is at hand; the system set up after World War II has been overthrown, and its constituents are searching nervously for new sources of security. Recent American foreign policy helped bury the old system without creating a new one to take its place. To America's credit, major assets, including the system of alliances, have come through frayed but largely intact. Without underestimating our own strength, however, we must recognize that through the persistent pursuit of apparently marginal advantages, no one of which could be construed as a dramatic, direct challenge to American security, the Soviet Union has definitely shifted the "correlation of forces" more to its favor. Thus far, the events of the seventies have not altered this movement.

For the world's three greatest powers, the next decade may be of decisive importance. The Soviet Union must forge a world order favorable to itself on the basis of what may be a transient military advantage, or acknowledge that the rise, or renaissance, of competing centers of power has made its bid for hegemony unattainable. China must surmount the problems of economic under-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

development and the political succession to Mao while forestalling Soviet military action, or court disaster in both domestic and foreign affairs. The United States must re-create the political consensus necessary for a credible foreign policy and use its strength to prevent an imbalance of power in the international system, or risk the choice of either futile conflict with its adversaries or frustrating accommodation to their interests.

Recent American foreign policy has been predicated upon the improvement of U.S. relations with both Moscow and Peking, even as they pursue their quarrel. But the Soviet Union and the People's Republic still share certain attributes bound to make life uncomfortable for the United States. First, they remain committed ideologically and practically to a view of world history as a continuous struggle between classes, both within and among nations.[18] This struggle does not conclude in "equilibrium" or "balance" but rather in the elimination or transformation of the adversary. Of course, such an ideology must be adjusted to the given "correlation of forces," but the level of conflict tolerable to the communist powers, even under a regime of "peaceful coexistence," may remain uncomfortably high.

Second, both Moscow and Peking recognize the political value of military power and place the highest priority on its accumulation. This priority has given the Soviet Union a global military reach only thirty years after the devastation of World War II, under circumstances where its historical European and Asian rivals remain severely limited regional powers. The Chinese development is more problematic, but its purpose seems unmistakable. If the Sino-Soviet contest goes on long enough, we can expect to see Peking develop a global reach as well. Whether the United States could or should do anything to prevent this is another question. Somewhat like the British before World War I, we may no longer be able to maintain a force superior to the strength of our two most powerful potential adversaries. Unless something can be done to modify Chinese and Soviet priorities, however, we cannot hope to stabilize the nuclear and conventional arms equations.

Third, and finally, both ideology and experience with the "correlation of forces" suggest the continued use of the indirect strategy by the two communist powers. So long as a nuclear con-

[18] For recent discussions of both Soviet and Chinese views of the emerging international system, see Nils H. Wessell, "Soviet Views of the Emerging International System," a paper delivered at the 1976 Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Toronto, February 1976, and W.A.C. Adie's "China and the Detente: Theory and Practice," *Lugano Review*, no. 1, 1975.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

frontation remains too dangerous or — in the Chinese case — so long as it is too early for a direct test of strength, conflicts by proxy and through wars of national liberation remain the preferred form of military struggle. If the nuclear stand-off between the United States and the Soviet Union persists, the regional conventional balance becomes of paramount importance. Thus, a basis exists for great-power collaboration — the avoidance of nuclear war — but the definition of spheres of influence and the rules governing the relationship between the spheres remain to be determined.

The ideology of conflict, the accumulation of military power and the indirect approach — i.e., the main features of the statecraft practiced by Moscow and Peking, both against each other and against the rest of the world — will endanger the transition toward a more stable international system. That the USSR and the PRC have fallen to fighting each other while they seek to improve relations with the United States is no guarantee either of our safety or of the permanence of their conflict. But the success they have enjoyed in their recent contests with the West is a measure of what Raymond Aron has called "the efficacy of a technique of action,"[19] characterized by strategic vision and tactical flexibility. Ultimately, Washington's ability to blunt the efficacy of this technique with its own vision and flexibility will determine in large measure "whether Western civilization is sinking into its final twilight or will survive to erect the modern world order which only the West can build." (p. 151.)

[19] Raymond Aron, *The Century of Total War* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1954), p. 341.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

publications received

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Détente: Prospects for Democracy and Dictatorship. By Alexander Solzhenitsyn. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1976. 112 pp. n.p. Two of Solzhenitsyn's major essays accompanied by a number of commentaries from others.

International and Intercultural Communication. Edited by Heinz-Dietrich Fischer and John Calhoun Merrill. New York: Hastings House, 1976. 524 pp. $22.50 ($12.50, paper). Articles on the structure and impact of international mass media.

International Organisations in World Politics: Yearbook 1975. Edited by Avi Shlaim. Boulder: Westview Press, 1976. 228 pp. $27.50. Group of competent but not unusual essays by noted scholars.

Types of International Society. By Evan Luard. New York: Macmillan, The Free Press, 1976. 389 pp. $14.95. An examination of the possible contributions of sociology and related disciplines to the study of international relations.

International Relations: A Policymaker Focus. By Robert L. Wendzel. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1977. 286 pp. $7.95 (paper).

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS AND TECHNOLOGY

Coping with the Oil Crisis: French and German Experiences. By Horst Menderhausen. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, for Resources for the Future, Inc., 1976. 110 pp. $7.50 ($2.95, paper). Much background on and responses to the 1973-1974 oil crisis.

Fear in the Countryside: The Control of Agricultural Resources in the Poor Countries by Nonpeasant Elites. By E. G. Vallianatos. Cambridge: Ballinger, 1976. 180 pp. n.p. An attempt to bridge the gap between Western technology and the traditional peasant.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Middle East Oil Money and Its Future Expenditure. By Nicholas Fallon. New York: Crane, Russak, 1975. 230 pp. $25.50. A courageous study of an important question that generally yields only educated guesses as answers. Fallon offers very useful data and some projections with a reasonable chance of fulfillment. [*The publisher and price of this book were listed incorrectly in the Summer 1976 issue of ORBIS.*]

Monetary Interdependence and International Monetary Reform: A European Case Study. By Paul De Grauwe. Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, Saxon House/Lexington Books, 1976. 118 pp. $12.50. Uses a mathematical model to explain monetary disturbances of the past ten years.

Oil Money and the World Economy. By Yoon S. Park. Boulder: Westview Press, 1976. 205 pp. $27.50. Uses econometric models to analyze the petrodollar problem.

Oil Resources: Who Gets What How? By Kenneth W. Dam. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976. 193 pp. $11.95. Excellent study of the Norwegian and British experiences in allocating benefits from oil production.

Reshaping the International Order: A Report to the Club of Rome. By Jan Tinbergen. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1976. 325 pp. $4.95 (paper). Report presented in late 1976 on progress in organizing interdependence among nations.

Energy Demand Studies: Major Consuming Countries—Analyses of 1972 Demand and Projections of 1985 Demand. First Technical Report of the Workshop on Alternative Energy Strategies (WAES). By Paul S. Basile and Carroll L. Wilson. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1976. 553 pp. $20.00.

MILITARY AND ARMS CONTROL

Armaments and Disarmament in the Nuclear Age: A Handbook. By the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1976. 308 pp. $18.00. A reasonably concise summary of the status of different armaments, both in use and under development.

Civilian Control of the Military: Theory and Cases from Developing Countries. Edited by Claude E. Welch, Jr. Albany: State University

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of New York Press, 1976. 337 pp. $20.00. Aspects of civil-military relations in ten countries.

Developing the ICBM: A Study in Bureaucratic Politics. By Edmund Beard. New York: Columbia University Press, 1976. 273 pp. $15.00. A mixture of bureaucracies and technology.

Arms Traffic: A Selected Bibliography. By Arthur Gillingham. Los Angeles: California State University, Center for the Study of Armament and Disarmament, 1976. 42 pp. n.p.

How Much Defense Spending is Enough? By Jack Kemp and Les Aspin. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1976. 64 pp. $2.00 (paper).

The Law of War and Dubious Weapons. By the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1976. 78 pp. $11.95 (paper).

THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA

As It Was: An Inside View of Politics and Power in the '50s and '60s. By Henry Cabot Lodge. New York: W. W. Norton, 1976. 224 pp. $8.95. Memoirs, replete with anecdotes, concentrating on the early years.

The Committee of One Million: "China Lobby" Politics, 1953-1971. By Stanley D. Bachrack. New York: Columbia University Press, 1976. 371 pp. $14.95. Use of some new data to explore the history of the "China lobby" in Congress and the executive branch.

Detente and Defense: A Reader. Edited by Robert J. Pranger. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1976. 445 pp., $4.50 (paper). Documents and secondary commentaries.

Managing an Alliance: The Politics of U.S.-Japanese Relations. By I. M. Destler, Priscilla Clapp, Hideo Sato and Haruhiro Fukui. Washington: Brookings, 1976. 209 pp. $9.95 ($3.95, paper). Many perspectives on an alliance fraught with problems.

Remaking Foreign Policy: The Organizational Connection. By Graham Allison and Peter Szanton. New York: Basic Books, 1976. 238 pp. $10.95. Provocative, well-argued study of changes proposed for foreign policy structures.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE

The Future of Soviet Military Power. Edited by Lawrence L. Whetten. New York: Crane, Russak, 1976. 190 pp. $14.50. A distinguished set of essays relating changes in Soviet military strength to the fading of detente.

Khrushchev: The Years in Power. By Roy A. Medvedev and Zhores A. Medvedev; translated by Andrew R. Durkin. New York: Columbia University Press, 1976. 198 pp. $10.95. Portrait of Khrushchev as an adventurer; his downfall was due to incompetence in agricultural policy.

Model or Ally? The Communist Powers and the Developing Countries. By Richard Lowenthal. New York: Oxford University Press, 1977. 400 pp. $12.95. A study of the transformation of Russian communism from an ideology into an imperialist doctrine.

The Multinationals and East-West Relations: Towards Transideological Collaboration. By J. Wilczynski. Boulder: Westview Press, 1976. 235 pp. $27.50. Examination of East-West cooperation in the commercial sphere.

The Political Economy of East-West Trade. By Connie M. Friesen. New York: Praeger, 1976. 203 pp. $18.50. Perceptions and realities explored for both East and West.

L'URSS et la Révolution Cubaine. By Jacques Levesque. Montreal: Les Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 1976. 220 pp. $15.00. Evolution of the Soviet presence in Cuba; the author sees a stable, "mature" relationship.

Comparative Patterns of Foreign Policy and Trade: The Communist Balkans in International Politics. By Cal Clark and Robert L. Farlow. Bloomington: Indiana University, International Development Research Center, Studies in East European and Soviet Planning, Development and Trade, no. 23, 1976. 152 pp. $6.00 (paper).

Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: A Polish View. By the Polish Institute of International Affairs. Warsaw: Polish Scientific Publishers, 1976. 291 pp. n.p.

The Soviet Theater Nuclear Offensive. By Joseph D. Douglass, Jr. Washington: GPO, under the auspices of the United States Air Force, 1976. 127 pp. $1.60 (paper).

Warning to the West. By Alexander Solzhenitsyn. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1976. 146 pp. $7.95 ($2.95, paper).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

WESTERN EUROPE

The Crisis of the Dictatorships: Portugal, Greece, Spain. By Nicos Poulantzas; translated by David Fernback. Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1976. 166 pp. $10.50. Socialist analysis of the crisis in NATO's southern flank.

The Futures of Europe. Edited by Wayland Kennet. New York: Cambridge University Press, for the Commission of the European Communities, 1976. 242 pp. $14.95. Based on the "Europe Plus Thirty Report" outlining long-term planning options for the European Communities.

Portuguese Revolution, 1974-76. Edited by Lester A. Sobel. New York: Facts on File, 1976. 151 pp. $8.95. Chronology of a changing revolution.

European Security—The CSCE Final Act: Text and Commentary. By G G Crean. Toronto: The Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1976. 75 pp. $1.50 (paper).

ASIA

China's African Revolution. By Alan Hutchison. Boulder: Westview Press, 1976. 313 pp. $14.95. Historical survey.

Disputed Islands in the South China Sea: Paracels, Spratlys, Pratas, Macclesfield Bank. By Dieter Heinzig. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, for the Hamburg Institute of Asian Affairs, 1976. 58 pp. DM 24.00 (paper). Complete data on the disputes; includes maps, legal claims and territorial limits.

Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence: From Sukarno to Soeharto. By Franklin B. Weinstein. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1976. 384 pp. $17.50. Comprehensive and incisive perspective on the economics of Indonesia's foreign policy.

Korea: A Divided Nation. Edited by Se-Jin Kim and Chang-hyun Cho. Silver Spring, Md.: Research Institute on Korean Affairs, 1976. 329 pp. n.p. Analysis of the problem of unification.

China's Scientific Policies: Implications for International Cooperation. By Charles P. Ridley. Washington and Stanford: AEI-Hoover, Policy Study no. 20, 1976. 92 pp. $3.00 (paper).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Korea: Problems and Issues in a Rapidly Growing Economy. By Parvez Hasan. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, for the World Bank, 1976. 277 pp. $15.00.

Southern Asia: The Politics of Poverty & Peace. Volume 13 of **Critical Choices for Americans.** Edited by Donald C. Hellman. Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, Lexington Books, 1976. 297 pp. n.p.

LATIN AMERICA

Argentina, 1943-1976: The National Revolution and Resistance. By Donald C. Hodges. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1976. 207 pp. $4.95 (paper). Well-informed study of the left-wing Peronist factions in Argentina and their efforts to obtain power.

Armies and Politics in Latin America. Edited by Abraham F. Lowenthal. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1976. 356 pp. $22.00 ($9.00, paper). A well-organized combination of general interpretations and case studies on a subject of perpetual relevance to Latin American domestic politics.

My Missions for Revolutionary Bolivia, 1944-1962. By Victor Andrade. Edited and with an introduction by Cole Blasier. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1976. 200 pp. $11.95. Memoirs of former Bolivian foreign minister and ambassador to the United States.

Oil and Politics in Modern Brazil. By Peter Seaborn Smith. Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1976. 289 pp. $19.95. The long Brazilian experience with nationalized oil exploration.

The United States and the Southern Cone: Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay. By Arthur P. Whitaker. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976. 464 pp. $20.00. A comprehensive and literate history of U.S. interests in the subregion.

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

The Baath Party: A History from Its Origins to 1966. By John F. Devlin. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1976. 372 pp. $11.95. Domestic and transnational influence of the Baath Party in the Middle East.

Egypt in the Arab World: The Elements of Foreign Policy. By A. I. Dawisha. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Halstead Press, 1976. 234 pp. $24.50. Structure of Egypt's foreign policy in the region.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Palestinian Movement in Politics. By Paul A. Jureidini and William E. Hazen. Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, Lexington Books, 1976. 139 pp. $15.00. Brief explanation of factions and personalities.

The Persian Gulf: An Introduction to Its Peoples, Politics, and Economics. By David E. Long. Boulder: Westview Press, 1976. 172 pp. $13.50. Survey of U.S. interests in a key area.

Social Change and Political Participation in Turkey. By Ergun Ozbudun. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977. 254 pp. $13.50. Comprehensive study of Turkish political development; utilizes quantitative data.

Arab Perceptions of American Foreign Policy During the October War. By William A. Rugh. Washington: The Middle East Institute, 1976. 51 pp. $2.50 (paper).

The Middle East: Oil, Conflict & Hope. Volume 10 of **Critical Choices for Americans.** Edited by A. L. Udovitch. Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, Lexington Books, 1976. 557 pp. n.p.

Revolution and Political Leadership: Algeria, 1954-1968. By William B. Quandt. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1976 (hardbound, 1969). 313 pp. $3.95.

AFRICA

Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents, 1975-76. Edited by Colin Legum. New York: Africana, 1976. 1,150 pp. $50.00. The annual volume with its usual comprehensiveness on African developments of the preceding year.

The African Diaspora: Interpretive Essays. Edited by Martin L. Kilson and Robert I. Rotberg. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976. 510 pp. $18.50. Superb insights into the cultural and historical bases of African influence on other (primarily American) societies.

English-speaking South Africa Today: Proceedings of the National Conference, July 1974. Edited by André de Villiers. Cape Town: Oxford University Press, for the 1820 Settlers National Monument Foundation, 1976. 387 pp. $17.50. Collection of papers exploring the problems faced by one group of modern South Africans in cultural limbo.

Strategy for Development. Edited by John Barratt, David S. Collier, Kurt Glaser and Herman Mönnig. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1976. 324 pp. n.p. Many perspectives on the problems of economic development, with primary focus on southern Africa.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Tanzania and Nyerere: A Study of Ujamaa and Nationhood. By William Redman Duggan and John R. Civille. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1976. 290 pp. $10.95. Sympathetic survey of Tanzania's attempt to develop economically on an independent path.

Uganda: The Asian Exiles. By Thomas and Margaret Melady. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1976. 86 pp. $6.95. Description of the uprooting of Asians from Uganda; highly sympathetic to the exiled minority.

War Clouds on the Horn of Africa: A Crisis for Détente. By Tom J. Farer. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1976. 157 pp. $3.75 (paper). Best study to date of instability in northeast Africa as related to U.S. interests.

Africa: From Mystery to Maze. Volume 11 of **Critical Choices for Americans.** Edited by Helen Kitchen. Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, Lexington Books, 1976. 412 pp. n.p.

Africa South of the Sahara, 1976-77. (Sixth edition.) Published by Europa Publications; distributed by Gale Research Co., 1976. 1,149 pp. $63.00.

South Africa—The Vital Link. Edited by Robert L. Schuettinger. Washington: Council on American Affairs, 1976. 120 pp. $5.00 (paper).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Transnational Perspectives

An International Journal

of

Federalism and World Affairs

If you are interested in world affairs, particularly those concerned with establishing transnational frameworks for improving human development and global stability, you should subscribe to *Transnational Perspectives.* It has an important political content based on feature articles from an international selection of authors, as well as topical information from the journal's United Nations editors, book reviews, announcements of international meetings and conferences, etc.

Our autumn 1976 **special double issue,** for example, focuses on the New International Economic Order and in particular on the RIO report (Reshaping the International Order) which has just been presented to the Club of Rome. Included in this issue are the following:

- An interview with *Professor Jan Tinbergen,* Nobel Prize winner for economics and coordinator, RIO project
- An article by *Dr. Johan Galtung,* professor of conflict and peace research at the University of Oslo, on "Decision making for development"
- Review of the report to the Club of Rome on *"RIO"*
- An interview with the *Jamaican permanent ambassador* to the UN on "Third World unity"
- A view from *Romania:* "Implementing self-reliance"
- *Dr. Ervin Laszlo,* fellow of the UN Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) and project director for Goals for a Global Society, talks about "From crisis prevention to positive goals"

Transnational Perspectives is published four times a year by the World Association of World Federalists and the World Federalist Youth. A subscription costs you U.S. $5.00 per year or (for youth/students) U.S. $3.00 per year. Membership in either federalist organization entitles you to a subscription to our journal.

Subscribe now: Write to *Transnational Perspectives,* Leliegracht 21, Amsterdam-C, The Netherlands. Information on becoming a member of the world federalist movement is obtainable at the same address.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Spring/Summer 1976 **Volume 30, No. 1**

POLITICAL ECONOMY: EUROPE AND THE U.S.

WORLD TRADE: STABLE OR UNSTABLE? — Harald B. Malmgren
MAJOR ISSUES OF WORLD MONETARY REFORM — Benjamin J. Cohen
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF U.S.-EUROPEAN RELATIONS — Theodore Moran
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY MANAGEMENT — Joan E. Spero
THE U.S. AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: THE CHANGING POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONTEXT OF TRADE RELATIONS — Steven J. Warnecke
THE IMPACT OF THE OIL AND MONETARY CRISES ON THE EUROPEAN AND ATLANTIC SYSTEMS — Wilfred L. Kohl
A VIEW FROM A DIFFERENT BRIDGE: POLITICAL ECONOMY OF OIL—A GLOBAL ANALYSIS — Manoucher Parvin
BOOK REVIEWS

Announcing: THE INTEGRATION OF WOMEN IN DEVELOPMENT, the Fall/Winter issue. Articles by Margaret Mead, Adrienne Germain, Fredrica Santos and others

Subscriptions: Single current issue $3.00; single back issue $3.00; one year $6.00; two years $11.00; three years $16.00; outside U.S. and Canada, add 50 cents per issue for postage and handling.

School of International Affairs, Columbia University
420 West 118th Street
New York, New York 10027

RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DI SCIENZE ECONOMICHE E COMMERCIALI

Anno XXIII — Settembre 1976 — No. 9

SOMMARIO

Cittadini della gleba

Information Base for Corporate Planning, D. A. SAVAGE

Marketing: An Area of Value, LELAND L. BEIK and WARREN A. FRENCH

Italian Managers Compared with Managers from Elsewhere in Europe, BERNARD M. BASS

Soviet-U.S. Trade: Perspectives and Prospects, OLEG ZINAM

A Note on the Microfoundations of Macroeconomics: The Contribution of Philip H. Wicksteed, ROGER E. MEINERS and LAWRENCE S. DAVIDSON

Il tempo nella riduzione del valore in prezzi, TULLIO BAGIOTTI

The Lagging Tourism Indicator Is Leading, BRUCE C. COHEN and GUSTAV SCHACHTER

RECENSIONI (BOOK REVIEWS)

Articles in English, Italian and French. Summaries in English and French. RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE is a monthly, published since 1954 under the auspices of Bocconi University, Milan. Editorial and administrative offices: Via P. Teuliè 1, 20136 Milan, Italy. Annual subscription: L 23,000. Back issues available.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A good way to keep informed about European and world affairs is to read regularly the journal of the German Society for Foreign Affairs:

EUROPA-ARCHIV

Zeitschrift für internationale Politik

Begründet von Wilhelm Cornides

EUROPA-ARCHIV, now in its thirty-first year of publication, contains articles and documents on international relations and a current chronology of world events as well as a monthly bibliography of recent publications in the field of international relations.

Articles in recent issues:

Jerome L. Heldring	**Die innenpolitischen Hintergründe der niederländischen Aussenpolitik**
Dieter Braun	**Wandel der Machtverhältnisse in der Region Indischer Ozean**
Harald H. Bungarten	**Europäische Umweltpolitik**
Arnold Hottinger	**Spanien ein Jahr nach Franco**
Josef Füllenbach	**Multilaterale Ost-West-Zusammenarbeit auf dem Gebiet des Umweltschutzes in Europa**

Annual subscription (24 issues): DM 115.—plus postage

Specimen copies on request

VERLAG FÜR INTERNATIONALE POLITIK GmbH

5300 Bonn - Stockenstrasse 1-5

ÖSTERREICHISCHE
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR
AUSSENPOLITIK

keeps you informed on Austrian foreign policy and international relations

Issue No. 3/1976 contained:

Andreas A. Khol, Der Rat für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten im aussenpolitischen Entscheidungsprozess

Documents, Speech delivered by the Federal Chancellor, Bruno Kreisky, at the Council of Europe

Chronicle on Austrian foreign policy

Book reviews

Annual subscription $20.00—six copies a year

Published by:

ÖSTERREICHISCHE GESELLSCHAFT FÜR AUSSENPOLITIK UND INTERNATIONALE BEZIEHUNGEN

A-1010 VIENNA, JOSEFSPLATZ 6, AUSTRIA

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The study of the interpenetration of economic, social, military, and political factors within the Third World.

Featuring articles on militarism in the Third World, dependency and development, planning and bureaucracy, developmental politics, class and stratification, rural-urban dichotomies, and developmental economics.

Outstanding Contributors in 1976:

Liisa North, Cynthia H. Enloe, Karen L. Remmer, Ronald H. Chilcote, William T. Levine, R. Kenneth Godwin, David M. Landry, Peter Simmons, Susan Eckstein, Immanuel Wallerstein, Sergio Roca.

Forthcoming in 1977:

Nadia H. Youssef, *Women and Agricultural Production in Muslim Societies*
Robert Bee and Ronald Gingerich, *Colonialism, Classes and Ethnic Identity: Native Americans and the National Political Economy*
Susan Aurelia Gitelson, *Foreign Policy Options for Small States: Kenya and Tanzania*
Howard J. Wiarda, *Corporative Origins of the Iberian and Latin American Labor Relations Systems*
Hyman Rodman, *Affluence, Poverty and the Family's Future: The Case of Trinidad*
Richard Robinson, *Dependence, Government Revenue and Economic Growth: A Cross National Analysis*
Swee-Hin Toh, *Canada's Gain from the Third World Brain Drain*

Published three times annually at Rutgers University.
Subscription Rates: $15 per volume year. $25 for two years. $35 for three years. $10 student rate per year. Foreign. $1.50 per year extra.

Mail prepaid orders to

STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Transaction Periodicals Consortium
Rutgers University
New Brunswick, N.J. 08903

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

William R. Kintner, President

Recent Monographs

No. 15. *Security Through World Law and World Government: Myth or Reality?* By James E. Dougherty. $3.50. 1974.

No. 17. *The Lin Piao Affair.* By Tai Sung An. $3.50. 1974.

No. 18. *The Eurogroup and NATO.* By William C. Cromwell. $4.00. 1974.

No. 19. *SALT II and the Search for Strategic Equivalence.* By Jacquelyn K. Davis, Christopher M. Lehman and Nils H. Wessell. $4.00. 1975.

No. 20. *The Conventional-Revisionist Controversy and the U.S. Role in World Affairs.* By Farid G. Lavipour, Robert G. Meadow and Alan N. Sabrosky. $4.00. 1975.

No. 21. *Overseas Investment and Political Risk.* By Dan Haendel and Gerald T. West with Robert G. Meadow. $4.00. 1975.

Special Report

The Measurement of Political Risk and Foreign Investment Strategy: A Summary Report. Edited by Dan Haendel, Robert G. Meadow and Gerald T. West. $10.00. 1975.

Recent Books

Strategy and Values: Selected Writings of Robert Strausz-Hupé. Edited by William R. Kintner and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, D. C. Heath and Company, 1974. 127 pp. $13.00.

China & Pakistan: Diplomacy of an Entente Cordiale. By Anwar H. Syed. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1974. 224 pp. $12.50 (paper, $5.00).

Technology and International Politics: The Crisis of Wishing. By William R. Kintner and Harvey Sicherman. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, D.C. Heath and Company, 1975. 164 pp. $14.00.

India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the Major Powers: Politics of a Divided Subcontinent. By Golam W. Choudhury. New York: The Free Press, Macmillan Publishing Co., 1975. 260 pp. $13.95.

Copies of Institute monographs may be obtained from the Foreign Policy Research Institute, 3508 Market Street, Suite 350, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104. Institute books may be obtained from the publisher.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
MONOGRAPH SERIES

Overseas Investment and Political Risk

Dan Haendel and
Gerald T. West
with Robert G. Meadow

The need for accurate assessment of political risk is increasing daily. Yet theorists, government leaders and corporate decision-makers agree that present knowledge and analytical techniques are inadequate. This monograph makes a significant contribution toward correcting this situation.

The authors examine the numerous factors that make estimation of political risk so complex and clarify the conceptual confusion that plagues discussion. Most important, they outline a strategy for the development of better analytical tools and develop an empirical, indicator-based measure of political system stability in sixty-five developing nations.

The Eurogroup and NATO

William C. Cromwell

Examines the history, problems and prospects of Eurogroup—ten West European states informally assembled for the avowed purpose of sharpening the teeth of NATO by honing the effectiveness of Europe's contribution.

SALT II and the Search for Strategic Equivalence

Jacquelyn K. Davis
Christopher M. Lehman
Nils H. Wessell

This carefully reasoned analysis traces the strategic arms limitation talks through the key agreements at Vladivostok in November 1974. The authors explore why each nation entered into SALT, what it hopes to gain and how, and what accords might result.

☐ Please send me _____ copies of *Overseas Investment and Political Risk* at $4 each.

☐ Please send me _____ copies of *The Eurogroup and NATO* at $4 each.

☐ Please send me _____ copies of *SALT II and the Search for Strategic Equivalence* at $4 each.

☐ Payment enclosed for $_____

NAME ADDRESS

CITY STATE ZIP

FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, 3508 MARKET ST., SCIENCE CENTER, PHILA., PA. 19104

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE INTERCOLLEGIATE REVIEW

A journal of scholarship and opinion publishing articles in the fields of philosophy, political science, economics, literature and social criticism. THE INTERCOLLEGIATE REVIEW is made available free of charge to faculty and students four times during the academic year by the Intercollegiate Studies Institute. Subscriptions are invited from those outside the academic community: one year, five dollars; two years, nine dollars; three years, twelve dollars. Subscriptions and inquiries should be addressed to: ISI, 14 South Bryn Mawr Avenue, Bryn Mawr, Pa. 19010.

Contributors to recent issues:

Hanson Baldwin, Louis I. Bredvold, Goetz Briefs, Yale Brozen, George Carey, John Davenport, Roger Freeman, Henry Hazlitt, Will Herberg, Russell Kirk, Thomas Molnar, Gerhart Niemeyer, Robert Nisbet, Stefan T. Possony, Peter Stanlis, Frank N. Trager, Stephen Tonsor, Ernest van den Haag, Eliseo Vivas, Robert Penn Warren, Francis G. Wilson, Donald Atwell Zoll

Contributors to previous issues:

Raymond Aron, William Bark, Andre Beaufre, Karl Brandt, Colin Clark, Donald Davidson, Lev E. Dobriansky, M. Stanton Evans, Lawrence H. Gipson, Otto von Habsburg, Arthur Kemp, Willmoore Kendall, William R. Kintner, Wm. Oliver Martin, Ludwig von Mises, Leo Strauss, Robert Strausz-Hupé, Eric Voegelin, Richard M. Weaver, Simon N. Whitney, Frederick Wilhelmsen, David McCord Wright

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

INDEX TO VOLUME 20

Afghan-Pakistani relations, see Tahir-Kheli
The African Dimension of Indian Ocean Policy, by Chester A. Crocker, 637-667
Albert, Bernard S., Constructive Counterpower, 343-366
America in a Revolutionary World, by Norman D. Palmer, 43-60
American Foreign Policy: Values Renewed or Discovered, by Kenneth W. Thompson, 123-135
The American Idea and the Western Hemisphere: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, by Arthur P. Whitaker, 161-177
Andemicael, Berhanykun, *The OAU and the UN: Relations Between the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations.* Reviewed by Richard E. Bissell, 537-540
Anderson, Frederic M., Weapons Procurement Collaboration: A New Era for NATO?, 965-990
Angola, see Crocker, Ebinger
Arab-Israeli conflict, see Rosen and Indyk
arms race, see Albert, Lehman and Hughes
Auton, Graeme P., Nuclear Deterrence and the Medium Power: A Proposal for Doctrinal Change in the British and French Cases, 367-399

Bacchus, William I., *Foreign Policy and the Bureaucratic Process: The State Department's Country Director System.* Reviewed by Roy M. Melbourne, 533-537
Bare, C. Gordon, Burden-Sharing in NATO: The Economics of Alliance, 417-436
Bax, Frans R., The Legislative-Executive Relationship in Foreign Policy: New Partnership or New Competition?, 881-904
Bissell, Richard E., Review of *The OAU and the UN: Relations Between the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations,* 537-540
Bozeman, Adda B., War and the Clash of Ideas, 61-102
Britain, see Auton
British/French deterrence doctrine, see Auton
Brunner, Karl, The New International Economic Order: A Chapter in a Protracted Confrontation, 103-121
Buchan, Alastair, Tomorrow's America, 27-42
Buckley, Peter J., and Mark Casson, *The Future of the Multinational Enterprise.* Reviewed by Werner J. Feld, 805-811
Burden-Sharing in NATO: The Economics of Alliance, by C. Gordon Bare, 417-436

Cabindan enclave, see Ebinger
Casson, Mark, and Peter J. Buckley, *The Future of the Multinational Enterprise.* Reviewed by Werner J. Feld, 805-811
CBS-TV Evening News, see Lefever
Changing Power Relations Between the Middle East and South Asia, by Howard Wriggins, 785-803
China Revisited, by G. W. Choudhury, 601-612
China's "World View," see Romance
Chinese policy toward the Third World, see Romance
Choudhury, G. W., China Revisited, 601-612
Claude, Inis L. Jr., Prospects for an American Renewal, 137-146
Cohen, Saul B., Geopolitical Bases for the Integration of Jerusalem, 287-313
COMECON and Rumania, see Socor
communications, see Lefever, Sussman
Constructive Counterpower, by Bernard S. Albert, 343-366
The Content of European Détente, by Gregory A. Flynn, 401-416
Controlling Multinational Enterprises: Problems, Strategies, Counterstrategies, edited by Karl P. Sauvant and Farid G. Lavipour. Reviewed by Werner J. Feld, 805-811
"correlation of world forces," see Deane
Crocker, Chester A., The African Dimension of Indian Ocean Policy, 637-667
CSCE, see Flynn, Socor
Curry, Dean C., Review of *Human Behavior and World Politics,* 529-533

Deane, Michael J., The Soviet Assessment of the "Correlation of World Forces": Implications for American Foreign Policy, 625-636
detente, see Buchan, Flynn, Sicherman and Sabrosky
Dunn, Lewis A., and William H. Overholt, The Next Phase in Nuclear Proliferation Research, 497-524

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Ebinger, Charles K., External Intervention in Internal War: The Politics and Diplomacy of the Angolan Civil War, 669-699
economics of alliance, *see* Bare
The Efficacy of Technique: "Protracted Conflict" Revisited, by Harvey Sicherman and Alan Ned Sabrosky, 1085-1102
energy development, *see* Ichord
equality among nations, *see* Humphrey
"Equivalence" and SALT II, by Christopher M. Lehman and Peter C. Hughes, 1045-1054
European Community, *see* Buchan
European detente, *see* Flynn
European security and Rumania, *see* Socor
executive agreements, *see* Stevens
The Executive, Congress, and Foreign Policy: Studies of the Nixon Administration, by John F. Lehman. Reviewed by Harvey Sicherman, 811-814
External Intervention in Internal War: The Politics and Diplomacy of the Angolan Civil War, by Charles K. Ebinger, 669-699

Feld, Werner J., Review of *The Future of the Multinational Enterprise* and *Controlling Multinational Enterprises: Problems, Strategies, Counterstrategies*, 805-811
Flynn, Gregory A., The Content of European Détente, 401-416
foreign assistance, *see* Louscher
foreign military sales, *see* Louscher
Foreign Policy and the Bureaucratic Process: The State Department's Country Director System, by William I. Bacchus. Reviewed by Roy M. Melbourne, 533-537
The Foreign Policy of "New" Pakistan, by Shirin Tahir-Kheli, 733-759
foreign policy values, *see* Claude, Thompson
The Founding Fathers and Foreign Policy: Implications for the Late Twentieth Century, by Hans J. Morgenthau, 15-25
France, *see* Auton
Francis, Michael J., United States Policy Toward Latin America: An Immoderate Proposal, 991-1006
The Future of the Multinational Enterprise, by Peter J. Buckley and Mark Casson. Reviewed by Werner J. Feld, 805-811

Gann, Lewis H., Review of *The "Tar Baby" Option: American Policy Towards Southern Rhodesia*, 525-529
Geopolitical Bases for the Integration of Jerusalem, by Saul B. Cohen, 287-313

Haemmerli, Alice B., International Norm-Creation for a Divided Society: A Reappraisal of Some Perennial Problems, 315-341
Hughes, Peter C., and Christopher M. Lehman, "Equivalence" and SALT II, 1045-1054
Human Behavior and World Politics, by Ralph Pettman. Reviewed by Dean C. Curry, 529-533
Humphrey, Don D., The Idea (or Fiction) of Equality Among Men and Nations, 227-251

Ichord, Robert F. Jr., Pacific Basin Energy Development and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1025-1044
The Idea (or Fiction) of Equality Among Men and Nations, by Don D. Humphrey, 227-251
Indian Ocean, *see* Crocker, Tahir-Kheli
Indonesia, *see* van der Kroef
Indo-Pakistani relations, *see* Tahir-Kheli
Indyk, Martin, and Steven J. Rosen, The Temptation to Pre-empt in a Fifth Arab-Israeli War, 265-285
International Norm-Creation for a Divided Society: A Reappraisal of Some Perennial Problems, by Alice B. Haemmerli, 315-341
international system, *see* Buchan, Thompson
Iran and India, *see* Tahir-Kheli
Iran and South Asia, *see* Wriggins
Israel, *see* Cohen, Rosen and Indyk
Israeli pre-emption, *see* Rosen and Indyk

Japan, *see* Park
Japan's Perspectives and Expectations Regarding America's Role in Korea, by Yung H. Park, 761-784
Jerusalem, *see* Cohen
Johnston, Whittle, Radical Revisionism and the Disintegration of the American Foreign Policy Consensus, 179-205

Khoman, Thanat, The New Equation of World Power and Its Impact on Southeast Asia, 613-623
Korea, *see* Park

Lake, Anthony, *The "Tar Baby" Option: American Policy Towards Southern Rhodesia*. Reviewed by Lewis H. Gann, 525-529
Lavipour, Farid G., and Karl P. Sauvant, editors, *Controlling Multinational Enterprises: Problems, Strategies, Counterstrategies*. Reviewed by Werner J. Feld, 805-811
law of the sea, *see* Romance

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Lefever, Ernest W., The Prestige Press, Foreign Policy, and American Survival, 207-225
The Legislative-Executive Relationship in Foreign Policy: New Partnership or New Competition?, by Frans R. Bax, 881-904
Lehman, Christopher M., and Peter C. Hughes, "Equivalence" and SALT II, 1045-1054
Lehman, John F., *The Executive, Congress, and Foreign Policy: Studies of the Nixon Administration*. Reviewed by Harvey Sicherman, 811-814
Liberal Communism in Western Europe?, by Richard Pipes, 595-600
The Limits of National Independence in the Soviet Bloc: Rumania's Foreign Policy Reconsidered, by Vladimir Socor, 701-732
Liss, Peggy K., The Significance of the American Revolution for United States-Spanish American Relations, 147-159
Louscher, David J., The Rise of Military Sales as a U.S. Foreign Assistance Instrument, 933-964

Maechling, Charles Jr., The Panama Canal: A Fresh Start, 1007-1024
The "March" Through the World's Mass Media, by Leonard R. Sussman, 857-880
mass media, *see* Lefever, Sussman
MBFR, *see* Flynn
Melbourne, Roy M., Review of *Foreign Policy and the Bureaucratic Process: The State Department's Country Director System*, 533-537
Middle East and South Asia, *see* Wriggins
The Moral Purposes and Philosophical Bases of American Foreign Policy, by Paul Seabury, 3-14
Morgenthau, Hans J., The Founding Fathers and Foreign Policy: Implications for the Late Twentieth Century, 15-25
multinational enterprises, *see* Feld

National Security, Defense Strategy and Foreign Policy Perceptions in Indonesia, by Justus M. van der Kroef, 461-495
NATO, *see* Anderson, Bare
naval expansion by PRC, *see* Romance
The New Equation of World Power and Its Impact on Southeast Asia, by Thanat Khoman, 613-623
The New International Economic Order: A Chapter in a Protracted Confrontation, by Karl Brunner, 103-121
The Next Phase in Nuclear Proliferation Research, by Lewis A. Dunn and William H. Overholt, 497-524
Nuclear Deterrence and the Medium Power: A Proposal for Doctrinal Change in the British and French Cases, by Graeme P. Auton, 367-399
nuclear proliferation research, *see* Dunn and Overholt

The OAU and the UN: Relations Between the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations, by Berhanykun Andemicael. Reviewed by Richard E. Bissell, 537-540
oil and the new power balance, *see* Wriggins
Overholt, William H., and Lewis A. Dunn, The Next Phase in Nuclear Proliferation Research, 497-524

Pacific Basin Energy Development and U.S. Foreign Policy, by Robert F. Ichord, Jr., 1025-1044
Pakistan, *see* Tahir-Kheli
Palmer, Norman D., America in a Revolutionary World, 43-60
The Panama Canal: A Fresh Start, by Charles Maechling, Jr., 1007-1024
Park, Yung H., Japan's Perspectives and Expectations Regarding America's Role in Korea, 761-784
Peking's Counter-Encirclement Strategy: The Maritime Element, by Francis J. Romance, 437-459
Pettman, Ralph, *Human Behavior and World Politics*. Reviewed by Dean C. Curry, 529-533
Pipes, Richard, Liberal Communism in Western Europe?, 595-600
Poland Between the Superpowers: Three Decades of Foreign Policy, by Arthur R. Rachwald, 1055-1084
Portugal, *see* Ebinger
The Prestige Press, Foreign Policy, and American Survival, by Ernest W. Lefever, 207-225
Prospects for an American Renewal, by Inis L. Claude, Jr., 137-146
Protracted Conflict, *see* Sicherman and Sabrosky

Rachwald, Arthur R., Poland Between the Superpowers: Three Decades of Foreign Policy, 1055-1084
Radical Revisionism and the Disintegration of the American Foreign Policy Consensus, by Whittle Johnston, 179-205
revisionism, realist and radical, *see* Johnston
The Rise of Military Sales as a U.S. Foreign Assistance Instrument, by David J. Louscher, 933-964

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Romance, Francis J., Peking's Counter-Encirclement Strategy: The Maritime Element, 437-459
Rosen, Steven J., and Martin Indyk, The Temptation to Pre-empt in a Fifth Arab-Israeli War, 265-285
Rumanian-Soviet bloc relations, *see* Socor
Rummel, R. J., Will the Soviet Union Soon Have a First-Strike Capability?, 579-594

Sabrosky, Alan Ned, and Harvey Sicherman, The Efficacy of Technique: "Protracted Conflict" Revisited, 1085-1102
SALT II, *see* Lehman and Hughes
Sauvant, Karl P., and Farid G. Lavipour, editors, *Controlling Multinational Enterprises: Problems, Strategies, Counterstrategies*. Reviewed by Werner J. Feld, 805-811
Seabury, Paul, The Moral Purposes and Philosophical Bases of American Foreign Policy, 3-14
Seabury, Paul, Thoughts on a New Foreign Policy Agenda, 565-578
Sicherman, Harvey, Review of *The Executive, Congress, and Foreign Policy: Studies of the Nixon Administration*, 811-814
Sicherman, Harvey, and Alan Ned Sabrosky, The Efficacy of Technique: "Protracted Conflict" Revisited, 1085-1102
The Significance of the American Revolution for United States-Spanish American Relations, by Peggy K. Liss, 147-159
Sino-American relations, *see* Choudhury
Sino-Pakistani relations, *see* Tahir-Kheli
Sino-Soviet relations, *see* Romance
Sino-Soviet rivalry, *see* Khoman, Tahir-Kheli
Socor, Vladimir, The Limits of National Independence in the Soviet Bloc: Rumania's Foreign Policy Reconsidered, 701-732
South Africa, *see* Ebinger
South Asia, *see* Wriggins
Southeast Asia, *see* Khoman
Soviet African policy, *see* Crocker
Soviet-American relations, *see* Rummel
The Soviet Assessment of the "Correlation of World Forces": Implications for American Foreign Policy, by Michael J. Deane, 625-636
Soviet first-strike capability, *see* Rummel
Stevens, Charles J., The Use and Control of Executive Agreements: Recent Congressional Initiatives, 905-932
strategic options, *see* Albert, Lehman and Hughes, Rummel
Sussman, Leonard R., The "March" Through the World's Mass Media, 857-880

Tahir-Kheli, Shirin, The Foreign Policy of "New" Pakistan, 733-759
Taiwan, *see* Choudhury
The "Tar Baby" Option: American Policy Towards Southern Rhodesia, by Anthony Lake. Reviewed by Lewis H. Gann, 525-529
The Temptation to Pre-empt in a Fifth Arab-Israeli War, by Steven J. Rosen and Martin Indyk, 265-285
Thailand, *see* Khoman
Third World, *see* Brunner, Romance, Sussman, Thompson
Thompson, Kenneth W., American Foreign Policy: Values Renewed or Discovered, 123-135
Thompson, W. Scott, Toward a Communist International System, 841-856
Thoughts on a New Foreign Policy Agenda, by Paul Seabury, 565-578
Tomorrow's America, by Alastair Buchan, 27-42
Toward a Communist International System, by W. Scott Thompson, 841-856

UNESCO conference, *see* Sussman
United Nations, *see* Haemmerli, Sussman
United States Policy Toward Latin America: An Immoderate Proposal, by Michael J. Francis, 991-1006
The Use and Control of Executive Agreements: Recent Congressional Initiatives, by Charles J. Stevens, 905-932
U.S. foreign policy, *see* Bax, Deane, Francis, Ichord, Lefever, Louscher, Maechling, Morgenthau, Park, Seabury, Stevens, Thompson
U.S.-Latin American relations, *see* Francis, Liss, Maechling, Whitaker

van der Kroef, Justus M., National Security, Defense Strategy and Foreign Policy Perceptions in Indonesia, 461-495

War and the Clash of Ideas, by Adda B. Bozeman, 61-102
Weapons Procurement Collaboration: A New Era for NATO?, by Frederic M. Anderson, 965-990
West European communism, *see* Pipes
Whitaker, Arthur P., The American Idea and the Western Hemisphere: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, 161-177
Will the Soviet Union Soon Have a First-Strike Capability?, by R. J. Rummel, 579-594
Wriggins, Howard, Changing Power Relations Between the Middle East and South Asia, 785-803

Zaire, *see* Ebinger
Zambia, *see* Ebinger

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

STATEMENT OF OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT AND CIRCULATION (Act of August 12, 1970: Section 3685, Title 39, United States Code)

1. *Title of Publication:* ORBIS.

2. *Date of Filing:* September 29, 1976.

3. *Frequency:* Quarterly.
A. No. of Issues Published Annually: 4.
B. Annual Subscription Price: $12.00.

4. *Location of Known Office of Publication:* 3508 Market St., Suite 350, Philadelphia, PA 19104.

5. *Location of the Headquarters or General Business Offices of the Publishers:* 3508 Market St., Suite 350, Philadelphia, PA 19104.

6. *Names and Complete Addresses of Publisher, Editor, and Managing Editor:*
Publisher: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 3508 Market St., Suite 350, Philadelphia, PA 19104.
Editor: William R. Kintner, 3508 Market St., Suite 350, Philadelphia, PA 19104.
Managing Editor: Richard E. Bissell, 3508 Market St., Suite 350, Philadelphia, PA 19104.

7. *Owner:* (If owned by a corporation, its name and address must be stated and also immediately thereunder the names and addresses of stockholders owning or holding 1 percent or more of total amount of stock. If not owned by a corporation, the names and addresses of the individual owners must be given. If owned by a partnership or other unincorporated firm, its name and address, as well as that of each individual must be given.) ORBIS is owned and copyrighted by the Foreign Policy Research Institute, 3508 Market St., Suite 350, Philadelphia, PA 19104.

8. *Known Bondholders, Mortgagees, and Other Security Holders Owning or Holding 1 Percent or More of Total Amount of Bonds, Mortgages or Other Securities: None.*

9. *For Completion by Nonprofit Organizations Authorized to Mail at Special Rates* (Section 132.122, PSM): The purpose, function, and nonprofit status of this organization and the exempt status for Federal income tax purposes have not changed during preceding 12 months.

10. *Extent and Nature of Circulation:*

	Average No. Copies Each Issue During Preceding 12 Months	Actual No. Copies of Single Issue Published Nearest to Filing Date
A. Total No. Copies Printed (Net Press Run)	4541	3600
B. Paid Circulation		
1. Sales through Dealers and Carriers, Street Vendors and Counter Sales	145	169
2. Mail Subscriptions	3367	3006
C. Total Paid Circulation	3512	3175
D. Free Distribution by Mail, Carrier or Other Means (Samples, Complimentary, and Other Free Copies)	292	231
E. Total Distribution (Sum of C and D)	3804	3406
F. Copies Not Distributed		
1. Office Use, Left-over, Unaccounted, Spoiled After Printing	737	194
2. Returns from News Agents	0	0
G. Total (Sum of E, F1 and 2 — should equal net press run shown in A)	4541	3600

11. *I certify that the statements made by me above are correct and complete.*

Richard E. Bissell

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

12. *For Completion by Publishers Mailing at the Regular Rates* (Section 132.121, Postal Service Manual): 39 U.S.C. 3626 provides in pertinent part: "No person who would have been entitled to mail matter under former section 4359 of this title shall mail such matter at the rates provided under this subsection unless he files annually with the Postal Service a written request for permission to mail matter at such rates." In accordance with the provisions of this statute, I hereby request permission to mail the publication named in Item 1 at the phased postage rates presently authorized by 39 U.S.C. 3626.

Richard E. Bissell

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Indexes. ORBIS is indexed by *Public Affairs Information Service, Social Sciences Index, Current Contents, Behavioral, Social & Management Sciences* and *ABC Pol Sci.* Abstracts of ORBIS articles appear regularly in *Historical Abstracts* and *America: History and Life,* both of which are publications of the American Bibliographical Center, as well as in *International Political Science Abstracts,* published in Paris by the International Political Science Association. ORBIS is abstracted and indexed in *United States Political Science Documents,* University Center for International Studies, University of Pittsburgh.

Microfilm and Microfiche. ORBIS is available to subscribers on space-saving microfilm and microfiche. As begun with Volume 7 (the Spring 1963-Winter 1964 issues) for microfilm, and Volume 1 (1957-1958) for microfiche, each volume of ORBIS is recorded separately and is obtainable at the end of the volume year. A complete backfile of microfilm, Volumes 1-6, is on one reel, priced at $24.00. Please address inquiries direct to distributors. *For microfilm:* University Microfilms, Inc., P.O. Box 1307, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106. *For microfiche:* Johnson Associates, P.O. Box 1017, Greenwich, Connecticut 06830.

Reprint Editions. Back issues of ORBIS, Vols. 1-15, are available from the Kraus Reprint Company, Route 100, Millwood, N.Y. 10546, at $574.00 for the fifteen volumes, clothbound, or $484.00 paperbound. Kraus per-volume prices (paperbound) are as follows: Vols. 1-5, $21.00 each; Vol. 6, $35.00; Vols. 7-9, $48.00 each; Vol. 10, $62.00; Vol. 11, $16.00; Vols. 12-13, $32.00 each; Vol. 14, $16.00; Vol. 15, $42.00. From Vol. 16 on, single issues and complete volumes are obtainable by writing to the ORBIS Circulation Manager. Prices for complete volumes are at the yearly subscription rate of $12.00 for individuals or $16.00 for institutions. Single copies are $4.00. Reprints of articles published in ORBIS, as long as they are available, are $0.50 each.

Design: William B. Bird

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED